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
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
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SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS



RUSSIA AND HER COLONIES

RUSSIA AND HER COLONIES

BY

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LONDON

GEORGE PHILIP AND SON LIMITED

30-32 FLEET STREET LONDON EC4

1952

By the same author:

MYTHS AND REALITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

First Edition

June 1952

Second Edition

November 1952

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

The word 'colonies' is employed in this book as a common denominator for a large number of territories which enjoy either legally or factually a special status within Soviet Russia. 'Colonies' are first of all those ethnically non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R. which, although not separated from the metropolitan country by sea, have a status similar to that of the overseas dependencies of any other power. These Russian colonies are situated in Asia, on the fringes of Europe and Asia and in the Far North.

The term 'colonies' is also extended to European countries or countries of predominantly European culture like the Ukraine, the Baltic States, Georgia or Armenia which have been reduced to colonial status by enforced dependence on the Moscow Government. Finally, as an exception rather than as a rule, the word 'colonies' is also used in its original sense for areas of settlement, mostly in reference to the colonization by Slavs of practically uninhabited territories.

No Soviet writer would speak of 'colonies' or of 'colonial policy' when describing the relationship between Moscow and the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. He would refer to *natsionalnaya politika* which is usually translated into English as 'nationalities policy'. This book uses 'nationalities policy' and 'colonial policy' in roughly the same sense. This does not mean that 'nationality' and 'colony' are identical. A colony is a territory and a nationality an ethnic group. Two or more nationalities may form part of one colony. In Soviet Russia itself two contradictory definitions of the word 'nationality' have been advanced. Some Marxist-Leninist theoreticians have maintained that a 'nationality' is on a lower level of development than a 'nation'. According to this explanation the Ukrainians, for instance, would be a 'nation' and the peoples of Daghestan only 'nationalities'. In the day-to-day work of the All-Union Communist Party and of the Soviet Government this distinction is not recognized and all non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union are identified as 'nationalities'.

The colonial problem of Russia cannot be viewed in isolation from the colonial problem presenting itself in other parts of the globe, for the struggle for the fulfilment of national aspirations among the colonial

PREFACE

peoples has proceeded everywhere on a similar pattern. This struggle can be observed more easily in British, French or American colonies or ex-colonies than in the non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R. which are cut off from almost every contact with the non-communist world. Four lessons may be drawn from the general trend in the colonial territories outside the Soviet Union.

First, the more advanced dependent peoples will appreciate material achievements only if such go hand-in-hand with political progress, i.e. if the colonial power encourages the growth of self-government.

Secondly, the peoples of the colonial territories in order to fulfil their national aspirations create political movements and ideologies corresponding to their own national and tribal traditions and different from those of their European colonizers.

Thirdly, national aspirations can be properly defined only if the colonies enjoy at least a certain measure of democracy and freedom of discussion. This implies the coexistence within one colony of various political groups with diverging views about the way in which to advance their development towards self-government and national independence.

Fourthly, recognition of self-government as a desirable political aim on the part of a progressive colonial power does not mean unlimited recognition of all national aspirations of a colonial people. National aspirations cease to be 'legitimate' if they aim at the oppression of ethnic and religious minority groups and if the colonial power has the obligation to protect these.

If one admits that the essence of a modern colonial policy lies in the encouragement of self-government, then every colonial system, including the so-called 'Soviet nationalities policy', must be judged on the basis of this fourfold standard.

I have therefore concentrated in this book on the question of the extent to which the government of the U.S.S.R. has assisted or hampered the legitimate national aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Empire. This does not mean that I seek to belittle or to deny any of the material achievements carried out by the Soviet Government in territories inhabited by non-Russian nationalities. I take them for granted as the basis of discussion. My contention is, however, that the essence of a colonial policy and of the political system of which it is a part cannot be estimated by reference solely to material achievements. The Dnieper Dam no more indicates that the Ukrainian problem has been solved than Hitler's motor highways indicated any virtue in German Nazism. The Main Turkmenian Canal will be no more proof of the success of Soviet colonial policy than the Trans-Siberian Railway line is proof of the success of the Czarist régime.

My original plan was to describe the working of Soviet colonial policy throughout the U.S.S.R. Practical difficulties have compelled

PREFACE

me to leave out of account the Soviet colonial territories on the Pacific coast and in Eastern Siberia. These Far Eastern territories, bordering on China, Japan and the United States of America, form a special geopolitical entity and I intend to write a separate book on them. I have made an exception in the case of the Autonomous Province of Birobidzhan which as an area of Jewish settlement is given its natural place in the chapter 'The Jews – a people of the Soviet Union'.

The problems connected with Soviet colonial policy are so vast that I have had to limit my subject in a further direction also. In dealing at greater or lesser length with some forty Soviet colonies one cannot hope to tell the full story. One can but give examples and mention the most typical features in the development of a given nationality while omitting or summarizing the secondary aspects of it. It may appear that I have done less than justice in this book to the Baltic peoples. Indeed, I have dealt with them only very briefly because events in the Baltic States have been a repetition of what happened earlier in other parts of the Soviet Empire. It seemed best to pay greater attention to those earlier events than to the repetition of them.

A word must be said about the sources used. I have employed as a rule only Soviet sources, primarily newspapers, journals, textbooks and broadcasts, and also novels, plays and poetry. With insignificant exceptions, I have refrained from using any other material which might have bearing on my subject. In particular, I have avoided the very large Russian émigré literature, statements by refugees from the Soviet Union, reports by non-communist foreigners of their experiences in Soviet Russia and news items published under a Moscow dateline in the press of Western countries.

Thus, as the book is based not on the testimonies of critics of the Soviet régime but on evidence emanating from the régime itself, several important factors pertaining to Soviet colonial policy have not been taken into consideration. Among these is the forced-labour system to which the reader will find only passing references. The use of Soviet sources, which to be more precise are mostly Soviet sources in the Russian language, has also affected the spelling of non-Russian names. Except for well-known personalities and places I have transcribed these names from the Russian. I have even used the official Russianized forms, for instance, Ibragimov instead of Ibrahim. This may be irritating for Orientalists but it is symbolic of the Russian preponderance in the U.S.S.R.

I am indebted to Mr. J. B. Birks, Miss Dorothy Davies and Miss Marjorie Nicholson for many valuable suggestions. Thanks are also due to Dr. W. A. Morison for translations of Russian poetry and to Mrs. Nancy Feeny for compiling the index.

WALTER KOLARZ

CONTENTS

PREFACE	<i>page v</i>
<i>Chapter I</i> RUSSIAN COLONIZATION AND SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY The essence of Russian expansion Russia's two histories Russian anti-racialism The Russian character of the October Revolution The Russian character of the Bolshevik Party Russian colonization under the Soviet régime Local nationalism Constitutional federalism Soviet Budgetary centralism The 'Soviet of Nationalities' Fallacies of Soviet statistics	1
<i>Chapter II</i> INNER RUSSIA Borderland Russia and Inner Russia	31
I THE TARTARS – A TEST CASE The fight for the 'Volga-Ural State' The first 'Alphabetic Revolution' The second 'Alphabetic Revolution' Ideological struggles in war and post-war period Tartars 'at home' and in diaspora	32
II BASHKIRIA – THE NEW OIL REPUBLIC 'Greater Bashkiria' against 'Greater Tartaria' Bashkir national opposition Bashkir oil	41
III THE CHUVASH – NATIONALISM WITHOUT PAN-ISM	46
IV 'FINNISH RUSSIA' Mordvinians: seven centuries of Russification Mari: national-religious resistance Udmurts: a 'capital' versus a people Komi – the northern coal republic	48

CONTENTS

V THE INNER NORTH The administrative structure Economic Sovietization Nationalism in the Far North Cultural assimilation The eclipse of the native Chapter III 'LIQUIDATED' PEOPLES I THE RUSSIAN GERMANS The origin of the Volga Germans Germans of South Russia The Germans in the Soviet Union The 'liquidation' of the Russian Germans II THE CRIMEAN TARTARS Emigration of the Crimean Tartars: 1784-1917 Crimean Tartar nationalism The Crimean Province III KALMUCKS Under the Czarist régime Under Soviet rule Chapter IV THE NORTH-WESTERN BORDER I CHALLENGE TO SCANDINAVIA Challenge of history The mission of St. Petersburg The Murmansk railway Kola peninsula and Murmansk Petsamo The Lapp issue II KARELIA - THE SCANDINAVIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC Russification of the Karelian A.S.S.R. The Stalin Canal The Karelian Isthmus - a new Russian province The 'annexation' of Kalevala III THE BALTIC SOVIET REPUBLICS Two Russian methods The Baltic diaspora in the U.S.S.R. Baltic in form - Russian in essence Liquidation of minorities in the Baltic States Soviet Estonia Soviet Latvia Lithuania: both ally and victim Russian Koenigsberg	59 67 68 76 81 88 88 97 104
---	---

CONTENTS

<i>Chapter V</i>	THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS	123
I	THE UKRAINE	123
	'Little Russia' and 'New Russia' Ukrainian diaspora in the U.S.S.R. Russian diaspora in the Ukraine Stalinist centralism versus Ukrainian autonomy Communist irredenta and 'Ukrainization' policy The first purges The Skrypnik affair The 'Great Purge' Comintern and 'Western Ukraine' Transcarpathian Ukraine Communists and anti-communists in the Western Ukraine Russian policy and the Uniate Church Ukrainian nationalism in the post-war period The Ukraine as a factor in Soviet 'world politics' National minorities in the Ukraine The 'Polish policy' of the Ukraine	
II	SOVIET MOLDAVIA	149
	Moldavia as A.S.S.R. Moldavia as Soviet Republic	
III	BYELORUSSIA	153
	Soviet policy in Eastern Byelorussia Kolas and Kupala – Byelorussian leaders 'Greater Byelorussia'	
<i>Chapter VI</i>	THE JEWS – A PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION	163
	Jews in the Communist Party Political and religious persecution of Soviet Jewry Soviet Jewry in the war and post-war period The social transformation of Soviet Jewry The eastward migration of Soviet Jews Jewish agricultural colonies The choice of Birobidzhan as prospective 'Soviet Jewish State' Kalinin Declaration versus Balfour Declaration Jewish colonization in Birobidzhan Birobidzhan – success or failure?	
<i>Chapter VII</i>	THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES	181
	Russia and the Caucasus The first exodus of the mountaineers The administrative chaos in the Soviet Caucasus	

CONTENTS

The second exodus of the mountaineers	
Continuity of Russian Caucasus policy: the Chechens	
Chechen-Ingush Moslem opposition	
Grozny – the oil city	
The abolition of the Karachay Province	
A ‘good’ people – the Ossetins	
Re-education of the Kabardinians	
The Circassians – a reserve of Soviet Middle East policy	
Russia’s most polyglot colony: Daghestan	
The two faces of Soviet policy in Daghestan	
The fight against the Shamil cult	
Daghestan’s language problem	
Daghestani literature	
Chapter VIII TRANSCAUCASIA	208
Transcaucasia and Russian history	
Transcaucasia and Russian Middle East policy	
I ARMENIANS	212
First Russian-Armenian contacts	
Russia – ‘Protector’ of Armenians	
The Armenian S.S.R.	
Armenian diaspora and Soviet repatriation policy	
The role of the Armenians in the Soviet Union	
The survival of Armenian nationalism	
II GEORGIANS	223
‘Georgian-Russian brotherhood’	
Menshevism versus Bolshevism	
Stalin’s fight against ‘national’ Bolshevism	
Three Georgian communists: Ordzhonikidze, Yenukidze, Beriia	
Georgia’s economic and cultural mission	
Greater Georgia	
Abkhazia	
III AZERBAIDZHAN	237
Baku – the oil city	
The Bolshevik Baku	
Multi-national Baku	
Baku and Azerbaidzhan	
The Nationalist opposition	
Russian-Azerbaidzhani cultural synthesis	
The other Azerbaidzhan	
IV TRANSCAUCASIAN MINORITIES	247
The Assyrians	
Russia and the Kurdish problem	

CONTENTS

Chapter IX SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA	255
The conquest	
The 'national-territorial delimitation'	
The revolutionary role of Soviet Central Asia	
The fight against Central Asiatic unity	
The Russians as 'elder brother'	
 I KAZAKHSTAN	 262
Sovietization of the Kazakh village	
Industrial colonization	
The struggle for the Kazakh soul	
 II KIRGHIZISTAN	 270
Russian colonization	
'Russian march to victory'	
 III UZBEKISTAN	 274
Samarkand and Tashkent	
Soviet cotton policy	
Industrialization and Russification	
Uzbek culture under tutelage	
Mir Alishir Navoi – Soviet national hero	
 IV TADZHIKISTAN	 282
Tadzhikistan versus Afghanistan	
Tadzhikistan and Persia	
Tadzhikistan and India	
Tadzhik national opposition	
 V TURKMENISTAN	 290
Turkmenistan's crucial problem – irrigation	
Greater Turkmenistan	
Political and linguistic opposition	
Post-war opposition	
 VI THE MINORITIES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA	 296
Uigurs and Dungsans	
Baluchis	
An Arab 'Birobidzhan'?	
 Chapter X SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AS A WORLD PROBLEM	 303
Soviet nationalities policy in Eastern Europe	
Soviet nationalities policy and British colonial policy	
The future of the peoples of Russia	
 INDEX	 321

MAPS

Soviet Central Asia and its neighbours

Caucasus, Transcaucasia and Turkey

The Western Marchlands of the Soviet Union

Autonomous Territories liquidated 1941/46

Autonomous Territories of European Russia

Front endpaper

Front endpaper

Back endpaper

Back endpaper

page 30

I

RUSSIAN COLONIZATION AND SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY

THE ESSENCE OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION

Political reality has transformed the word 'Europe' into an empty geographical notion. From a merely geographical point of view Europe is still the continent bounded by the Atlantic in the West and the Ural Mountains in the East. Politically, however, Europe is divided into 'Eur-Asia' and 'Eur-America'. Western and Southern Europe form a unit with America, whilst Eastern Europe belongs to another 'political continent' which includes the whole of Northern Asia and a large part of Central Asia. This division which has become unmistakably clear since the end of the Second World War is fundamentally an old division which arose when Europeans started to colonize America.

Russia is the only big European nation which has remained aloof from the colonization of America, if we leave out of account the episode, ending in 1867, of the Russian occupation of Alaska and the comparatively insignificant number of Russian immigrants going to the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many subjects of the Czar did certainly go to America during this last stage, but only a small percentage of them were Russians in the ethnical sense; most of them were Jews, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Poles, etc.

While practically all European nations were devoting their energies to the colonization of the Americas and other overseas territories, the Russians colonized the vast spaces adjoining their own original living-space.

The European peoples built a new great continent for what became the new nations of America. In addition to North and South America the Europeans colonized Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Africa; they dispersed their efforts all over the globe. The Russians built Eurasia for their own benefit.

Many European nations were constantly losing the best, most active and most enterprising members of their younger generation in the process of colonization; the Russians preserved their youth for themselves. They invested their manpower almost exclusively for the benefit of their own people and their own Empire.

Russia's continental expansion is unique in its scope, but other European nations, for example the Germans and the Poles, have tried continental expansion too. These two peoples, wedged in between the Russian colossus and the Western seafaring nations, played a dual role. They participated in a subordinate position in the colonization of the new world, and on the other hand, they also attempted to effect their own continental expansion and colonization in Eastern Europe. In the Middle Ages the Germans crossed the Elbe, Oder and Vistula and colonized Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia and East Prussia. The Poles spread their culture and political rule from the area of Poznan and Cracow, the territorial nucleus of their national existence, to Lithuania and to what to-day is Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Russia's strong position at the end of the Second World War brought about changes on the map of Central and Eastern Europe which deprived both Germans and Poles of the fruits of their colonizing efforts, efforts which had always been modest compared with Russia's forward march to the Urals and beyond.

It is a misconception of Russian history to consider it primarily as an urge towards the sea. Certainly, access to the sea was of vital importance to Russian trade and to the general development of Russia towards the status of a world power. It was a great moment in Russian history when Russia reached the shores of the Baltic under Peter the Great and the Black Sea coast under Catherine II. But it was a far greater moment when Ivan the Terrible captured Kazan on October 2nd, 1552, for that event not only brought about the transformation of the comparatively small national Russian State of Muscovy into a multi-national Empire, but also determined the future direction of Russian expansion. Most of the subsequent territorial conquests can be traced back to the liquidation of the Tartar Khanate of Kazan. Thus the lines of Russian destiny were not St. Petersburg-Odessa nor St. Petersburg-Riga-Koenigsberg, but ran from Moscow via Kazan and Orenburg to Tashkent, via Kazan across Siberia to Vladivostok and again via Kazan to Astrakhan and Baku.

Russia's maritime expansion was, in some cases, only the crowning of her continental expansion, not a purpose in itself. Thus Russia did not aim at the conquest of the Pacific shore. Russia's interest in the Pacific and the emergence of a Russian Pacific policy were the more or less accidental outcome of the conquest of Siberia.

The idea of 'mobile frontiers,' not the urge to the seas, dominates Russian geographical and political thinking. Russia is a state which has been expanding for centuries; her borders have never marked the real limits of Russian rule, the final dividing line between Russian subjects and foreigners, but only a temporary demarcation without foundation in international law or real political importance. This applies to Russia's

Eastern borders in particular, but it is also true to some extent of her Southern and even of her Western borders.

In the East and South the demarcation line was usually only the front line from which new thrusts into further unknown territories were launched as soon as the required manpower became available. The bounds of the Russian Empire in the East, South and North were not determined by the resistance which other states opposed to Russian expansion, but mainly by insuperable physical obstacles such as oceans, deserts, or mountains of great altitude. The idea of 'mobile frontiers' demonstrated by the entire course of Russian history, to-day still determines Russian foreign policy and the Russian people's approach towards this policy.

The conquest of the Russian Eastern territories, in so far as it was the outcome of deliberate political planning, was carried out with the memory of the Mongol yoke of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as the psychological and ideological background. There was not only the desire to avenge the disgrace of that past domination, but also an ever-present sense of the danger that the colonization work might suffer a setback by a new irruption of Asiatic peoples into Russian land. In order to ban the menace of a new Genghis Khan, the Czar of Moscow had to become Genghis Khan. There was a kind of logical compulsion for the Russians to penetrate deeper and deeper into the East, to build strongholds and fortified lines, conquer foreign peoples and explore Asia's most distant territories. At least the first stage of the Russian expansion to the East is comparable to the Christian 'reconquest' of Spain from the Moors, and later a belief in the fulfilment of a Christian mission accompanied Russian expansion beyond the Urals.

RUSSIA'S TWO HISTORIES

In the Soviet Union, it is true, the idea of a 'Christian mission' is no longer popular, but the attitude towards the historic Russian expansion as such remains positive. The formation of the Russian Empire, the most immense agglomeration of land in the world, is viewed in Communist Moscow primarily as the outcome of the gigantic collective efforts of the Russian people.

There is, indeed, much evidence for the thesis that the Russian Empire is chiefly an unconscious creation due to the sufferings but also to the enterprising spirit of a vanguard of the Russian people. The Russian peasants left their homes to shake off the fetters of autocracy and bondage, and to gain freedom they were ready to walk barefoot to the end of the world. This urge towards new land, born of despair, hunger and oppression, eventually gave rise to a kind of Russian people's imperialism.

Official Russian policy and Russian state imperialism often lagged behind the people's initiative. Frequently, official Russia did no more than endorse and legalize the facts which the people had created. Even the greatest figures of Russian history, like Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, on several occasions simply followed in the wake of lawless bands of fugitive peasants, the famous Cossacks, who had enlarged the boundaries of Russia without even knowing it.

In this way Russia lived a double life and had a double history. There was the official history of the Czars and the no less important unofficial history of the Cossacks. Cossack history is not only a social history in the sense of a history of the lower classes of the Russian people, but history in the strictest and widest sense of the word, a history of wars and conquests and territories. Despite the frequent wars which the official Russia of the Czars and the unofficial Russia of the Cossacks waged against each other, the latter became ultimately an essential source of Russian strength and greatness. The Cossack rebels, who from the beginning of the sixteenth century onwards had been settling on the Don, had a decisive share in conquering the southern steppes for Russia and in enabling her to reach the shores of the Azov and Black Seas. From the Don the Cossacks went to the Volga, the Ural river and to Western Siberia and later to Lake Baikal, to the Amur and the Ussuri river in the Far East. In the later stages of their development the Cossacks became organically united with 'official' history, lost their rebel character and served in the famous Cossack units of the Russian army.

Associated with the Cossacks in the Russian people's colonization movement were the members of the persecuted religious sects emerging from schism in the Russian Orthodox Church. These 'religious colonists' were more important in quality than in quantity. Just as the English Puritans crossed the ocean in search of religious freedom, so the Russian dissenters or 'Old Believers' covered tremendous distances on land to reach territories where official persecution and intolerance could not reach them. To be free to observe their ancient religious customs, which had been brushed aside by an ecclesiastical reform in the official Church in 1666, they went to the most distant areas of the Russian Empire, to the Far North and to Siberia. The 'Old Believers' and the members of other sects who were ready to brave any danger and every conceivable hardship for the sake of freedom to worship God in their own way were easily Russia's most tenacious and most valuable colonists.

However, without the development of a vigorous Russian central state authority the spontaneous Russian people's colonization would have ended in an impasse. Thus Russia's official and unofficial history are inseparably linked with each other and it is hardly possible to take up a positive attitude towards the latter and to disown the former as

Soviet historians originally tried to do. These attempts to discriminate between two histories, characteristic of Soviet historiography in the twenties and early thirties have been abandoned, and there are no greater admirers of the centralistic order introduced by the great Russian Czars and of their territorial conquests than the historians of the Stalinist epoch.

RUSSIAN ANTI-RACIALISM

Neither official nor unofficial Russia knew any racial prejudice. It would, therefore, be an unjustified over-simplification of Russian history to describe the Russians as 'oppressors' and the non-Russians as the 'oppressed' in the conquered and colonized territories of the Russian Empire. There was, of course, a Russian upper class in the new Eastern territories, i.e. the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, but there was no Russian master race since the serfs of the Russian squires were not only 'natives' but Russians as well. Some nationalities such as the Tartars also had an upper class whose prestige did not rank below that of the Russian squires. Russian and native oppressed classes joined hands in common action against economic oppression. Russian and Tartar nobility on the other hand established close social relations with each other which were not marred by any racial antipathies.

At no time in Russia's development was there any need for a book like *Uncle Tom's Cabin* since racial intermixture and assimilation were the basic principles on which Russian colonization was built. The classic work of Russian literature depicting the relationship of the Russians towards Tartars, Bashkirs, Kalmucks, etc. in the multi-national Volga region is the *Chronicles of a Russian Family* by S. T. Aksakov, a striking illustration of the Russian-oriental synthesis which came into existence during the centuries following the conquest of Kazan.

The author of this remarkable work was no revolutionary but a conservative country gentleman belonging to a family tracing its origin back to the ninth century. This family after transferring its seat to Bashkiria had no objection to establishing the closest possible ties with Tartars and Bashkirs, which Aksakov illustrates by numerous examples. He mentions one of his uncles, a wealthy nobleman who was so attracted by the Bashkirs that he used to spend the greater part of the summer with them. 'He spoke their language like one of themselves, and would remain whole days in the saddle never alighting even for a moment, so that his legs were as bowed as any Bashkir horseman's.' Another of Aksakov's relatives married a beautiful Tartar girl whose family had then (at the end of the eighteenth century) already adopted 'an external European culture and spoke good Russian but retained the strictest Mohammedan faith'. The young Russian-Tartar couple soon enjoyed

a 'firm and honourable position' in Russian provincial society and the Tartar lady turned out to be 'a most graceful and interesting woman of the highest fashion causing no little sensation and envy'. The most remarkable evidence of the gradual growing together of Russians and non-Russians in the Volga valley and the Transvolga region was the personality of Aksakov's own tutor at Kazan University, Nikolay Mikhailovich Ibragimov. His family name and his external appearance were completely Tartar or Bashkir; he had an enormous head, wide cheek bones and small piercing eyes. Culturally, however, he was so totally Russian and Slav that he wrote an *Introduction to the Slavonic Grammar* for the perusal of Russian secondary schools. It was he who encouraged Aksakov to take up a literary career.¹

In Siberia, where the local nationalities were more primitive than in the Volga region, the lack of racial prejudice expressed itself in a far more robust way than in Aksakov's refined family circle. Rape and barbarian acts of violence towards native women marked the first stage of the 'physical *rapprochement*' between Russian Cossacks and the Siberian peoples. This intermixture between Russians and natives was later carried on on a voluntary basis with the blessing of the Orthodox Church. As a result of intermarriage with the natives the Russians in many parts of Siberia lost all similarity to the Russians of Kiev and Novgorod. Thus in the Lower Ob region, in the Northern part of the Tobolsk province, the 'Russians' assumed the characteristic features of the Ostyaks: round face and slanting eyes; in the Tomsk area, Russians mixed with Tartars, Kalmucks and Kirghiz and assumed their physical characteristics; in the area of Lake Baikal black-haired and black-eyed 'Russians' bear witness to Russian-Buryat mixed marriages.

Absence of racial pride and prejudice is thus for Russia not a revolutionary principle, but is both the natural prerequisite of the growth of the Russian Empire and the natural outcome of centuries of racial intermixture. A conservative Russian nobleman would have been as proud of being a descendant of Genghis Khan as of the most highly-born Slavonic ancestry. The Soviet régime may have transformed anti-racialism into a dogmatic principle, it may have formulated this principle legally and politically, but Russian anti-racialism is no Bolshevik creation, it is a component part of Russian history.

At the time of the establishment of the Soviet régime Russian colonization was still unfinished. The Russians had colonized the Eastern part of European Russia, the Volga region and the Urals from the sixteenth century onwards, they had colonized the Black Sea coast and the North Caucasus region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A great effort was made to colonize Siberia in the period between 1886 and 1916 when 4,500,000 persons went to that vast area, of whom, it is true, 1,000,000 returned to Europe. But all these and many other

colonizing activities amounted to little when related to the gigantic potentialities of the Russian Empire. The North, not only the Far North, was a huge empty space. Siberia had hardly any major towns. The Russian Far East was badly underpopulated.

THE RUSSIAN CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

The October Revolution of 1917 instead of ending Russian colonization gave it a new impetus. The Revolution was a Russian revolution. It was Russian not only in the sense that it took place in Russia, but also in that it was carried out by people who were Russians in the ethnical or cultural sense.

This does not mean that it was backed by the majority of the Russian people or that it was the triumph of Russian national aspirations. On the contrary, the Revolution was the work of one Russian party only, the Bolshevik or Communist Party, which tried to impose itself on all nationalities of the Russian Empire in the first place and then on all nations of the earth.

The ideals of the earlier democratic Revolution of February 1917 were understandable not only to Russians but to all nationalities of the Russian Empire. The political aspirations of the progressive nationalists in Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Ukraine and Byelorussia were not fundamentally different from those for which the supporters of the 'Provisional Government' fought in Moscow and Petrograd. The October Revolution, on the other hand, was based on a principle which from the outset was not acceptable to the non-Russian nationalities – the leadership of the proletariat over the peasantry. This meant in reality the leadership of the Russian working class over the peasants of all the peoples of Russia.

The triumph of Bolshevism could, therefore, be achieved only by the extermination of all movements which did not accept the leadership of the proletariat. These movements included not only the bulk of the big Russian party of Socialist-Revolutionaries but also a large number of local political forces like the Dashnaks in Armenia, the Mussavat Party in Azerbaidzhan, the Alash Orda in Kazakhstan, the Shuro Islamiya movement in Turkestan, etc.

The October Revolution proclaimed the equality of all nations of the Russian Empire, but this 'equality' was an empty formula in view of the leading part which the Russian proletariat was called upon to play. Mikhail Kalinin blurted out the truth when he said it was the aim of Soviet policy 'to teach the people of the Kirghiz steppe, the small Uzbek cotton-grower, and the Turkmenian gardener to accept the ideals of the Leningrad worker'.² Kalinin, who was the head of the Soviet State between 1920 and 1946 thus admitted that there was no

question of working out a compromise between Russian workers, Ukrainian peasants, Uzbek cotton-growers, and Mongol cattle-breeders. The worker of Leningrad – or of Moscow – would simply impose his ideals on the others.

The heroes of the October Revolution and of the Civil War in the non-Russian territories of what is now the Soviet Union were primarily Russians or people of non-Russian nationalities who had severed their links with their nation of origin and adopted Russian culture. In Central Asia the triumph of Bolshevism was secured by the two Russians Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze and Valerian Vladimirovich Kuybishev. No Soviet textbook has ever tried to deny the role of Frunze and Kuybishev in the establishment of Soviet power in Central Asia or claimed that any Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Turkmenian, or Tadzhik personality, took a leading part in it. To make the Russian leaders of the revolution more acceptable their names were slightly transformed and appear in the local Central Asian folklore as 'Prunze-aka' and 'Koibashi-aka'.³ In the multi-national Northern Caucasus region the leaders of the revolution were the Russian Sergey Mironovich Kirov (Kostrikov) and the Georgian Ordzhonikidze, in Byelorussia the Russianized Jew Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, in Azerbaidzhan the Armenian, Anastas Mikoyan.

THE RUSSIAN CHARACTER OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY

The strength of the Russian element inside the revolutionary vanguard, the Communist Party, can be gauged from official statistics on the ethnical composition of the party membership. In 1922, when the Civil War had almost ended, 71·96 per cent or 270·409 party members were Great Russians although their percentage of the total population was 52·91 per cent. Other nationalities which had a greater number of party members than they were entitled to on the basis of their numerical strength in the country were Jews (5·21 per cent), Latvians (2·53 per cent), and Poles (1·5 per cent). The Latvian and Polish communists were mainly political *émigrés*, while the prominence of Jewish communists arose from the high proportion of Jewish people in the town population of Western Russia. Russians, Jews, Latvians and Poles aggregated 81·2 per cent of the total party membership, although they represented at the utmost 55·5 per cent of the total population. The Ukrainians, the second largest nationality in the Soviet Union, accounted for only 5·88 per cent of all communists, although one out of every five Soviet citizens was a Ukrainian. The largest non-European groups among the party members were Tartars 3,940 (1·05 per cent), Azerbaidzhani Turks 2,451 (0·65 per cent), Uzbeks 2,043 (0·54 per cent). Kazakhs and Kirghiz together had 4,890 communists, or 1·3 per cent of the total.⁴ None of these figures corresponded in the least to the

numerical importance of the peoples concerned. In themselves these figures were of little importance since they showed only the number of the rank and file communists belonging to a given nationality, without disclosing their real political weight.

In this respect statistics on the ethnical composition of party congresses are much more revealing since the congress delegates are, for the most part, leading officials of the party. At the Thirteenth Congress, held in May 1924, only 1 per cent of the delegates represented the Turko-Tartar peoples who were then almost 11 per cent of the entire population of the Soviet Union. The Russians had 60·8 per cent of all delegates; 11·3 per cent were Jews, 7 per cent Latvians and 4·7 per cent Ukrainians.

At the Fifteenth Party Congress, held in December 1927, when the important decisions on the collectivization of agriculture were taken, the non-European nationalities were again without adequate representation. The Turko-Tartar group had but 1·6 per cent of all delegates. The percentage of Russians had gone up to 62 per cent; Jews and Latvians still sent fairly large delegations, although their percentages had gone down to 7 per cent and 4·7 per cent. The relative strength of the Ukrainians had increased to 9·8 per cent, i.e. almost double, and the number of Byelorussian delegates had gone up from 1·2 to 2·9 per cent. The delegations of a number of non-Slav nationalities, however, decreased slightly compared with 1924.⁵

Throughout its existence the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has remained a predominantly Russian and Slav body. The number of non-Russian party members, it is true, increased both absolutely and relatively, but this statistical increase was not accompanied by a corresponding increase of their influence in the party and state machinery. Attempts have been made to shake Russian predominance and to establish both a greater degree of national equality within the Communist Party and a genuine federation within the Soviet Union. But these were foiled by Stalin and his associates during the big purge of 1936/38.

There is no doubt that Stalin upheld the Russian character of the October Revolution while his opponents wanted to broaden the basis of the Soviet régime by giving greater weight to the non-Russian nationalities. Both the left-wing and the right-wing opposition to Stalin agreed on that point for opposite reasons. For the extreme left, Russian predominance was incompatible with the idea of the world revolution. The right-wing opposition around Bukharin and Rykov was guided in its hostility to centralism by its generally more liberal approach to Soviet internal politics. Both groups were able to quote in support of their standpoints the works of Lenin, who in various proclamations and appeals to non-Russian peoples had shown great understanding

for their national aspirations. In his 'Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine' Lenin recognized the right of the Ukraine to complete independence.⁶ In another letter 'To the Communists of Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan and the Mountain Republic' Lenin advised the Communist Parties of the Caucasus and of Transcaucasia not to copy the Russian experience but to show more mildness and caution than the Russian Bolsheviks did. Lenin further suggested to the local communists that they should be ready to make concessions to the petty bourgeoisie, to the intelligentsia and, particularly, to the peasantry.⁷

How far Lenin was able to equate his practical policy with these theoretical precepts is another question. The forcible incorporation of the Caucasian and Central Asian territories into the Soviet Union, for instance, took place under Lenin and was not primarily Stalin's responsibility. The fact remains, however, that Lenin's approach to the national problem was not as crude and inelastic as Stalin's. Those communists who play the founder of the Soviet State against his successor when denouncing Russification and centralism are thus not entirely wrong even if they do overstate the case.

Left-wing opposition to Stalin's nationalities policy was predominantly theoretical but Bukharin and especially Rykov, who for several years had been at the head of the Soviet state administration, challenged Stalin in the practical field as well. As early as 1923, at the Twelfth Communist Party Congress, Rykov had declared 'It is impossible to administer from Moscow on the basis of bureaucratic centralism a country with more than 130,000,000 inhabitants covering one-sixth of the earth'. Rykov, the son of a Russian peasant, acted at least to some extent on the basis of this principle. Manifestations of local nationalism had already been suppressed under his rule, but more drastic centralization measures and the large-scale persecution of federalist-minded non-Russian communists started only after his dismissal from the post of Soviet Prime Minister and his replacement in 1930 by V. M. Molotov. Rykov's policy too had moved within the narrow framework of a one-party system, but in the days of inflexible centralism which Molotov introduced under Stalin's supreme guidance the Rykov period appeared like a golden age to the communist chiefs of the non-Russian peoples. The leading communists of the Caucasus and Central Asiatic republics thus co-operated with the right-wing opposition in the hope that the downfall of Stalin might lead to the fulfilment of some moderate national aspirations.

From the point of view of the régime it was thus not enough to have ousted Rykov from office; it was necessary to exterminate physically him and his group which represented a federalist alternative to Stalin's nationalities policy. The official charges put forward against Bukharin, Rykov and many other members of the opposition asserted that they

wanted to 'sell' the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia to 'imperialistic powers'. These allegations sound fantastic and cannot be accepted at their face value. Nevertheless, the charges against Rykov contained a grain of truth. Rykov did want to alter the status of the non-Russian nationalities, not to please imperialism but to do justice to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Together with Rykov and his co-defendants in the Moscow trial of the so-called 'Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites' the Stalin administration exterminated communist federalists all over the Soviet Union. By wholesale police measures and mass trials it deprived almost all the important non-Russian peoples of an entire generation of their political leaders, economic experts and cultural workers. These purge victims were described as 'enemies of the people', 'bourgeois nationalists', 'agents of German fascism' if their homes were West of the Urals and 'agents of Japanese militarism' if they belonged to an Asiatic nationality. The purge of the national deviationists from 1936 to 1938 was exclusively directed against persons who had grown up in the Bolshevik Party and who themselves had taken an active share in the liquidation of genuine local nationalists. Thus the non-Russian peoples lost two sets of their national *élite* during the period stretching from the October Revolution until roughly the outbreak of the Second World War. The first included intellectuals who had championed the cause of their peoples under the Czarist régime and the second group was made up of those Bolsheviks who had taken their place and had tried to defend the interests of the nationalities and territories of which they had been put in charge. It is true that Stalin's purges affected both Russians and non-Russians alike, but the non-Russians, having only a limited reserve of educated persons at their disposal, suffered proportionally much heavier losses than the Great Russians who numbered 100,000,000.

The Eighteenth Party Congress of March 1939 formally concluded the purge and elected a Central Committee the composition of which was highly characteristic of the Russian predominance in the Soviet Union. The Committee of seventy which is the highest policy-making body in the U.S.S.R. included no more than two persons of Moslem and Turkic origin. These were the Party Secretary of Azerbaidzhan, M. D. Bagirov and the Party Secretary of Uzbekistan, Usman Yusupov. The latter was the only representative of the 11,000,000 Moslems of Central Asia on the Central Committee since the other 'Central Asian', the then Party Secretary of Kazakhstan, Nikolay Skvortsov, was a Russian.

There were three famous Caucasians on the Central Committee; but they have never claimed to be the spokesmen of their respective peoples since their main ambition has always been to strengthen the central state machinery of the Soviet Union; the Georgians, I. V. Stalin

and Lavrenty Beriya, and the Armenian, Anastas Mikoyan. Another less-known Armenian on the Committee was I. T. Tevosyan, then Minister for Shipbuilding. The rest of the Central Committee were Slavs, most of them Russians, about half a dozen representatives of the Ukraine and one or two Byelorussians. The Slavs also included eight communists of Jewish origin who were, however, completely assimilated and could not be regarded as anything but Russians. Several of them were ousted from the Committee during the period of Nazi-Soviet co-operation.

Among the sixty-eight alternate members of the Central Committee elected at the Eighteenth Party Congress, the non-Slavs formed again but a tiny group, including one Tartar, one Bashkir (who was expelled in 1941), one Armenian, three representatives from Georgia and two local NKVD chiefs bearing Georgian names. Of the latter, one was stationed in Leningrad, the other in Vladivostok.

Among the rank and file of the Communist Party the non-Russians are, of course, more strongly represented than on the Central Committee, but there is still a great disproportion between Russians and non-Russians. This can be illustrated by a comparison between Moscow and the Ukraine. In 1949 Moscow (including the whole of Moscow Province) with 9,000,000 inhabitants had 600,000 organized communists. The Ukraine with its 40,000,000 inhabitants had only slightly more, namely, 684,000 party members, but the number of Ukrainian communists is smaller than that, as the figure includes at least 25 per cent non-Ukrainians, mostly Russians.*

Since the October Revolution is a Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik Party a Russian Party, they are both bound to pursue Russian aims. The aims of a Russian policy, like any other national policy, can

* At the Fifteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which was held in May 1940, only 56 per cent of the delegates were Ukrainians, as many as 37·2 per cent were Great Russians, 4 per cent were Jews and 2·8 per cent belonged to other nationalities (*Pravda*, May 16th, 1940.)

In the other European border republics of the U.S.S.R. the position is roughly the same as in the Ukraine: the organized communists represent 1 to 2 per cent of the total population. The Party has 110,000 members in Byelorussia (1949), 31,000 in Latvia (1949), 30,000 in Moldavia (1951), 24,000 in Lithuania (1949), 19,000 in Estonia (1951). Many Communist Party members of these border republics do not belong to the local nationalities but are Great Russian party and state officials, skilled workers and technicians.

In the six Moslem Republics of the U.S.S.R. – Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizistan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan – there are over 580,000 full party members and candidates for membership in a population of nearly 20,000,000, including both Moslems and non-Moslems. Most of the party members live in the industrial centres, where the Russian element is numerically strong, particularly in Kazakhstan (229,000 members in 1949) and Azerbaidzhan (108,000 members in 1951).

Apart from the Great Russians, the Party has recruited a fairly strong membership among Georgians and Armenians. There are 61,000 party members in Armenia (1951) and 166,000 in Georgia (1949). This means that about 5 per cent of the population of these two republics are organized in the Communist Party.

take a great variety of forms. It can be peaceful or aggressive abroad, liberal or despotic at home. The Soviet régime and the Bolshevik Party have interpreted the aims of a Russian policy in the most narrow-minded way; they have followed the bad rather than the good examples of Russian history, while acting in conformity with some of its fundamental lessons. Thus they have accepted the definition of the 'bourgeois' historian, Klyuchevsky, who said Russian history was that of a country which was being colonized.

RUSSIAN COLONIZATION UNDER THE SOVIET RÉGIME

The Soviet leaders realized that the power and size of the Russian Empire were due to successfully conducted colonization and that the Soviet Union too could not do without a colonization policy. The form and methods of Russian colonization, but not its essence, changed to a certain degree under the Soviet régime.

In the first years after the October Revolution the pace of colonization declined owing to the general confusion and the hostility of the non-Russian peoples towards new Russian colonists. Moreover, agricultural colonization had lost a great deal of its previous attraction because the best land had already been occupied by Russian settlers, and more land could be made available only at the price of investing considerable sums in irrigation and improvements. Land conditions in Asiatic Russia were such that Siberia and Central Asia combined could not absorb more than 200,000 to 250,000 agricultural settlers a year. Despite the existence of vast empty spaces in Russian Asia, the colonization movement at the beginning of the First World War was heading towards an impasse.⁸

Not only the Soviet régime but any other Russian régime taking over in 1917 would have had to alter the methods of colonization policy. The Soviet Government, particularly since 1928, the beginning of the planning period, continued to encourage agricultural colonization on a moderate scale, but the emphasis was clearly shifted to industrial colonization. To industrialize Russian Asia, to exploit its great national riches, in short, to carry out the Five-Year Plans, it was imperative to draw on the reserves of population of European Russia and to transfer them beyond the Urals. In the twelve years between the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1939 alone, 3,000,000 people migrated from Central and Western Russia into the new industrial centres of the Urals, Siberia and the Russian Far East. In addition, 1,700,000 new settlers came into the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics.

The migration towards the East constituted, however, only one aspect of a general industrialization and urbanization process which also led to a migration of 4,800,000 people into the provinces of Moscow and

Leningrad between 1926 and 1939, and to a minor migration of 350,000 people into the Gorky Province.⁹

An important feature of the industrial colonization was the foundation of new towns and workers' settlements. Between 1917 and 1947, the Soviet régime claims to have brought into existence 508 new towns and roughly 2,000 workers' settlements of an urban type. A detailed analysis of these figures shows that urbanization and Russification went hand in hand, since many of the new towns became Russian industrial strongholds in non-Russian territories. Out of the 508 new towns, 209 sprung up in non-Russian Soviet Republics, including fifty-one in Transcaucasia, forty-seven in Central Asia, and forty-three in the Ukrainian coal district – the Donets Basin. Almost half of the new workers' settlements were likewise built in the non-Russian Republics, including 230 in Central Asia alone. As to the 299 new towns of Russia proper, many were founded in ethnically non-Russian territories or in areas with mixed populations: sixteen in the Far North, fifty-five in the Urals and fifty East of the Urals.¹⁰

Despite all efforts made under the Soviet régime to shift populations from the densely populated districts of European Russia to the scarcely populated North and East, little had been achieved up to the outbreak of the Second World War. The census of 1939 revealed that the unequal distribution of Russia's population showed trifling changes compared with the Czarist period, notwithstanding all the new towns and new industrial centres: six per cent of the Soviet population lived scattered over two-thirds of the country's territory while forty-eight per cent of the people were concentrated in six per cent of the territory.¹¹

Only a bold policy of agricultural resettlement could remedy this situation. Moreover, industrial colonization was bound to reach a saturation point if a sufficient food basis could not be provided for the new 'mushroom towns' in Asia. To keep up the tempo of industrial colonization agricultural colonization too needed a fresh impetus. Greater emphasis on agricultural colonization was, therefore, one of the important features of the Third Five Year Plan (1938–1942). To render agricultural colonization on a larger scale possible, the Soviet state had to make higher demands on agricultural science, whose main task it became to extend the cereal growing area towards the North and to make Russia's wheat belt as elastic as possible. On the other hand, the Soviet Government tried to create better opportunities for agricultural colonization by improving the organization in charge of it. Various Soviet institutions dealing with resettlement and colonization matters had been in existence since 1925, but in 1939 a new authority was created – the 'Central Resettlement Board', which had its agents in all Union Republics and Provinces. The outbreak of the war interrupted the work of the board, and in 1945, when it was able to resume its

activities, it was disbanded and a new resettlement organization was created and attached to the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federative Socialist Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). This was a logical measure since the R.S.F.S.R. is the most important purveyor of settlers for under-developed areas.*

During the first post-war Five Year Plan (1946–50) the Soviet Government encouraged both industrial and agricultural colonization, but both had a very obvious strategic tinge. Colonists were directed to certain militarily vital areas, such as the Murmansk Province and the Russian-Manchurian border regions, but above all to the new strategic outposts which Russia had annexed at the end of the Second World War. In this latter category belonged the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet portion of the former East Prussia, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. A widespread propaganda campaign was started to popularize the new territories as settlement areas: pamphlets describing their rich resources and potentialities were lavishly distributed and the advantages of settling in the new districts were eagerly discussed in collective farm meetings – on the initiative of the communist rural organizations.

Although one need not believe every word of Soviet propaganda about the spontaneous desire of the Russian people to migrate to remote areas in order to serve the motherland, it would be untrue to suggest that administrative coercion is the only motive behind the continuous large-scale population movements inside the Soviet Union. It cannot be denied that there exists the enthusiasm of a young generation which wants to build and to create, if possible in a new and unknown territory. There also exists the inborn 'wanderlust' of the Russian peasant and his natural ability to adapt himself to different geographical surroundings and climatic conditions. Another powerful incentive for a semi-voluntary peasant migration inside Russia is the hope, if not the definite promise, that the collective farm statute will be less strictly applied in the distant territories than in the over-crowded provinces of Central Russia. Less rigidity in the application of the statute may be worth a journey thousands of miles long, since it means for the peasant more time to be devoted to his individual allotment outside the collective farm and a larger number of cows, sheep and goats for his personal use.

Although the primary approach of the Soviet régime towards colonization is an economic and strategic, and not a national Russian one, Soviet colonization policy serves to promote the triumph of the Russian people no less than colonization under the Czarist régime. Only a people which is both numerically large and stubborn by character, a people which is used to hardships and privations and which has ex-

* A number of non-Russian Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Tadzhikistan, etc., also have resettlement organizations which are in charge of minor local resettlement schemes.

perience in colonizing activities can carry out successful colonization work on such a large scale as is needed in the vast Euro-Asiatic plain. This is why only Russians and Ukrainians can be relied upon as colonizers to any extent worth mentioning. Many other peoples may locally participate in the great colonization of the Russian East and North, but the Russians themselves must necessarily lead and dominate the colonization work everywhere. The role of the Russians in the work of colonization is that of a huge advancing army which is accomplishing the main job, but which is assisted by a number of small satellite detachments to whom certain local tasks are assigned. The use of non-Russians for Russian colonization is common to both the Czarist and Soviet régimes, but the latter is by far more thorough and systematic in the mobilization of the non-Russian population and no longer permits the alternative of emigration abroad.

Christians from the Baltic countries, Moslems from the Volga, Tartars and Mordvinians, Chuvash and Mari, cultured Jews and half-civilized Chukchi from beyond the Polar Circle – they are all thrown into action by the Russian colonizers for the ultimate benefit of the Russians. The more the peoples of Russia become intermingled and the more they are scattered through the Eurasian continent by a planned colonization policy the less there is danger of the rise of 'national problems' and the greater the likelihood of their absorption by Russian civilization. From economic necessity the Soviet régime is inflicting a double blow on the non-Slav peoples: it pumps Russian and Ukrainian skilled workers, specialists and officials into the territories of the small Soviet nationalities and recruits unskilled labour from among the latter to send them to Russian industrial centres, in an endeavour to solve the manpower problem there.

LOCAL NATIONALISM

The Soviet nationalities policy is thus largely identical with the promotion of colonization and industrialization in the non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R. It can also be defined in other ways; it depends on the standpoint from which the definition is formulated. From the point of view of Soviet Russia's neighbours the Soviet nationalities policy is an instrument of Soviet diplomacy. The Bolshevik 'Old Guard' considered the nationalities policy as an abstract policy of encouraging the cultural and economic development of the peoples of Russia. For the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union itself the nationalities policy and the fight against local nationalism are identical notions. Each of these definitions contains a certain amount of truth, but there can be no doubt that the fight against local nationalism has been the dominant element in the Soviet nationalities policy since the thirties.

Until then the communist leadership had most energetically fought against 'Great Russian chauvinism' which had been described as the 'main danger on the national front'. Gradually the situation was reversed, the danger of 'Great Russian chauvinism' was more and more belittled and the campaign against 'local nationalism' became increasingly merciless. We have already referred to the political side of the purges, but the 'fight against local nationalism' implied more than a struggle for power between centralists and federalists. The expression 'local nationalism' was used in the widest possible sense. Every assertion of national individuality in the economic, cultural and political field was transformed in Soviet language into 'local nationalism'.

The main forms of local nationalist tendencies which the Soviet régime tried to stamp out were the following:

1. THE 'FEDERALIST NATIONALISM'. Many a nationality of the Soviet Union realized that it was too weak by itself to resist Russian colonization. It therefore tried to strengthen its position by entering into closer relationship with one or several other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union to which it was ethnically related or linked together by geographical circumstances. Whenever such tendencies were expressed the Soviet central Government denounced them as 'counter revolutionary manœuvres' emanating from some sort of pan-ism. Sub-federations are considered undesirable within the U.S.S.R. however politically reliable those participating in them may be. Thus a regional federation of the three Baltic Soviet Republics is unthinkable under the working of Soviet nationalities policy; and in four cases the Soviet central Government actually suppressed regional sub-federations after having permitted them for longer or shorter transition periods (in the Volga region, Transcaucasia, Northern Caucasus region and Central Asia).

2. LOCAL NATIONALISM IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. Measures applied to the whole Soviet Union were frequently transformed into measures against local nationalism, when put into practice in the territories of national minorities. People of many nationalities in the Soviet Union denied the Moscow Government the right to interfere with the internal economic structure of the territories which they inhabited. A case in point was the collectivization of agriculture in 1930-33, which, as a rule, met with greater resistance in the non-Russian areas than among the Great Russians. Other economic measures again, like the resettlement of the millions of nomads of the Soviet Union, affected exclusively non-Russian nationalities.

3. RELIGIOUSLY TAINTED NATIONALISM. The fight against 'local religion' has always been closely inter-twined with the fight against local nationalism. The Soviet leaders have disregarded the simple truth that a nation cannot be free if its religion is oppressed. In the inter-war

period the campaign against the religions of the national minorities was conducted by the state authorities, the Communist Party, the Communist Youth League and by the 'Nationalities Commission' of the Central Committee of the S.V.B. (Soyuz Voynstvuyushchikh Bezbozhnikov – League of Militant Godless). After the war the work of the S.V.B. was taken over by a 'Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge' which has a special anti-religious department ('Section for Propaganda Problems of Scientific-Atheistic Knowledge'). The Society which is closely connected with the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Communist Party has branch organizations in all non-Russian Soviet Republics. Although the principal target of the Bolshevik fight against religion was the Russian Orthodox Church, the non-Russians, particularly the Eastern nationalities of the U.S.S.R. were affected by it more than the Slavs. Since nationality and religion are almost identical in the Eastern provinces of the Russian Empire – as almost everywhere in the Orient – the fight against religion in these territories was implicitly a fight against national culture and national traditions as well.

4. **LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM.** The Soviet régime rightly feared that the languages of the non-Russian nationalities could too easily become an instrument in the struggle against Bolshevism if they were not carefully kept under control. The question of political terminology, for instance, was of paramount importance. 'Bourgeois nationalists' could obtain political advantages by what orthodox communists considered to be an incorrect translation of such terms as 'Soviet', 'dictatorship of the proletariat', and 'general line of the party'. The régime tried, therefore, to wrest from the 'nationalists' the weapon of the languages by changing their character and introducing into each of them a large number of Russian and Russianized so-called international terms. The dual aim of the Soviet language policy was to reduce on the one hand the differences between the local languages and the Russian, and on the other to widen the cleavage between languages belonging to one and the same language group so as to weaken all pan-isms but pan-Slavism.

Not only was the victory of the Stalin group over the opposition forces inside the Communist Party tantamount to the victory of centralism; it also implied the triumph of the Russian language and of Russian civilization. It is a striking coincidence that the decree on the obligatory teaching of Russian in all national minority schools was passed on the very day on which Rykov and Bukharin were sentenced to death – on March 13th, 1938. The new party leadership which Stalin installed in the various national republics started its activity by launching a campaign for the study of the Russian language. For the non-Russian communists a good command of Russian thus became a way to manifest their loyalty to the Kremlin.

During and particularly after the Second World War official Soviet ideology became less hypocritical by openly proclaiming that the Russians were the 'driving force' within the U.S.S.R. and not just one of the '180 peoples of the Soviet Union'.

On the very morrow of victory Stalin ordered that greater emphasis should be given to the leading role of the Russian people in the Soviet State. When addressing the Red Army commanders at a great victory celebration on May 24th, 1945, Stalin demonstratively toasted the Russian people whom he described as the 'most outstanding people of the U.S.S.R.' and he paid tribute to the 'clear mind, steadfast character and patience' of the Russians. This toast was not only a eulogy of the Russians, but also an oblique censure intended for the other peoples of the Soviet Union, whose mind, character and patience from Stalin's point of view had been less commendable during the Great Patriotic War.

It seems that Stalin's subtly formulated reproach to the non-Russians was justified. In the fatal years of 1941 and 1942 in particular, the Russians had borne the brunt of the battle. In October 1942 *Pravda* dropped all propagandistic pretence and stated flatly that the Russians formed the 'vast majority' of the army. This admission was very remarkable in view of the fact that the Russians constitute less than half of the population of the U.S.S.R.*

Stalin's toast to the Russian people was no toast in the ordinary sense of the word. It was the ultimate logical conclusion to be drawn from the Russian character of the October Revolution. It also supplied the key for the understanding of the purges carried out after 1945 among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. The aim of these purges was to eliminate from the cultural life and the national traditions of the non-Russians everything that might possibly encourage among them any kind of anti-Russian sentiments.

CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

In examining the essentials of Soviet nationalities policy we cannot overlook the laws, decrees and constitutions of the U.S.S.R. and its constituent republics, but we must use them with care. Considered in isolation they give no more than a clue to the propagandist aspect of Soviet

* The same *Pravda* article which was quoted by *Soviet War News* on October 16th, 1942, also complained about the insufficient military training of the non-Russian soldiers. The newspaper said: 'Not all the reserves arriving at the front from the national republics and provinces are equally well trained. Some young soldiers are insufficiently familiar with military technique, particularly with their weapons. It is the duty of military training organizations to attend to this, to give the young fighters a complete idea of modern war weapons and teach them how to use them. Political work has always been an important activity of our army organizations. It is of particular importance among Red Army men of non-Russian nationality. . . .'

nationalities policy, whilst the real position of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union can be judged only on the basis of the application of the laws, i.e. in the light of facts. The constitutional framework of the U.S.S.R., though not a guide to the fundamentals of Soviet nationalities policy, acquaints us with the terminology with which the latter operates and introduces us to the various degrees of Soviet territorial autonomy.

1. SOVIET REPUBLICS. The highest form of Soviet autonomy is enjoyed by the sixteen constituent Soviet Republics. According to Soviet legal theory these sixteen Republics are fully fledged sovereign States, with all the prerogatives of a State including a constitutional right to leave the Union should their respective parliaments, the Supreme Soviets, so decide.

The sovereignty of the Soviet Republics is, however, a mere constitutional fiction, because in reality they have no say in questions of internal security, high-level economic planning, transport, or higher education, not to speak of foreign policy and defence. Since February 1st, 1944, the Soviet Republics have possessed a nominal right to have foreign ministers and defence ministers of their own, but the national foreign ministers and foreign offices have a purely formal existence, while the national defence ministries never came into being. It is difficult to see what functions such defence ministries could have had, in view of the centralized and predominantly Russian character of the Soviet armed forces. Non-Russians, it is true, may rise to the highest posts in the Red Army and Navy, but Russian is the official language of the Soviet military apparatus. During the Second World War all military orders were written in Russian.

Even from a merely legal point of view the constituent Soviet Republics do not own the natural riches on their soil. The coal of the Ukraine, the oil of Azerbaidzhan, the copper of Kazakhstan belong to the U.S.S.R. as a whole and not to the individual republics. The same applies to the agricultural land of the Republics.

The 'sovereignty' of the Union Republics is also rendered fictitious by the existence of the 'Prokuratura', the strongly centralized office of the all-Union Attorney-General ('Generalny Prokuror') which was founded in 1933. The all-Union Attorney-General himself appoints an Attorney-General for each of the Union Republics and even the personnel of the 'Prokuratura' in the provinces and districts of these republics is under his supreme command. Republican governments cannot interfere in the least with the work of the 'Prokuratura' nor can they influence the composition of its local staff. The Attorney-General has a dual function. He acts as Public Prosecutor and he checks on the legality of measures carried out by the republican and local authorities. The Attorney-General of a Union Republic, on instructions from the all-Union

Attorney-General, can rescind any local laws and decrees if they contradict the so-called 'revolutionary legality'.

The legal system on which the 'Prokuratura' bases its work is in itself rigorously centralized. There is no all-Union Penal Code, it is true, but the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. is also in force in Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. The fact that there are separate penal codes for the R.S.F.S.R., Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Transcaucasian and some of the Central Asian Soviet Republics is of little importance since their differences in content are insignificant. Moreover many articles in the individual penal codes have been superseded by all-Union laws and decrees (particularly the decrees on the 'protection of socialist property' and on various 'state crimes').

Often, the Soviet legal 'States' do not correspond to States in the sense of living organisms. In numerous instances these 'States' have not been created by historical development or by the will of their peoples, nor do they owe their existence to some particular geographical features. They owe their origin simply to a decision taken by the Soviet leaders or even by the supreme Soviet leader only. Examples of such 'States' which were created by Soviet political opportunism are the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R., the Moldavian S.S.R. and the Soviet Republics of Central Asia. Republics which were taken into the Soviet Union *en bloc* as an outcome of military operations, such as Georgia, Estonia and Latvia are of a different nature. Originating from political and economic units gravitating around a centre, they possess the characteristics of statehood in the sense of political and economic geography, even if the Soviet central Government has considerably curtailed the exercise of their actual state functions.

Soviet legal theory, as taught in Soviet law schools, asserts that a territory has to answer three requirements to become a Soviet Republic, namely: (a) the nationality giving its name to the Republic must have an absolute majority in the territory concerned: (b) a Soviet Republic must have a common border with at least one foreign State because otherwise it could not secede from the Union if it wished to do so, and (c) a Soviet Republic must have at least 1,000,000 inhabitants.¹²

These 'conditions' too are only theory and are not fulfilled by all the sixteen Soviet Republics. Thus the Kazakhs have no absolute majority in Kazakhstan, nor have the Karelians and Finns combined in the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic. Moreover, the last-mentioned republic did not fulfil condition (c), since it had less than a million inhabitants when promoted to the status of a fully-fledged Soviet Republic. As to condition (b) it has become an illusion, since several Soviet Republics adjoin only Soviet satellite States and Soviet-controlled territories (Byelorussia, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan).

2. **AUTONOMOUS SOVIET REPUBLICS.** A considerably lower degree of autonomy was granted to the 'Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republics' (A.S.S.R.) but they are also officially described as 'States'. Out of the sixteen Autonomous Republics twelve are part of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), one each belongs to Azerbaidzhan and Uzbekistan and two to Georgia. An A.S.S.R. is extremely limited in its scope of action and its autonomy is almost exclusively confined to the linguistic sphere. Formally and legally, however, things are different, since every Autonomous Republic possesses a constitution of its own (although almost identical in wording and content in all sixteen A.S.S.R.s), a 'Council of Ministers' and a 'Supreme Soviet'.

3. **AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES.** The next group of national territorial units, the Autonomous Provinces (*Avtonomnye Oblasti*) have lost much of their importance by the introduction of the 1936 Constitution promoting the more populous Autonomous Provinces to Autonomous Republics. Out of the nine still existing Autonomous Provinces six belong to the R.S.F.S.R. and one each to Georgia, Azerbaidzhan and Tadzhikistan.

The difference between an 'Autonomous Province' and an ordinary province is that the former has rules of its own with regard to its official languages. The 'Autonomous Province' has a special 'Statute' adopted by the provincial Soviet and confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic to which it belongs; it also has a special representation in the 'Soviet of Nationalities' which the ordinary province has not.

The 'Autonomous Provinces' of the R.S.F.S.R. are not placed directly under the government of the Russian Federation but under the Executive Committee (Ispolkom) of a kind of super-province, 'Kray', which can be translated as 'Territory'. Thus the Autonomous Province of the Circassians belongs to the Stavropol Territory, the Khakass Autonomous Province to the Krasnoyarsk Territory, etc.

4. **LOWER FORMS OF NATIONAL AUTONOMY.** Yet another form of national autonomy was designed primarily for the small nationalities of the Far North, the 'National Areas' (*Okrugi*). There are ten such 'National Areas' altogether, four of which extend along Russia's Arctic coast. The majority of the 'National Areas' cover huge but almost unpopulated spaces and even from the legal point of view they enjoy only a very limited autonomy.

'National Districts' (*Rayony*) were devised for small but compact minorities wedged into alien surroundings. These 'National Districts' consist very often of five to ten villages only. Before the Second World War there had been as many as 147 'National Districts' in the R.S.F.S.R. alone. Most of them were located in the Far North, Yakutia, Buryato-Mongolia, Eastern Siberia and the Amur region.

'National Village Soviets' (village councils) and 'National Collective

Farms', of which there are many hundreds, guarantee, in theory, the rights of the tiniest national minority group.

The Soviet central Government has shown a singular indifference to its own creations in the field of nationalities policy. 'National Areas' and 'National Districts' have often suddenly passed out of existence. Frontiers of both Soviet Republics and Autonomous Soviet Republics have never been regarded as more than experimental lines which can be changed by decree just as they were created by decree. Whole slices of territory have often been cut off from one republic and added to another when this appeared to be convenient from the economic point of view. Capitals of Autonomous Republics have been similarly shifted according to economic expediency. Moreover, even the internal administrative division of a constituent republic into provinces is not a matter to be decided by the republic concerned, but belongs to the competence of the central authorities in Moscow.

The Stalin Constitution of 1936 set itself the task of giving a final form to the administrative sub-division of the U.S.S.R. But ever since then there have been numerous alterations which were not due to territorial conquests alone. All this is only too natural: Russia is a young country whose economic potential is steadily growing and whose administrative set-up, therefore, has to be elastic without being hampered by the interests of the local peoples.

SOVIET BUDGETARY CENTRALISM

The real importance, or rather the factual insignificance, of the autonomous units created by the Soviet constitution can best be shown by examining the budgetary means at the disposal of both the central government and the regional governments and Soviets.

The expenditure side of the Soviet budget is usually sub-divided into five groups: (1) financing of national economy; (2) social and cultural measures; (3) administration; (4) defence, and (5) miscellaneous expenditure. Expenditure for national economy is covered by the central budget to the extent of 86.3 per cent. Only 6.3 per cent is derived from the budgets of the Union Republics. The remaining 7.4 per cent of the expenditure for national economy comes from the so-called 'local budgets' which include the budgets of the provinces, districts, the town councils and the rural councils. Half of all 'local' national economy expenditure is spent by the town councils and only an insignificant percentage – at any rate less than ten per cent – by all A.S.S.R.s, Autonomous Provinces and National Areas put together. Their combined share in the whole national economy budget is less than one per cent of the total. (All these and the following figures are based on the budget of 1941, the first full year in which the present sixteen

Soviet Republics were in existence. The figures would hardly be different in any other year.)

The central budget finances 93·8 per cent of all expenditure for industry, including the entire heavy and armament industry and also the larger plants of the building, food, textile, fishing and timber industries. Only the small plants of light industry and the production of local fuel resources are financed by the constituent republics.

In the field of agriculture the share of the local budgets is somewhat bigger, for the central budget absorbs 'only' 77·1 per cent of the whole expenditure for agriculture. The Union budget is responsible for Machine Tractor Stations (M.T.S.), large-scale irrigation schemes, those state farms which grow cereals, sub-tropical fruits, cotton and other technical cultures and also for all cattle farms. The appropriations out of the republican budgets go to small state farms growing vegetables or breeding poultry, rabbits and bees.

As far as transport is concerned the Union budget has a *de facto* monopoly since it covers the entire air, rail, water and road transport of all Soviet Republics with the exception of local road communications of 'republican importance' which account for less than two per cent of transport expenditure as a whole.

With regard to social and cultural expenditure the preponderance of the Union budget is less marked; it directly controls only 35·7 per cent of the appropriations in that field. However, even for social services and education the constituent republics have far less financial means at their disposal than the Union. Their share in the funds earmarked for social and cultural purposes is no more than 14·3 per cent which, although nominally a figure referring again to 1941 only, may be considered a fair average. Fifty per cent of the funds in this category are covered by the local budgets. Over 300 educational institutions all over the U.S.S.R., many research institutes, scientific libraries and all the Academies of Sciences are financed out of the Union budget. The republican budgets provide for secondary schools, libraries, museums, state theatres, etc. The republican and local budgets also cover ninety per cent of the expenditure on public health.

Administration costs are divided up as follows between the three groups of budgets: Union budget 32·4 per cent, republican budgets 24 per cent, local budgets 43·6 per cent. All that is vital to state security in all parts of the U.S.S.R. is covered out of the Union budget. The local budgets, apart from providing appropriations for general administrative purposes, finance registry offices, traffic police and fire brigades.

The 'miscellaneous expenditure' is almost entirely charged to the Union budget (95·3 per cent).

Since the expenditure side of the republican and local budgets is small, the latter have little need of major resources of income. The pur-

chase tax and the State's share in the profits of nationalized industry, the two main sources of income of the Soviet budget, thus go mainly into the central treasury and only comparatively small portions are diverted each year into the republican treasuries and local budgets.¹³

The centralistic direction of Soviet financial policy does not prevent, of course, the application of heavy state investments in the non-Russian territories. On the contrary, Soviet statistics could prove only too easily that a comparatively greater proportion of the budgetary appropriations goes to non-Russian territories than to many territories inhabited by Russian people. The fact remains that the republican governments have no financial autonomy, no real say in regard to the money spent on their territory. If the Soviet Republics enjoyed budgetary autonomy the budgets would undoubtedly look different and the interests of the individual peoples of the Soviet Union would not be sacrificed to the interests of the Union as a whole; instead a compromise would have to be worked out between all-Union requirements and local aspirations.

THE 'SOVIET OF NATIONALITIES'

The protagonists of Soviet nationalities policy might argue that the non-Russian nationalities have a considerable, if not decisive, influence on the preparation of the Soviet budget, through their predominant participation in the Soviet of Nationalities. At this point we again have to leave Soviet reality as expressed in the budgetary figures and to revert to the fiction of Soviet constitutional law.

The Soviet of Nationalities is the Second Chamber of the Soviet parliament, which until 1936 was known as 'Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.' (in Russian abbreviated as Ts.I.K.) and which since then has been officially called 'Supreme Soviet' or 'Supreme Council'. The Soviet of Nationalities has equal rights with the First Chamber, the Soviet of the Union, and serves in theory as the constitutional safeguard for the small nationalities, so as to check any preponderance of the Slavs.

Under the 1923 constitution there was a very wide measure of equality between large and small nations in the Soviet of Nationalities. Union Republics and Autonomous Republics were placed on the same level and had five representatives each, Autonomous Provinces one each. The new constitution greatly enlarged the Soviet of Nationalities but discriminated between Union Republics and Autonomous Republics. At present every Soviet Republic elects twenty-five members to the Soviet of Nationalities, every Autonomous Republic eleven, every Autonomous Province five, and every National Area one deputy. Although the non-Russian Soviet Republics and the Autonomous Republics and Provinces usually include Russians in their delegations to

the Soviet of Nationalities, the non-Russians and even the non-Slavs have a clear majority in that body. Had the deputies of the Supreme Soviet any real powers they could by a common effort easily prevent the passage of any law which they thought harmful to their national interests; they could even defeat the adoption of the Union budget.

Membership of the Soviet 'parliament', however, signifies not much more than a title of honour for a distinguished Stakhanovite, a 'Hero of the Soviet Union', a successful chairman of a collective farm or a writer of nation-wide reputation. Both the Soviet of Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union meet for no more than a fortnight every year for purely formal sessions, in which they have to give belated approval to all the measures taken by the government and to pass the budget. The speeches made during the 'Supreme Soviet' sessions serve predominantly for propagandist purposes, although they also contain, here and there, elements of criticisms regarding points of detail and some minor recommendations which, however, never affect the substance of the budget or the general policy of the régime.

Even if the Soviet of Nationalities had more power and held longer sessions it could not safeguard the individual national interests of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., in view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the deputies are members of the Communist Party. The formidable totalitarian power of the Communist Party reduces even further the importance not only of the Soviet of Nationalities but also of the entire constitutional system created by Soviet nationalities policy.

The organization and machinery of the All-Union Communist Party is centralistic in the extreme. The party is the same in all Soviet Republics, Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Provinces, etc., and thus guarantees a complete uniformity of policy throughout the Soviet Union despite all constitutional federalism. The central machinery of the All-Union Communist Party is constantly checking on the governments of the constituent republics lest they should take too literally the federal character of the constitution. An entire staff of party officials at the service of the 'Central Committee' is constantly being switched round in the Soviet Union so as to ensure that the Party shall remain one monolithic whole, without regard to local frontiers drawn between Russia's nationalities. The Central Committee often endows its emissaries with extraordinary powers reducing to nothing all the prerogatives which the governments of the Soviet Republics, or Autonomous Soviet Republics possess on paper. After the completion of the emissaries' mission, Moscow's interference is then usually admitted by the formula 'with the assistance of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party it has been possible... to overcome the difficulties on the agrarian front', or '... to liquidate the nationalistic deviation', or '... to raise the level of cattle breeding.'

FALLACIES OF SOVIET STATISTICS

Soviet propaganda has tried to conceal the basic truth about its nationalities policy not only behind a fictitious legal construction but also behind a dense smokescreen of statistics.

This propaganda makes belief that Soviet nationalities policy is the sum total of all the figures referring to the cultural and economic advancement of the peoples of Russia in the last thirty years. It is quite immaterial whether the Soviet statistics are accurate or not; they cannot reflect the success or failure of Soviet Russia's handling of the nationalities problem, because they refer solely to quantity and not to quality.

1. CULTURAL STATISTICS. Soviet cultural statistics, for instance, reveal a fantastic growth of literacy among the non-Russian peoples, but they do not say what end the literacy serves. Does it smooth the path for the beginning of a national cultural life of the peoples concerned? Is it a preparation for final 'Russification'? Or is it designed to fabricate a uniform 'Soviet culture', national in form but Bolshevik in substance?

Moreover, Russian and Western concepts never fully tally. Words like literacy and illiteracy have a different meaning in the Soviet Union and in Western Europe. The slogan of '100 per cent liquidation of illiteracy' in a given area of the Soviet Union does not mean that any number of people approaching this percentage can participate in cultural life even in the most primitive way. After the formal liquidation of 'illiteracy' there still remains what Russians call *malogramotnost*, which means a low degree of literacy implying a technical knowledge of the alphabet without the ability to make practical use of it.

Or let us take the impressive number of books published since 1917 in the national languages. At the first glance these figures can tell us nothing about the cultural development of the peoples for whom they are printed. These statistics will reflect reality only as soon as we break them up and find out how many books in a given language are simply translations of the works of Lenin and Stalin, of the *Short History of the All-Union Communist Party*, or propaganda pamphlets, and how many books constitute genuine contributions towards the cultural enrichment of the nationality for which they are printed. There is no doubt that this last figure will be in every single case discouragingly small.

2. ECONOMIC STATISTICS. Even less relevant for any assessment of Soviet nationalities policy are economic statistics. These will tell us the percentual increase of industrial production in any national minority territory of the Soviet Union, but the figures themselves will not answer the question how far this increase guarantees or endangers the survival of the non-Russians of the U.S.S.R. This is a reproach not to Soviet reality but to Soviet propaganda, which is trying to conceal a most logical

and natural fact; that the theory of the Soviet nationalities policy has to be sacrificed to the Five-Year Plans, since the contrary would be Utopian. Practice has shown that every new factory, every new coal-mine, every new oil-well in a non-Russian territory of the U.S.S.R. is not primarily an asset for the people of that territory but rather for the Great Russians, who alone have a sufficient manpower reserve to staff the new enterprises.


3. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES. Finally, the most fundamental figure of the Soviet nationalities policy – the number of peoples in the Soviet Union – is also an arithmetical illusion if not further elucidated. The number of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is usually given as 180, although there are other estimates, slightly higher and slightly lower. A scientific analysis based on the 1926 census gave the number of nationalities in the U.S.S.R. as 169, sub-divided into twelve basic groups. According to this analysis Russia included 47 Turkic, 39 Japhetic (Caucasian), 27 Ugro-Finnish, 17 Iranian, 9 Palae-asiatic, 8 Indo-European, 5 Semite, and other nationalities.¹⁴ Such figures, accurate as they may be from the point of view of the ethnographer, have no practical value and exaggerate the real scope of Soviet nationalities policy, which is big enough without any exaggeration.

At least half of the 180 peoples cannot be reckoned as nationalities in a cultural or political sense, even if the most generous criterion is applied. The Soviet cultural worker and communist propagandist must therefore operate with a figure considerably lower than 180. Alexander Fadeyev, the well-known Soviet writer and member of the Communist Central Committee, addressing the Peace Congress in Paris in 1949, said there were 'about seventy nationalities' in the Soviet Union. This is nearer the truth in so far as nationalities which have arrived at a minimum degree of cultural or even linguistic self-expression are concerned. There are indeed newspapers in eighty languages of the Soviet Union. Political and literary journals exist in fifty languages.¹⁵

The régime can reckon with thirty to forty-five nationalities in the actual sphere of Soviet 'home politics'. Thus forty-four nationalities were represented among the delegates of the first post-war congress of the Communist Youth League¹⁶ and thirty-two nationalities among the delegates to the Tenth Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions in 1949.¹⁷ Even the existence of thirty to forty nationalities which count politically is sufficient to make the tasks of the Soviet nationalities policy, with its narrow pattern and rigid principles, extremely complicated. How the Soviet régime has tried to solve the multitude of political, economic and cultural problems which are inherent in Russia's multi-national character, can be shown only by examining the application of Soviet nationalities policy in detail, nationality by nationality, republic by republic, province by province.

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AUTONOMOUS TERRITORIES OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA

II

INNER RUSSIA

BORDERLAND RUSSIA AND INNER RUSSIA

Borderland Russia and Inner Russia must be distinguished in any detailed analysis of the Soviet nationalities policy.

In Borderland Russia the Soviet régime faces the problems of world politics and takes them into account. As all fifteen non-Russian Soviet Republics are by definition border republics, they have all been in a position to render political and strategical services to the Soviet Union as a whole.

The fifteen border republics form an almost continuous semi-circle stretching from south of Murmansk to the Russian-Chinese-Mongol border and interrupted only by the Gulf of Finland, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Only in the Far East does Russia proper form the borderland to any large extent.

Two chains of autonomous republics and provinces can also be included in Borderland Russia: one stretches along the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains; the other is situated in Eastern Siberia and along the borders of Outer Mongolia.

The borderland character of the North Caucasus region and of Eastern Siberia is not so apparent in normal times but emerges very clearly in periods of crisis, as for instance in the years of the Civil War and foreign intervention following the October Revolution. Then the small peoples of the Northern Caucasus gravitated towards the independent republics of Transcaucasia or even towards Turkey, and parts of Eastern Siberia towards Japan.

Apart from being a geopolitical notion, Borderland Russia also makes sense historically, since it comprises on the whole those territories which became parts of the Russian Empire after the beginning of the seventeenth century, during the rule of the Romanov dynasty. Inner Russia, on the other hand, consists mostly of territories which belonged to the Empire of Ivan the Terrible, with the exception of Central Siberia.

Inner Russia's nationality problems, unlike those of Borderland Russia, have, as a rule, no direct bearing on the actions of Soviet diplomacy. They are, however, highly characteristic of other important aspects of Soviet nationalities policy.

I. THE TARTARS – A TEST CASE

The Tartars, or to be more accurate, the Kazan or Volga Tartars, are the most advanced of the Moslem peoples of the Soviet Union and are the most numerous non-Slav people of the R.S.F.S.R.

It is important to bear in mind that the struggle for the soul of the Tartars was implicitly a struggle for the soul of all Turkic and Moslem peoples living under Soviet rule. The Tartars served as a kind of guinea pig of Soviet nationalities policy. Methods and policies were tried out on them before being applied to other Turkic peoples.

THE FIGHT FOR THE 'VOLGA-URAL STATE'

The Tartars, unlike many other peoples of Russia, produced a fairly strong merchant class which evolved a very outspoken nationalist ideology. The Tartar bourgeoisie and the Tartar intelligentsia, particularly since the 1905 revolution, considered pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism as their political ideals. After the October Revolution the Tartars felt confident that the time had come to revive in a new form the Tartar Khanate of Kazan by the creation of a 'Volga-Ural State', or, as they themselves called it, the 'Idel-Ural State'.

The Soviet Government, apparently acting on the advice of the People's Commissar for Nationalities, J. V. Djugashvili-Stalin, showed itself initially ready to meet the wishes of the Tartars and decreed that the Middle Volga and the Southern Ural regions should be included in a 'Tartar-Bashkir Soviet Republic'. Both Lenin and Stalin then recognized that Bashkirs and Tartars were so closely related that the formation of separate Tartar and Bashkir republics was not warranted. Stalin, together with a 'Commissar for the Affairs of the Moslems of Central Russia', signed a decree on March 22nd, 1918, holding out the promise of the convocation of a 'constituent congress of Soviets' to determine finally the frontiers of the Moslem republic.

The Tartar-Bashkir Republic never became a reality. At first it could not be set up because its prospective territory was in the hands of the 'Whites'. As soon as the Soviet power was re-established in the Central Volga and Ural areas the idea of a proletarian Volga-Ural State was dropped because of the alleged hostility between Tartars and Bashkirs. Tartar and Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republics were founded instead.

It was the fear of pan-Turkism which made Stalin change his mind. The interests of the Soviet régime called for a division of the Turkic and Moslem peoples of Russia into as many branches as possible instead of encouraging the tendencies towards unity which naturally existed among them. Stalin's idea of a 'Tartar-Bashkir Republic' was later even stigma-

tized as a counter-revolutionary conception whenever either the Tartars or the Bashkirs advocated it.

Pan-Turkism was too strong to be checked by splitting up the Moslems of Volga and Ural into two separate republics. The first Prime Minister of the Tartar A.S.S.R., Sultan-Galiyev, in particular, was an ardent defender of pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic ideas. He stood for the formation of a special Moslem Communist Party and advocated the union of the Volga Moslems with those of Central Asia. He also supported an alliance between the communists and the followers of the Moslem reform movement, the 'Djadidists'.

Sultan-Galiyev, who was 'exposed' as head of an illegal anti-Soviet organization in 1923, was the first Prime Minister of a national Soviet Republic to be arrested. Trotsky even asserted that Sultan-Galiyev was the first prominent member of the Communist Party to be arrested on Stalin's order.¹

The trial of Sultan-Galiyev took place as late as November, 1929. It had to be staged to discourage support of 'Sultan-Galiyevism', a progressive form of Tartar nationalism, which was prevalent among the Tartar people. In connection with the trial the Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Tartaria issued a warning against the dangerous ideology of pan-Turkism. The committee appealed to the party members 'to extirpate the remnants of Sultan-Galiyevism, to reinforce the fight against nationalistic prejudices among the backward masses, to unmask the protagonists of the Sultan-Galiyev ideology still existing in our party'.²

In spite of a thorough purge effected in 1929-30 among Sultan-Galiyev supporters, new trouble occurred in 1932, when the government of Tartaria had to take further 'energetic measures' against the personnel of the state publishing house and the Tartar Pedagogical Institute in Kazan, where bourgeois nationalist elements were said to predominate.³ These were, however, but small incidents in a hard and protracted struggle, in which not this or that group of persons nor single institutions were at stake but Islam and national traditions as a whole.

There is, indeed, no other Moslem people in the Soviet Union among which Bolshevism tried so hard to wipe out 'religious prejudices' as among the Tartars. This attempt was carried out with the help of anti-religious journals in the Tartar language like *Fen-Em-Din* (Religion and Science) and *Sugyshchan Allasyz* (The Militant Godless), and also by persistent campaigns against the observance of the Moslem holiday Kurban-Bairam. The so-called 'Alphabetic Revolution', too, was primarily an instrument in the fight against religion. Although the 'Alphabetic Revolution' affected nearly all the non-Slav peoples of the Soviet Union, it assumed nowhere else such acute forms as in Tartaria.

The double 'Alphabetic Revolution' consisted of the change-over in

the twenties from the Arabic, Mongol and other alphabets to the Latin alphabet and the replacement of the Latin alphabet by the Russian in the late thirties. These two operations constituted undoubtedly the most fateful events on the cultural front of Soviet nationalities policy in the first thirty years of Soviet power.

THE FIRST 'ALPHABETIC REVOLUTION'

Lenin himself described the first part of the 'Alphabetic Revolution', the 'latinization', as the 'Great Revolution in the East'. The act of compelling dozens of nationalities to abandon their ancient cultural tradition dating back through centuries and symbolically expressed in their alphabets had indeed an indisputable revolutionary significance. The 'latinization' was not an emanation of the Soviet régime nor an absolutely essential point of the Bolshevik programme. The idea of replacing the difficult Arabic by an easier alphabet had emerged in the nineteenth century and the Azerbaidzhani poet, Akhundov, advocated it as early as 1878. The first text-book written for a people of Russia on the basis of the Latin alphabet was published shortly before the October Revolution: it was the so-called 'Novgorodov Alphabet', an adaptation of the Latin alphabet to the Yakut language. Its author was a Yakut intellectual, S. Novgorodov, who had graduated at the St. Petersburg School of Oriental Languages. The biggest and most decisive step towards 'latinization' came from outside Russia, from Kemalist Turkey, where the abolition of the Arabic script was one of the most drastic measures taken by the great Kemal Atatürk.

However, though not having the initiative in the 'latinization', Soviet Russia carried it through on such an enormous scale that 'latinization' and Soviet nationalities policy in the East became for a time almost identical notions. The reasons which prompted the Soviet Government to press for the general acceptance of the Latin alphabet were manifold:

1. The Arabic alphabet was synonymous with Islam, the Koran and the Shariah, and thus with the perpetuation of religious influences on the millions of Moslems of the U.S.S.R. A similar link existed between Buddhism and the characters used by the Mongols of Russia and the Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia. Thus the introduction of the Latin alphabet meant the elimination of traditions contrary to the spirit of the new Soviet epoch and so rendered an anti-religious education easier.
2. The Arabic and other 'archaic' alphabets delayed the cultural development of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., because they were difficult to learn and were not suitable for the mechanized age which Soviet power wanted to inaugurate. It was a complicated matter to produce typewriters or typographical machines for peoples using the old alphabets. Their serial production became easy as soon as the Latin alphabet was adopted

despite the numerous additional letters outside the ordinary Latin alphabet necessitated by the phonetics of the various languages.

3. The transition to the Latin alphabet made it easier for the Russians to acquire at least some notion of the languages of their non-Russian fellow-citizens, to check on their national literatures and to translate them into Russian. The period of industrialization was resulting in many new contacts between Russians and the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. and relations between the two were to be improved by removing the obstacle of the 'archaic' alphabets.

4. The new alphabet was an excellent means of weeding out all the books in the existing literatures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. which were imbued with the spirit of the past and thus either useless or dangerous from the Soviet point of view. By changing over from one alphabet to another the Soviet Government had an opportunity to pick out from the old literature all that did not conflict with the objectives of the new régime and to reprint it in Latin characters, whilst the other works could no longer be understood by the rising generations and were consigned to oblivion in archives and oriental libraries.

5. The changing of the alphabet was intended to help in putting into effect the slogan 'Workers of the World Unite' and particularly in creating stronger ties between the proletariat of the West and the toiling masses of the East. For this reason the universal Latin alphabet was chosen; this could not be identified with a single nation or a small group of nations, like the Cyrillic script which is the alphabet of the Eastern Slavs alone.

The introduction of the Latin alphabet in Turkey and in the Soviet Union was by no means the same thing. In Turkey 'latinization' was enacted by a Turkish party backed by a large part of the Turkish people. In the Soviet Union 'latinization' was forced upon the Turkic and other peoples by a predominantly Russian central Government with the co-operation of only a section of the local communists.

In the first years the Soviet régime tried to 'sell' the idea of the Latin alphabet to the Eastern peoples by means of more or less peaceful persuasion. It was even permissible for a certain period to discuss in public the pros and cons of 'latinization', although the régime never made any secret of its preference for the change. The turning-point leading towards a more active 'latinization' policy was the Turkological Congress in Baku which in 1926, under Bolshevik inspiration, gave its scholarly sanction to the Latin alphabet. The official propaganda for 'latinization' became particularly insistent in and after 1927 when an 'All-Union Central Committee for the new Turkic Alphabet' was created in Baku. Three years later it moved to Moscow, reorganized as the 'All-Union Central Committee for the New Alphabet attached to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.'.

This committee no longer 'advised' or 'recommended' but simply ordered, as all Soviet state authorities do, and its activities consequently provoked widespread dissatisfaction among the peoples on whom the new alphabet was imposed. Only primitive ethnical groups like those of the Far North, for instance, who had no alphabets at all before the October Revolution, accepted the new alphabet without opposition. The more educated and developed a people, the greater was, as a rule, their resistance to the 'Alphabetic Revolution' enforced by the Soviet régime.

This was particularly marked in the case of the Volga Tartars who, in Czarist Russia, had attained a comparatively high degree of literacy. The struggle against Bolshevism and Soviet power in Tartaria, therefore, assumed largely the character of a bitter and protracted fight against the new Latin alphabet and for the maintenance of the Arabic alphabet. The Tartar intellectuals thought that from a purely practical point of view there was the less reason to adopt the Latin alphabet because a reformed Arabic alphabet had been introduced in Tartaria after the October Revolution. Books in large number had been printed in this new 'reformed alphabet' which fully satisfied pedagogical requirements.*⁴ The Latin alphabet was so unpopular among the Tartars that even leading Tartar communists did not dare to support the reform. Contributors to the official Tartar Party newspaper *Kzyl Tatarstan* (Red Tartaria) as late as 1926 adhered to the view that 'latinization' was impracticable.⁵

The régime broke the opposition of the 'Arabists' in the late twenties by stamping as a counter-revolutionary and enemy of the people everybody who refused to renounce the Arabic alphabet, which the Tartars, together with many other Turkic peoples, considered an essential part of their national civilization, religion and way of life. It was tantamount to high treason not to accept the 'Alphabet of Lenin' and the 'Alphabet of the October Revolution', as the Latin characters were then described.

After a short period in which the Arabic and Latin alphabets co-existed in Tartaria, printing in Arabic letters was stopped completely in 1929. In the second half of that year the Latin alphabet became official and exclusive in Tartaria as well as in most of the other Soviet Republics and Autonomous Soviet Republics.

For a time the Turkic peoples carried on a sort of guerilla war against the new alphabet, and it was only on July 16th, 1935, that the Presidium of the Soviet of Nationalities declared the transition to the new alphabet to have been 'successfully concluded on the whole'. The official balance-sheet of the 'latinization' was indeed impressive: the Soviet State had created sixty-nine new alphabets on the basis of the Latin alphabet for 26,000,000 people.

* Similar reformed Arabic alphabets existed in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The cost of the 'latinization' in terms of money, manpower and human energy is incalculable. It would have been an excellent investment had the Latin alphabet remained in force, but its triumph was short-lived. The official enthusiasm over the 'great revolution in the East' began to dwindle as soon as it had reached its peak.

THE SECOND 'ALPHABETIC REVOLUTION'

Official Soviet experts on linguistic and cultural affairs felt that 'latinization' had been overdone. They found that some of the new alphabets had been badly compiled and that others were altogether useless, since they had been created for small peoples who had no prospect of developing a culture of their own.

It appeared more and more evident that the 'latinization' was hampering the non-Russian peoples in gaining a good command of the Russian language, since to learn Russian meant to learn a second alphabet. When on March 13th, 1938, the Soviet Government and the Communist Central Committee issued their joint decree on the obligatory teaching of Russian in all non-Russian schools, a revision of the 'latinization' policy became urgently necessary.

Whilst the first doubts of 'latinization' had been suggested by purely practical considerations, they were later reinforced by weighty political motives. The Latin alphabet had been a natural by-product of the idea of world revolution, conceived in the initial stage of Soviet power and of a genuinely international Bolshevism. Under the 'socialism in one country' policy the Latin alphabet turned out to be a barrier separating the Russians and Ukrainians from the non-Slav nationalities. The desire to remove this barrier was felt with special intensity in the late thirties in connection with a noticeable return to Russian national traditions.

Thus the Soviet central Government and the All-Union Communist Party proclaimed the liquidation of 'latinization' and the inauguration of a second 'Alphabetic Revolution' which can be summed up in the formula 'one Union, one party, one alphabet'. Some allowances, it is true, were made for Armenians, Georgians and Jews and for peoples who had had Latin alphabets before the 'latinization' drive, like Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Finns. The triumph of the Latin alphabet over the Arabic one was the victory of the secular State over religion. The triumph of the Russian alphabet over the Latin script marked a victory of Russian civilization of which Czarist Russia could never have dreamed. Czarist Russia had tried to introduce the Russian alphabet for non-Russian languages on a small scale, mostly as an instrument for Christianization. The nationalities which had used the Russian alphabet before 1917 included the Mordvinians, Mari, Chuvash, Komi, Udmurts, Ossetins, Oirots, Avars and Kumyks. Most of them had to

abandon the Russian alphabet during the 'latinization' period under the Soviet régime. Experiments with the Russian alphabet had also been made among the Kazan Tartars. A well-known Orientalist, N. N. Ilimsky, had compiled text-books in the Russian script to be used in special schools for baptized Tartar children. About 500,000 Tartar books, mostly on religious subjects, were printed in the Russian alphabet during the fifty years preceding the First World War. Such efforts were without much effect on the cultural life of the Tartar people, who under the old régime remained Moslems and attached to the Arabic alphabet, since Czarist Russia never applied such drastic measures of collective persuasion as the Soviet Union.

Soviet propaganda boosted the change-over to the Russian alphabet as being just as great an advance as 'latinization' had been said to be before. The President of Tartaria, Galei Afzaletdinovich Dinmukhamev, addressing the Supreme Soviet of the Tartar A.S.S.R., welcomed the alphabetic Russification of the Tartars as a 'tremendous and joyful event' and as a 'most important step forward towards the *rapprochement* of Tartar culture with the so exceedingly rich culture of the Russian people'.⁶

He also asserted that the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Tartaria of May 5th, 1939, concerning the introduction of the Russian alphabet, was issued 'in response to the petitions of the toiling masses' of the Republic. The fulfilment of the alleged petitions implied the destruction of the large amount of literature which the Tartar State Publishing House had produced since the introduction of the Latin alphabet. This publishing house, called 'Tatgosizdat', claimed to have printed 14,037,540 copies of school text-books and 2,049,900 copies of the classics of Marxism in the period between 1935 and 1939 alone. Following the introduction of the Russian alphabet 'Tatgosizdat' had to start again from scratch. The same happened, of course, in all the other Turko-Tartar and Moslem republics of the U.S.S.R., where the second 'Alphabetic Revolution' was carried out in 1939 and 1940.

IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLES IN WAR AND POST-WAR PERIOD

The second 'Alphabetic Revolution' in Tartaria by no means completed the spiritual pacification of the Tartars. The next task to be accomplished was to bring Tartar history into line with the Bolshevik conception of Russian history. When in the late thirties the Russian communists re-introduced the cult of Peter the Great, Suvorov and Kutuzov, the Tartar intellectuals thought that they were also entitled to some hero-worship and started to rewrite and reinterpret their history in the same way as the Russians did. They extolled the Golden Horde as a progressive State in its period and glorified the Tartar Khan *Idegei*.

This new nationalistic deviation was tolerated in the early part of the German-Russian War when the Soviet Government could not afford to antagonize the Tartar nationalists. Only when victory over Germany seemed to be within reach did the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party open an offensive against the 'deviation'.

On August 9th, 1944, the Central Committee issued a statement ordering the Tartar Provincial Committee of the Communist Party 'to proceed to a scientific revision of the history of Tartaria, to liquidate the serious shortcomings and mistakes of a nationalistic character committed by individual historians and writers in dealing with Tartar history'. The statement took particular exception to the Idegei cult since 'Idegei had carried out a number of devastating raids against Russian towns and villages'. The Central Committee further advised the Tartar communists to counteract Tartar nationalistic ideology by devoting greater attention to the history of the joint struggle against foreign invaders of Russians, Tartars and other peoples of the U.S.S.R.⁷

The Tartar communist leader, Dinmukhametov, even before the Central Committee had issued its statement, clearly indicated what sort of conception of history Soviet power wanted the Tartars to accept in exchange for their national history as they themselves understood it. 'The Tartar people', said Dinmukhametov, when addressing the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in March, 1944, 'has been fighting for a long period shoulder to shoulder with the Russian people against all and every kind of foreign invaders. As far back as 400 years ago the Tartar Dzhigits (horsemen) fought in the same ranks with the Russians'.⁸ In this conception of history there is naturally no room for a Golden Horde, a Khan *Idegei* or the conquest of the Kazan Khanate by Ivan the Terrible and it is not astonishing therefore that leading Tartar intellectuals still refused to accept the new line after the Central Committee statement of August, 1944. Even the Tartar Provincial Committee of the party which had been instructed to restore 'order' in the ideological field was at first somewhat reluctant to act too severely towards authors who had 'sinned' in the eyes of the central Government. In 1947 the Tartar communists became more active, sacked the entire board of editors of the only Tartar literary journal and expelled the main culprits from the party. *Pravda* was still not satisfied and went on to accuse the Tartar communists of serious shortcomings in their ideological work.⁹

The idea of Russian-Tartar brotherhood should not be considered as wrong merely because the Soviet power proclaims it. The Tartars are surrounded by Russians on all sides, they are dependent on them in their cultural development and there can be no solution of the Tartar problem without or against the Russians. The idea of Russian-Tartar brotherhood which must be considered independently of the régime ruling in Moscow and Kazan is, therefore, not only reasonable but the only

possible political conception for the Tartars from the point of view of national self-preservation. The brotherhood ideology is, however, turned into a complete absurdity if Russian communists forcibly impose it on the Tartars or if this ideology is intended to deprive Tartar history of all national Tartar features to the extent that it becomes Russian history.

The great Tartar poet, Gabdullah Tukay (1886–1913), clearly realized that Russian-Tartar co-operation must be the cornerstone of any Tartar policy in Russia. In 1907 Tukay wrote a poem, *We shall not go away*, in which he denounced pan-Islamic propaganda for a mass emigration of the Tartars to Turkey. 'Destiny has linked us with the Russian land, here are we born, here we grew up and here we shall die', is the keynote of this poem. Both Russians and Tartars, said Tukay, had one holy dream and one aim in common, to see Russia free.¹⁰ The Soviet régime greatly popularized Tukay, notably emphasizing his praise of the Russians and their great poets, for indeed he always prided himself on being their pupil. The poem *We shall not go away* is quoted in Soviet Russia more than anything else that Tukay wrote. It is quoted as a historic document though to see Russia free is still a 'holy dream', a common aim for both Russians and Tartars.

TARTARS 'AT HOME' AND IN DIASPORA

Tartaria supplies a classic example, not only of Soviet cultural policy in non-Russian territories, but also of the changes which have occurred under the Soviet régime in the ethnic composition of the Autonomous Republics and Provinces. In 1926 the Tartars still had an absolute majority in the Tartar A.S.S.R. They then formed 52·1 per cent of the population of Tartaria and the Russians 40·1 per cent. In 1939 out of a population of 2,915,277 the Tartars had 48·8 per cent and the Russians 42·9 per cent.

More important than the numerical relation between Russians and Tartars is the fact that the Russians still dominate the great majority of the economically important and skilled professions in Tartaria. The Tartars on the other hand have remained a people primarily engaged in agriculture. Among the engineers, constructors and architects who worked in Tartaria in 1939 the Tartars themselves numbered 13·75 per cent only. Among industrial managers there were 23·76 per cent Tartars, among accountants and book-keepers 18·22 per cent, among scientific workers, professors and lecturers of higher educational institutes 18·16 per cent. Among doctors there were only 16·5 per cent Tartars and among dentists no more than 13·1 per cent. However, even these percentages, low as they are in relation to the strength of the Tartar population, constitute a tremendous achievement compared with the Czarist period.

The Tartars had their full share of teachers in primary and secondary schools, where 48·75 per cent of the total were Tartars in 1939; but the demand for higher education is still much smaller among the Tartars than among Russians. Shortly before the Second World War only 17·2 per cent of the students of Tartaria's higher educational institutes, including Kazan University, were Tartars.¹¹ This percentage makes it unlikely that the Tartars will increase their share in the academic professions of their country within any foreseeable time.

If Tartaria is less valuable from the economic point of view than other Autonomous Soviet Republics which specialized in the production of gold, coal or oil,* it has one asset which no other A.S.S.R. has: its manpower reserves.

Czarist Russia recruited from the Volga Tartars coalminers for the Donets Basin, which thus became the cradle of the Tartar proletariat. The Soviet régime, far from sending the Tartars back to their homeland, increased their number through systematic recruiting campaigns. Before the Second World War the number of Tartar coalminers in the Donets Basin must have been at least 60,000 against half this figure before the First World War.

The second largest coalmining centre of the Soviet Union, the Kuznetsk Basin (*Kuzbass*) of Western Siberia, was also developed with the assistance of Tartar manpower. The number of Tartar coalminers in the *Kuzbass* had already reached 20,000 by the early thirties.

The Moscow Province became another centre of a Tartar working class and the last recorded figure of Tartars in the capital itself was 35,000. In 1931, 15 per cent of all Tartars organized in trade unions lived in the Moscow Province against 36·2 per cent in Tartaria itself. The textile industry of Ivanovo, the Russian Manchester, had absorbed up to the early thirties 20,000 Tartar workers.

The large number of Tartars living in the diaspora is a great drawback from a national Tartar point of view, since it accelerates the Russification of the Tartars and weakens their position in the Tartar A.S.S.R.

II. BASHKIRIA - THE NEW OIL REPUBLIC

'GREATER BASHKIRIA' AGAINST 'GREATER TARTARIA'

The Bashkir Republic, as we have seen, owes its existence primarily to a Soviet policy of 'divide and rule'. The task of Bashkir nationalism from the Soviet point of view, was to render impossible the emergence of a Moslem State on the borders of Europe and Asia, which might have covered over 150,000 square miles with a population of over 5,000,000.

* Oil deposits do exist in Tartaria and form part of the 'Second Baku', but the Tartar oil industry, though growing, is still in its initial stage.

The Bashkirs differ in origin from the Tartars and they also have a history of their own, a history which includes a very brilliant record of resistance to the Czarist régime conducted by outstanding leaders like Batyrsha, who headed a revolt in 1755, or Salavat Yulayev, the Bashkir comrade-in-arms of the Russian Cossack rebel Pugachov, whose revolt started in 1773.

Thus there is enough historical material to build up something like a Soviet Bashkir national state ideology, but there are not enough Bashkirs to make the Bashkir Republic anything more than a propaganda instrument and a tool for keeping the Volga Moslems apart. Not only did the Tartars dispute the claim that the Bashkirs were a separate nation in the cultural sense and therefore advocate the extension of Tartar culture to Bashkiria, but also many Bashkirs, particularly those living in border areas, accepted the thesis of the Tartar-Bashkir identity. The dividing line between Bashkirs and Tartars is even more fluid than between other Turkic peoples, and practically all Soviet population and cultural statistics confirm that there can hardly be any question of separate Bashkir and Tartar national individualities. A person who would call himself 'Tartar' at one census might describe himself as 'Bashkir' at the next. Other people who feel that the Bashkirs are something historically distinct from the Tartars would still consider themselves as part of the Tartar people culturally. Thus there were 713,000 Bashkirs in the whole of the Soviet Union according to the 1926 census, but only 53·8 per cent of them professed to speak the Bashkir language.

Although the existence of a Bashkir national culture was questionable, the Soviet central Government wanted to make the Bashkir A.S.S.R. as large as possible. In 1922 the Soviet Government created a 'Greater Bashkiria' which with 55,000 square miles was more than twice as big as the Tartar A.S.S.R. Only 28·5 per cent of the population of this 'Greater Bashkiria' were actually Bashkirs in 1926, and in 1933 only 23·5 per cent, but these percentages have little value, since language and nationality do not coincide in Bashkiria. Moreover, there are minor Turkic ethnical groups like the Teptyars who are sometimes added to the Bashkirs and sometimes to the Tartars. If school statistics can give an approximately fair picture of the various nationalities in Bashkiria, they show that Bashkirs in the cultural sense form less than one-fifth of the population of the Bashkir A.S.S.R. In 1946-7 education was given in the Bashkir language only in 18·5 per cent of the 5,126 schools of Bashkiria; and on the basis of the number of pupils attending these schools the percentage of Bashkirs would be even lower.¹²

The so-called Bashkiria is not and has never been a national Bashkir republic and it is even gradually losing the character of a Moslem republic. In 1926 the Moslems of Bashkiria, Tartars and Bashkirs combined, were just slightly stronger than the Slavs of the Autonomous

Republic, while almost one-tenth of the population was divided up between the Chuvash and Ugro-Finnish peoples. It is a fair assumption that the two Moslem peoples together have now not even a relative majority in Bashkiria. Out of the twenty deputies which the Bashkir A.S.S.R. elected in 1947 to the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., only eight could be identified as Bashkir or Tartar Moslems, while twelve were non-Moslems, mainly Russians.

Ufa, the capital of the Bashkir A.S.S.R., is still the religious centre of the Moslem communities of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Mufti of Ufa is one of the four most important religious leaders of the Moslems of the entire U.S.S.R. The Mufti of Ufa has on various occasions addressed the Moslems of Russia and the world with officially inspired statements supporting the aims of Soviet foreign policy, much as the 'Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russians' used to do in his appeals to the Christian world.

BASHKIR NATIONAL OPPOSITION

In view of the complicated ethnical composition of Bashkiria, Soviet power had to fight on three fronts in that republic. The Soviet Government had to check Great Russian chauvinism, which showed no understanding of the subtle communist manœuvre — the creation of the Bashkir A.S.S.R. —, it had to put down the 'agencies' of Sultan-Galiyevism in Bashkiria, which persisted in their demand for a 'Greater Tartaria', and it also had to fight against Bashkir nationalism.

Although Bashkir nationalism played to a certain degree into the hands of the Soviet power, it easily got out of control. The Soviet Government was interested only in a Bashkir cultural nationalism severing all ties with the rest of the Turkic and Moslem world. The genuine Bashkir nationalists, however, combined their propaganda for a distinct Bashkir national ideology with pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. In 1919–21 the young Soviet power had to protect itself by armed struggle against this type of Bashkir nationalist. The Bashkirs had a national leader in Zak-Validov, who, in 1919, became head of a Bashkir national government. After a short period of co-operation with the communists Validov, together with many of his supporters, fled to Central Asia in 1920. For a fairly long time the heritage of Bashkir nationalist tendencies which Validov left behind was stigmatized by the Communist Party as 'Validovism'.

When political 'Validovism' was liquidated, something like a cultural 'Validovism' remained in being. Thus in 1928–29 a 'counter-revolutionary' literary organization, called 'Usyu' and in 1930 another organization, 'Dzhidegen', were, in the Soviet jargon, 'unmasked' and 'smashed'. Both these organizations had tried to fight against the influence of the Communist Party on Bashkir literature.¹⁸

An important section of Bashkir intellectuals came into conflict with the Soviet power over the language problem. They agreed with the Soviet régime that the Bashkir language ought to be encouraged at the expense of the Tartar language. They were, however, unwilling to accept the 'sovietisms' and 'internationalisms' which Moscow wanted to introduce into the new Bashkir written language, and favoured Arabic and 'archaistic' expressions instead. If they accepted 'sovietisms' they spelled them 'wrongly' and tried to adapt their spelling to what they thought to be the spirit of the Bashkir language. Moscow rebuked the leadership of the Communist Party of Bashkiria for having tolerated these 'mistakes' until 1933.¹⁴

Bashkir nationalism survived the liquidation of Validovism, the triumph of Bolshevism on the language front and even the big purge of 1937, when a large number of 'bourgeois nationalists' were liquidated as alleged German and Japanese spies. The latter included the Prime Minister of Bashkiria, Bulashev, and the President, Tagirov. The survival of Bashkir nationalism was attested in particular by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in a statement issued in January, 1945, only a few months after the Tartars had incurred the displeasure of the Kremlin. The statement alleged that a number of historical and literary works in the Bashkir language had idealized the Bashkir patriarchal past and had proved incapable of discriminating 'between the genuine national liberation movements of the Bashkir people and aggressions carried out by feudal lords against neighbouring nations'.¹⁵

The statement of the Central Committee made particular mention of a play, *Idukay and Muradym*, as a striking example of nationalistic deviation. Yet a letter to Stalin signed by over a million workers, collective farmers and intellectuals of Bashkiria had described the same play in March, 1944, as an outstanding literary work filling the people of Bashkiria with pride.¹⁶

The Central Committee statement also criticized a drama in verse, *Kakhym-Turya*, likewise mentioned in the letter to Stalin, for misrepresenting the history of Bashkir participation in the war against Napoleon. The drama maintained that there had been no complete harmony between Russian and Bashkir warriors. This was a particularly sore point, since Soviet propaganda throughout the years 1941-45 had persistently recalled to the Bashkirs the glory of their twenty cavalry regiments which had helped the Czar to ward off the French invasion of 1812.

Bashkir national opposition to the Soviet régime did not centre on cultural topics alone but also touched on the real problem of Bashkiria, which is the economic exploitation of that country by the Russian state. The development of a mining industry which was started under Peter the Great in the territory of the Bashkirs was probably the heaviest

blow inflicted on this people, since it added Russian industrial colonization to agricultural colonization. When the Soviet régime came to power Bashkir nationalists believed that Bashkiria's industrialization could be stopped and the Bashkirs thus saved from being engulfed by the Russian advance. The Soviet régime was bound to stamp out the anti-industrialization tendencies among the Bashkirs even more energetically than cultural counter-revolution, for Soviet economic planners have a great future in store for Bashkiria.

BASHKIR OIL

Only two dates are likely to be of real importance to a future historian of Bashkiria, 1557 and 1932. In 1557 the Bashkirs started to pay *yasak* to the Russian Czar and in 1932 oil was discovered in their territory. This discovery not only was certain to affect the fate of the peoples of Bashkiria but also had far-reaching consequences for the whole of Soviet economic planning. The Bashkir oil was located exactly where it was needed, in an area far distant from every possible future theatre of war, on the borders of Europe and Asia, near the big industrial centres of Western Siberia and the Ural region.

As soon as the oil was found events moved quickly. In 1934 a 'Central Scientific Research Laboratory' was established in Ufa. In 1936 and 1937 the annual output of the Bashkirian oil wells reached just under 1,000,000 tons.¹⁷ The centre of the new oil district was the Bashkir village of Ishimbayevo, which was transformed into the town of Ishimbay in 1940. Ishimbay became the heart of the so-called 'Second Baku', which is a collective denomination for all the new oil-bearing areas between Volga and Ural. During the war, when Baku was for a time more or less cut off from the rest of the U.S.S.R., Ishimbay saved Russia from the oil famine. By 1942 the 'Second Baku' was producing 7,000,000 tons of oil, and after the war Bashkir oil continued to remain a very important factor in Soviet economy.

In 1945 Ishimbay was given a brother in the form of a second oil town, Oktyabrsk, erected on the site of another Bashkir village, Narishevo. Yet another Bashkir village, Chernyakovka, on the outskirts of Ufa, had developed into the town of Chernyakovsk and became a centre of oil-refining and machine-building industry.¹⁸

From the standpoint of the Soviet State the foundation of Ishimbay and Oktyabrsk meant more oil; from the standpoint of the Bashkirs and Tartars it meant that more Russians entered Bashkiria. No group of workers in Russia seems to be so much on the move as oil-workers, and many of the new Russian inhabitants of Ishimbay and Oktyabrsk did not come directly from Russia proper but via Baku. In a letter to Generalissimo Stalin the oil-workers of Bashkiria stated that many of them had

carried with them from Baku 'the glorious Bolshevik traditions of knowledge and experience of the oldest oilworkers of the Soviet Union.'¹⁹

The building of Russian towns which are taking the place of Bashkir villages is no new feature introduced by the Soviet régime. Just as Soviet power is creating 'oil towns', so long ago the Czarist régime used to build Russian mining towns on Bashkir soil. Oktyabrsk and Ishimbay are the modern equivalent of Chelyabinsk and Zlatoust which came into being in the eighteenth century.

III. THE CHUVASH – NATIONALISM WITHOUT PAN-ISM

The Chuvash belong neither to the Finnish-Ugrian group nor to the Turkic group of peoples. Their language, it is true, is considered as a Turkic one, but since almost all Chuvash are Christians there is hardly any cultural community between them and the other Turkic peoples adhering to the Moslem faith. The Chuvash form an isolated unit among the peoples of Inner Russia and have developed neither pan-Finnish nor pan-Turkic trends. They have nevertheless produced a strong nationalistic ideology of their own which in the first years of Soviet power proved to be a serious handicap to the Communist régime.

The Chuvash national ideology is under the spell of the Bulgarian Empire, which had its heyday between the tenth and twelfth centuries and which covered the central Volga areas. The Chuvash claim to be descended from the ancient Bulgars, the ruling people of the Bulgarian Empire, who played an important civilizing part and set the example of a stable way of life to other peoples who settled after them on the banks of the Volga.

The Chuvash claim to the heritage of the Bulgarian Empire became particularly loud in the years following the October Revolution in which there was a general national revival among the Volga nationalities. Chuvash intellectuals insisted on their people assuming the name of 'Bulgars' while 'Chuvashia' was to be renamed 'Bulgaria'. The Soviet régime which had allowed many peoples of Russia to change their names if they so desired refused to grant the same request to the Chuvash. The régime considered that in the case of the Chuvash a change of name would encourage a rather dangerous nationalistic myth. According to the generally accepted conception of history the 'Bulgarian Empire' was a multi-national state and the Chuvash could therefore raise no valid claim to be the sole descendants of the medieval 'Bulgars'. Thus the Kazan Tartars could also look upon the Bulgars as their ancestors and they might have felt resentment had the Chuvash been allowed to monopolize that historic name. Moreover, the Soviet Government might have feared that the Soviet nationalities policy would perhaps have looked ridiculous had the Chuvash been granted a name which is practically

identical with that of the Bulgarian people in the Balkans. Even after the Soviet Government had prohibited the use of the name of 'Bolgars' instead of 'Chuvash', the writers of Chuvashia continued in plays and novels to extol the memory of the Bulgarian Empire until the Communist Party put an energetic check on such expressions of romantic nationalism.²⁰

Chuvash nationalism, however, was not only a romantic conception looking to the past but also Chuvash communists coupled their historical theories with certain territorial claims. They demanded in particular that the town of Simbirsk - Ulyanovsk - should be incorporated into Chuvashia. Simbirsk had been in the past the most important national centre of the Chuvash. The first Chuvash books were printed there in Czarist times and the first Chuvash secondary school was founded in the town. Whatever Simbirsk's role in Chuvash cultural history might have been, it is and always was a Russian town of considerable size. The demand for the cession to Chuvashia of Simbirsk, the birthplace of Lenin, was not open to discussion and infuriated the Communist Central Committee against the 'Chuvash comrades', whom it denounced as 'nationalists'. The Central Committee considered that the main reason for the strength of Chuvash nationalism was the predominantly agricultural character of the Chuvash A.S.S.R. To provide the republic with class-conscious workers who would not bother about the ancient 'Bulgarian Empire' and the purity of the Chuvash language, the boundaries of Chuvashia were altered in 1926 in such a way as to include an additional district with a strong working-class population. Within a few months the proletarian element within the Communist Party of Chuvashia had increased from nine to forty per cent.²¹

Notwithstanding the change taking place within the party, Chuvashia remained an essentially agrarian country. Its peasantry in the early thirties violently resisted the introduction of collective farms, and there were even attempts on the life of communist propagandists in Chuvash villages. To remedy this situation, the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party in Gorky took the situation in hand and restored 'order'.²²

Chuvashia is in a special position among the autonomous republics of the R.S.F.S.R., inasmuch as the Chuvash have a large majority within the administrative unit which bears their name. In 1930, out of Chuvashia's 933,000 inhabitants, 74.9 per cent were Chuvash, 19.7 per cent Russians, 2.5 per cent Tartars and 2.6 per cent Mordvinians. The Chuvash majority is not threatened by Russian colonization since no industrial or mining projects are planned which would require the introduction of additional manpower. Over 500,000 of the 1,367,000 Chuvash live outside the Chuvash A.S.S.R., mostly in other autonomous republics, particularly in Tartaria, where there are 150,000.

From a merely statistical point of view the Chuvash occupied the thirteenth place among the peoples of the pre-1939 Soviet Union, but this is no pointer to their real relative importance. Many of those whom ethnical statistics still describe as 'Chuvash' are at least half Russianized and belong to the Russian cultural sphere. Before 1917 Russification had made considerable progress among the Chuvash. They used to learn the Russian language most willingly, liked to have family relations with their Russian neighbours and were glad to send their children to Russian schools. Chuvash boys who had been trained as priests and teachers used to return to their native villages as ardent propagandists of Russian culture. The Chuvash-Russian *rapprochement* was particularly encouraged by the fact that a Russianized Chuvash educationalist, I. Y. Yakovlev, compiled in 1872 a Chuvash alphabet on the basis of the Russian one. This alphabet created in the 'dark ages' of Czarist Russia, existed practically unaltered until 1938 when it was somewhat reformed but not abolished altogether. The Chuvash have always looked upon Yakovlev as a benefactor and national hero. Their reverence for Yakovlev was for a long time frowned upon by the Communist Party because of his reactionary political views, his opposition to the revolution of 1905 and his close ties with the Orthodox Church. After the Second World War the official Soviet attitude towards Yakovlev changed, the Soviet press honoured his memory and recalled that he had been encouraged in his work by Lenin's father, I. N. Ulyanov (1830-1886), a school inspector of the Simbirsk Government.²³

IV. 'FINNISH RUSSIA'

Russian colonization resulted in the extinction of several Finnish peoples who in the ninth and tenth centuries occupied the entire vast space of Northern and part of Central Russia. The Russian people absorbed such Finnish tribes as Ves, Merya and Muroma, and this process of absorption and assimilation led to the formation of a Slavo-Finnish mixed race which from a linguistic and cultural point of view became Russian.

Other Finnish tribes were spared total extirpation. Although decimated by Russian conquest and colonization and ousted from their original areas of settlement, they were able to carry on their existence as separate nationalities. The four most important surviving Finnish peoples in the Eastern and North-Eastern part of European Russia are the Mordvinians, the Mari, the Udmurts and the Komi.

MORDVINIANS: SEVEN CENTURIES OF RUSSIFICATION

These four peoples were subject to Russian colonization in varying degrees, but of all four the Mordvinians were undoubtedly most affected

by Russification. According to the Soviet census 1,431,000 Mordvinians lived in the U.S.S.R. in 1939. Numerically the Mordvinians are thus stronger than Tadzhiks, Turkmenians, Kirghiz, or Estonians – all peoples having Soviet Republics of their own. In reality, however, the Mordvinians are in a far more hopeless position than even some of the smallest nationalities of the Soviet Union.

The most essential fact in the history of the Mordvinians is their slow but steady migration eastwards to which the Russian advance has compelled them ever since the twelfth century. In 1220 the Russian conquest of the original Mordvinian homeland – the territory on the left bank of the river Oka and its tributaries – entered upon an active stage by the foundation of Nizhny Novgorod. To-day, under the name of Gorky, one of the biggest industrial centres of the Soviet Union, Nizhny Novgorod was then but an isolated Russian stronghold on Mordvinian soil. Conveniently situated at the Oka-Volga confluence it became a focal point for Russian expansion in the Upper Volga region. As the Russian eastward expansion went on, an ever-increasing number of Mordvinians came under Russian rule and more and more Mordvinian land was taken over by Russian landowners and peasants. Many Mordvinians tried to escape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from Russian civilization and conversion to Christianity by finding new homes east of the Volga, but there too they fell under Russian political rule and Russian cultural influence. Russian colonization split the Mordvinians into a large number of small groups scattered over a vast area stretching from Nizhny Novgorod over Saratov to the Caspian Sea and from the region of Ryazan to Ufa, not to mention the minor Mordvinian diaspora in other parts of Russia.

The Soviet authorities, for a considerable period, disbelieved in the possibility of a national renaissance of the Mordvinians and hesitated for over ten years to grant them a special autonomous territory. As late as 1928 a Mordvinian 'Autonomous District' was created, which was transformed into an 'Autonomous Province' in 1930 and into an 'Autonomous Republic' in 1934. From the point of view of the Mordvinian people little was achieved by the creation of the autonomous territory, for more than half of the Mordvinians of the U.S.S.R. remained outside its boundaries. Moreover, the Russians had and still have a solid majority in the Mordvinian A.S.S.R. Figures referring to 1936 showed that on the 10,000 square miles of the little republic there lived 785,000 Russians out of a total population of 1,327,000. The Mordvinian minority, to which less than 500,000 people belonged, was split up into two groups of almost equal strength, namely, the Moksha-Mordvinians numbering 245,000, and the Erza-Mordvinians with 232,000. A Mordvinian proverb says that the Mordvinian people has one head but two mouths, which, indeed, is true since Erza and Moksha

Mordvinians have each their own literary language. The language differences between Moksha and Erza are so great that an Erza and a Moksha Mordvinian when talking together have usually to take refuge in Russian as a medium of intercourse.

Owing to the strength of the Russian element in Mordvinia, it is only natural that complaints about 'Great-Russian chauvinism' among the communists of that territory should have been more frequent than charges against Mordvinian national deviationists. The 'Great-Russian chauvinism' showed itself in the doubts which the local Russian communists felt about the wisdom of creating an autonomous Mordvinian territory. Similar tendencies existed and probably still exist among the Russian communists of other autonomous provinces and republics as well.

Although the Mordvinians constituted a much smaller problem to Moscow than most other nationalities, a Mordvinian nationalist opposition took shape nevertheless, and was called 'Sukhorukovism' after its leader Sukhorukov, a former Vice-President of the provincial government, the Executive Committee of Mordvinia. Early in 1934, 'Sukhorukovism' was officially stated to have been 'unmasked', but it was regretfully added that its roots still remained.²⁴

The attempt at a Mordvinian national revival on a religious basis which had been made at the beginning of the nineteenth century caused considerable uneasiness to the Czarist authorities, but it is doubtful whether it still had any major repercussions under the Soviet régime. This national-religious renaissance movement was led by the Mordvinian Kuzma Alexeyev, whom the Russians nicknamed 'Kuzma, the Mordvinian God'. Kuzma predicted that the Christian faith would soon disappear and that the old pagan faith of the Mordvinians would triumph. Kuzma did not confine his predictions to the religious field alone; he promised the Mordvinians that after having broken the yoke of the landowners they would become a free people, the first on earth. As Kuzma had assembled thousands of followers around him, the Czarist governor of Nizhny Novgorod thought it wise to arrest the 'prophet' and some of his disciples. The memory of Kuzma and his prophecies lived on among the Mordvinians and the Soviet régime took his popularity into account. The religious side of Kuzma's activities had to be ignored, of course, but the Mordvinians were allowed to look upon him as a sort of forerunner of Bolshevism of the same type as the Russian Cossack rebels Stenka Razin and Emelyan Pugachov. The state-controlled folk poetry in the Mordvinian language went so far as to claim that Bolshevism had made good Kuzma's prophecies about the emergence of a free Mordvinian people.

MARI: NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS RESISTANCE

The Mari people – 481,000 strong in 1939 – were likewise pressed back and scattered by the Russian drive to the East. Within a few centuries they had to change their areas of settlement several times. To-day the bulk of the Mari dwell between the Volga and Vyatka rivers and only a small remnant is left on the right bank of the Volga, where once the majority had their homes.

The Mari, despite their smaller number, are in a much better position as an ethnic group than the Mordvinians and when the Mari Autonomous Province was founded in November 1920 (transformed into a Republic in 1936), almost three-fifths of the entire Mari people could be included in that territorial unit. The remainder of the Mari had to live in the Bashkir Republic (85,000), in the Tartar Republic (20,000), in various parts of the Ural region (41,000), etc.

The population of the Mari Province was made up in 1926 of 53·3 per cent Mari and 42·3 per cent Russians. However, it must be borne in mind that the Mari, just like the Mordvinians, are sub-divided into two different linguistic groups, the Lowland and Hill Mari, each having its own literature.

Unlike the Mordvinians, the Mari have shown a remarkable tenacity as a people despite the unfavourable situation in which Russian colonization has placed them. The standard work on Russian geography published before the First World War said about the Mari, or, as they used to be called, Cheremiss: 'One meets but seldom a nationality which notwithstanding its low level of development has such a fully crystallized national self-consciousness and which is so much attached to its national existence'.²⁵

This quotation throws light on the difficulties which the Soviet régime experienced from Mari nationalism. The Mari linked the struggle for the conservation of their nationhood with the defence of what may be considered as the Mari national religion. Both Christendom and to a lesser degree Islam had their converts among the Mari, but pagan beliefs and customs remained deep rooted. Instead of going to church or to the mosque the Mari continued to go into their holy birch woods where they said their pagan prayers. They always felt that their existence as a nation would be endangered if they abandoned the old faith. 'If we cease to go to the woods, our whole people will perish', the Mari used to say.

The national-religious movement among the Mari assumed particular liveliness towards the end of the nineteenth century through the foundation of a new influential sect 'Kugu-Sorta', whose teachings are based on a queer mixture of pagan and Christian elements. The 'Kugu-Sorta' sect whose supporters called themselves 'Chi-Mari', i.e. genuine Mari,

opposed a primitive resistance to the Czarist régime and the capitalistic order of society, a resistance which expressed itself in a boycott of factory goods and in the refusal by members of the sect to serve in the war.

After the October Revolution 'Kugu-Sorta' experienced a considerable boom, since many Mari turned away from Christendom when the Orthodox Church was deprived of its official backing. Some native Mari communists (of whom there had never been more than a few hundred) gave moral support to the sect, stressing its revolutionary character, but the leading party organs considered 'Kugu-Sorta' as the most dangerous anti-Soviet organization among the Mari people. The sect opposed, indeed, to the Russian State, whether Czarist or Bolshevik, its own dream of a Mari State without Russians and produced a historical myth depicting the past of the Mari people in the most splendid colours. Thus one of the Mari folk tales which had been traced back to 'Kugu-Sorta' influences started with the words 'And there was a time when the Mari ruled over half of the Russian land and its capital was Maska Ava or Moscow as the Russians called it when our forefathers had been driven away. . . .'

The Mari believed that they founded Moscow, which name they said was derived from Maska Ava, meaning 'mother of the bear'. Apart from propagating an anti-Russian ideology 'Kugu-Sorta' was distinguished by a marked hostility to technical progress. The members of the sect showed a peculiarly strong detestation of the railways passing through the territory of the Mari. They called them 'fire-serpents' and said they would destroy the Mari people.²⁶ No information is available as to the activities of the sect in recent years, but it was still very much alive in the early thirties and seems to have formed some sort of 'united religious front' with other groups ranging from devout Christians to outspoken pagans to resist Bolshevik pressure.

A more sophisticated form of national opposition to Bolshevism than the one represented by the 'Kugu-Sorta' sect also emerged among Mari intellectuals. Some of these intellectuals adhered to pan-Finnish ideas and were more inclined to look towards bourgeois Helsinki for cultural advice than to proletarian Moscow. 'Finnish bourgeois culture' appeared to them as a pattern for the cultural revival of the Mari and other Finnish peoples of the Soviet Union.²⁷ The emergence of these pan-Finnish ideas is the more noteworthy since the Mari had been for centuries under Slav or Tartar influence.

To counterbalance the nationalistic and pan-Finnish ideas current among the Mari, the Soviet authorities disseminated their version of Mari-Russian relations in the past, the only version which can be legally spread and printed in the Mari A.S.S.R. It is difficult to assess to what extent the Mari genuinely accept the official ideology although the large majority of the adult population of the Mari Republic signed in 1946 a

letter to Stalin endorsing it. The letter, made up of 288 lines in verse, said among other things:

From times immemorial we believe, we know
That the Russian is our friend and brother
This friendship has lasted four centuries
From the very days when Akpars, the hero
Led the Mari people into the Russian camp
And went into battle against the Tartar Khans.²⁸

The story of the Mari princeling Akpars who participated in the Russian conquest of Kazan is indeed borrowed from Mari folklore, but it contains only part of the historical truth since the nationally more conscious Lowland Mari supported the Tartars in their fight against the Russians.²⁹

The 'Letter to Stalin', apart from containing some sort of ideological credo, expressed the gratitude of the Mari people to the Generalissimo for the great changes which had taken place in the Mari Republic since 1917, both culturally and economically. Among the economic achievements of the régime in the Mari A.S.S.R., the development of the timber and paper industry ranks first in importance. It even led to the foundation of a new town, Volzhsk, which was built around a huge Cellulose Paper Combine.

UDMURTS: A 'CAPITAL' VERSUS A PEOPLE

The Udmurts – 605,000 strong in 1939, live in a compact mass in the headwater region of the Kama River. They have no such big diaspora outside their autonomous territory as have both Mari and Mordvinians. Theoretically their national survival seems to be better guaranteed. Although the living-space of the Udmurts, who were called Votyaks until 1928, has been affected by Russian colonization, the consequences were offset to some degree by the high birth-rate of the Udmurt peasants, whose families are usually considerably bigger than those of the Russian peasants in the neighbourhood. In respect both of their birth-rate and their power of resistance to Russification, the Udmurts compare favourably with the other Finnish peoples of the U.S.S.R. Thus between 1926 and 1939 the Mordvinians increased by 8·3 per cent, the Komi by 8·7 per cent, the Mari by 12·4 per cent, but the Udmurts by 20·1 per cent.

The proportion between Udmurts and Russians in Udmurtia is almost the same as that between Mari and Russians in the Mari A.S.S.R. The 1926 census showed that there were 52·3 per cent Udmurts, 42·3 per cent Russians and 2·3 per cent Tartars in what was then still the Autonomous Votyak Province, promoted to a Republic in 1936.

There would have been no reason to be unduly pessimistic about the

national future of the Udmurts but for the capital of Udmurtia, forming a mighty Russian bulwark within the Udmurt autonomous unit. When the Udmurt Autonomous Province came into being on January 5th, 1921, the Moscow authorities decreed that the centre of the Province was to be the township Glazov, which in Czarist times had always been considered as a sort of unofficial capital of the Votyaks.

Soon after the publication of the decree on the establishment of the Udmurt Autonomous Province, Moscow decided that humble Glazov with its 5,000 inhabitants was no suitable capital for Udmurtia and transferred the seat of the provincial government to Izhevsk, a Russian industrial town. This was in line with the general Soviet policy of establishing administrative headquarters at places where a strong working-class could supply a solid backbone to Communist Party work.

Little Glazov would have been a congenial capital for the Udmurt peasant people who could never regard Izhevsk as their national centre. The Iron and Steel Works of Izhevsk, already famous in the First World War, became the principal economic asset of Udmurtia but they bore no relationship to the Udmurt people. In the inter-war period Izhevsk did not stop growing and between 1932 and 1939 alone its number increased from 114,000 to 175,000. The new-comers were almost exclusively Russian workers.

The Udmurt nationalists opposed the growth of Izhevsk and its industry. In doing so they acted out of a natural instinct of national self-preservation which necessarily ran counter to the necessities of all-Union economic planning and to technical progress. In particular, the most important Udmurt writer of the post-revolutionary period, K. Chainikov, preached an outright hatred of Izhevsk. Chainikov, who had originally welcomed the October Revolution, showed himself disappointed when the communist leadership subordinated the Udmurt national interests to the Soviet state interests.

The great majority of the leading Udmurt intellectuals shared Chainikov's nationalistic outlook and a 'Conference of educated Udmurts' held in 1929 ended in a fiasco from the Communist Party standpoint. Just as among the Mari, pan-Finnish ideas were at one time fairly widespread among these 'educated Udmurts'. As late as 1933 the Soviet periodical *Revolutsionny Vostok* called upon Soviet historians to work out a Marxist-Leninist history of Udmurtia, which would unmask the pan-Finnish theories, the dream of a 'Greater Finland' which was to include Udmurts, Mari, Komi, Karelians and the Finns of Finland proper.³⁰

The nationalism of the Udmurt intellectuals was not the greatest difficulty which the Soviet régime encountered in Udmurtia. The clan organization of the Udmurt people proved to be a far greater handicap. The existence of strong clan relations between the Udmurts made it

difficult for the Russian communists to spread their ideas of class struggle in the Udmurt villages or to disintegrate the Udmurt peasantry into various social groups according to the size of their holdings. Even the poorest Udmurt peasants could not be easily incited against the Udmurt 'kulaks', because they were linked with each other by the strong bonds of clan relations and by the 'veme', a primitive system of mutual assistance, in which every village inhabitant, rich or poor, participated.

Each Udmurt village had its council of clan elders, called 'kenesh', which, in the official communist view, constituted a most dangerous bulwark of anti-Soviet feudal nationalism among the Udmurts. The 'kenesh' were alleged to be the source of most anti-Soviet rumours circulating among the Udmurts and even of terroristic actions. The collectivization of Udmurtia's agriculture did not wipe out the 'kenesh' altogether and its remnants still penetrated into the collective farms.³¹

KOMI - THE NORTHERN COAL REPUBLIC

The Komi A.S.S.R. is the largest of all Autonomous Republics of European Russia. In the past the territory inhabited by the Komi or Zyryans offered little attraction to Russian colonists owing to its harsh climate and its considerable distance from the centres of Russian life. In 1926 the land of the Komi, which is larger in size than Italy and Austria put together, had among its 211,000 inhabitants, 92·2 per cent Komi and 6·6 per cent Russians. Thus the Komi Republic (officially an Autonomous Province until 1936), was easily the most homogeneous autonomous territory of the R.S.F.S.R.

The remoteness of the Zyryans from Russian civilization during the Czarist period cannot be better demonstrated than by quoting the only passage in Russian classical literature referring to them:

'The Chukchi have no Anakreon

And Tyutchev will not go to the Zyryans . . .'

This epigram which the poet Fet dedicated to his fellow-lyricist, Tyutchev, is mentioned in almost every booklet and article written in the Soviet Union on the Komi and their country. The new Russia can very easily bring evidence that contrary to conditions in Fet's time, Tyutchev and dozens of other Russian poets have 'gone' to the Zyryans both in the original as well as in Komi translations. This, however, testifies much more to the successful expansion of Russian civilization in the Far North than to the emergence of a Komi national culture. It is true to say that from the fourteenth century onwards, when Novgorod and Muscovy quarrelled over the possession of the land of the Zyryans, down to the October Revolution, the Russification of the Komi made less progress than between 1917 and 1947.

Until about 1929 the Komi people enjoyed a considerable degree of national autonomy. The number of communists in the Komi Province was small – 945 in 1921, 1,252 in 1926, 2,068 in 1931 – and only a tiny percentage of them were workers. About four-fifths of all communists in the Komi Province belonged to the Komi nationality. They favoured a Komi 'national policy' aiming at the establishment of some sort of 'Greater Komi Republic' to be as independent of the Russian centre as possible. The Komi communists supported by their newspaper *Komi-Mu* wanted to have a viable national state in the North of European Russia which was to be economically orientated towards the Scandinavian market. The Komi communists were well aware of the tremendous mineral riches existing in the Autonomous Province and wanted to exploit them for the benefit of the Komi people alone.³²

The Greater Komi Republic, according to the wishes of its protagonists, was to include, apart from the Komi Province proper, territories inhabited by the Komi-Permyaki,* as well as Udmurtia and it was to have an outlet to the Arctic Ocean at the expense of the Nentsy. The latter were to be put under a Komi protectorate. The Komi communists energetically opposed, therefore, the establishment of a special 'National Area of the Nentsy' and two Communist Party conferences of the Komi Province passed resolutions to that effect.

The ideological basis of the 'Greater Komi' idea was the historical myth of the medieval northern State of Biarmia which ancient Scandinavian sources described as a numerous, strong and wealthy nation. Komi nationalists dreamt of reviving its former splendour although scanty information on Biarmia had reached posterity. The Soviet régime took considerable trouble in fighting this romantic ideology and a whole book was published to show that Biarmia had been the state of the Karelians and not of the Komi.

In 1929 the central Government put an energetic check on Komi nationalism by including the Komi Province in the 'Northern Territory' despite violent protests from the local communists. All important matters concerning the Komi Province were henceforward no longer regulated in Syktyvkar, the provincial capital, but in Archangel the centre of the 'Northern Territory', if not entirely in Moscow.

After 1929 the national deviationists among the Komi communists were removed from their leading posts.³³ Komi nationalism was, however, vanquished not by political purges but by an unintentional encirclement of the Komi nation. Soviet power changed the ethno-

* The Komi-Permyaki are closely related to the Komi-Zyryans and the demand for union of the two branches of the Komi people is not unreasonable. The Komi-Permyaki, who are somewhat less developed culturally, have a special National Area in the Sverdlovsk Province in the Ural region. The National Area of the Komi-Permyaki adjoins the Komi A.S.S.R., covers 19,300 square miles and has 200,000 inhabitants including 70 per cent Komi-Permyaki.

graphical map of Northern Europe in such a way that the Komi finally bordered on the Russian living-space not only in the South where Russians had been their neighbours for centuries but also in the North which until recently had been sparsely populated by both the Komi themselves and the Nentsy.

It all started in 1929 when a Russian expedition went to the northern part of what was then the Autonomous Komi Province. The expedition worked under the auspices of the G.P.U. which later played an important role in the area described as the 'Ukhta Pechora region'. This region, almost 100,000 square miles in extent, comprises in addition to the northern districts of the Komi Republic parts of the National Area of the Nentsy.

The expedition returned with comprehensive data about oil and coal riches in the territory which it had been charged to explore. It had discovered in the region of the Pechora river the existence of a 'Polar Donets Basin' of gigantic proportions. The Pechora coal was believed to be of higher quality than coal in the big Russian mining centres. Subsequent expeditions discovered coal deposits at thirty points of the vast Ukhta-Pechora region.

In 1932 an important practical step was taken by the formation of the Ukhta-Pechora Trust. At the same time the Polar Commission of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. began to work out a detailed plan to transform the Ukhta-Pechora region into a mining and industrial district and into a fuel basis for the Leningrad industry. The plan specified that the number of the inhabitants of the area concerned which was 71,000 in 1934 was to increase to 168,000 in 1942 and to over 500,000 in 1947.³⁴ Thus the northern part of the Komi Republic was to have a larger population than the entire republic had in 1939. The history of the northern part of the Komi Republic largely ceased to be the history of the Komi people and became mainly that of three big undertakings, the oil trust 'Ukhtomkombinat', the coal trust 'Vorkutugol' and the Northern Pechora Railway Line. The history of the two 'industrial giants' in the Far North and of the 'northernmost railway line in the world' which connected the giants with the rest of Russia was at the same time a fateful item in the history of many peoples, who under hard compulsion participated in strengthening the economic potential of the land on both sides of the polar circle. Although many accounts by eyewitnesses of unimpeachable probity are available on the extent of forced labour in those areas, we shall ignore this side of the question and confine ourselves to official sources. These sources, while not revealing the real extent of the sufferings endured by the new 'colonists' in the Far North, bear, nevertheless, evidence of the hardships which the Kremlin imposed on Russians, Ukrainians and other nationalities for the exploitation of the extensive subsoil riches of the Komi Republic.

Most of the big changes in the northern part of the Komi Republic took place during the war. The native reindeer-breeders and hunters of the Pechora region, after serving at the front, came back to their families to find that much of their homeland had been transformed and that many 'foreigners' had established themselves there. In the war the Pechora district had become the fifth largest coal producing centre of the Soviet Union and occupied an important place in the overall economic planning for the entire Russian North. The importance of the Pechora coal district lay in making Leningrad gradually independent of Donets coal.

The principal centre of the new Arctic mining centre, Vorkuta, which was entered as a town in Russia's map on November 26th, 1943, boasted four years later a theatre, a cinema, a football stadium, clubs and schools. Vorkuta reached 30,000 inhabitants soon after the Second World War. During the 1946 elections to the Supreme Soviet, 650 canvassers worked in the Vorkuta constituency which then had twenty-three polling-stations against a single polling-station and 1,000 voters in 1937.³⁵ Vorkuta became soon an 'old town' through the foundation in the vicinity of a new mining centre, Inta.

The mining trust 'Vorkutugol' not only dominated Vorkuta itself but also its neighbourhood where it owned large reindeer farms supplying food for the coal-miners. The Komi people living in the area were transformed from reindeer owners into workers of state farms under the management of 'Vorkutugol'.

'Vorkutugol' assumed its great importance as a result of the building of the Northern Pechora Railway Line. This new lifeline of the Komi A.S.S.R. was completed on its full length of 700 miles only in 1942. After the Turksib, the Northern Pechora Railway Line was the largest constructed by the Soviet régime in its first thirty years. The very existence of the new railway line has promoted Russian colonization in the Far North. Thousands of Russian workers with their families have already settled along the line. Their small settlements may turn out to be the nuclei of new towns.

The example of the Komi Republic is particularly instructive since it shows how much Russian and international colonization can progress in the climatically most unsuitable territories provided that the necessary economic pre-requisites exist. What happened in the Ukhta-Pechora region can easily be repeated and has already been repeated to some extent throughout the vast region of Northern Europe and Asia which we shall describe as the 'Inner North'.

V. *THE INNER NORTH*

From a purely geographical, ethnological or folk-lore point of view there might have been a good case for dealing with all Soviet regions bordering the Arctic Ocean as a single whole. Geopolitics, however, could not warrant such a treatment. The western and eastern flanks of the Soviet Arctic have a quite distinct political importance as borderlands and cannot be lumped together with such territories as the Taimyr or the Yamal peninsulas which play no part in Russia's contacts with foreign countries. The Kola peninsula forming the extreme West of the Soviet Arctic can only find an adequate interpretation within the context of Russia's relations with Scandinavia while the north-eastern tip of Asia is but an extension of Russia's Pacific front line and must thus be considered as such.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The total strength of the peoples of the Soviet Far North is usually estimated as between 140,000 and 160,000 which includes both the peoples of the 'Inner North' and the peoples of the Soviet Arctic borderlands. Many of the Far Northern peoples are but a few hundred strong, but others run into thousands and they were rather difficult to 'sovietize', both from a mere technical and from a political point of view.

The peoples of the Far North were the last ones to be put under effective Soviet rule. Stable territorial national units were created for them as late as 1929-30. The Soviet régime, it is true, tried to extend its grip on the peoples of the Far North before this date and to encourage culture and literacy among them. With this end in view a 'Committee for the Assistance and Protection of the Small Peoples of the North and Siberia' was founded in 1923 and the Leningrad 'Institute of the Peoples of the North' came into being in 1925.

However, only the formation of the 'National Areas' (okrugi) in Northern Europe and Siberia placed the Soviet nationalities policy in the Far North on more solid foundations. The first National Area of the Far North was formed in 1929 for the Nentsy who used to be called 'Samoyeds' in Czarist times.

In December 1930 six more National Areas originated in Northern Siberia, of which two, those of the Chukchi and Koryaks belong to the Russian Far East and will therefore not be dealt with in this book. The four other National Areas are:

1. The Yamalo-Nenets National Area covering the Yamal peninsula and the area of the Ob estuary. (177,000 square miles and 12,753 inhabitants.)

2. The Dolgano-Nenets National Area covering the Taimyr peninsula (231,000 square miles and 7,477 inhabitants.)
3. The National Area of the Khanty (Ostyaks) and Mansi (Voguls). (270,000 square miles and 45,524 inhabitants.)
4. The National Area of the Evenki (212,000 square miles and 7,500 inhabitants.)

Of these four National Areas the first and last were at the time of their foundation ethnically fairly homogeneous. The Nentsy dominated the Yamalo-Nenets National Area and the Evenki had a substantial majority in the area which bore their name. The Khanty-Mansi Area was, however, already half-Russian when it was formed, while the Dolgano-Nenets or Taimyr National Area is inhabited, apart from Russian colonists, by four native nationalities, Nentsy, Dolgany (yakutized Tungus), Yakuts and Evenki (Tungus).

From 1932 to 1938 the scope of the National Areas was greatly reduced by the powers vested in the *Glavsevmorput* (Glavnoye Upravlenie Severnogo Morskogo Puti), the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route which was then in control of economic and cultural activities in the Arctic and Sub-Arctic regions of Soviet Asia. Since August 1938 the work of *Glavsevmorput* has been in the main limited to the development of the Northern Sea Route itself.

ECONOMIC SOVIETIZATION

In the field of economics only the second Five Year Plan was fully extended to the Far North while the first Five Year Plan had still largely ignored the native economy of the Nentsy, Evenki, Mansi, Khanty, Dolgany, etc.

In the early thirties the Soviet Government thought that an energetic intervention in the economic conditions of the Far North was overdue. The régime could not remain indifferent towards the fact that over thirteen years after the October Revolution an entire branch of the national economy had remained the unrestricted prerogative of private enterprise. This branch was reindeer-breeding and it was accordingly the aim of the Government to bring at least the bulk of Russia's 2,500,000 reindeers under state control. The collectivization of reindeer-breeding was prompted not only by reasons of principle but also by economic considerations, since Soviet experts had calculated that Russia's reindeer population could be increased up to 30,000,000 if there was scientific management, which the natives were not able to guarantee.³⁶

Ruthless fostering of class struggle was the means by which the Soviet régime tried to achieve the transition of the Far Northern nationalities from the individualistic to a collectivized and state-controlled economy. Soviet power disintegrated the primitive tribal unity

of the northern peoples by splitting them up into 'Kulaks', 'Serednyaks', owners of medium-sized reindeer herds and 'Bednyaks', poor reindeer-breeders. In short, Soviet power dealt with the tiny northern nationalities in the same way as with Ukrainians and the other more advanced peoples of the Soviet Union. 'Serednyaks' and 'Bednyaks' were more or less forcibly pressed into collective farms or were encouraged to become employed on state farms. The latter belonged to a state enterprise *Olenovodtrest* which as early as 1931 owned 120,000 reindeers, all of them confiscated 'kulak' property.

The northern peoples understood little of the economic and social reforms which the Soviet régime wanted to introduce in their homeland. They saw only that the reindeer were taken away from them and made in one form or another the property of the Russian state which they could not identify with themselves. The 'natives' reacted therefore against the building up of a state-controlled economy in the tundra by a primitive but stubborn and successful resistance characterized by active wrecking, sabotage and mass slaughter of reindeer. Thus 'tribal kinglets, kulaks and shamans' of the Taimyr National Area, said to be inspired by a 'bestly hatred of socialism', were accused of having organized acts of sabotage in the reindeer state farms.³⁷ The same seems to have happened in the other National Areas as well. 'Nationalistically-minded people and kulaks' from among the Nentsy, Mansi, Khanty and Evenki carried out sabotage in the reindeer state farms by taking jobs as shepherds or by getting their followers employed in these jobs in order to wreck from within the state-controlled sector of Far Northern economy.³⁸ In consequence of these wrecking activities the reindeer population of the Taimyr area alone was reduced within two years by almost two-thirds. The economic situation in the National Areas had become so threatening that the Central Committee of the Communist Party on June 22nd, 1932, issued a statement ordering the local party organizations to discontinue their efforts towards full collectivization in the Far North. Following the intervention of the Central Committee, the slogan of 'Liquidation of the Kulaks' was replaced by 'Limitation of the Kulaks'.

NATIONALISM IN THE FAR NORTH

The small peoples of the Far North not only challenged the economic reforms of the Soviet régime but also attacked the latter on political grounds. It seems that at least the two largest of the 'northern peoples', the Evenki and the Nentsy have each produced a national ideology of their own, which they opposed on various occasions to the official Soviet ideology.

A Russian ethnologist, Shirokogorov, in his standard work 'Social

Organization of the Northern Tungus', deals with the national ideology of the Evenki (Tungus). According to him the Evenki firmly believe in a great and splendid future. They are certain that they will grow one day in number and move forward to the steppe and the agricultural regions over which they will establish political control. Whilst hoping for their own growth they are equally convinced of the moral and physical decline of the nations who have expanded their living space at the expense of the Evenki during the past few centuries, i.e. the Chinese, Japanese and Russians.³⁹

Against this kind of nationalist messianism the Soviet régime has to fight even beyond the Arctic Circle. The formation of the National Areas in the Far North had the unintended effect of further stimulating the already existing nationalistic trends. A people like the Nentsy seems to have misunderstood the predominantly economic motives behind the foundation of the National Areas. Some Nentsy took the 'National Area of the Nentsy' at its face value and really thought that it was a National Area where the Nentsy were supposed to rule to the exclusion of other peoples. No wonder that they started a propaganda campaign for the expulsion from the National Area of the Russians and the Komi, using the catchphrase 'The Tundra to the Nentsy'. The Communist Party fought against a 'Nenets nationalistic deviation' both by the usual measures of coercion and by propagating a pro-Soviet interpretation of Nenets folk-lore or simply by inventing such a pro-Soviet folk-lore.⁴⁰ Thus among the Nentsy of the 'Dolgano Nenets National Area' the memory of Vauli, the leader of a local revolt against Czarism and tribal kinglets in the nineteenth century is particularly popularized, and the first play ever produced in the language of the Nentsy by the first Nenets playwright deals with his exploits.⁴¹

CULTURAL ASSIMILATION

The great cultural efforts which Soviet power deployed in the Far North are undeniable. Soviet statistics claim the existence of 500 schools, including 100 secondary schools, in the Far North.⁴² Each National Area has its libraries, 'Houses of Culture' and 'Red Tents'. Each National Area can send its boys and girls to technical schools in various Arctic towns and to the Leningrad Institute of the Peoples of the North. The 'capitals' of the National Areas, Dudinka, Khanti-Mansiinsk and Salekhard even have theatres. All this means that culture is coming to the Far North. Often it is communist-tainted culture, but not always, since the institutions created by the Soviet power in the National Areas are spreading general Russian culture derived both from the classical period and from the Soviet era.

The schools in the Far North are also bound to become media of

Russification owing to the impossibility of a national culture of the Evenki, Nentsy or Mansi. On paper, it is true, there exist two sorts of schools in the Far North, Russian schools as everywhere in the U.S.S.R. and 'native schools' where education is given for three years in the vernacular and the transition to Russian is effected in the fourth year. This, however, is pure theory and propaganda for, as a Soviet expert on the peoples of the Far North, I. Ignatov, has pointed out, children attending native schools can learn practically nothing there, owing to the low standard of the languages concerned. Ignatov, who is in charge of education of the Khanty-Mansi and the Yamalo-Nenets National Areas stated that the languages of the Far North included not a single literary language, none of them possessing any system of grammar or any proper literature. Whenever the attempt was made to fill out three school years with teaching in the native language, education broke down completely, said Ignatov.⁴³

As the experiment with the native schools has been a failure it may be abandoned altogether. This change in educational policy will probably be hastened by the lack of native teachers, a deficiency which thirty years of Soviet rule has been unable to make good. The huge National Area of the Evenki provides a particularly good illustration in this respect. In 1937 the area employed but two native teachers in its nineteen schools.⁴⁴ Ten years later no progress worth mentioning had been achieved. A school inspector of the Evenki National Area still complained of the 'acute shortage of national teaching cadres'. These cadres were trained by the teachers' training college of Igarka, but hardly any graduates came from there into the Evenki area. Nor could the Evenki area send anyone to the Leningrad Institute because no young people with sufficient education were available. Under these circumstances, said the inspector, the overwhelming majority of the teachers in the Evenki National Area were Russian, of whom only a few had a good command of the Evenki language.⁴⁵

THE ECLIPSE OF THE NATIVE

The Far Northern nationalities are so small that even a very moderate introduction of Russian manpower into their territories can adversely affect their national survival. Between 1926 and 1935 the proportion of the 'natives' in the population of the Soviet Arctic dropped from 56 to 35 per cent. To-day this percentage has certainly decreased below 20 per cent. The National Areas of the Far North are becoming more and more unreal and in the long run only propaganda interests can vindicate their continued existence.

During the second Five Year Plan, Arctic towns like Norilsk, a mining centre with the largest nickel deposits of the U.S.S.R. or Igarka,

a port near the mouth of the Yenisei, sprang up at the very gates of the National Areas. Norilsk had 30,000 inhabitants after the Second World War and Igarka, a fishing village with seven Russian inhabitants in 1928, has to-day a population of 25,000, chiefly Russians and Ukrainians.

Igarka and Norilsk have been compared to the Canadian Arctic town of Aklavik, but this comparison is unfair. It is true that Aklavik has not yet reached Igarka's population figure, but Aklavik has only a voluntary population and is not made up like Igarka of disgruntled 'kulaks' and other specimens of exiles and semi-exiles.⁴⁶ Aklavik with its Anglican and Catholic churches, its Anglican and Catholic schools for Eskimo and Indian children is an outpost of Western civilization in the Far North.⁴⁷ Igarka and Norilsk, on the other hand, are extensions towards the Far North of the Soviet system of compulsion.

However, even stern measures of compulsion have not enabled the Soviet Government to carry out all its development plans designed for the Far North. The harshness of the climate, the lack of transport facilities and of adequate food supplies have put a brake on the more ambitious projects, reported to the world by pro-Soviet travellers in terms which suggested that they were already a reality. The re-organization and purge of the *Glavsevmorput* in 1938 has likewise hampered the implementation of certain plans. Entire coal and oil-bearing regions such as the so-called 'Nordvik-Khatanga Rayon' at the North-Western border of Yakutia are still virtually untouched.⁴⁸

There are also the Arctic islands, Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, the North Siberian Islands and the Francis Joseph Land which have hardly been brought yet within the orbit of socialist reconstruction work. They either have a tiny native population like Novaya Zemlya or are practically uninhabited. The day will come, however, when Russian civilization will push forward both into the remote corners of the Russian continental Arctic and into the Russian Arctic Islands, and when the last natives of the Far North will have adopted the Russian language and Russian culture.

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III

'LIQUIDATED' PEOPLES

During and after the Second World War the Soviet Government dissolved four Autonomous Republics and expunged four major and several minor nationalities from the ethnographic map of the U.S.S.R. The fate of one of the four republics, the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., and of a number of liquidated small peoples are inseparably linked with the nationality problems of the Caucasus and will be discussed in that context. We are here concerned with only three of the disbanded A.S.S.R. whose existence had been guaranteed by the Stalin constitution of 1936 – the Volga German A.S.S.R., the Crimean A.S.S.R. and the Kalmuck A.S.S.R. The peoples of these republics saw their political and cultural institutions destroyed. They were forced to leave their homes and farmsteads and were dispersed over the vast expanses of Soviet Asia. In taking such drastic measures the Soviet leaders claimed, in the case of the Volga Germans, to have acted in accordance with the requirements of national security; in other cases, however, they admittedly assumed the role of judges meting out retribution to communities accused of collective betrayal or complacency towards the aggressor during the war.

The liquidation of the four republics and the bitter fate which awaited their inhabitants have helped more than anything else could have done to see through the fog of Soviet propaganda, a propaganda which had used the republics concerned as illustrations of the successful solution of the national problem in the Soviet Union. The liquidation of the republics was a warning to all other non-Russian peoples, many of whom might have found themselves in the same position had their loyalty to Russia been put to the same test as that of the Volga Germans, Crimean Tartars and Kalmucks. Had the U.S.S.R. been invaded by Japan, the Autonomous Republics of the Yakuts and Buryato-Mongols might have suffered the fate of the Crimean and Kalmuck Republics; had it been Turkey, a similar doom might have been the lot of the Azerbaidzhani Turks.

The liquidation of the republics amounted to a practical as well as theoretical bankruptcy of the Soviet nationalities policy. In annihilating

entire ethnical groups without any differentiation between social classes, the Soviet régime had implicitly accepted a thesis previously rejected by the Bolsheviks as un-Marxian, namely, that there existed 'good' and 'bad' peoples. The distinction in itself implied an ideological capitulation to nationalism.

The disappearance of such peoples as the Crimean Tartars or Kalmucks does not concern students of ethnology alone, as if it were an event occurring on the outskirts of human civilization with no effect on world politics. On the contrary, the destiny of the peoples in question is closely intertwined with the destiny of Europe. It was just because there was nothing unusual in the eyes of the Russian Government in the transplantation of entire nations that mass transfers of population had become possible in Europe after the Second World War. The Soviet Government saw no reason why millions of Poles and Germans could not be shifted to new places, if such a process could be applied to Crimean Tartars and Kalmucks in the Soviet Union. Thus, on the basis of experiments which had been carried out in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government advised and encouraged the transfers of population in Central Europe after the Second World War. In the same way as the Soviet Russian Government believes in mobile frontiers, it also thinks in terms of 'unfinished spaces'; in other words, in terms of a developing country where peoples can be reshuffled according to the needs of state economy and state defence.

The liquidation of certain peoples of the Soviet Union has, however, more than a purely negative character; from the Russian imperial point of view it led to the triumph of Russian civilization in areas where the Russian element had waged a difficult and protracted struggle in order to get the upper hand over a recalcitrant and unreliable native population.

I. THE RUSSIAN GERMANS

The liquidation of the Germans of Russia was one of the most outstanding achievements of the Soviet régime, from the point of view of a narrow-minded Russian nationalism. The Germans in Russia had an important civilizing influence as long as European Russia was still in the process of being opened up and as long as wide tracts of untilled land existed therein. This pioneer work once terminated, the German blessing became a curse in Russian eyes. The Czarist Government was frequently urged to curb the German influence, but it was left to the Soviet régime to carry out the anti-German part of the Russian nationalist programme. The Bolshevik Government destroyed the economic power of the Russian Germans through nationalization and collectivization and

eliminated them as a political factor by disbanding all their organized communities and removing them from Europe.

Various categories of Germans existed in pre-revolutionary Russia. German doctors, musicians, scientists and craftsmen living in a purely Russian environment could be found in the smallest Russian town. This type of German figured in many works of Russian classical literature, sometimes as a colourless pedant, sometimes as a rather likeable idealist. These 'isolated Germans' were, to a greater or lesser degree, absorbed by the Russian people. Another type of German in Russia was the arrogant 'Herrenvolk', the Baltic barons living in Estonia and Latvia. A large number of civil servants, diplomats and army officers in Russia were drawn from them. Then there were the two large, compact groups of Russian Germans – those living on the Volga and those of South Russia – who had carried out important agricultural pioneer work for the Russian Empire. Lastly, there were many smaller groups of German peasant settlers scattered almost over the entire vast surface of Russia, who locally assisted the Russians in carrying out their colonization tasks.

THE ORIGIN OF THE VOLGA GERMANS

Organized German immigration into Russia on a large scale can be traced back to the two Imperial Manifestos of December 4th, 1762, and of July 22nd, 1763, in which Catherine II invited foreigners from all lands to settle in Russia. The prospective settlers were promised not only land, but also full religious freedom, the right of self-government, freedom from taxes and other burdens for many years, exemption from every kind of military and civilian service, and a loan for the building of farmhouses and stables, repayable free of interest after ten years. About 25,000 people, mainly Germans, answered her call.

All historians of the colonization, not excluding descendants of the colonists themselves, described the majority of Catherine's 'pioneers' as the lowest scum of the German people, including former convicts, ruined merchants and craftsmen, prostitutes, all sorts of people 'who had failed in life, and idlers hoping to be transferred to a paradise where not the slightest effort was expected of them'.¹ Many colonizations in all parts of the world had been started with a similar brand of people and were, in the end, similarly successful, for the foundation of more than 200 German villages in the Volga region having in 1914 an aggregate population of over 500,000, may well be described as a success.

The Volga Germans were not only free peasants in a country of serfs, but they were also Europeans on the threshold of territories inhabited by Asiatic peoples. These two facts alone would have sufficed to put

them into a privileged position among their neighbours, but to these were added the numerous concessions which the Imperial Government had bestowed on them. No danger of competition threatened them; there was no agrarian bank which might have indulged in speculations with the virgin soil of the steppe, nor an indigenous population with priority rights. When the land originally allocated to the Germans became too small for their growing families, the Government granted them new and extensive territories. It was on that additional land that during the nineteenth century ninety 'new villages' were founded, named thus in contrast to those situated in the territories originally earmarked for German colonization. The last 'new village' was set up as late as 1902.

GERMANS OF SOUTH RUSSIA

German immigration into South Russia started a little later than the German colonization of the Volga steppe. The first German colonists came to the Russian South in 1787, but only during the first and second decades of the nineteenth century did they start to arrive in impressive numbers. German farmers, some of whom became big landlords, were given a free hand by the Russian Government, and the Russian South thus became for them a land of unlimited possibilities. This is how a German describes the growth in prosperity and economic power of the Germans in Southern Russia in the nineteenth century:

'Many a German peasant wandered all his life from one estate to another, but always from a smaller to a larger one. From 270 acres his property grew to 700 and then to 1,400 and 2,700 and more. The ambition of every man consisted in leaving to each of his usually numerous sons at least the same amount of land as he himself had originally possessed. I knew a few of these first pioneers who had gone out to the steppe: honourable patriarchs who a few years ago had celebrated their golden wedding. The old folk have between 13,500 and 27,000 acres of land, the sons have their own estates of 7,000 to 13,500 acres and some of the numerous grandsons have likewise self-contained farms of 1,350 to 2,700 acres. If the property belonging to the sons-in-law is added to this, the entire land property concentrated in the hands of a single big German peasant family frequently exceeds 270,000 acres'.²

Already in 1860, the type of a prosperous German colonist appeared in Russian literature under the name of Bogdan Bogdanovich Schultzwein in the historic novel *The Refugees in New Russia* by G. P. Danilevsky. Schultzwein's father came to Russia on Shanks's pony and became a shepherd at another German's farm. But his son became a successful farmer and clever dealer in agricultural products, bent on

extending his business. Whenever there was any land for sale, Schultzwein was first on the spot and gradually he became the owner of the entire district. Danilevsky's book terminated with the following words: 'But is that anything to wonder at, since he is a German and not even a Russian German, but a foreign German from Germany?''³

In the three South Russian Governments of Kherson, Tauria (including the Crimea) and Yekaterinoslav (now Dniepropetrovsk) the Germans formed comparatively small minorities not exceeding 7 per cent of the entire agricultural population, but their economic importance and influence were far-reaching. In the Kherson Government, the Germans owned 23 per cent of the entire sowing area, in the Yekaterinoslav Government 25.4 per cent, and in Tauria 39.25 per cent.

In some Black Sea areas the German sector was still more important. Thus in the Odessa district nearly 60 per cent, and in the district of Akkerman (now Byelgorod Dnestrovsky) in Bessarabia, 40 per cent, of the whole sowing area belonged to Germans. The entire German land holdings in South Russia corresponded roughly to the size of Bohemia.

The Germans continued to buy land in Russia up to the very eve of the First World War. German agricultural activities were mainly concentrated in the areas mentioned above, but were by no means restricted to them. The business instinct inherent in the Germans prompted them to buy land also to the North, in the Kharkov, Voronezh, and other Governments, as well as to the East, namely, in the Kuban and Terek districts in the North Caucasus. German villages also sprang up in the Governments of Orenburg and Ufa, and even in Siberia and the Central Asiatic steppe.

Practically all sections of the Russian people felt uneasy about the economic power which the Germans wielded in Russia. Bitter resentment was caused by the fact that Russian land holdings in the most fertile areas were becoming smaller every year whilst German wealth was proportionately increasing. Indignation was also felt because of the large number of destitute Russian and Ukrainian peasants who had to work as farm labourers for German farmers. There can be no doubt that the German colonization in the Ukrainian South was as much of an anomaly as the predominance of Polish landed property in the Ukrainian and White Russian West.

THE GERMANS IN THE SOVIET UNION

It so happened that a number of German colonies were located in sectors which were strategically important to Russia and though this state of affairs was by no means intentional it was bound to lead to a number of anti-German measures during the First World War. On

December 13th, 1915, the confiscation, with compensation to the owners, of the entire German land holdings in Western and Southern Russia was proclaimed by law, but was carried out only to a slight extent. In 1916 the Czarist Government decreed the expulsion from their homes of the Volga Germans, to be effected by April 1917; but the decree fell into abeyance with the overthrow of the Czarist régime and was repealed after the October Revolution. This enabled the Bolsheviks to proclaim themselves the saviours of the Volga Germans.

Between 1917 and 1941 the Soviet power dealt with the Germans in Russia on a purely class basis: it relied on the support of the village proletariat and a small number of German workers and waged a merciless struggle against German kulaks. During the same period, Soviet propaganda asserted that the Volga Germans had made a considerable contribution to the Bolshevik cause during the Civil War. The German village proletariat, according to the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, organized partisan detachments and gave many an example of gallantry and endurance when fighting for the establishment of the Soviet power. The Volga Germans, said the Encyclopedia, had fought on all fronts during the Civil War: the First German Communist Regiment of Katherinenstadt (later Marxstadt) fought against the German occupation in the Ukraine, the Second German Regiment was in action against the White Guard Generals Wrangel and Denikin. The First German Cavalry Regiment, which belonged to the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny, distinguished itself in action against Wrangel and the Poles.⁴

In reality, Soviet power had few active supporters among the Volga Germans in the first years following the Revolution. There were not more than 200 organized Communist Party members among the Volga colonists and many of the soldiers in the so-called Volga German Civil War detachments were ex-prisoners of war of the Imperial German army who had turned communist.

In view of the strength of the Communist Party in Germany and Russian hopes for an early proletarian revolution in that country, the existence of a compact area of German settlements was a great asset for Soviet propaganda. Despite the high percentage of non-proletarian elements in their midst, the Volga Germans were, therefore, one of the first peoples of Russia to obtain a kind of national autonomy in the form of an 'Autonomous Workers' Commune' on October 19th, 1918. After over five years' of existence the 'Commune' was raised on February 20th, 1924, to the status of an A.S.S.R.

The show-window character of the Volga German A.S.S.R. was always present to the minds of those responsible for the planning of Soviet policy on nationalities. 'The situation of the Volga Germans' – said Dimanshtein, Stalin's former assistant at the People's Commissariat for Nationalities – 'is of interest to the German proletariat

because they can follow our achievements by studying the example of the Volga Germans. The latter are of interest to the German bourgeoisie too who wish to use the case of the Volga Germans for focusing attention on our negative sides',⁵

Whilst the Soviet Government wanted to sustain a Volga German Republic it did not wish it to be 'too German'. In 1926 the population of the republic included 66.4 per cent Germans, 20.4 per cent Russians and 12 per cent Ukrainians. The German population was made up mainly of farmers, whilst the Russian and Ukrainian element contained a high percentage of industrial workers. The social composition of the three ethnical groups of the Volga Republic thus clearly indicated that the Slav minority was bound to be more reliable from the point of view of the Soviet régime than the Germans. The Soviet central Government acted accordingly and moved the capital from the actual centre of the German Volga colonists, Marxstadt, into the Slav town of Pokrovsk, situated on the left bank of the Volga opposite Saratov. This operation was carried out in August 1922, when the Volga German autonomy was still in the 'Autonomous Commune' stage.

The Volga German colonists always considered Pokrovsk as something alien to them. They referred to it as 'Kosakenstadt' ('Cossack town'), since it had been founded by Ukrainian Cossacks in the middle of the eighteenth century, shortly before the arrival of the German colonists in the Volga region. In 1926 the population of the town still included 42 per cent of Ukrainians against 44 per cent of Russians; only 11 per cent were Germans.⁶

At the time of the 1926 census, Pokrovsk had only 33,600 inhabitants, but within six years its population had grown to 53,000. Renamed Engels in the early thirties, it became, despite its small German population, an important German cultural and political centre. The leading German communists of the republic were, of course, concentrated in the 'capital' where they held government jobs, but even so 73 per cent of the communists in Engels were non-Germans.⁷

The Slav population in the Volga German Republic grew not only in the capital but also in other places. Thus a new workers' settlement 'Krasny Tekstilchik' ('The Red Textile-worker') sprang up during the Second Five Year Plan, fifteen miles from Engels around a cotton mill. The process of industrialization and urbanization going on in the Volga German Republic makes it questionable whether it would have been able to survive in the long run even if harsh administrative measures had not been applied against the Volga Germans after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war.

The propaganda value of the Volga German Republic was somewhat reduced by the grave political and economic crises characterizing its

development between 1927 and 1933, the very period when it might most usefully have served the purposes of the Communist Party in Germany. Thus the way to collectivization in the German Volga area was paved by the expulsion of a large number of German 'kulaks' and their removal to Kazakhstan, whilst several thousand other Germans emigrated abroad. The plight of the wealthy section of the Volga Germans gave rise to a 'Brothers in Distress' action in Germany which was part of the anti-Soviet campaign conducted by the Nazi Government.

By 1931 the Volga German A.S.S.R. had been collectivized up to 86 per cent, an achievement at that time unique throughout the U.S.S.R. It had been reached at the price of radical political purges. A. Welsch, the Volga German Prime Minister in 1936, admitted that 'not a few nationalist and other anti-Soviet elements' had to be expelled from the parliament and government of the Republic during the collectivization period.⁸ In October 1937, Welsch, who had been responsible for the previous purges, was himself arrested together with the President of the Republic, Luft. These and other changes in the leading personnel of the A.S.S.R. did not affect the use which Soviet propaganda made of the Volga Germans right up to the beginning of the Russian-German war of 1941. The Volga German collective farms were, in particular, praised as unusually efficient, and early in 1939 the official Soviet organ, *Moscow News*, exclaimed enthusiastically: 'These people are demonstrating to the whole world what the industrious gifted German people are capable of when they are free of the yoke of capitalism'.⁹

German settlements in the Soviet Union outside the Volga German A.S.S.R. had also received the permanent attention of the Soviet Government. Only one-third of the 1,423,000 Soviet Germans lived in the Republic; the others were scattered over many parts of the U.S.S.R. Outside the Volga German Republic the Soviet Germans had seventeen 'National Districts' altogether. Six were located in the R.S.F.S.R. (in the Altai region in Asia, in the provinces of Saratov, Stalin-grad and Orenburg, in the Northern Caucasus region and in the Crimea). One German National District was in Georgia and one in Azerbaidzhan. The remaining German Districts were in the Ukraine. Most of them were named after leading German communists. There was a Fritz Heckert District in the Nikolayevsk Province, a Thaelmann District in the Donets area, a Karl Liebknecht District near Odessa, a Luxemburg and a 'Rot Front' District in the Dniepropetrovsk Province. These and other German National Districts of the Ukraine aggregated 237 German villages.¹⁰ The official Soviet travelling agency, 'Intourist', made some of these villages internationally famous. Thus, scores of foreign delegations, including foreign sailors on shore-leave in Odessa harbour, were taken to the German village of Gildendorf

whose collective farmers were in advance of every plan. Widely known German collective farms conveniently in reach for foreign travellers existed also at the outskirts of Leningrad such as 'Rote Fahne' and 'Thaelmann'.

THE 'LIQUIDATION' OF THE RUSSIAN GERMANS

The fate of the Soviet Germans was sealed on August 28th, 1941. On that day a decree of the Soviet Government expelled them from the family of Soviet peoples and ordered their removal from the Volga to the provinces of Novosibirsk and Omsk as well as to the Altai region. The same decree abolished the Volga German A.S.S.R. which was later divided between the Russian provinces of Stalingrad and Saratov.

The Soviet decree's allegation that the Volga Germans were disloyal was in striking contradiction to all previous propaganda claims, including the official returns of the elections to the Volga German Supreme Soviet which had been held on June 26th, 1938. The returns affirmed that 99·8 per cent of all voters of the Volga German Republic had participated in the elections and 99·7 per cent had voted for the communist candidates. Three years after these elections not even Volga Germans who were organized in the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League – there were several thousands of them – were considered worthy of being exempted from the wholesale deportation of their people. The decree of August 28th, 1941, made no exception in their favour.

Whilst the liquidation of the Volga German colonization was a purely Soviet responsibility, the annihilation of German colonization in the Black Sea regions was due to action by both Stalin and Hitler. Of the rough total of 480,000 Germans who appear to have been settled in the Ukraine, the Crimea and the North Caucasus regions at the outbreak of the war, the Russian authorities removed probably about 200,000, while the Nazi armies during their occupation of the Southern parts of the Soviet Union evacuated the rest of the Black Sea Germans to Germany.

There is little authentic information about the situation of the Russian Germans after the Second World War. Soviet political, ethnographical and geographical literature published since the war has completely ignored the fact that there had ever been a very substantial German minority in the Soviet Union. The Germans have similarly disappeared from all statistics referring to the ethnic composition of the U.S.S.R. The Russian poet, Nekrasov said 'People live even in Siberia'; and it would have been conceivable for the Volga German Republic to be resurrected on the banks of the Ob, Irtysh or Yenisei. Such a German Autonomous Republic was not, however, founded, nor was an Autono-

mous Province nor even an Autonomous Area. The German minority of Soviet Russia which must still comprise several hundred thousand people has no representative in the central parliament nor in the parliaments of the individual republics.

Many Russian Germans seem to have been dispersed over the industrial areas of the Urals and the Kuznetsk Basin as well as on the Russian and Ukrainian collective farms of Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan. On the other hand, there is also a number of predominantly German collective farms in the Omsk Province bearing such names as ‘Arbeiter’, ‘Rosa Luxemburg’, and ‘Progress’. The existence of these farms was officially confirmed on April 5th, 1951, when over two dozen German collective farmers and tractor drivers of the Omsk Province were awarded medals for ‘prowess of work’ and ‘excellence of work’ by decree of the Supreme Soviet.

II. THE CRIMEAN TARTARS

EMIGRATION OF THE CRIMEAN TARTARS: 1784–1917

The liquidation of the Crimean Tartars as an ethnic group and their removal from their Crimean homeland by the Soviet Government was but the last act of a long process which had started when the Empress Catherine II established a Russian Protectorate over the Crimea in 1774 and annexed it in 1783.

The Crimean Tartars were no backward people in need of tutelage. They had built up a militarily vigorous and economically flourishing State from the fifteenth century onwards. Gardening, the cultivation of vines and tobacco, silkworm cultivation and cattle-breeding had reached a high standard in the Crimea. The Crimean Tartars traded successfully with the Mediterranean world, exporting cotton and silk materials and great quantities of wheat. One hundred years after the Russian conquest of the Crimea, a Russian writer remarked sadly that only a few traces remained of the former wealth of the country, when it was under Tartar rule.¹¹ The reason for the decline was the gradual exodus of the Tartars. Their tragedy began immediately upon their conquest by the Russians.

The first important trek to Turkey started in 1784. It is estimated that during the first emigration period between 1784 and 1790, out of the total population of the Crimea of 1,000,000, about 300,000 Tartars had left the peninsula. It was not emigration alone that took the Tartars away from their homes on the Crimean coast. They were also victims of a military-political action such as the Russian authorities often applied to newly conquered peoples; they were transferred from the strategically important positions where they lived to other parts

where they could be more easily controlled. This meant that a large number of Crimean Tartars were removed from the sea coast to the steppe inside the Crimean peninsula.

There were minor emigration movements in 1807 and 1811 at the time of a Russo-Turkish war in which the sympathies of the Crimean Tartars were with Turkey. The second large-scale emigration wave set in after the Crimean War. In the years 1859-63, more than 150,000 Tartars left the Crimea and the adjoining areas legally while many thousands more departed illegally during the same period of time. This new wave of emigration affected 784 villages, including 687 in Crimea proper, many of which were left completely deserted by their inhabitants.

The second Tartar emigration was prompted by the oppressive rule which the Russian authorities had exercised against the Tartars during the Crimean War. From the first the Russians regarded the Tartars as enemy agents. Cossack detachments closely guarded the Tartar villages and made many indiscriminate arrests among the Tartar population. The Russian Commander-in-Chief, Prince Menshikov, had already suggested at the time of the Crimean War the wholesale transfer of the Tartar population into the interior of Russia, a measure which it was then deemed impossible to take, but which the Soviet Government put into effect almost ninety years later. Menshikov's suggestion was accepted only to the extent that the population of a few villages was removed not to Siberia but to the Kursk Government in the central part of European Russia.

After the great exodus of 1859-63, Tartar emigration revived again after 1875 and about 18,000 Tartars left the Crimea between 1875 and 1892. This was an illegal emigration for by then the Russian authorities had realized the great economic disadvantages caused by the Tartars leaving the country and refused to issue passports to further emigrants. To fight Tartar emigration the Czarist Government appointed in 1876 a 'Commission to investigate the best means of keeping the Tartars in the Crimea'. No better means could be found than a stricter police terror against any Tartar suspected of intending to leave the country. All coercive measures proved to be inadequate; the emigration of the Tartars continued and stopped only after the October Revolution.¹²

The colonization of the Crimea and of the areas North of the peninsula which had belonged to the Crimean Tartar Khanate and later to the Government of Tauria was an extremely complicated process. To fill the gap left by the Crimean Tartars the Russian Government recruited colonists from several European nationalities. Apart from the already mentioned German colonists, Bulgarian, Czech and even Estonian settlers came to the peninsula. Russian colonization proper in the Crimea advanced at an amazingly slow pace with the result that at the time of the Crimean War only 15,000 Russian colonists

had made their home there. It was only during the second half of the nineteenth century that Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish colonization assumed greater proportions.

CRIMEAN TARTAR NATIONALISM

The Tartar element in the Crimea had been reduced to about one-quarter of the population when that territory became part of the Soviet Union. The question arose, therefore, whether it was at all advisable to set up a Crimean Republic. In May 1921 the Crimean Provincial Committee of the Communist Party decided by 96 votes to 52 that the Crimea should be merely another province of Soviet Russia. This decision was overruled by the central Government in Moscow. On October 13th, 1921, Lenin and Kalinin signed the decree which brought the Crimean A.S.S.R. into being.

The reasons prompting the Soviet Government in founding the Crimean Republic were only too apparent. It was obvious that the Kremlin's gesture towards the Crimean Tartars would be welcome to all peoples of Soviet Russia belonging to the Turko-Tartar group. Though they were small in number, the prestige of the Crimean Tartars ranked high in the Turkic and Moslem world. Thus the most outstanding advocate of pan-Turkism in Czarist Russia was the Crimean Tartar scholar, Ismail Bey Gasprinsky. The newspaper which Gasprinsky edited demanded the creation of a unified Turkish language to be understood 'from the Crimea to Herat and from Constantinople to Kashgaria.'

Gasprinsky's cultural pan-Turkism became popular not only with the Turkic peoples of Russia but also with many intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire. Here we come to another reason which made the foundation of a Crimean Republic imperative. The Soviet Government thought that a Crimean Republic would have 'international importance' and that it would serve as a 'window of Russia into Turkey and into the East'.¹³ It even believed that the existence of a Crimean Soviet State would strengthen the chances of communism in Turkey. There was a semblance of justification for this official Soviet optimism. At the time of the foundation of the Crimean A.S.S.R. Crimean Tartars were playing an important part in the leadership of the Turkish Communist Party. One-third of the members of its Central Committee were Crimean Tartars and the leader of the Turkish trade unions was himself of Crimean Tartar origin.

In reality the Crimean A.S.S.R. has never lived up to Moscow's high expectations. It was never a propaganda asset as far as Turkey is concerned. The first thing that Turkey heard about the new republic was the terrible famine which had broken out there in the winter of 1921-2. A Crimean delegation even toured Turkey in 1922 to beg for help for

the victims of the famine epidemic which caused particularly heavy losses to the Tartar people. The propaganda value of the Soviet Crimea was further reduced by the active suppression of local nationalism which started earlier there than in other parts of the U.S.S.R. The main target of persecution was the remnant of the nationalist Crimean Tartar party, the 'Milli Firka'. After the establishment of the Soviet régime this party was officially disbanded, but its left-wing members had joined the Communists in the hope that the existence of an autonomous Crimea would ultimately promote national Tartar aims.

Tartar nationalists who had expected communist assistance in a revival of the Tartar Crimean Khanate were soon disillusioned. The Prime Minister of the Crimea, Veli Ibragimov, the main protagonist of the Tartar nationalist tendencies, was arrested in 1927 as a 'class-enemy' and executed in the following year. At the same time the Soviet régime liquidated all manifestations of Tartar nationalism – also nicknamed 'Veli-Ibragimovism' – in the cultural field. It purged the staff of the Crimean People's Commissariat of Education, banned nationalist textbooks and stopped the publication of two literary journals in the Tartar language.

Veli Ibragimov and his supporters were violently opposed to the arrival of new agricultural colonists in their country. The suppression of 'Veli-Ibragimovism' thus cleared the way to a further strengthening of the non-Tartar element in the Crimean A.S.S.R. As a result of Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish colonization the proportion of Tartars in the total population of the Crimea fell between 1926 and 1936 from 26.2 to 23.1 per cent. The Slav share in the population of the country went up accordingly, and there were, in 1936, 43.5 per cent Russians and 10 per cent Ukrainians in the Crimean A.S.S.R. In reality, the position of the Crimean Tartars was even more hopeless than these figures indicate. Five hundred thousand people, mostly Russians, each year visited the Crimea, which is, after the Caucasus, the main health and holiday centre of the Soviet Union, and thus likewise contributed to reinforce the Slav character of the Crimean Republic.

In fairness it must be said that the Soviet régime tried to encourage in the inter-war period such Crimean Tartar cultural activities as were harmless from the point of view of communist state and party interests. Thus the Crimean State Publishing House published Crimean Tartar folk-tales in the Tartar original and also in Russian translations. The latter appeared in beautifully illustrated editions with enthusiastic prefaces highly praising the fine sense of humour and poetic gift of the Crimean Tartars. The collection and transcription of Tartar folk-tales was carried out scientifically and systematically. A team of research workers was busy for sixteen years collecting these tales in remote mountain villages, in the city bazaars, from lonely fishermen and

wayfarers. No fewer than 500 tales and stories belong to the Akhmet Akhay Ozenbash cycle alone. They all deal with the life and deeds of the Tartar Till Ulenspiegel – Akhmet Akhay – who is depicted in some tales as a fool, in others as a wise man and is the personification of the Crimean Tartar popular wit. Only one of the three announced volumes of the Akhmet Akhay tales appeared in Russian translation during the winter of 1940.¹⁴ The book of Tartar folk-tales became, within a few years of its publication, a kind of obituary of the Crimean Tartars, a document testifying to the vitality and gallantry of a people who have, through the ages, responded bravely and with a smile to all the forms of adversity.

THE CRIMEAN PROVINCE

It is impossible to say with certainty to what extent the Crimean Tartars remained loyal to the Soviet régime and to what extent they betrayed it when living under German occupation. There is no doubt that there was a certain amount of disloyalty, although both German and Soviet sources exaggerated its proportions, the Germans for propaganda reasons and the Russians to justify their repressive measures against the Crimean Tartars. The official Soviet statement on the matter came from the then secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., Bakhmurov, who on June 25th, 1946, made the following points which equally applied to the Crimean Tartars and the Chechen people of the Caucasus:

1. Many Crimean Tartars instigated by German agents, joined German volunteer detachments and waged armed struggle against Red Army units.
2. They set up saboteur gangs to fight against the Soviet power in the rear.
3. The bulk of the Crimean Tartar population did not offer opposition to these traitors.¹⁵

We shall not attempt to argue against this official explanation. In reviewing the history of the Crimean Tartars we have shown the real background to the abolition of the Crimean A.S.S.R. The Russian Bolsheviks simply carried to a logical end the Crimea policy of the Russian Czars, aiming at assuring the triumph of the Russian over the Tartar cause.

During the Second World War, the Crimea, which in the past had been the centre of great events of Russian history, again became the scene of outstanding acts of Russian heroism. Sevastopol in the early part of the German-Russian war was the most popular town in Russia after Leningrad and Stalingrad. The feats of the men of Sevastopol who withstood a siege of 250 days were celebrated all over the Soviet

Union in poems and leading articles and quoted as examples to the whole country. At the same time the memory of the first siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean War was revived and popularized.

The glory which battle-scarred Sevastopol had acquired during the two sieges of 1855 and 1942 overshadowed in the Russian mind all the daring feats accomplished in the course of centuries by the warriors of the Crimean Khans. Russian Sevastopol had scored over romantic Bakhchisaray, the historic capital of the Crimean Tartars, which remained their cultural centre even in the twentieth century. It was in conformity with the logic of history – the history of Russian colonization, of expulsion of non-Russians and of the advance of the Slavs to the sea – that Crimean Tartaria finally vanished from the scene after the Second World War and that the political geography of the Soviet Union knew in future only the Crimean Province of the R.S.F.S.R.

This new Crimea is a Slav Crimea. Along with the Tartars the equally 'unreliable' Greek and German colonists have disappeared from the country. The Russian-Ukrainian element which only a short time ago had a narrow majority over the combined non-Slav peoples now dominates the peninsula. The collective farms which were deserted as a result of military operations or because of the transplantation of the Crimean Tartars have been taken over by Russian and Ukrainian colonists who have tried to imitate the skill of the Tartars in growing tobacco and wine by making use of their well-proved methods.¹⁸

III. KALMUCKS

UNDER THE CZARIST REGIME

The Kalmucks had probably the most eventful history of any nationality of the U.S.S.R. Until their forcible evacuation from their 'Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic' they were the only Mongol and the only Buddhist people in Europe. They had joined the Russian family of nations as late as the seventeenth century when, with 50,000 kubitki (carts used as nomad tents), they left Chinese Turkestan and reached the Volga in 1630. On Russian soil these nomads from the Asiatic steppe continued to live according to their own laws and under the supreme authority of their Khan, who exercised the unlimited despotic and theocratic powers bestowed on him by the Dalai Lama in person. The Russian authorities soon realized the important role which the Kalmucks, if properly used, could play in the consolidation of Russia's eastward expansion. The Kalmuck warriors, without a homeland and showing blind obedience to their chief were, for example, an excellent instrument for keeping in check the recalcitrant local peoples of the Urals such as the Bashkirs.

Peter the Great, whose rule was, in general, attended by stern measures against local peoples, did not curtail the freedom of the Kalmucks but treated them as allies. He appreciated particularly the services of the great Khan, Ayuka, who ruled over the Kalmucks from 1672. When leaving Russia for his great journey to the West in 1697, Peter sent a special message to Ayuka asking him to shield Russia's Eastern frontiers during his absence. There are few instances which could have better shown Russia's dual Euro-Asiatic character than this co-operation between Peter the Great and Khan Ayuka. Leaving his country with the aim of paving the way for its Europeanization, he relied on a half-savage Kalmuck 'guard' for the security of the Eastern territories of his realm.

Russia's policy towards the Kalmucks changed, however, under Catherine II. The Empress did not wish to have the Kalmucks as 'vassals' or 'allies' any longer and transformed them into subjects of the Russian crown. The Kalmucks were permitted to maintain some of their tribal peculiarities, but deprived of all the attributes of sovereignty. In 1771, Catherine decreed the limitation of the Kalmuck autonomy and even abolished the Khan title. The Kalmucks are a proud people; under the new conditions the majority of them did not wish to remain in Russia and left the country after having lived there for 140 years.

The Czarist authorities had no difficulty in handling the Kalmuck minority which remained on Russian soil and numbered 50,000 persons. A 'Kalmuck Office' in Astrakhan exerted the supreme supervision, with the Astrakhan governor acting as 'Chief Guardian' ('Glavny Potechitel'), of the Kalmucks and with District Guardians in every 'ulus', the Kalmuck equivalent of the Russian 'uyezd' (district). In the nineteenth century there was no longer any need to use Kalmucks in punitive raids on other non-Russian nationalities, but the Kalmucks proved to be of value in the regular Czarist army.

To the Russian aristocracy the Kalmucks contributed a very distinguished family: the descendants of the Khan Ayuka tired of life in the steppe and attracted by Russian civilization became baptized and Russianized. The widow of Ayuka's grandson, the Khan Donduka (Russianized 'Dondukov'), became a Christian and her children were brought up as 'perfect Russians'. The prestige which this new Russian aristocratic family enjoyed was so great that a Russian nobleman of old stock who had married Ayuka's great-granddaughter, changed his name from Korsakov into Dondukov-Korsakov and added a Kalmuck sable to his own coat of arms.

The bulk of the Kalmuck people on Russian territory did not follow the example of their Khan's family and remained faithful to their own nationality and religion. Lhasa, the capital of Buddhism, continued to

be their religious centre to which they looked for spiritual guidance and there was a frequent exchange of visits between Tibetan and Kalmuck priests. The influence of the priests on the Kalmuck people was remarkable. No action of any importance was ever undertaken by a Kalmuck without prior consultation with a priest.

Since the Czarist authorities looked upon the Kalmuck as an alien and unreliable element which did not fit into European Russia, official 'Kalmuck policy' in the nineteenth century consisted mainly in ousting the Kalmuck people from all economically valuable areas and particularly from the fishing waters of the Caspian Sea and the Volga. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the 'ten verst limit' was fixed for the Kalmucks which meant that no Kalmucks were allowed to approach Russian settlements beyond that limit of ten versts (over six miles). Russian colonization was thus enabled to prosper on the fertile fringe of 'Kalmuckia'. In the sixties of the nineteenth century the Kalmucks were ordered once again to withdraw for another ten versts from the previous limit. Having been cut off from the Volga and the Caspian Sea the impoverishment of the Kalmucks worsened with every passing year; the number of their cattle dropped from 2,500,000 head in 1803 to 453,000 head in 1896.

Such was the fate of the Kalmuck people under the Czarist régime. Nobody gave a more fitting description of Kalmuck history than Lenin in his first proclamation to the Kalmuck people dated July 2nd, 1919. Lenin declared: 'Kalmuck Brothers, the entire past of your people is an uninterrupted chain of suffering. Owing to their economic and political backwardness, your people have always been an object of exploitation by stronger neighbours. The Government which extended its power by bloody conquests over many foreign races has likewise fastened the chains of slavery on the freedom-loving Kalmuck people'.

As time went on, Soviet propaganda in Kalmuckia spoke less and less of the 'chains of slavery' of the past, but recalled the military records of the Kalmuck people as part of the Czarist army. This line is taken, for instance, in the 'Yorel', the epic poem which the Kalmuck people is said to have composed on the occasion of Stalin's sixtieth birthday in 1939. Thus the 'Yorel' refers to the share of the Kalmucks in the fight against the Swedish king, Charles XII, whose soldiers were 'more numerous than ants, more bloodthirsty than shakals, more crafty than snakes'. Published at the time of German-Russian co-operation the 'Yorel' omits the fact that Kalmucks also took part in the Seven Years War (1756-1763), particularly in the Russian conquest of East Prussia. It turns to the Napoleonic Wars when ten Kalmuck cavalry regiments helped in warding off the Invasion of 1812. Three Kalmuck regiments, two with camels, one on horseback entered Paris in 1814:

'Together with the Russian eagles the Kalmucks defended their land
Against greedy Napoleon,
Who wanted to bridle the whole world
As if it were his horse.
Thus during three centuries
In countless battles
The earth was soaked
With the blood of Kalmucks and Russians. . . .'

UNDER SOVIET RULE

The 'Yorel' idealized even more the period of Russian history following the establishment of Soviet power. In reality, many things had happened in Kalmuckia which did not lend themselves to glorification. During the revolution the majority of Kalmucks had belonged to the 'camp of reaction'; their leaders had first declared for a moderate democratic self-government and later supported the Cossack counter-revolution which at one time dominated the Kalmuck steppe. Banditry flourished in Kalmuckia in the Civil War period and a Soviet publication stated, as late as 1926, that 'objective pre-requisites for banditry on a small scale' had not yet disappeared.¹⁷ These 'objective pre-requisites' included the existence of rival clans among the Kalmuck tribal nobility.

In 1929 the Soviet authorities launched their decisive offensive against what they called the Kalmuck 'upper class'. A decree issued on October 16th, 1929, ordered the transfer 'beyond the borders of Kalmuckia' of the members of the Kalmuck 'feudal aristocracy' the 'Noyony' and 'Zaisangi' and the confiscation of their property. The October decree which changed the entire economic structure and the political face of the Kalmuck people constituted formally a measure of class struggle. In reality, however, it was a far-reaching Russian interference with the destinies of the Kalmuck people, effected with the help of a tiny number of local Kalmuck communists. The 'Noyony', who were expelled by the Soviet authorities, were not only 'feudal' aristocrats but also the hereditary heads of the Kalmuck local organs of self-government. In spite of their often tyrannical rule, they symbolized in the eyes of the Kalmucks historical national tradition. The removal of the 'Noyony' from Kalmuckia was certainly a progressive act from an abstract standpoint, but it failed to take into account the peculiarities of Kalmuck historical developments. The Kalmucks, whose way of thinking did not evolve in the framework of Marxian dialectic, were bound to resent the action against the 'Noyony' as a blow directed against their people as a whole. The action must have appeared to them as a continuation of the Czarist Russian coercion which had limited the power of the 'Noyony' in order to increase

the influence of the Russian State in the country of the Kalmucks.

The positive side of Soviet policy in Kalmuckia consisted in the formation of a Kalmuck Autonomous Province by a decree which Lenin signed on November 4th, 1920. After the liquidation of the Kalmuck national leadership the Autonomous Province was transformed into an Autonomous Republic in 1933. The Republic covered 26,000 square miles and had 200,000 inhabitants of whom 70 per cent. were Kalmucks. Soviet Kalmuckia was, at first, governed from Astrakhan, just as in Czarist times. In 1927 the building of a town was started in the main cattle-breeding area of Kalmuckia. Named Elista, it became the capital of the Kalmuck A.S.S.R. and the first Kalmuck town in history. By the outbreak of the Second World War, Elista had 12,000 inhabitants, it was officially described as a 'clean, neat, elegant little town of concrete, metal and glass'.¹⁸ It had three libraries totalling over 300,000 books, and a theatre. Apart from Elista, the Soviet Government founded the township of Lagan on the Caspian Sea coast.

During the inter-war period, literacy in Kalmuckia had increased from 4 to 90 per cent, but it would be wrong to assume that the foundations of a Kalmuck culture were laid by the Soviet régime. The Kalmucks have ancient cultural traditions which were bound to come into conflict with communist ideology. The works of literature which the Kalmucks created belong to a feudal epoch and were, therefore, obnoxious from the Soviet point of view. The great national epic of the Kalmucks, 'Dzhangar', in particular, was found to be 'imbued with religious and reactionary content'. It was obvious that such an important monument of the Kalmuck national past could not simply be thrown overboard. Kalmuck and Russian writers were, therefore, advised 'to purge it carefully of the harmful influences of the age and the tendencies of the ruling class'.¹⁹ Even this was not enough; the main features of 'Dzhangar' had to be interpreted in a Soviet sense. The 'Yorel' in honour of Stalin seems to have succeeded in doing it. The two heroes of 'Dzhangar', Dzhangar himself and Khonrog, found, according to the 'Yorel', their reincarnation in Stalin. Like Dzhangar and Khonrog, Stalin has built the fairyland 'Bumba, the land of eternal youth, the land of eternal abundance, the land of heroes'.²⁰

The 'Yorel' ended with a Kalmuck request to Stalin: 'Lead us forward to Communism!' But whither did Stalin lead the Kalmucks? No official Soviet statement has ever answered this question. In the early part of the Russian-German War, Soviet propaganda repeatedly stressed the eagerness of the Kalmucks to contribute to the 'defence of the Socialist Fatherland'. In October, 1942, the Russian newspapers quoted a letter addressed to Stalin by a meeting of Kalmuck representatives expressing 'the determination of the Kalmuck people to mobilize all their resources in order to help the Red Army to rout the invader'.

The German army which had overrun so many territories also occupied Western Kalmuckia, including the capital, Elista. After the liberation of Elista on New Year's Day, 1943, Soviet propaganda still recognized the Kalmucks as 'a people of the Soviet Union'. In February, 1943, a 'Kalmuck Provincial Committee' of the Communist Party was still in existence. The Committee decided at that time to reopen Kalmuck schools and reading rooms. It also announced that the Kalmuck people had collected 7,000,000 roubles for the purchase of arms for the Red Army.²¹

Some time between 1943 and 1945 the Soviet Government must have changed its mind about the Kalmucks. It may be that the conduct of the Kalmucks during the German occupation was not in keeping with the pledge which they were reported to have given before the Nazi invasion of their republic. The Soviet Government never complained officially about Kalmuck treachery and unreliability during the war. The liquidation of the Kalmucks as an organized community was carried out informally. The Kalmuck A.S.S.R. was absorbed by the Province of Astrakhan, the Kalmuck capital Elista became the Russian settlement Stepnoy and the 'noisy town of the Kalmuck fishermen, Lagan' assumed the Russian name of 'Kaspiskoye'. The opening sentence in Lenin's proclamation to the Kalmucks in which he described their history as an 'uninterrupted chain of suffering' had been amply confirmed.

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IV

THE NORTH-WESTERN BORDER

I. CHALLENGE TO SCANDINAVIA

Whilst Russia's advance in the East, where she was forming her gigantic Empire, was a steady and easy one, in the West she had to struggle hard for every inch of space which was to come into her orbit.

In the past, Russia's conception of 'the West' was quite different from what it has become in modern times. For a long period Russia considered the West as consisting only of Poland and Scandinavia, more particularly Sweden.

To achieve her expansion in the West, Russia had for centuries been fighting both Poland and Sweden and had brought the former to her knees in the eighteenth and again in the twentieth century; but Russia had never been able to defeat Sweden in the same way. It is true that Russia managed to reduce the area of Sweden and to limit her power; she failed, however, to erase the Swedish State from the map of Europe.

A new impulse has been given to the centuries-old Russo-Scandinavian conflict since the Soviet régime came into power. Soviet rulers did not hesitate to use to the full the fact that Russia is the fifth Scandinavian State, in the sense that her territories comprise some regions which the Scandinavians themselves, for geographical, historical or ethnical reasons, consider to be part of Scandinavia.

CHALLENGE OF HISTORY

Despite her position as a 'Scandinavian State', Soviet Russia is now trying to shake off everything which may conceivably form a historical link between Russia and Scandinavia or be interpreted as a debt owed by the Russian State and people to Scandinavians. For Soviet Russian national pride it is, for instance, insufferable that the first Russian State should have been founded in the middle of the ninth century by the Varangians, ancestors of the modern Swedes.

The problem of the origin of the first Russian State, to which historical literature refers as the 'question of the Normans', has been eagerly, and not always dispassionately, discussed since the eighteenth century. On that issue Russian historians were split into two camps:

some eminent historians, like Pogodin and Solovyov, believed in the Scandinavian origin of the first Russian rulers, while other not less well-known authorities, such as Kostomarov and Illovaisky, challenged it.

At first, Soviet historical science was not interested in this quarrel of 'bourgeois historians'. However, following the awakening of Slav racial feelings in Soviet Russia, the necessity of purging Russian history of all Scandinavian elements was actively urged by propagandists. The new nationalist atmosphere which was born in the Soviet Union during the Second World War made it impossible for any Soviet historian to defend the 'Norman' theory; its rejection became a kind of unavoidable patriotic duty. Such an 'official' Soviet historian as Professor N. S. Derzhavin went so far as to outlaw the 'Norman' theory altogether by declaring it contradictory to the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin on the origin of the State.¹ At the same time, Soviet historians popularized and studied the pre-Varangian Slav roots of Russian history, including the era of the Scythians, on the basis of the theory of the latter being the forefathers of the Slavs.

An ever-increasing number of Russian books deal with Russian early history and the pre-historic period. The majority of the authors blame German influence for the offence of having introduced into Russian historiography the theory of Russia's Varangian or Norman origin. The conclusion arrived at by the new Slav-biased conception of early Russian history is that the Varangians and Normans in many respects stood on a lower level of social and cultural development than the ancient Russians. The Soviet reader is told that Russians could have borrowed nothing from the Scandinavians for the simple reason that the latter had nothing to offer. Being a people inferior to the Russians the Scandinavians could not possibly have been the founders of the Russian State.²

It is an essential feature of the new Soviet Russian ideology which emerged out of the Second World War to deny that Russians had ever been in the position of pupils to foreign teachers. In this respect the Soviet régime does not follow the example of Peter the Great who, at the crisis of the war with Sweden, readily acknowledged that the Swedish King Charles XII had been his master in military science.

In the field of power politics, however, the Soviet Union fully endorses the aim pursued by Peter the Great, which was to oust Sweden from the world arena and to relegate her to the role of a purely Scandinavian power. The practical results achieved by such a policy were that in the eighty-eight years which elapsed between the peace of Nystad in 1721 and that of Abo, in 1809, Sweden lost not only all territories on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, but also her island possessions in the Baltic, such as the exclusively Swedish - from the ethnical viewpoint - Åland archipelago, and the partly Swedish

Õsel (Saaremaa) Island off the Estonian coast. The shock of military defeat suffered by Sweden was further aggravated by the way in which Russia consolidated her position in the newly won territories.

THE MISSION OF ST. PETERSBURG

The founding of St. Petersburg in 1703 was the most important move for the consolidation of Russia's positions *vis-à-vis* Scandinavia. It is immaterial whether in founding St. Petersburg, Peter the Great really did say 'From-here-we-shall-threaten-the-Swede' as Pushkin suggested in his famous poem *The Bronze Horseman*: the new Russian capital fulfilled in fact the function of threatening Sweden and the whole of Scandinavia. The very existence of the city implied that Russia was determined to dominate the Baltic Sea. It also implied that sooner or later Russia would subjugate Finland in order to ensure the safety of St. Petersburg.

St. Petersburg, this bulwark against Scandinavia, was itself to some extent of 'Scandinavian' origin, since the foundations were laid by Swedish prisoners of war and the local Finnish population. In later years, referring to the involuntary participation of their kinsmen in the building of the city, Finnish nationalists said, not without reason, that the Finns had actually built 'the scaffold for their own execution'.³

While the first workers to lay the base for St. Petersburg were Swedes and Finns, a large army of forced labour recruited from all parts of the Russian Empire was brought in to complete the work. Many thousands of those serfs fell victims to the harsh climate of the St. Petersburg region, its marshes, the lack of food and adequate clothing, epidemics and sheer exhaustion. These Russians had not only to build under compulsion; they were also forced to settle in the new city in order to provide it with necessary craftsmen and merchants.

The foundation of St. Petersburg not only had tremendous political, military and cultural significance in itself, but also prepared the way for the further extension of the area of Russian settlement to a sparsely populated alien territory. Almost simultaneously with St. Petersburg a number of other Russian towns and localities had sprung up, among them Tsarskoye Selo, the residence of the Russian Imperial family, which took the place of the Finnish village Saari Mois (1708), Peterhof (1709), Oranienbaum (1714) also formerly a Finnish village, etc. In 1703 – the year of St. Petersburg's foundation – Peter the Great inaugurated yet another town destined to 'threaten' the Scandinavians – Petrozavodsk – where, in Peter's time, guns were manufactured for the war against Sweden.

Many people in Russia hated St. Petersburg. The common man considered a town built on water as an unnatural and devilish creation.

Nationalist-minded aristocrats and intellectuals always preferred the 'genuinely Russian' Moscow and loathed St. Petersburg as the channel of European influence. Only the Soviet régime relieved the anxiety of those who feared intercourse with the West. It reinstated Moscow as Russia's capital and drew a thick curtain in front of the 'window' which Peter the Great had cut into the European side of the Russian house. St. Petersburg, under the new name of Leningrad, was isolated from the non-Russian world.

Having ceased to be the capital of Russia, Leningrad assumed new, but in some ways not less important functions, which were determined by its geographic position. Under the guidance of such energetic 'governors' as S. M. Kirov and A. A. Zhdanov, Leningrad became the capital of the Soviet Far North. Many Soviet efforts towards large-scale developments in the Soviet Arctic can be traced back to Leningrad, where organizations and institutes like the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route, or the Institute of the Peoples of the North, have their headquarters.

THE MURMANSK RAILWAY

In addition to directing the destinies of the entire Soviet Arctic, Leningrad communists have devoted special attention to the colonization of the vast but badly neglected territory along the Finnish border stretching from Lake Onega to the Arctic Sea. For this they used as a springboard the railway line linking St. Petersburg with the ice-free Murman coastal district which was built during the very last years of the Czarist régime in response to military requirements of the war period. The railway's northern terminus, Romanov-na-Murmane (Romanov-upon-Murman) was founded in 1915 and named after the Russian Imperial family. Two years later it was changed to Murmansk and as such the town became known to the outside world.

The construction of the Murmansk railway line was a decisive step towards the conquest of the Russian North and represented the most important new asset in the Russian challenge to Scandinavia since the foundation of St. Petersburg. The railway, more than 630 miles long and familiarly known as 'Murmanka', was built within less than eighteen months at the price of great loss of life, as in the case of St. Petersburg. Another noteworthy parallel was that large numbers of Finnish workers took part in its construction with the difference that the Finns formed but a section of a large international labour force which comprised tens of thousands of Chinese, Uzbeks, Tartars, Turkmenians, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war and even a few hundred Canadian workers with some experience in the construction of trans-continental railways. Some of the uprooted Asiatic workers settled down along the railway

line they were building and population statistics for 1926 still indicated the presence of Chinese and Tartars in the Murmansk area.

The Murmansk Railway (now called 'Kirov Railway') and its subsidiary lines proved of the greatest value to the advance of Russian civilization in the Far North and had a stimulating effect on the increase of the Russian population not only in the present Murmansk Province but also in Karelia. In its final implication the building of the Murmansk Railway led to a complete reversal of forces in the European Far North and ensured an overwhelming numerical preponderance of Russians in the Russian-Norwegian-Finnish border areas south-east of the North Cap. The existence of the Murmansk Railway enabled Russia, in particular, to stabilize her hold on the Kola Peninsula, which, being totally undeveloped, could be considered up to 1920 as potential Norwegian or Finnish living space.

KOLA PENINSULA AND MURMANSK

The Kola Peninsula is an ancient Russian territory despite the enormous distance which separates it from the important Russian political centres. The presence of Russians in Kola was mentioned as far back as 1216 and the locality of Kola itself, situated a few miles south of the present city of Murmansk, has been in existence as a Russian stronghold probably since 1264. Kola was known as 'citadel' under Ivan the Terrible, 'fortress' under Peter the Great and 'district town' under Catherine II. However, not satisfied with the possession of Kola, the Russians with the aid of Karelians and Lapps pushed westwards and southwards into Northern Norway. Soviet historians have attached considerable importance to the *de facto* domination which the Russians had exercised in the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries over the north Norwegian Finnmarken province. The historian, I. P. Shaskolsky, even arrived at the conclusion that Norway had no reason whatever for claiming Lappland (Finnmarken) as her historical possession. So far these 'findings' have only appeared in the *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, a publication of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, but they could, of course, easily be used one day for establishing a Russian historic claim on Northern Norway.⁴

While in 1326, by the treaty of Nøteborg, the Russian State of Novgorod renounced all further violent incursions into Northern Norway, the Russians continued their peaceful penetration of the Norwegian arctic coastal regions. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Russian fishermen frequently wintered in the Finnmarken, and in the seventeenth century, according to Russian historians, they even founded several Russian settlements in Norway including 'Vasin' and 'Vargaev', which later became the Norwegian towns of Vadsoe and Vardoe.⁵

Russian influence in the Far North declined at the beginning of the eighteenth century when Archangel, the starting point of many fishing expeditions to the Finnmarken and the Murman Coast (the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula), lost its previous position. In 1722 Peter the Great issued a Ukaz which deprived Archangel of its status of military port and export harbour for the benefit of St. Petersburg. This presented a great opportunity to the Norwegians.

Numerous Norwegian fishermen settled permanently on the Russian Murman coast, with the result that cod from the Russian Murman area was delivered to St. Petersburg fish market under the label of 'Norwegian cod'. The Norwegians were satisfied with the fishing rights they had been granted off the Murman coast and at no time have they advanced any territorial claims on the 60,000 square miles of the Kola Peninsula which, as late as 1897, had altogether 9,291 inhabitants out of whom 5,853, or 63 per cent, were Russians.

The Finns, on the other hand, immediately after having obtained their national independence in 1918, displayed an active interest in that area, more particularly in the part of Kola adjoining the Norwego-Russian and Finno-Russian border. But Finnish hopes of territorial aggrandisement in the Far North were frustrated through the evolution of the Murmansk Province, and Murmansk city in particular.

Murmansk, an insignificant township of 2,500 inhabitants in 1920 and still a small town of 29,200 inhabitants in 1931, had become a city of 117,000 people on the eve of the Second World War. Nor was Murmansk an isolated new town surrounded by a neighbourhood which had remained static. With a view to achieving a revolutionary development of Russian Far Northern regions, the Soviet régime launched a full-scale scientific attack on the Kola Peninsula; 425 expeditions and research parties were sent there between 1920 and 1934 alone.

The first tangible result of those efforts was the creation of two new Arctic mining towns: Kirovsk, the apatite town, founded as 'Khibinogorsk' in 1928, and Monchegorsk, the nickel town. Russians from the Urals and the Volga, Ukrainians and even Tartars took part in the building of these localities. The multi-national army of workers in the Murmansk District included deportees, people of the former upper classes, who, at the price of working for some years in the north, could obtain civic equality for their children, including accession to higher educational institutions otherwise denied to non-proletarians. Russian workers were induced to settle down in the Murmansk region, by being offered as incentives higher salaries and longer holidays than those employed in other parts of the Soviet Union. By May 1938, the Murmansk District had developed to an extent justifying its promotion from a mere district of the Leningrad Province to a province in its own right.

During the first post-war Five-Year Plan, new mining centres such as

Olenogorskoye and Enskoye sprang up for the exploitation of the newly discovered iron-ore deposits which is now in full swing.⁶ The rapid growth of the population of the Murmansk Province in the post-war period is shown by the fact that in the 1950 elections to the Supreme Soviet, the province had two constituencies; in 1946 it had one. This change in electoral geometry would indicate that the province has over 500,000 inhabitants since every constituency represents theoretically 300,000 inhabitants.

While the names of Murmansk, Monchegorsk and Kirovsk are being lavishly diffused by every conceivable form of propaganda, complete silence is observed about Polyarnoye, a base of the Russian Arctic fleet, which is located a few miles north of Murmansk. Without Polyarnoye, Murmansk would have been incomplete since it is the iron hand which shields the Murmansk workshops.

Neither Norway nor Finland – the two Nordic countries nearest to Murmansk – possesses any towns larger than the Russian Arctic city, with the exception of their respective capitals. The striking changes achieved by the Russians in these parts of the Soviet Union can be best gauged by the fact that at the time of the October Revolution the three Norwegian Arctic towns of Hammerfest, Vardoe and Vadsoe seemed large and prosperous cities in comparison with the then existing primitive Russian settlements, Kola and Alexandrovsk, of 1,000 inhabitants each. Now, however, the balance has been completely reversed and the Norwegian towns are totally eclipsed by the radiance of the Russian northern giant.

PETSAMO

The outstanding position occupied by Murmansk in the Far North was further strengthened by Russia's annexation in 1944 of the territory of Petsamo (in Russian, Pechenga). The incorporation of Petsamo into the Soviet Union established a direct Norwegian-Finnish border of 120 miles in length. This made Norway fully aware of the pressure which the Soviet province of Murmansk and Russia as a whole are exercising in the Far North. The new common frontier between Russia and Norway could not be compared to the one which existed before 1917. That was a dead and politically meaningless frontier. On the other hand, the frontier re-established in 1944 was an active and potentially dynamic one on account of the economic, political and military significance of the Soviet province behind it.

The annexation of Petsamo by the Soviet Union also changed fundamentally the very essence of the Finnish State. One may argue that Russia simply recovered what she had lost after the First World War. This is true from a formal point of view. The region of Petsamo is, in a way, old Russian soil. A famous Russian Orthodox monastery had been

founded here in 1532. The Swedes burned down the monastery in 1589 and annexed the Petsamo region. Russia again recovered it in 1809 and held it until 1920, when Petsamo was included in the Finnish Republic.

In the inter-war period Petsamo became an organic part of Finland. The entire geopolitical outlook of the Finnish State became based on the assumption that Petsamo would remain Finnish for all time and that Finland would continue to be an Arctic power. Guided by these considerations the Finns built an Arctic highway 340 miles long linking Petsamo with the rest of the country. Settlers were brought to Finnish Lapland and a new harbour was constructed in Petsamo Fjord. On January 1st, 1938, Finland took a further step towards strengthening her Arctic possessions by forming a special Lapland province with Rovaniemi, the southern terminal of the Arctic Highway, as its administrative centre. As to the Petsamo region itself, the number of its inhabitants increased from 1,905 in 1926 to 5,000 in 1939.

The armistice of 1944, which gave the Petsamo region and its nickel mines to Russia, cut off the Finns from the Arctic. Thus all Finnish efforts to develop the Finnish Northern March were invalidated and the Arctic Highway, which had been built at the price of great financial and other sacrifices, lost its *raison d'être*. Finnish investments in money and energy in the Petsamo region proved to be not only useless but even detrimental to Finnish interests: the Finns had transformed a rather unimportant fishing village into a kind of unprotected northern entrance into the Finnish house, which, when in Russian hands, was bound to make the position of the Finnish State precarious. The Soviet régime is determined to develop Pechenga on the same scale as the rest of the Murmansk Province. The avowed objective of Soviet planning is to build in the Pechenga area another Arctic town comparable to Kirovsk, Monchegorsk or even Murmansk, and to add to the State Trust 'Pechenganikel', which is exploiting the local nickel mines, some other enterprises of all-Union importance.⁷

THE LAPP ISSUE

The possession of Petsamo has also enabled the Soviet Union to increase its cultural and political influence over the Lapps, the aborigines of the Scandinavian Far North. Already the Czarist authorities had paid some attention to them. In 1888 they rebuilt the ancient Petsamo monastery which served as a cultural centre for the Lapps, especially for their younger generation. Also Russian scholars showed some interest in the Lapp people and praised their sense of humour, their diligence and their thirst for knowledge.⁸

It was left for the Soviet régime to conduct a systematic 'Lapp policy'. The Communist Government thoroughly transformed the life

of the 'Saami', as the Lapps are officially called in the U.S.S.R. A 'Saami National District' was founded in the Kola Peninsula where the Lapps acquired administrative experience. They also ceased to be a people exclusively consisting of hunters and fishermen. In 1926 the first Lapp student entered the Leningrad Institute of the Peoples of the North. Since then the presence of Lapp students in Leningrad has become a regular feature. Lapps can also be found among the students of the Murmansk Teachers' Training College and of the Murmansk Communist Party School.

There would be no need to mention the small group of 1,800 to 2,000 Russian Lapps, but for the possibility that Soviet Russia may produce an imaginary Lapp issue against an unfriendly Scandinavia. Soviet nationalities policy never overlooks the 'brothers beyond the frontiers' of any Soviet nationality. Therefore it duly takes into account the existence of the 19,000 Lapps in Norway and of the 8,000 Lapps in Sweden. It would be fully in line with the revolutionary and explosive character of Soviet nationalities policy if Soviet propaganda should one day coin the slogan 'Unification of all Saami in one single national territory'. In view of their potential vanguard role in a Soviet-sponsored 'unification' campaign the Russian Lapps are, from the point of view of the Soviet State, more important than most other races of the Far North. That is why they have become the subject of a particularly intense political indoctrination. All along the Russian Arctic coast Soviet propagandists have spread legends and songs to the effect that Lenin and Stalin have brought the sun to the peoples of the Far North. These legends exist also in the Saami language, but Soviet-manufactured Saami folklore not only seeks to popularize the Bolshevik leaders, it also tries to instil a militant spirit into the Saami.

This tendency of Soviet propaganda has found expression in the following 'Song of Saami Reindeer-Breeders':

If Stalin and Voroshilov said a war had come
 And if the enemies intended to take our land, we shall march,
 We shall take our rifles and shoot, we shall defend our tundra.
 The snow is deep in the tundra, no roads exist there,
 But we are not scared of snow, we shall get through everywhere,
 Our reindeer are quick,
 They shall carry guns, ammunition, provisions.
 They shall give us their flesh and their hides.
 With our reindeer we shall help the Red Army,
 We shall defeat the white enemies,
 We shall defend our soil, our lakes and our reindeer.⁹

II. KARELIA - THE SCANDINAVIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

The land of the Karelians stretches from the Finnish Gulf across the Karelian and Aunus Isthmus up to the White Sea; its Northern border is formed by the Kola Peninsula and to the West its frontier roughly coincides with the Soviet-Finnish State boundaries.

Western Karelia, the land bridge between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, the more civilized and originally more densely populated part of Karelia, belonged to the Swedo-Finnish State up to 1721 and to Finland from 1809 until 1940.

Eastern Karelia, a forest-covered area almost as large as England and Wales put together, on the other hand, lived under various forms of Russian rule: first it belonged to the State of Novgorod, then to Muscovy, then to the Russian Empire, and finally to the Soviet Union. Nordic geographers, however, consider East Karelia as part of Fennoscandia - the geological Scandinavia - and numerous were the Finns who had hoped that this area also would come politically into Scandinavia's fold.

Twice in the course of recent history was the union of Finland with Eastern Karelia on the point of fulfilment; first during the Russian Civil War of 1917-20 and then again in the Second World War. However, Finnish hopes did not materialize and instead Russia brought about the union of Western and Eastern Karelia in setting up the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic.

The ideological bases of a Karelian Soviet Republic are the close links which had existed between Russians and Karelians over several centuries. From the racial point of view, it is true, Karelians are intimately related with the Finns of Finland proper. Historically and culturally, however, there is little affinity between the two peoples. The Finns came into the orbit of Western culture and belonged first to the Catholic and later to the Lutheran Church. The Karelians, on the other hand, had lived in the sphere of Russian culture and Orthodox religion. They supported Russia whenever she was involved in conflicts in North-Western Europe and even defended her heroically - a fact which Soviet propagandists have not failed to underline.¹⁰

While the Orthodox Karelian population of Eastern Karelia have preserved their faith throughout the centuries, the Karelians living on the shores of Lake Ladoga, so Russian historians assert, had known religious persecution under the Swedish rule, particularly in the seventeenth century, after the peace of Stolbovo (1617). On the order of the great Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus II, Protestant pastors were appointed to all Karelian villages. Attendance at the pastors' sermon

on Sundays was made compulsory. The Swedish King himself implicitly recognized the preponderant position which the Russian language still held in Western Karelia by ordering the Lutheran catechism to be distributed in a Russian translation. Under the pressure of religious persecution which was in keeping with the general spirit of intolerance then existing throughout Europe, approximately 10,000 Orthodox Karelian families left Western Karelia in the seventeenth century and settled in the Russian Governments of Tver (now Kalinin), Novgorod and Yaroslavl where their descendants live to this day. The former Karelian land on the shores of Lake Ladoga was colonized by Swedes and Finns from the interior of Finland.¹¹

In 1721 the bulk of Western Karelia became Russian, but only in a purely territorial sense, since little or no effort was made to conquer it culturally and ethnically: Swedish officials were left in office, the Swedish language was retained and so were Swedish institutions and laws. Western Karelia, or as it was then called, the Government of Viborg, was again re-united with Finland when the latter was annexed by Russia as an autonomous Grand Duchy. Thus instead of Russianizing Western Karelia and 'avenging' the Orthodox Karelians, Czarist Russia, 'the prison-house of nations', handed the area back to the Swedes and Finns. It has been left to the Soviet régime to carry out a Russian national mission in both Western and Eastern Karelia.

RUSSIFICATION OF THE KARELIAN A.S.S.R.

Until 1940, Soviet Russia controlled only Eastern Karelia. From the outset the Soviet rulers realized the extraordinary importance of this almost unpopulated area as a link between the Arctic and Russia proper on the one hand and as a base for the ideological conquest of Finland on the other. In practice, however, the two tasks assigned to Eastern Karelia were to a large extent contradictory. In order to ensure the safety of the Murmansk Railway it was imperative to encourage Russian colonization, but the more Russians came to Karelia the less propaganda possibilities could be derived from the existence of a Karelian autonomy.

While the spokesmen of the régime never tired of stressing the particular historical individuality of the Karelians as an ethnic group, Soviet authorities were reluctant to encourage a Karelian language. A decree of the Soviet Government of July 25th, 1923, stipulated that the Karelian, Finnish and Russian languages should enjoy equal rights throughout the territory of Karelia. This provision remained on paper. For both political and practical reasons only Finnish was established as the official language in Soviet Karelia in addition to Russian. There was no real Karelian literary language until 1931, and even after its

creation it was introduced only in the Karelian areas of the Kalinin Province,* but not in Karelia itself. The use of the Finnish language in Soviet Karelia had the great advantage that every newspaper, every book and every pamphlet printed for the Soviet Karelians could be used for propaganda in Finland itself.

Eastern Karelia underwent various transformations under the Soviet régime. The first stage was the 'Karelian Workers' Commune' founded in June 1920. From a national Karelian point of view the 'Commune' was not altogether unsatisfactory as the majority of its inhabitants were Karelians. The 'Commune' remained in existence until July 1923, when it was promoted to an 'Autonomous Republic' receiving as a birth gift a few Russian districts bordering the Workers' Commune in the East.

This operation reduced the Karelians to a minority in their country. Russian colonization further diminished their comparative strength. Their share in Karelia's population dropped from 37·6 per cent in 1926 to 35·6 per cent in 1930 and to 33·1 per cent in 1932.

The Finns constituted up to 1940 less than 1 per cent of the population of Karelia. Most of them were communist refugees from Finland. They occupied many of the administrative key positions in the Karelian A.S.S.R. and frequently outnumbered the Karelians inside the local Communist Party organizations.

Apart from the Russians, Karelians and a handful of Finns the Karelian A.S.S.R. includes yet another nationality, the Vepsians. They are an Ugro-Finnish people numbering not more than 33,000 of whom 9,000 are living in Karelia. They have been exposed to extraordinarily strong Russian cultural influence and must, therefore, be added to the Russians rather than to the Karelians.

Two bodies were in charge of the Russification of Karelia: the Colonization Department of the Murmansk Railway and a Resettlement Committee set up in Petrozavodsk in 1926 'to make rational use of the non-populated and scarcely populated districts of Karelia'. The activity of these organizations greatly assisted the urbanization of the republic. The new settlements emerging along the Murmansk Rail-

* According to the 1926 census only about 100,000 Karelians lived in the Karelian A.S.S.R., 140,000 inhabited an area in the Moscow Province which was later incorporated into the Kalinin Province, and 4,000 Karelians were scattered over various parts of North-Western Russia. Statistics of the early thirties give the number of Karelians in the Moscow Province as between 160,000 and 165,000.

In the Moscow Province the Karelians were organized into four National Districts. Forty-six 'National Village Soviets' were incorporated into other districts.¹⁸ Cultural work in the four National Districts was not very successful owing to the protracted period of Russification to which the Karelians in the Kalinin area had been exposed.

During a short period in the thirties the Kalinin Karelians were given a special 'National Area' (okrug) of 2,240 square miles centred around the town of Likhoslavl on the Moscow-Leningrad Railway. The experiment broke down and the 'National Area' was abolished in February 1939.

way – Kondopoga, Medvezhegorsk and Byelomorsk – were Russian towns. The predominant Russian population of the capital, Petrozavodsk, increased from 27,100 to 69,700 in the twelve years between the 1926 and 1939 census.

The Finland-born Karelian Prime Minister, Doctor Gylling, made desperate attempts to assert the Finnish character of Petrozavodsk and even wanted to change its name, which reminded the Karelians too vividly of Czarist Russia. In April 1935 he approached the Presidium of the Soviet of Nationalities with that request. The Presidium agreed with Gylling's proposal and decided that the problem should be taken up with Mikhail Kalinin, the Soviet President. However, nothing more was heard of that matter and Gylling was purged on the charge of 'nationalistic excesses' a few months later.

THE STALIN CANAL

The colonization of Karelia and the history of Soviet Karelia as a whole entered a new stage on August 2nd, 1933, when the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the U.S.S.R. declared the 'Baltic-White Sea Stalin Canal' open for navigation. The new canal linked the White Sea with Lake Onega only, but since Lake Onega was already connected by canals with Lake Ladoga and Leningrad, a continuous waterway was established between the White Sea and the Baltic. Soviet propaganda was, therefore, able to coin the phrase that the Stalin Canal transformed Scandinavia into an island, a phrase which was obviously meant as a challenge to Scandinavia though a more subtle one than Pushkin's 'from-here-we-shall-threaten-the-Swede'. The slogan about the 'island Scandinavia' implied that the canal was to change the entire face of the European North and to strengthen Russia's position there, particularly in regard to Finland. Seen in historic perspective the building of the canal was, after the foundation of St. Petersburg and the building of the Murmansk Railway, the third vital move which the Russians undertook in less than 250 years with the aim of achieving the consolidation of their Empire on the fringes of Scandinavia.

The Baltic-White Sea Canal had come into being in the same way as St. Petersburg and the Murmansk Railway, namely, through the large-scale use of slave labour. The work of the Stalin Canal was organized and carried out by the G.P.U., and an official Soviet publication stated that 'the labour was performed by convicts, thieves, murderers, bandits, wreckers, prostitutes and counter-revolutionaries'.¹³ The participation of political prisoners in the Stalin Canal work was undoubtedly larger than the statement tried to suggest.

Many Stalin Canal workers remained in Karelia as woodcutters,

carpenters, technicians, etc., and as pilots, mechanics and sailors of the Baltic-White Sea Canal fleet. In addition to this colonization by convicts and exiles, the digging of the Stalin Canal also gave an impetus to a new wave of Russian voluntary colonization into Karelia.

By May 1938 the position of the Russian element in Karelia had become strong enough to warrant the separation of the northernmost part of the Republic, the important industrial district and city of Kandalaksha (Kannanlahti) with its predominantly Russian population, from the Karelian A.S.S.R. and its incorporation into the Murmansk Province. In this way Karelia lost its second largest town which included the biggest Karelian fish cannery, one of the largest power stations of the Republic, an aluminium factory and an electro-chemical combine. This readjustment of frontiers by which Karelia was, as it were, decapitated, was quite logical considering that the industry of Kandalaksha depended economically on the Murmansk Province, particularly on the raw material of the Kirovsk mines.

THE KARELIAN ISTHMUS - A NEW RUSSIAN PROVINCE

In the winter of 1939/40 came the long awaited moment when Soviet Karelia was to be used for a big Soviet propaganda manoeuvre aiming at the Sovietization of the whole of Finland. When war broke out between Russia and Finland on November 30th, 1939, the Soviet Government was ready to sacrifice Karelia. The Karelian A.S.S.R. was to be given as a birthgift to a communist Finland. A small group of Finnish communist exiles who had set up a Provisional Finnish Peoples' Government in the frontier town of Terijoki was allowed to propagate the union of Karelia and Finland as the 'national dream' of the Finnish people. An old Comintern official, Otto W. Kuusinen* concluded on December 2nd, 1939, a treaty with the Soviet Union pledging the Kremlin to assist in the establishment of the Finnish-Karelian Union. This objective could not be reached in view of the slow progress of the Red Army in Finland. The Soviet Union, therefore, quietly dropped the 'People's Government' and concluded a peace treaty with Finland's legal rulers. Instead of a communist Finland the peace settlement brought to the Soviet Union only an important territorial aggrandisement in the form of the Karelian Isthmus, including Finland's second largest city, Viipuri (Viborg). Following this annexa-

* How unrepresentative Kuusinen is of the Finnish nation can be gathered from a statement which fifteen Comintern leaders issued on the occasion of his 50th birthday in 1931. The statement described Kuusinen as 'one of the most prominent leaders of the staff of the world revolution.' 'Comrade Kuusinen', the statement added, 'has fought as a real Bolshevik against all deviations from the general line of the Comintern. His special fields of work were national and colonial problems where he always applied "an elastic, exceedingly well-thought-out tactic".'¹⁴

tion the Karelian A.S.S.R. was transformed into the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic.

In 1941, when Finland and the Soviet Union resumed hostilities, Viborg was again taken by Finland, but Russia reoccupied it in 1944. Viborg was then but a heap of ruins. Its Finnish inhabitants had gone, having fled to Finland proper. To the Soviet Government, the virtual absence of Finns from Viborg and the Karelian Isthmus was a welcome pretext to open the whole area for Russian colonization. The Karelian Isthmus was first of all separated from the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic, and incorporated into the Leningrad Province of the R.S.F.S.R. A systematic influx of Russian colonists started immediately after this administrative change. Six thousand five hundred families had been earmarked for agricultural settlement on the Isthmus in the first post-war Five Year Plan period. The new Russian settlers came from Vologda, Yaroslavl, Ryazan, Kirov, Vladimir and Kalinin, thus mainly from Northern Russia. Officials and teachers arrived together with the collective farmers to staff administrative offices and hundreds of Russian schools which were founded on the Isthmus within a few years. In August 1946 a small part of the Karelian Isthmus was exempt from actual colonization and transformed into a 'Spa District' (Kurortny Rayon) by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. The area concerned is located in the immediate neighbourhood of the former Finnish-Soviet frontier. It includes a large number of rest and nursing homes which are reserved for the Leningrad workers.¹⁵ The town of Viborg itself was rebuilt and transformed into a Russian industrial and cultural centre. Viborg got a score or so of Russian schools, a Russian theatre and a House of Culture.¹⁶ This remarkable work of colonization was crowned by a symbolic gesture. The Soviet Government ordered the re-erection in Viborg of the monument of Peter the Great which had been built in 1910, but was removed after the establishment of the Finnish Republic. This monument now overlooks the entire city.¹⁷

The colonization of the Karelian Isthmus was a great victory for the Russian people. It enabled them to move their ethnical borders deeper into Fennoscandia at a point which had had a crucial importance in Russo-Scandinavian relations ever since 1293 when Viborg was founded as a Swedish bulwark directed against the Russian Novgorod.

THE 'ANNEXATION' OF KALEVALA

The Soviet Government has not only deprived the Finns of some of their national territories, but it has also tried to take from them the most valuable of their national cultural traditions. The Soviet Governments of Moscow and Petrozavodsk went so far as to deny to the Finns

the right to claim for themselves the great national epic *Kalevala*. To judge from a flood of Soviet literature and from various statements by Kuusinen, *Kalevala* has become the property of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and of the Soviet Karelians in particular. *Kalevala*, one of the most outstanding creations of world literature, was published for the first time in 1849 by Elias Lönnrot, a Finnish country doctor. Lönnrot collected most of the runes of *Kalevala* on the territory of what is now Soviet Karelia. This fact alone is sufficient to make *Kalevala* a Karelian or a Karelo-Finnish national epic. The area where popular singers recited to Lönnrot parts of the *Kalevala* epic was even demonstratively renamed the 'Kalevala District of the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.' to make quite clear that *Kalevala* belongs to the Soviet Union.

Soviet propagandists considered that *Kalevala* was the property of the Soviet Union not only because of its place of origin but also on account of the contents. *Kalevala*, so they said, was first of all an apotheosis of creative work, secondly, it was anti-religious in character (references to Christianity in *Kalevala* were not recognized as authentic) and thirdly it had an anti-Viking and thus anti-Scandinavian bias. For all these reasons the Soviet State was more entitled to consider *Kalevala* as part of its cultural heritage than bourgeois Finland.

The Finnish national epic depicts, as so many works of folk poetry do, the fight between good and evil symbolized by the struggle between the hardworking and friendly people of Kalevala and Pohjola the home of wicked sorcerers. In the Soviet interpretation Kalevala appears as a country with a classless society where a kind of primitive communism existed. Kalevala is thus almost a forerunner of Soviet Russia itself.¹⁸

The communist poets and writers of the Karelian Republic have most ingeniously exploited the foremost heroes and themes of *Kalevala* for purposes of Soviet propaganda. Thus one of them wrote a poem saying that Lenin and Stalin have rebuilt Sampo, the magic self-grinding mill which, according to the epic, was destroyed in the fight between Kalevala and Pohjola.¹⁹ A new so-called folk epic allegedly originating in Karelia itself and dealing with the defence of Tsaritsyn during the Russian Civil War included the smith Ilmarinen, the most popular figure of *Kalevala*, among the heroes accompanying the 'great Stalin'. Another officially inspired folk epic transformed Ilmarinen into a producer of 'iron horses' - tractors - for Soviet collectivized agriculture.²⁰

The propaganda conducted by the Soviet régime about *Kalevala* served in part at least as a diversion from the fact that the Karelo-Finnish element in Karelia has become totally insignificant. In July 1948, Karelia had but 125 schools in which education was given in Finnish. The total number of schools in Karelia was at that time 569. Of the eight theatres of Soviet Karelia two only are producing Finnish

and Karelian plays.²¹ If these figures reflect the ethnical composition of Karelia more or less accurately, they would mean that the Karelo-Finnish element has been reduced to one-quarter of the total population of the country.

III. THE BALTIC SOVIET REPUBLICS

Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are usually linked together under the collective name of 'Baltic States', but there is a considerable difference between Latvia and Estonia on the one hand and Lithuania on the other.

The common fate which befell the three Baltic sovereign States in 1939-40 established an understandable feeling of solidarity between the populations of these countries annexed by Soviet Russia; yet historically and culturally a considerable cleavage exists between the Lithuanians and the other two Baltic nations. In the first place the Lithuanians having formed part of the medieval Lithuanian-Russian State are historically more closely connected with the Russians than the Latvians or the Estonians. Secondly, the majority of Lithuanians have not been exposed to the same strong German influence as Latvians or Estonians. The three peoples, however, have in common their ties with the West to which the Lithuanians are linked by their Roman Catholic religion.

In their relationship to Russia the three Baltic countries also fulfil different functions. Latvia and Estonia serve Russia as a way of access to the Baltic Sea and Lithuania acts primarily as a bulwark against Polish nationalism.

TWO RUSSIAN METHODS

The history of the Baltic Provinces shows that Russians have applied both harsh and lenient methods in the endeavour to keep them under their rule. The 'harsh method' was used by Ivan the Terrible during the Livonian War which lasted twenty-five years (1558-83). Soviet historians paid special attention to Ivan's Baltic policy and one of them, P. Y. Vipper, even described the Livonian War as a 'just war, not a war of aggression'. Ivan's way in dealing with the occupied Eastern Livonia - Eastern Estonia and Eastern Latvia in terms of modern geography - consisted in energetic measures of assimilation, in distributing the confiscated land among Russian boyars and in building Russian Orthodox Churches in the conquered towns.²² In brief, Ivan ignored the wishes of the occupied Baltic territories and set out to establish a truly Russian order. Vipper, who mentions all these facts in his biography of Ivan, fails to conclude from them that they accounted for the termination of Russian rule in Livonia.

Peter the Great, who, 150 years after Ivan the Terrible annexed

Estonia and parts of Latvia to the Russian Empire, acted differently and left intact the internal order which he had found there. Peter and his successors, who enlarged Russia's Baltic domain, respected that order with all its shortcomings, especially the tyrannic rule exercised by a German Baltic upper class over Latvians and Estonians. This policy of non-interference was observed to the end of the nineteenth century, up to the reign of Czar Alexander III who curbed the influence of the German Baltic barons and embarked on a policy of Russification.

The Soviet régime faithfully copied the 'iron hand' method of Ivan the Terrible in all questions concerning the internal administration of the Baltic Provinces, but at the same time took over the imperialistic will of Peter the Great as far as the Baltic Sea was concerned. The men in the Kremlin, therefore, never considered the loss of the Baltic Provinces after the October Revolution as the last word of history. They always felt that the separation from Russia of the Baltic coastal areas ran contrary to the lessons of history and geography. Although recognizing the independence of the Baltic States *de jure* and concluding non-aggression treaties with them the Soviet ruling circles never accepted their independence *de facto*. No Russian communist was able to reconcile himself lightheartedly to the establishment of bourgeois régimes in the Baltic countries. The revolutionary movements of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania had been organically linked with Russian Bolshevism, and the failure of the Baltic communists to stay in power was thus an implicit failure of the Russian Soviet Government. It was bound to be avenged at an opportune moment.

THE BALTIC DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

In the inter-war period the Soviet leaders and even the Russian people could never lose sight of the Baltic problem since a large number of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians continued to live in their midst despite the existence of independent Baltic States. Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians, the latter to a lesser extent, were 'peoples of the Soviet Union' long before the transformation of the Baltic countries into Soviet Republics.

It is true that there was no 'Little Latvia' or 'Little Estonia' in the form of a special territorial unit within the framework of the U.S.S.R. on the same lines as 'Little Rumania' – the Moldavian A.S.S.R. or 'Little Finland' – the Karelian A.S.S.R. None the less the tens of thousands of Latvians and Estonians who were scattered all over the Soviet Union fulfilled the same propaganda functions as those exercised in other cases by special Autonomous Republics.

The Baltic diaspora in the Soviet Union had various origins. There was first of all a strong Latvian and Estonian peasant immigration into

Russia proper. It started at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the population of entire villages left their homes after an unsuccessful revolt against the German Baltic barons. In the second half, and particularly in the last few years of the nineteenth century, a new wave of Latvian and Estonian peasant immigrants came to Russia proper, but in the twentieth century the Baltic immigration changed its character. The 1905 Revolution was particularly violent in Latvia and many revolutionary Latvian workers fled to Russia to escape the vengeance of the German landowners. In the years 1919–21, after the collapse of the first Soviet Latvia, about 60,000 to 70,000 Latvian communists and their sympathizers settled down in Soviet Russia. In the same period a number of Latvian and Estonian agricultural colonists left their Russian homes and went to the newly established Baltic 'bourgeois Republics', but the bulk of the colonists remained in Russia, even under the Soviet régime.

The two main centres of Estonian and Latvian immigration in Russia were the Western border areas near the Estonian and Latvian state frontiers and Western Siberia. More than half of all the Estonians of the U.S.S.R. – 75,000 to be exact – lived in the Western part of that administrative area which originally formed the Leningrad Province, but which later was subdivided into the Provinces of Leningrad and Pskov. Many of the Estonians of the Leningrad Province who were organized into 123 collective farms and had 90 national schools at their disposal had settled down in the nearest vicinity of 'bourgeois Estonia'. Some inhabited villages on the left bank of Lake Peipus which separates Estonia from the U.S.S.R.²³ One of the Soviet border territories comprising an Estonian minority was given the name of the Estonian communist leader, Victor Kingisepp (1888–1922), who was executed by the Estonian 'counter-revolution'. The Kingisepp District was, however, no autonomous Estonian area.

The much smaller community of Latvian peasant colonists of the Leningrad Province had twenty-six National Collective Farms and twenty-one national schools.²⁴ The real strength of the Latvian ethnical group in the Soviet Union lay in the existence of strong and well-organized colonies in numerous Soviet cities such as Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk. A 'Foreign Bureau of the Latvian Communist Party' co-ordinated the activities of these colonies and a cultural organization, 'Prometei', catered for their intellectual welfare. 'Prometei' was in charge of three Latvian theatres in Moscow, Smolensk and Leningrad. It had a publishing house of its own which printed communist propaganda literature as well as Latvian translations of Soviet authors and Russian classics.²⁵ The Soviet Latvians also had two daily newspapers, one published in Leningrad, the other in Novosibirsk and there existed special Latvian children's

magazines, Komsomol publications and a Latvian literary and art review.²⁶

Individual Latvians and Estonians were serving the Soviet Union in different ways long before their respective countries were compelled to place at the disposal of the U.S.S.R. the whole of their economic assets, natural riches and manpower. Latvians and Estonians gave the Soviet régime not only industrious collective farmers and skilled workers, but also high ranking party and administrative officials, diplomats and G.P.U. agents. The influence exercised by the small Baltic minorities of the Soviet Union during the inter-war period becomes understandable if we bear in mind that they had the highest percentage of Communist Party members of all Soviet nationalities. Thus in 1927, 12,198 Latvians or 8.98 per cent of the entire Latvian minority were party members, while the 2,577 Lithuanian and the 3,682 Estonian communists accounted for 6.2 per cent and 2.38 per cent, respectively, of their national minorities in the U.S.S.R. The importance of these figures can be assessed more properly if we bear in mind that only 0.88 per cent of all Russians and 0.39 per cent of all Ukrainians were organized in the Communist Party at that time.²⁷

The Latvian communists, who had played an outstanding part in the Civil War in the fighting for Petrograd, Moscow and Kazan, had earned the reputation of particular reliability. For a long time they enjoyed preferential treatment and were given many important key positions unattainable by other much more numerous nationalities of the Soviet Union. The most prominent Latvian in Soviet politics was Yan Ernestovich Rudzutak, member of the Politbureau of the All-Union Communist Party, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars from 1926 and in this capacity in supreme charge of Russian economic reconstruction. Rudzutak, who had survived several purges, was executed in 1937. Another influential Latvian was Robert Petrovich Eideman, President of the Osoaviakhim, the Soviet A.R.P. organization. He too was executed for treason together with Marshal Tukhachevsky. The nine judges passing the death sentence on Tukhachevsky, Eideman, etc., also included a Latvian, General Alksnis, organizer and commander of the Russian air force. Early in 1938 he was himself removed from office and jailed. The list of outstanding 'Soviet Latvians' of the period between the wars would be incomplete without the mentioning of Robert Indrikovich Eikhe. For over ten years he was the ruler of Western Siberia, at first as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Siberian Territory (Sibkray), and after 1929 as First Secretary of the West Siberian party organization. In 1935 he became an alternate member of the Bolshevik Politbureau. He also did not survive the big purge.

The Baltic refugees in the Soviet Union not only occupied important

posts in the Soviet state administration, but also kept alive their own local problems. They cultivated the memory of the ephemeral Soviet Republics which in 1918-19 had existed in parts of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and prepared themselves for a fresh start. 'We shall never surrender to anybody the banner of Soviet Latvia' – said the Latvian communist Y. Krumin, in 1935 – 'the banner of the first dictatorship of the Latvian proletariat and we shall again carry this banner into the fight for a new Latvia which, freed from the previous mistakes and weaknesses, will victoriously conclude the great cause started in 1919'.²⁸

As *émigrés* in the Soviet Union the Baltic communists analysed their mistakes in great detail, and admitted that they had failed to understand the importance of the national problem. During the short period in which they had been in power the Baltic communists had indeed been concerned only with the creation of an abstract 'workers' and 'peasants' State. They did not realize that problems of language and culture were of interest to workers and peasants as well and that the aspirations towards an Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian national State could not be dismissed lightly as purely bourgeois conceptions.*

BALTIC IN FORM – RUSSIAN IN ESSENCE

In 1940 the Soviet Government and the Baltic communists had their second start in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Have they shown since then that they have learned the lessons of the abortive experiments in 1918-19? Yes and no. They have paid lip-service to the national feelings of the three countries but have simultaneously violated their genuine national interests in the most flagrant way. The Soviet régime, it is true, no longer disregarded the national traditions of the Baltic peoples but 'readjusted' them so that they would fit into the general pattern of Russian State interests.

One particularly strong tendency was to accentuate whenever possible the anti-German aspects in the history and literature of the Baltic peoples, and, at the same time, completely to suppress any anti-Russian propen-

* The first Soviet Lithuania supplies an interesting example of the extent to which the communists ignored the national factor. The manifesto of the 'Provisional Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government of Lithuania', set up in December 1918, mentioned only social and economic problems. The composition of the so-called Lithuanian Soviet Government itself showed that the Soviet power considered 'Lithuania' as a geographical setting for a multi-national State and not as a national State of the Lithuanians. The Government was made up of two Poles, two Jews and four Lithuanians, and it would have included Byelorussians had it been possible to find suitable Byelorussian communists in Vilna.

The chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Government, V.S. Mitskevitch-Kansukas, later described as a serious political error the fact that Lithuanian communists did not adhere to the principle of national self-determination to the point of separation and had thus created the impression that the Lithuanian Soviet Government was simply another occupation government maintained in power by Red Army bayonets.**

sities therein. These aims were most easily realized in the case of the Lithuanians, ample material being provided for their anti-German past by their struggle against the Teutonic Knights and above all by the Battle of Tannenberg (1410) when Lithuanians and Russians had fought on the same side.

In Latvia, Soviet authorities used for their own purposes the legend of the national hero, Lachplēsis, fighting against the 'Black Knight'. According to the war-time interpretation of the legend, Lachplēsis was a kind of guerilla leader who defeated the Germans; in the post-war period he appeared as the personification of the victorious Soviet power asserting itself against the forces of darkness and reaction. In Estonia, the Soviet régime made similar use of Kalev, the hero of the national epic, *Kalevipoeg*, whom Soviet propaganda represented as the champion of Russian-Estonian co-operation. This interpretation is based on a reference in the epic to a bridge which Kalev began to build across the Lake Peipus.

Soviet policy in the Baltic States can be characterized not only by the familiar official slogan, 'National in form, socialist in content', but also by the formula 'Baltic in form, Russian in essence'. Particularly since 1945 the Soviet régime has treated the Baltic States not only as Soviet provinces but also as part of the Russian living space. The influx of Russians into the Baltic Republics is important both in quantity and in quality. The Soviet Government has not been so clumsy as to appoint Russians to such posts as those of the Prime Ministers of the Baltic Republics or of the chairmen of the local Supreme Soviets. Even the first party secretaries are natives of the countries concerned. By a coincidence, however, their deputies are Russians in all three republics and there are many more Russians in responsible and influential party positions. Moscow also sent administrators, economic experts and skilled workers. On the other hand, the Baltic communists were unable to acquire any important posts in Moscow. After the annexation of the Baltic Republics the leaders of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian communists were not admitted into the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, but became only alternate members of that body.

The Russians not only occupied important key positions in the Baltic Republics as individuals but also assumed the status of a second State-nation in each. Russian was introduced as a State language on the same footing as Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian, and in the new coats of arms of the three Soviet Republics the motto, 'Workers of the World Unite', appeared in both the local and the Russian languages.

114658

LIQUIDATION OF MINORITIES IN THE BALTIC STATES

The increase of the Russian minorities in the Baltic States was accompanied by another change in the ethnical composition of those countries. Through various administrative and economic measures the Soviet Government eliminated practically all non-Russian minority groups. The German minorities had already been repatriated to Germany as a result of the Nazi-Soviet pact of autumn, 1939, on the partition of Eastern Europe into German and Russian spheres of interest. Since Germany had recognized the Soviet claim to the Baltic States she decided to withdraw all persons of German origin from those countries. In all, 130,000 Germans had been evacuated, 80,000 from Latvia and Estonia and 50,000 from Lithuania.

In 1941 the Soviet authorities began to evacuate the Swedes of Estonia, remnants from a period when the Swedish king ruled over both western and eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. These Estonian Swedes did not live on the Estonian mainland where the Soviet Government could have easily coped with them, but on various Baltic islands of strategic importance such as Vormsi, Rogö (Pakrisaared), Runö (Ruhnu), and Ösel (Saaremaa). Soviet Russia therefore thought it preferable to clear the country of the entire Swedish minority and concluded an agreement with Sweden about its repatriation. The first Swedish transports had already left Estonia when the Russian-German War broke out. Later the German occupation authorities in Estonia continued with the organized evacuation of the Swedes. They, too, did not succeed in finishing the job. Many Estonian Swedes whom the Germans had failed to evacuate in time crossed the Baltic in small fishing boats in order not to fall again under Soviet rule. The majority of the 7,800 Estonian Swedes were thus driven out not by the Soviet régime itself but by the fear of the return of communism to Estonia.*

The politically important Polish minority of Lithuania decreased considerably in consequence of an agreement on the exchange of populations which Soviet Lithuania concluded with the Polish National Committee on September 22nd, 1944. Following this agreement 150,000 Poles were evacuated from Lithuania, particularly from the Vilna region. Probably an equal number of Poles refused to leave. The government and Communist Party of Soviet Lithuania have therefore published a number of newspapers in the Polish language and have also opened

* Another Swedish minority group within the Soviet Russian Empire was liquidated as early as 1929 when 900 inhabitants of Gammal Svenskby, a Swedish village on the Dnieper, were granted permission to emigrate to Sweden. The inhabitants of Gammal Svenskby were well-to-do peasants who opposed collectivization. The Swedes concerned came from the Estonian island of Dagö (Hiiumaa). Czarina Catherine II had offered them land in the Southern Ukraine where they settled down in 1780.**

over 100 Polish schools. The survival of even a small Polish minority in Lithuania will make it possible for Polish nationalists to maintain their traditional claim on the city of Vilna.

The number of Jews in the Baltic States was also drastically reduced, but in their case the Germans, not the Soviet Government, were chiefly responsible. Many thousands of Baltic Jews were exterminated by the Germans because the Soviet authorities had failed to evacuate them in time.

From a narrow-minded, nationalistic point of view the Baltic peoples might perhaps have welcomed at one stage the disappearance of national minorities, which until 1939 had lived in their midst. In the event they discovered that the departure of Swedes, Poles, Germans and Jews was hardly to their advantage since it only made room for Russian colonists.

SOVIET ESTONIA

Of the three Baltic peoples the Estonians are in the greatest danger of falling victim to the Russian advance. This is due mainly to the fact that the Estonians are fewer in number than either Latvians or Lithuanians. Their numerical inferiority is aggravated by the fact that their natural increase is lower than that of the majority of Western European peoples. In 1938 the rate of natural increase in Estonia was 1·7 per 1,000 inhabitants, which was the lowest of all European countries with the exception of France, and, on account of the Civil War, Spain. In 1940 the situation in Estonia deteriorated to such an extent that a decline of 0·6 per 1,000 was recorded.

In Latvia the position in regard to the population increase is slightly better than in Estonia, its index being at 4·9 in 1938, and 3·7 in 1940. Both Estonians and Latvians are peoples with a Western European birth-rate living in Eastern Europe and they will undoubtedly suffer from all the inconveniences inherent in such an anomaly, in the first place from the pressure exercised by the population of the Soviet Russian Empire whose rate of increase was 17·8 in 1938.

The Russian pressure will become particularly active and real in the case of Estonia because of the close proximity of that country to Leningrad. Leningrad, with a population of over 3,000,000, must inevitably extend its grip over the whole of Estonia with its 1,000,000 inhabitants, and Estonia will then be degraded to a kind of economic annexe of the second largest Soviet city. The construction of a gas pipe-line linking the gas-works of Kokhtla-Järve in Eastern Estonia with Leningrad is an indication that such a development is well under way. Kokhtla-Järve, a new Estonian town which was built during the first post-war Five-Year Plan, is the 'centre of the Estonian Donbass' and is expected to become the largest shale-producing centre in the U.S.S.R.

The development of the new shale mines, shale-refining plants, electric

power stations, etc., while increasing the economic potential of the U.S.S.R. as a whole, has perceptibly intensified the manpower problem from which Estonia is suffering as a consequence of the war. Thousands of Estonians fell in action during the hostilities, thousands were deported to the East by Soviet authorities in 1941 and many thousands more fled from their mother-country westward to escape the Soviet régime. The loss of such a considerable number of her inhabitants – many of them able-bodied people in the prime of life – has depleted the already scanty manpower resources of the little country. Hardly a single article on Estonian economy appearing in Soviet publications after the war has omitted to stress that Estonia's exceptional shortage of labour was a handicap for the reconstruction work in that country. This shortcoming has been remedied in the usual way, namely by importing Russian manpower in large enough numbers to fill the gaps created by the voluntary or forced exodus of the Estonians. Russian technical experts, mining engineers and skilled workers are helping to keep the wheels of Estonian economy turning. This applies especially to the 'Estonian Donbass', where can be found coal-miners from the Donets Basin and from the Moscow Province and shale-miners from the distant Volga.³¹

While Russian colonization of Eastern Estonia is prompted by economic considerations a strategic colonization is simultaneously taking place in Estonia's 'Far West', her islands in the Baltic. The latter are important outposts of the U.S.S.R. as a whole and it is not surprising that the Soviet authorities should have sent there not only soldiers and sailors but also settlers. Thus on the small island of Vormsi, where there had never been a single Russian, there is now a Russian school with seven forms.³² In so far as the islands preserved their Estonian character the Soviet authorities were determined to transform them into particularly reliable communist strongholds. Thus the 'movement' for the collectivization of Estonian agriculture originated under the guidance of a Russian party secretary on the island of Saaremaa (Ösel) where the first 'Kolkhoz' was formed in the autumn of 1947.³³

When Soviet troops occupied Estonia in June 1940 the Estonian Communist Party was extremely small. In Estonia itself it had been decimated by the terror of the 'bourgeois régime', while the ranks of the Estonian communists in Russia had been depleted through Stalin's big purge. In the first half of 1940 small communist organizations existed in Tallin, where the party had between 120 and 150 members, and in other Estonian towns such as Tartu, Narva and Pärnu. In February 1941, over seven months after the establishment of the Soviet régime, the Estonian Communist Party had 2,107 full members and candidate-members which corresponded to 0.2 per cent of the total population of the country.* The newly recruited party members included

* *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, April 7th and 8th, 1951.

quite a number of prominent left-wing intellectuals to whom Moscow had surrendered the leading governmental posts in the country, in the absence of genuine die-hard communists. Thus the well-known Estonian historian, Hans Kruus, was at first Deputy Prime Minister of Soviet Estonia, and later Foreign Minister. The poet, Johannes Semper, was Soviet Estonia's first Minister of Education. The writer and poet, Johannes Barbarus (Vares), was President of Soviet Estonia until his death in 1947.

All these and other leading officials of the Estonian S.S.R. used to be people of considerable standing in 'bourgeois Estonia'. They were both pro-Russian and pro-Communist, but they were also imbued with Estonian national traditions. They had all been reared in the spirit of the literary movement 'Young Estonia' (Noor Eesti), which had been both progressive and cosmopolitan in character. Its principal slogan used to be: 'More culture, more European culture. Be Estonians, but be Europeans as well'.³⁴ Estonian literature had been much more influenced by Western writers and poets than by Russian ones. To be cut off from Western contacts was therefore an unbearable thought to intellectual communists such as Johannes Semper, who had translated into Estonian the works of Victor Hugo, Emile Zola and Verhaeren.

Another tradition dear to all Estonians is that connected with the National Song Festival the first of which was held in 1869 and was the first great manifestation of Estonian nationhood. Even many Estonian communists thought that the festival, which was celebrated both under the Czarist régime and in the independent Estonian Republic, ought to be preserved as an expression of the artistic genius of the Estonian people. The Twelfth Estonian Song Festival of 1947, the first to be held in Soviet Estonia, was organized by people whom one could with some exaggeration describe as national Estonian communists. Under their leadership the festival made ideological concessions to the Soviet régime, but it was at least Estonian in form. Russian songs and Russian choirs had been kept out of it.

The central authorities of the U.S.S.R. could not in the long run tolerate this attitude of the Estonian intellectual *élite*, its attempt to reconcile communism with friendliness towards Western European culture. As soon as the situation was ripe, the régime had to strike its blow against the recalcitrant Estonian communists and establish total ideological uniformity in Estonia. In the spring of 1950, on the eve of a new Song Festival, the régime considered that the moment was appropriate for a big shake up. The men who in June, 1940, had lent themselves so willingly as tools of the Soviet régime were removed from their posts. The same fate was meted out even to all the Moscow-trained Estonian communists who had not given proof of sufficient vigilance in the discovery of nationalist trends in the Estonian S.S.R.

SOVIET LATVIA

The 1,500,000 Latvians stand a better chance of national survival than the Estonians, not only because they are more numerous, but also because of the fact that their country is not situated at the approaches to a big Russian city.

Russian pressure on Latvia will remain comparatively restricted so long as that country is not given a special economic mission within the Soviet Russian Empire. Before 1914, Latvia did fulfil such a mission in regard to Czarist Russia: 28·4 per cent of Russian exports and 20·1 per cent of imports went through the three Latvian ports of Riga, Liepaja and Ventspils. The decline of those ports in the inter-war period gave Russia a strong argument against the severance of economic ties between herself and the Baltic States, Latvia in particular.

The re-establishment of Russian rule over Latvia did not automatically result in her ports resuming the role they had played before the First World War. Since then Leningrad has become the biggest port in the Soviet Union. In the thirties, 44·4 per cent and 29·4 per cent of all Soviet imports and exports respectively went via Leningrad. The Soviet central Government will hardly allow the port of Leningrad to reduce its turnover for the sake of Latvian economic interests. There can be no question of a return to the pre-1914 position, when only 7·7 per cent of Russian exports and 14 per cent of the imports passed through St. Petersburg's harbour. The utmost that Latvia can expect from Soviet economic planning is that the combined freight turnover of her three ports should equal that of the port of Leningrad. Their return to their pre-1914 importance is further hindered by the competition of the new ice-free ports which Russia has acquired in the southern parts of the Baltic Sea and by the general shrinking of foreign trade under the Soviet régime.

The economic structure of 'bourgeois Latvia' was such as to make its Sovietization a difficult task. In 1940, at the time of the Soviet annexation of the country, the big industrial undertakings which under the Czarist régime served as the breeding ground for the Latvian revolutionary movement, had all but completely disappeared. In 1938 the average number of workers employed in Latvian industrial enterprises was only sixteen, against 143 in 1913. The partial disappearance of big industrial enterprise was accompanied by an exodus of the urban population to the rural areas. The Latvian capital, Riga, alone lost approximately 150,000 of its inhabitants between 1914 and 1935.³⁵ The Soviet régime in Latvia was faced with the problem of doing away with the small industrial enterprises and, consequently, with the important class of small industrialists. Its chief task, however, lay in the field of agriculture.

Soviet agrarian policy in Latvia was much the same as in other 'new' Soviet territories; it was calculated to deceive the peasants over the collectivization issue. This policy of deceit had to be conducted with particular care because the Soviet régime had a bad record with Latvian peasantry from the time of the first Soviet Latvia. In March, 1919, the Latvian Soviet Government had decreed the formation of big state farms on the lands confiscated from the estate owners. Peasants not only did not receive any land but were forced to work on the state farms as labourers and to surrender their cattle. According to an official Soviet admission this policy led to a break in the alliance between the proletariat and the poorest section of Latvian peasantry.³⁶

After the proclamation of the second Latvian Soviet Republic in 1940, the Soviet authorities decided to adopt another method; while reintroducing the state farm system they simultaneously gave land to the poor peasants and strengthened the medium-sized holdings (between 25 and 50 acres). Under this system no peasant was to own more than 75 acres. Words like 'collectivization' and 'kolkhoz' were for the time being taboo. During the period of recuperation after more than three years of German occupation the Latvian farmers were led to believe that the introduction of collective farms was not part of the Sovietization of the Baltic States. In the autumn of 1946, when economic reconstruction was well on its way, leading Latvian party and state officials cautiously brought up the idea of collectivization, describing it as an aspiration of the 'most advanced part of Latvian peasantry'. In the following spring the first isolated Latvian collective farms came into being. The Soviet authorities spent a great deal of money to make the new kolkhoz look prosperous, and provided them with the most up-to-date technical equipment. Large numbers of individual peasant farmers were shown around these new collective settlements à la Potemkin. Collectivization propaganda was also conducted by subtler means since it had become a major topic in the novels and plays of Latvian communist writers. In the summer of 1948 the collective farms in Latvia numbered only 200, but throughout 1949 the tempo of collectivization was stepped up in such a way that the private sector of Latvian agriculture had practically disappeared by the end of that year.

Collectivization in Latvia, just as in many other new Soviet territories, was built on shaky foundations. The new collective farms could not be provided with a political backbone in the form of solid rural Communist Party organizations. In many Latvian villages it was indeed impossible to find a single communist or even a person to qualify as a candidate member of the Communist Party. At the time when collectivization started there were entire rural districts without party cells.³⁷

A 'shortage' of communists also existed in certain parts of Latvia's urban society and hampered the successful Sovietization of the country's

cultural life. The lack of communist intellectuals made itself felt not only in the narrow sphere of university life from which professors imbued with 'bourgeois anti-scientific ideas' could not be ousted quickly enough, but it also put a brake on 're-education' in the Soviet sense of the masses of the Latvian people.³⁸

LITHUANIA: BOTH ALLY AND VICTIM

In terms of geography the Soviet Baltic Republics are not fully identical with the 'bourgeois' Baltic States. Both Estonia and Latvia have each lost to the R.S.F.S.R. border territories of about 800 square miles. Soviet Lithuania, however, has added to her pre-September 1939 territory 3,200 square miles in the east and more than 1,000 square miles in the south.

This difference in treatment seems clearly to indicate that the U.S.S.R. considered Lithuania useful from the point of view of Soviet foreign policy, whereas Estonia and Latvia were from the Soviet Russian standpoint no more than internal problems of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, her geographical position made Lithuania much more valuable to Russia than Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania had common frontiers with two big European nations, Poland and Germany. Russia had thus an obvious interest in using Lithuania against both of them as a pawn in the diplomatic and military game.

This is why relations between Russia and Lithuania during the inter-war period were on a different footing from Russian-Latvian or Russian-Estonian relations. In Soviet eyes Lithuania was an oppressed nation deserving sympathy ever since Poland had wrested from her the city of Vilnius (Vilna in Russian, Wilno in Polish) by a *coup de force* in November 1920. This feeling was but little affected by the fact that the country was ruled most of the time by right-wing régimes which oppressed the local communists.

A Comintern appeal to the world proletariat, issued in 1928 in defence of Lithuanian independence, was perhaps the most striking evidence of the special position which Lithuania occupied among the Baltic States with regard to her relations with Russia. The appeal in question, adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, referred to the hostile intentions which the Polish Marshal Pilsudsky never ceased to harbour against the small Lithuanian State and called upon the workers of Poland, Britain, France and Germany to give unrestricted support to the Lithuanian workers and peasants.

The Soviet Government always considered that Vilna should belong to Lithuania, it being her historical capital, even though the Lithuanians formed only a tiny percentage of its population. When Russia and Lithuania concluded the peace treaty of September 28th, 1920, the

Soviet Government allocated to Lithuania the city and district of Vilna, and thereafter the Russian attitude never wavered in its opposition to the Polish annexation of the Vilna area.

Lithuania also never recognized the loss of her capital and gratefully acknowledged the Soviet attitude in a question in which the entire Lithuanian national prestige was engaged. Lithuania therefore refused to join any anti-Soviet coalition. As early as 1923 she reacted favourably to a Russian offer of a guarantee pact, and in 1926 the Soviet-Lithuanian Guarantee Treaty was signed, the first to be concluded by Russia with one of her western neighbours. In October 1939, Russia having, in co-operation with Germany, liquidated the Polish Republic, handed over to Lithuania the long-coveted Vilna district. According to Polish statistics the territory which had been added to the Lithuanian Republic had over 500,000 inhabitants, of whom 11·3 per cent were Lithuanians, 3·3 per cent Jews, 2·5 per cent Byelorussians and 69·2 per cent Poles. In the town of Vilna itself at the time of the Polish census in 1931, only 1 per cent of all inhabitants gave Lithuanian as their mother tongue; and even as late as 1943 Lithuanians accounted for only 21·7 per cent of Vilna's population. By giving Vilna to Lithuania the Soviet Government made a present which cost them nothing. Indeed, Vilna turned out to be a present given by Russia to Russia. Nine months after the incorporation of Vilna into Lithuania the Soviet Union not only recovered that city but annexed the whole of Lithuania through its transformation into a Soviet Republic. A popular Lithuanian saying gives the whole situation in a nut-shell: 'Vilnius is ours, but Lithuania is Russia's'.

Not only the Soviet occupation as such but also the shifting of the capital from Kaunas (Kovno) to Vilna, is detrimental to the interests of the Lithuanian people. While Kaunas, the emergency capital of the inter-war period, was located in the very centre of the Lithuanian 'living-space', Vilna is situated at the ethnical border between Lithuanians and Byelorussians, and is thus strongly exposed to Slav influence.

From the Russian point of view Lithuanian national aspirations not only represented a useful pretext for pressing Poland back to the west, but they also helped towards the establishment of the 'unity of the Njeman valley'. The Njeman – called Memel by the Germans and Nemunas by the Lithuanians – has its source in Byelorussia and is an important means of communication for the Russian timber export trade. Up to 1945 Russia had never controlled the entire course of the river. In Czarist times the mouth of the Njeman was in German hands. In the inter-war period its middle course belonged to Poland, while its mouth had a dramatic history. In January 1923 Lithuania occupied the river mouth together with the port and district of Memel (Klaipeda in Lithuanian), a territory with 150,000 inhabitants, most of them German-

speaking. The Memel Statute signed by France, Britain, Italy and Japan legalized the Lithuanian *fait accompli* but stipulated that the Memel territory should enjoy internal autonomy. Russia rejected the Memel Statute and even protested against it as interfering with Lithuania's internal affairs.

In March 1939, Hitler repeated for Germany's benefit the *coup de force* of 1923, detached Memel from Lithuania and brushed aside the Memel Statute. In January 1945, the Red Army conquered the Memel area and restored it to Soviet Lithuania. The Russian conquest of Memel, which ceased, of course, to be an autonomous territory and became an integral part of the Soviet Union, finally consecrated the unity of the Njeman valley.

As one of the most important ports of the U.S.S.R. on the Baltic coast, Soviet Klaipeda was too important to be left in Lithuanian hands. Russian colonization began, providing staff for the extensive Klaipeda ship-repairing works and for other important enterprises. In 1947 the number of Russians in the port was large enough to warrant the opening of a permanent Russian theatre.

RUSSIAN KOENIGSBERG

By annexing Koenigsberg, and by converting it into a purely Russian city, Soviet Russia has in the geopolitical and ethnical sense outflanked the Baltic States, and transformed them into a kind of Russian hinterland. Figuratively speaking, the whole of Soviet East Prussia constitutes a belt which cuts off the unreliable Baltic nations from the West.

The annexation of north-eastern East Prussia, with Koenigsberg as administrative centre, is a great historical triumph for Russian policy. This former German province had played a conspicuous part in Russian military history: it had been the battleground of four consecutive wars which Russia had waged against a western enemy; the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the Napoleonic Wars and the First and Second World Wars. The idea of permanently attaching East Prussia to the Russian Empire is not new to Russia's ruling circles. It had been suggested during the Seven Years' War when the troops of Czarina Elizabeth occupied East Prussia, but only the Soviet Union possessed enough dynamic strength to put the annexation of that territory into effect.

The Soviet writer, Vyacheslav Shishkov, in his great historical novel *Yemelyan Pugachov* evoked the memory of the first Russian occupation of Koenigsberg. Although the novel was written at the height of the Russian-German conflict, Shishkov described the harmonious relations which had prevailed between Russians and East Prussians at the time of the Seven Years' War. When occupying Koenigsberg, said Shishkov, 'Russian progressive officers were interested in everything that was use-

ful; they eagerly absorbed whatever it was impossible to have or behold in their own country'. These young Russians, thirsty for knowledge, deprived themselves of everything in order to spend all their money on useful books, manuscripts and optical and physical instruments. The peasant soldiers, on their part, were eager to obtain the seeds of plants they saw for the first time in their lives, with the aim of introducing these new cultures into their own fields and gardens.³⁹ At that period, indeed, a certain harmony did exist in Russian-occupied Koenigsberg. On January 21st, 1758, the Russians entered the city to the ringing of bells; three days after the occupation, on the very birthday of their Prussian King Frederic II, the city's burghers took the oath of allegiance to the Czarina Elizabeth and the Czarist authorities refrained from making the slightest attempt at Russification.⁴⁰

The mildness of the first Russian rule over Koenigsberg and the friendly response of the local population were characteristic of an age where wars were conducted with a certain amount of chivalry. The second Russian occupation of Koenigsberg 187 years later was the typical outcome of a total war. Nothing remained untouched.

In 1946, by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the city of Koenigsberg received the name of 'Kaliningrad' (City of Kalinin) and the Province as a whole that of 'Kaliningrad Province'. Another decree transformed the port of Koenigsberg, Pillau, into 'Baltiisk' and the town of Insterburg into 'Chernyakhovsk' in honour of General Ivan Chernyakhovsky who fell in the early stages of the Red Army offensive against the then Nazi bulwark East Prussia. The Soviet Government also removed from the map of East Prussia all geographical names which for a long time had evoked painful memories in the minds of Russian patriots. Preussisch Eulau and Friedland, where in 1806 the Russian army had suffered heavy losses in the war against Napoleon, became 'Bagrationovsk' (after the famous Czarist general Bagration) and 'Pravdinsk' respectively. The name of Tilsit, where Czar Alexander I concluded with Napoleon a humiliating and unpopular peace treaty, was likewise erased and replaced by 'Sovietsk'.⁴¹

In solving the problem of East Prussia Stalin put Russian interests before those of the Comintern. Instead of transforming the Koenigsberg region into the nucleus of a Soviet Germany, he made of it a 'genuine Russian land' where nothing was to recall the German past. The Kremlin also insisted that Koenigsberg, despite the geographical obstacles standing in the way of such an action, should become an integral part of the Russian S.F.S.R. instead of the Byelorussian or Lithuanian Soviet Republics adjoining the Koenigsberg Province. More particularly, all Lithuanian national claims on parts of East Prussia were brushed aside, although to the south of the former Lithuanian-German border, in the Tilsit area, there was a small Lithuanian minority, which might

have justified some frontier adjustments in Lithuania's favour.

The Russian colonization of the Kaliningrad Province was carried out at a very quick pace. Already in December, 1946, there were as many as 271 collective farms and forty-six state farms in the province and by April 1948 these had increased to 367 and fifty-three respectively. The first thousands of Russian settlers came to the Kaliningrad Province from the nearby Byelorussian provinces of Minsk, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Gomel. They were soon outnumbered by groups of collective farmers from Russia proper, mainly from the provinces of Orel, Kursk, Voronezh, Bryansk and Moscow, which had suffered from the war. Thus up to a point it could be argued that the Kaliningrad Province served reparation purposes. From the end of 1947 onwards things changed. The province was then used for indiscriminate Russian colonization. The new colonists hailed from provinces which military operations had never directly affected, such as Kostroma, Kirov, Kuybishev, Yaroslavl and Gorky. The Baltic coastal areas of the new Russian province were the last to be colonized. To make that part of the colonization profitable from the economic point of view, the Soviet authorities despatched to the East Prussian shore whole groups of fishermen from the Azov and Black Seas, the Volga and the Caspian. The former German East Prussia seaside resorts were also reopened under the new names 'Zelenogradsk', 'Svetlogorsk', 'Pionersk', etc.⁴²

The peasant settlers were assisted by considerable state subsidies in the form of special allocations of cattle, poultry, seeds and agricultural equipment. All the settlers in East Prussia were granted important tax reductions. One of the greatest attractions, however, for the Russian colonists were the farmsteads and cottages of East Prussia. These were much superior to those they were leaving.

The Russian colonization drive was not confined to peasant elements. Industrial workers from Central Russia were recruited for the power stations, factories, harbour installations, and Machine Tractor Stations, which were springing up all over the Kaliningrad Province.

In the wake of the workers and peasants came the intellectuals to help organize Russian clubs, libraries, cinemas and other cultural institutions which were started in the new province. In 1949 the Arts Committee of the central Government sent a group of artists to Kaliningrad to open a permanent Russian theatre. By the autumn of 1948 2,500 Russian teachers had already taken up posts in the province, but no new arrivals of teachers from outside were later necessary since two teachers' colleges and a Pedagogical Institute started work on the spot. The whole province had 422 schools in 1948 including twenty-five in the provincial capital.⁴³ The Soviet authorities had originally opened about thirty German schools for the children of the remaining German inhabitants, but it is doubtful whether they still exist.⁴⁴

The colonization of the Kaliningrad Province differs from other similar Russian moves in being intimately co-ordinated with the westward migration of both Poles and Czechs which was carried out under the auspices and on the initiative of the Soviet Union after the Second World War.

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V

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

Ukrainians and Byelorussians are officially recognized as independent nations within the U.S.S.R., yet not in the same sense as Armenians, Georgians or the peoples of Central Asia. Nominally the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other peoples having Soviet Republics of their own are put on an equal footing, but in reality the Kremlin adheres to the idea of a Russian super-nation comprising Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians. This Russian super-nation makes up almost four-fifths of the population of the U.S.S.R. and is thus largely identical with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet régime which has always been eager to exaggerate the importance of the cleavage between various branches of the family of Finnish or Turkic peoples is equally anxious to minimize the differences existing between Slavs. This apparent contradiction in approach is easily explained. Finnish and Turkic unity favours disintegration but Slav unity makes for the consolidation and the strengthening of the Soviet State.

The dominant Soviet conception of history classes Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians as 'three brotherly peoples' who after the twelfth century developed out of a formerly existing single Russian people. The Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians, according to official Soviet history, were still united in the ancient Slav State of Kiev and went their separate ways only after Kiev's downfall.

I. THE UKRAINE

The Ukrainians are the most numerous people of the Soviet Union apart from the Great Russians.

Their land is both the most important industrial arsenal and the largest granary of Russia. Before the Second World War it supplied more than half Russia's coal, 60 per cent of her iron ore and cast iron, 50 per cent of all steel, 70 per cent of all sugar beet and 40 per cent of all winter-wheat. These facts in themselves determine the importance of the Ukrainian factor in the general planning of Soviet Russian policy.

Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia, but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand, has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazepa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's.

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

bute a large army of colonists to the Slav ethnical expansion towards the East at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century. To describe the Ukrainians as junior partners in the Russian colonization of Eurasia would hardly do full justice to the role which they played. Thus among the eight 'Governments' of European Russia which between 1897 and 1911 supplied the highest number of settlers for Russian Asia four were predominantly Ukrainian, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev and Kharkov – two were Byelorussian – Mogilev and Vitebsk, and only two Great Russian – Kursk and Voronezh.

The share of the Ukrainians in the Eurasiatic colonization makes any complete separation of Ukrainians and Russians, such as the extreme Ukrainian nationalists advocate, difficult if not impossible. Almost everywhere throughout the Soviet Empire there are Ukrainians living as workers, peasants and technical specialists. According to incomplete figures referring to the early thirties 1,049,000 Ukrainians then lived in Kazakhstan, 966,000 in Western Siberia, 447,000 in the Lower Volga region and roughly 400,000 in the Far East.¹ Smaller groups of Ukrainians lived in the Middle Volga region (215,000), in the Ural region (137,000) and in the western regions of the R.S.F.S.R. (186,000). This last-mentioned group of Ukrainians, particularly those of the province of Bryansk, constitute a particularly interesting species. They speak a strange Russian-Byelorussian-Ukrainian mixed language but have retained some sort of romantic attachment to the Ukraine on account of the alleged relationship of their forefathers with the Ukrainian Cossacks.²

The largest Ukrainian group outside the Ukraine, over 3,500,000 strong, inhabits the North Caucasus region where the Ukrainians in certain areas form up to 60 per cent of the total population. Ukrainian nationalists have therefore demanded that the borders of the Ukrainian Republic should be shifted towards the east to include in particular the fertile Kuban area.

The Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in the R.S.F.S.R., was steadily reinforced throughout the inter-war period. Between the 1926 and the 1939 census a considerable number of Ukrainians left the Ukraine to settle in the new industrial centres of Russia proper, thus increasing the Russian-Ukrainian intermixture. Through this migration such typical national Ukrainian provinces as Poltava and Vinnitsa lost within twelve years 15 and 7 per cent, respectively, of their total population.

RUSSIAN DIASPORA IN THE UKRAINE

From the point of view of future Ukrainian-Russian relations the existence of the Russian ethnical element in the Ukraine is no less important than the numerous Ukrainian diaspora in the R.S.F.S.R. and in the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics.

According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dnepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to 222,000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geographical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain

co-ordination of the affairs of the two peoples. The Bolshevik régime has failed to bring about this co-ordination. The Russian-Ukrainian union as determined by the constitutions of 1923 and 1936 amounted to a subordination of the Ukraine to Moscow and indirectly to the Great Russians.

The foundation of the U.S.S.R. on December 30th, 1922, constituted in itself a triumph for the Russian people and a defeat for the Ukrainians. It signified the end of the loose constitutional ties which during the first years of the Soviet régime existed between Great Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and the peoples of Transcaucasia. A firm centralistic organization – the U.S.S.R. – took the place of the treaty relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. Stalin, in his capacity of Peoples Commissar for Nationalities, played a leading part in this process of transformation which rendered a great service to Russian nationalism but ignored the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples.

It is easy to understand why Stalin followed in the footsteps of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in his desire for a strong centralistic Russian State. He knew the strength of local nationalism and distrusted many of the local Communists. He thought that the future of the Soviet Union could not be left in their hands and that Moscow, the capital of the Russian people, was the only suitable centre of gravity of the Soviet State. This is the psychological background against which the foundation of the U.S.S.R. has to be considered. Lenin was still alive when the U.S.S.R. was proclaimed and Stalin was then by no means all-powerful. That is why the discussions preceding the foundation of the Soviet Union took place in an atmosphere of comparative freedom. Both Stalin and his opponents clearly showed their cards.

The opposition to the formation of a centralized Soviet Union, as Stalin conceived it, was led by the Ukraine with the prominent participation of Georgia. The principal spokesman of the Ukraine in the discussion on constitutional issues was Khristian Rakovsky, an old Bolshevik, whom Stalin later on never ceased to consider as a dangerous 'wrecker'. Rakovsky was no Ukrainian himself, but a Bulgarian who at the First Congress of the Comintern in March 1919 represented the 'Revolutionary Balkan Federation'. There is no doubt that Rakovsky, strongly aided by the old Ukrainian Bolshevik, Mikola Skrypnyk, proved to be an excellent defender of the interests of the Ukrainian and indirectly of all non-Russian communists of Soviet Russia.

Rakovsky and Skrypnyk wanted to preserve the statehood of the Ukraine and opposed to Stalin's 'Union', a loose 'confederation' of Soviet Republics. Instead of Stalin's 'Soviet of Nationalities' Rakovsky proposed a 'Council of States'. He further rejected the establishment of the 'Presidium of the Central Executive Committee', which until the new Stalin Constitution of 1936 was the most powerful constitutional organ

of the Soviet State and served the purposes of a centralistic leadership. The Ukrainians, led by Rakovsky and Skrypnik, also made efforts to keep their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, to maintain at least some degree of control over the railway system and postal services in their territory and in general to curtail the prerogatives conferred on the all-Union Peoples Commissariats.³

The Ukrainians were defeated and Stalin got his centralistic constitution accepted which, in the long run, enabled him to rule in Kharkov and Kiev almost in the same way as in Moscow and Leningrad.

COMMUNIST IRREDENTA AND 'UKRAINIZATION' POLICY

Though ignoring the wishes of the Ukrainians regarding their constitutional status within the U.S.S.R., Stalin offered them a glittering consolation prize; the promise of a future Ukrainian State, to include all the Ukrainian lands which the peace settlement after the First World War had allocated to Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

This aim was to be achieved with the help of the Comintern and its policy on the national question. Many Ukrainians, though anti-Soviet 'bourgeois nationalists' at heart, were inclined to make peace outwardly with Bolshevism in the first years of the Soviet régime, because world-Communism stood for the most far-reaching fulfilment of Ukrainian national aspirations.

The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in 1924 included in its resolution on the 'National Question in Central Europe and the Balkans' the following passage 'The Congress . . . considers it necessary for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it, with the U.S.S.R.'. The congress was satisfied that the Communist Parties of Poland and Rumania had successfully promoted the demand for Ukrainian self-determination. From the details of the resolution it appeared that the frontiers of a future united Ukraine were to be drawn slightly to the west of the Russian-Polish border as fixed in 1945.⁴

The wish of certain groups of Ukrainian nationalists to come to terms with the Soviet régime was reinforced by an apparent readiness of the Soviet Government to grant to the Ukrainians a certain measure of freedom in the cultural field, provided that they recognized the totalitarian aspirations of the Communist Party. An expression of this policy of communist-nationalist co-operation was the fact that the historian of Ukrainian nationalism, Mikhaïl Hrushevsky, returned to Kiev in 1924 to take over the direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

For the next few years Ukrainian intellectuals were absorbed with the cultural 'Ukrainization' of the Ukraine, for which Moscow gave a free hand while firmly controlling the posts of political command. The Ukrainian language came into its own, a scientific Ukrainian terminology was created, and Ukrainian book production had a boom.

THE FIRST PURGES

The Soviet authorities soon discovered that the Ukrainian nationalist renaissance could not be arrested halfway and that cultural nationalism was bound to lead to political nationalism. The Ukrainian nationalists on the other hand, found out that in a totalitarian State like the U.S.S.R. there could be no real freedom, not even for Ukrainian cultural nationalism. From 1926 onwards the contradictions between Ukrainian nationalism and the communist State became more and more noticeable. Before hitting out against the bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist groups which conspired against the Soviet régime, the Kremlin had to make order within the Ukrainian Communist Party itself. The latter had originated from the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks with a genuine home-grown communist movement, the Borotbists. They were a left-wing extremist group called after the Ukrainian émigré newspaper *Borotba* published in Geneva in 1915. From the ideological point of view they had much in common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslav communists. They insisted on unconditional national independence, but in every other respect their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Bolsheviks. In 1919 the Borotbists assumed the title of 'Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists)' and applied for membership of the Communist International. Together with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks proper they formed the first Ukrainian Soviet Government, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee which organized the fight against General Denikin's White Guards. Lenin valued the co-operation of the Borotbists and stated that the question of Ukrainian independence should be no reason for disunity between them and the Bolsheviks, the more so since a section of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks favoured an independent status for the Ukraine.⁵ The merger of the two communist fractions in March 1920 was of great value to the Bolsheviks for the Borotbists exercised considerable influence on the Ukrainian masses.

The Borotbist traditions of Ukrainian communism explain to a considerable extent the particular strength of nationalist heresy within the Ukrainian Communist Party. The first Borotbist deviations were officially labelled as 'Khvylovy-ism' and 'Shumsky-ism' after Mikola Khvylovy, an outstanding Ukrainian writer and Oleksandr Shumsky, Minister of Education. Both Khvylovy and Shumsky scandalized orthodox communists in the middle of the twenties by their outspoken western

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party prompted the Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislaw Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale.

Skrypnyk drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnyk's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnyk's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.⁶ In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937-38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union.

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.⁷ Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrainian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers, Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian problem in the same way as Gogol did by considering it basically as a struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evoking the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'.

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border.

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in December 1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the October Revolution.⁸

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian territories of Poland. This annexation carried out in 1939, it should be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's frontiers.

There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.⁹

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.¹⁰

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.¹¹

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

The history of the Western Ukraine between the two wars thus contains abundant evidence that the union of Western Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine had nothing in common with the spontaneous wishes of the populations concerned.

The annexation of the Western Ukraine was carried out in three stages. First, 1939 saw the occupation by the Red Army of the Ukrainian territories of Poland with 7,000,000 Ukrainians according to Ukrainian statistics, and 5,000,000 Ukrainians according to Polish statistics. Secondly, 1940 brought the establishment of Soviet Ukrainian rule over 1,000,000 Ukrainians of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia following an ultimatum to Rumania. Finally, in 1945 the union with the Transcarpathian Ukraine was established and 500,000 more Ukrainians were 'liberated'.

The economic importance of the 50,000 square miles which the Soviet Union annexed as 'Western Ukrainian territories' is comparatively slight. The only real assets were the oil and natural gas riches of Eastern Galicia. The Eastern Galician oil-wells were, however, showing clear signs of exhaustion, since their production had sunk from 1,047,000 tons in 1913 to 601,000 tons in 1929 and to 353,000 tons in 1938. Soviet economists thought at first that this decrease was simply due to Polish capitalist inefficiency and predicted that the establishment of the Soviet régime in Eastern Galicia would lead to an increase of the oil production.¹² But in this they seem to have been mistaken, since the oil target figure for 1950 for the whole of the Ukraine was but 325,000 tons. The Soviet régime was more lucky with the natural gas deposits of Dashava than with the oil of Drogobych and Borislav as was shown by the building of a 300-mile-long gas pipeline linking Dashava with Kiev.

From the geopolitical point of view two of the new Ukrainian territories deserve particular attention: Southern Bessarabia – now the Izmail Province of the Soviet Ukraine – securing Soviet Russia an access to the Danube Delta, thus making her a Danubian power, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine, allowing her to be a factor in the Danubian basin.

TRANSCARPATHIAN UKRAINE

The annexation of Southern Bessarabia simply meant that Russia had recovered one of the territories which she had lost after the October Revolution, but Transcarpathia was a new asset which the Russian Empire had never before possessed.

Militarily, Russia obtained an area south of the Carpathians big enough with its 4,400 square miles for large-scale troop concentrations and an ideal initial basis for operations against a hostile Slovakia or

Hungary. Transcarpathian Ukraine in the hands of Soviet Russia meant approximately the same in gain of military power that an Italian frontier province beyond the Alps or a Spanish frontier province beyond the Pyrenees would mean for the strategic strengthening of France if she were awarded either of them.

Politically, the Transcarpathian Ukraine constitutes a permanent challenge to the Slovak and Hungarian neighbours, a warning to them that Russia would remain at their doorsteps if they ever wanted to shake off communist rule.

When Russia annexed the 'Transcarpathian Ukraine' in July 1945, Soviet propaganda made the point that this annexation fulfilled an urgent desire of the Transcarpathian people to join their 'Ukrainian motherland'. Soviet authorities referred in particular to a petition of the 'First Congress of Peoples Committees' (Soviets) of the Transcarpathian Ukraine demanding the union of the territory with the Ukrainian S.S.R. This Congress which held its meetings guarded by Red Army troops in November 1944, was, however, a self-appointed body just as the 'peoples committees' were self-appointed. Approximately at the time the Congress of Peoples Committees decided to join the Soviet Union, the pro-Soviet Czech Exile Government in London expressed the conviction that 'the Slav people of Transcarpathia desires to be reunited with Czechoslovakia'.¹³

After having successfully exploited the slogans 'Union of the Ukrainians of both sides of the Carpathians' and the 'longing of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians to join the Ukrainian motherland', the Governments of Moscow and Kiev realized that there was a considerable difference between the so-called Ukrainians of Transcarpathia and Ukrainians from their side of the mountains, not to speak of the Ukrainians of the Eastern Ukraine. The Soviet authorities in dealing with this new Soviet territory became aware that many people in the Transcarpathian Ukraine considered Russian rather than Ukrainian as their written language, showed Russian rather than Ukrainian national consciousness and looked upon the Russian Pushkin rather than the Ukrainian Shevchenko as their greatest national poet. Soviet newspaper reporters soon joyfully recorded the discovery of a village, 'Pushkino', which was advertised as one of the many evidences of 'irresistible and profoundly touching love of everything Russian and of the Russian land' which could be met in the Transcarpathian Ukraine.¹⁴

The truth about Transcarpathian Ukraine is that its Slav inhabitants – there is also a substantial Hungarian minority – have not fully made up their minds whether they are Ukrainians, Russians or something in between the two. This was no secret to anyone familiar with the conditions of the territory, but the Soviet Government, misguided by its own propaganda, ignored it. After discovering the real state of

affairs, Soviet policy in Transcarpathian Ukraine kept a certain balance between Russian and Ukrainian cultural work in the new province. Russian books and Russian newspapers are now being printed there side by side with Ukrainian ones.

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

The annexation of the Western Ukraine, whilst increasing on the one hand the might of the Soviet Empire and improving its strategic position, at the same time delayed the internal political consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Owing to its notable past failures the Communist Party machinery found it difficult to take root among the people of the Western Ukraine – even after its incorporation into the U.S.S.R. In each of the nine Western Ukrainian provinces (six from Poland, two from Rumania and one from Czechoslovakia), the Communist Party could rely only upon a few thousand loyal Bolsheviks. Thus in the large province of Rovno (formerly Polish), the Communist Party early in 1948 had but 6,000 members of whom more than half joined during the war and in the post-war period.¹⁵ In the Transcarpathian Ukraine the party had in December 1946 only 4,000 members, about one-half per cent of the entire population.¹⁶ This figure included not only local communists but also party and state officials who had come to the province in considerable numbers from beyond the Carpathians.

Together with a minute number of people who could be considered reliable from the Soviet standpoint, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in absorbing the new territories took over a large number of people with a Western anti-Soviet outlook, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian intellectuals. This fresh accession of Ukrainian nationalist elements also encouraged the opposition forces in the 'Old Ukraine'. The great prominence of the historic vanguard role of the Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound to make itself felt inside the Soviet Ukraine as well. Years of Rumanian and Polish oppression had been unable to obliterate the importance of Western Ukrainian cultural nationalism which had unfolded itself before 1918 under the liberal rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Ukrainian nation was, indeed, a recognized political and cultural fact inside the Austrian Empire at a time when Czarist Russia denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation.

Lvov in Galicia and Chernovitsy in the Bukovina had been centres of a legal Ukrainian national movement and of an openly professed Ukrainian culture long before Kiev and Kharkov. The Western Ukraine had not known that revolutionary Ukrainian-Russian comradeship-in-arms

which had existed in Ukraine proper, and the Western Ukrainian, quite understandably, never felt that he owed anything to Russia and to the Russians. This mentality of the Western Ukrainian, who had outspoken leanings towards independence, was bound to create considerable difficulties inside the Soviet Ukraine.

The Soviet Government set itself the task of counteracting the recalcitrant Western Ukrainian spirit and of levelling out the differences existing between the 'liberated Western Ukraine' and the rest of the Ukraine in the cultural, economic and political sphere.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE UNIATE CHURCH

After the liquidation of all openly anti-Bolshevik movements in the Western Ukraine and the annihilation of the 'class enemy' in the form of the bourgeoisie and the 'kulaks', there still remained for subjection to the 'levelling-out process' one important bulwark of Westernism: the Uniate Church with over 3,500,000 followers in Eastern Galicia and several hundred thousand in the Bukovina and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Uniate Church had come into existence at the end of the sixteenth century in the interest and under the influence of the Polish State. As time went on the Uniate Church developed into something more than the artificial creation of a ruling caste. It was, in the end, the true expression of an area which is neither West nor East since the Uniate Church combined Eastern rites with a Western cultural and ecclesiastical orientation symbolized by the recognition of the Roman Pope.

The struggle between Poland and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though essentially a political one, was largely conducted under the cloak of religious differences. Russia claimed that her aim was to emancipate the Orthodox population of Eastern Poland from 'temptation and humiliation' by the Poles. To push back the influence of the 'Polish' Roman Catholic Church and to carry out the liquidation of the Uniate Church were thus major objectives which Russia pursued in the three partitions of Poland. The Empress Catherine II proclaimed in 1794 that resistance to the reunion of Uniates and Roman Catholics with the Orthodox Church in the territories conquered from the Poles was a criminal offence; and thus about 2,000,000 Roman Catholics and Uniates were 'persuaded' to embrace the Orthodox Church of their ancestors in the course of a few weeks. A church council of the Uniates held in Polotsk in Byelorussia (White Russia) in 1839 brought 1,500,000 Uniates together with their bishops back into the fold of Orthodoxy. In 1874 the last Uniate diocese of Kholm was abolished and 500,000 Uniates willy-nilly transformed into Orthodox congregations.

Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church.

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken.

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.¹⁷

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism.

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman

of the seventeenth century, Bogdan Khmelnytsky. The Kremlin, like Hitler, had no intention of satisfying the essence of Ukrainian national aspirations; all it wanted was to secure a greater degree of Ukrainian co-operation in the war effort, in guerilla fighting and sabotage behind the enemy lines. The Soviet Government could not prevent its war-time emergency measures from being misunderstood and mistaken for some sort of *carte blanche* for future nationalistic deviations.

The full extent to which Ukrainian nationalists may have betrayed the Soviet Union during the war with Germany is, of course, impossible to estimate. The Ukrainian Soviet Government indirectly recognized, however, that the militant anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists must have constituted a fairly considerable body by proclaiming an amnesty in 1944 for the members of the U.P.A., the 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army'. This amnesty is unique in the history of the U.S.S.R. since it applied collectively to an entire group notable for its fanatical hatred of the Soviet régime and its contempt for the Russians.

This amnesty offer was so unusual for Soviet conditions that many U.P.A. members refused to take it seriously. The U.P.A. continued to terrorize the Soviet Ukrainian-Polish-Czechoslovak border areas, and in 1945-47 carried out daring raids deep into Czech and Polish territories. The members of the U.P.A. detachments were often referred to as 'Banderovtsy' after their leader Stephen Bandera.

The 'Banderovtsy' exploited for their ends the fact that a comparatively small strip of land in Eastern Poland which was inhabited by Ukrainians was not included in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the area of Kholm and Hrubeshov. According to the nationalities programme of the Comintern the Kholm area was to be included in the Soviet Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian State President, M. S. Grechukha, in a Supreme Soviet debate on February 7th, 1944, also demanded the incorporation of this 'Ukrainian Far West' into the Ukrainian S.S.R.¹⁸ However, the Soviet central Government apparently found it impossible to convince the Western Allies and even the Polish communists that another slice of Poland should be cut off. Thus the Ukraine was denied its 'Far West' and a repatriation of the Ukrainians of the Polish areas concerned was carried out instead.

The activities of the 'Banderovtsy' found particular support among the peasants of the Ukrainian villages of the Polish border area earmarked for evacuation; for one of the foremost tasks of the U.P.A. detachments was to render the evacuation impossible and to prevent by terrorist acts any Polish colonization on former Ukrainian farmland. It has been asserted that the Banderovtsy enjoyed support from local Ukrainian Soviet authorities in the border areas because of their anti-Polish character. This allegation is difficult to check. It is certain, however, that the U.P.A. detachments could not possibly have maintained

themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry.

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.¹⁹

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941-5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946-7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.²⁰

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president,

Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.²¹

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnytsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.²³

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.²²

She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commissariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuisky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuisky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.²⁴ Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi-national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total population of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a

useful function from the point of view of the central state authorities.

The smaller minorities such as Bulgars, Greeks and Germans were of little political importance but their survival constituted an interesting reminder that the Ukraine and particularly its southern parts owed a great deal to foreign colonists.

For the non-Ukrainian population of the Ukraine twenty-seven national districts had been called into being, including eight Russian, nine German, one Polish and three each for Bulgars, Greeks and Jews. Besides, there were twelve Czech and three Albanian National Village Soviets.

The events of the war left the Russian minority in the Ukraine more or less untouched but led to the annihilation or considerable reduction in size of most of the other minority groups such as the Germans, Greeks, Jews and Bulgars and only a few remnants of the previous elaborate system of National Districts and National Village Soviets persisted.

1. GREEKS. Most Greeks of the Ukraine had been subject to an enforced exodus similar to that of the German colonists. They had played a remarkable role in colonizing the south-eastern corner of the Ukraine, the area north of the Azov Sea. They had not only established a large number of villages but had also founded the town of Mariupol in 1775. Right up to the beginning of the twentieth century Mariupol still had a considerable number of Greek inhabitants.

Under the Bolshevik régime, Mariupol, one of the big centres of Soviet heavy industry, lost not only its Greek inhabitants but also its Greek name, and in 1948 assumed that of a Russian communist, A. A. Zhdanov, a native of the city.

The All-Union Communist Party tried to educate the 'Soviet Greeks' into reliable Soviet citizens. Although more than half of the 285,000 'Soviet Greeks' lived in the Ukraine, it was considered preferable to concentrate the work of cultural and political enlightenment in the Greek language not on Ukrainian territory but in the city of Rostov-on-Don, within easy reach of both the Greek settlements of the Ukraine and the Greek minority groups scattered in the Northern Caucasus region. Rostov became the headquarters of a Greek communist publishing house from which the Greek language newspaper *Kommunistis* and Greek communist pamphlets were dispatched both to the 'Azov Sea Greeks' and to the Northern Caucasus Greeks.

However, this propaganda seems to have been of little avail since the 'Soviet Greeks' appeared to have been 'unreliable' at the time of the German military advance. Many of them were deported by the Soviet authorities, most probably to Soviet Asia.

2. BULGARIANS. The 'Soviet Greeks' had never been of much use for propaganda intended for Greece proper; their National Districts were created for reasons of administrative convenience only. The Bulgarian

National Districts were a different matter. The most important of these Bulgarian National Districts received the name of Vasil Kolarov, a Bulgarian communist leader, who, after the abortive Bulgarian communist *coup d'état* of 1923, lived as an exile in the Soviet Union. The creation of the 'Kolarov District' in the Dniepropetrovsk Province with the 'capital' Kolarovka was thus a deliberate gesture to stimulate the illegal Communist Party in Bulgaria and to show its supporters that a little Soviet Bulgaria was alive inside the U.S.S.R. even if Bulgarian reaction frustrated the establishment of a Soviet Republic in the real Bulgaria for the time being.

During the German occupation of the Ukraine many Russian Bulgars – they numbered 114,000 in 1939 – were repatriated to Bulgaria. After the end of the war at least a part of these evacuees were brought back to the Soviet Union, but there is no evidence of a survival of the Bulgarian National Districts.

3. ALBANIANS. There has been definite news that the 3,000 Albanians of the Soviet Ukraine have survived the war and have maintained their three Village Soviets in the Azov District of the Melitopol Province. The best evidence that this small minority remained in favour with the authorities was the fact that a fairly comprehensive study of their customs was published after the Second World War.²⁵ Also at least some of the Czech Village Soviets and collective farms of the Ukraine seem to have remained and their example was used as propaganda for collectivized agriculture in Czechoslovakia proper.

THE 'POLISH POLICY' OF THE UKRAINE

The most important nationality problem for the pre-war Ukraine was the Polish problem, just as the Ukrainian problem was the most serious nationality problem of pre-war Poland.

However unfavourable the drawing of the Soviet-Polish frontiers of 1921 had been from the Ukrainian point of view, 782,334 Poles lived, according to the 1926 census, within the borders of the U.S.S.R., of whom 476,435 were in the Ukraine itself, 97,948 in Byelorussia, and 197,827 dispersed over the R.S.F.S.R. Polish statisticians, and apparently also some Polish communists in Russia, have never accepted this figure, and have asserted that the total number of Poles amounted to 1,500,000.²⁶

During the inter-war period Soviet policy considered the 'Soviet Poles' primarily as a potential revolutionary vanguard. The official Soviet view was that however small the Polish minority in the Ukraine, it was its duty to develop a proletarian Polish culture within the U.S.S.R. which could influence the Poles on the other side of the border. This idea was rejected by some prominent Polish communists who thought that the

Poles of Russia – mainly peasants who had settled in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – should choose between assimilation or cultural community with the toiling masses of Poland without having the ambition of playing that ‘vanguard role’ which Soviet nationalities policy sought to attribute to them.

Of the various manœuvres for which the Polish minority of the Ukraine was used, the most interesting was the formation of a Polish National District in 1925. This district was situated in a boggy area of Volhynia on the Polish-Ukrainian border. It was named after the Polish communist leader, Marchlewsky, and its little centre, the township of Dovbysh was renamed ‘Marchlewsk’.

The most prominent Bolshevik of Polish origin, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the head of the Cheka, left no doubt that the Polish National District was meant to be a challenge to ‘bourgeois Poland’ when he wrote to the workers of Dovbysh on March 14th, 1926, ‘your work in the small Polish district can have tremendous importance for the cause of liberation of the proletariat and peasants of Poland’.²⁷

The National District was not only intended to attract the sympathetic attention of the workers and peasants of Poland but was also designed to show the glaring contradictions between the Polish oppression of minorities and the skilful handling of Russia’s own Polish minority problem. The practical importance of the ‘Marchlewsky District’ was negligible and very few politically-minded Poles proper heard of its existence. Moreover, the name of Marchlewsky could hardly attract anyone outside the Polish Communist Party. Even inside the communist camp Marchlewsky was a much discussed figure owing to the complete neglect of the national issue to which he was inclined as a disciple of Rosa Luxemburg. Julian Marchlewsky (1866–1925) was an international revolutionary who worked in the Russian, Swiss, Polish and German revolutionary movements and was even for a short time a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany. His job as ‘President of the Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee’, a kind of Polish Communist Exile Government set up in 1920, was for him no more than another Comintern assignment. He was also Russian consul in Berlin, rector of the University of the Peoples of the West, president of the M.O.P.R. (International Society for the Assistance of Revolutionaries) at various stages of his career.

Apart from its awkward name the Marchlewsky District was doomed to failure since its thirty Polish villages, which accommodated only 10 per cent of the Ukrainian Poles, could hardly become the centre of a proletarian Polish culture. Even all the 170 Polish Village and Township Soviets in the two Western Soviet Republics put together – 150 in the Ukraine, 20 in Byelorussia – could neither play a creative cultural role nor become a springboard for the conquest of Poland.

The failure of Soviet Russian and Soviet Ukrainian 'Polish minority policy' in the inter-war period could be in particular gauged from the fact that the number of Poles in Russia diminished in thirteen years by almost 20 per cent, numbering 626,905 in 1939.

The real chance for a Polish minority policy in a big way came for Russia in October 1939, when she annexed temporarily 4,794,000 Poles with the drawing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop demarcation line partitioning Poland between Germany and the U.S.S.R. However, the policy of co-operation with Germany, the general anti-Polish mood prevailing in the Soviet Union and especially the strength of Ukrainian nationalism prevented the Soviet Government from putting the 'Leninist solution of the nationalities problem' into practice as far as the Poles were concerned. Discrimination against the Poles was particularly shown by the small number of Polish candidates put up during the first Soviet elections held in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in October 1939, and by mass evacuations of Poles to the East.

Through the Yalta decisions Russia obtained former Polish territories, including probably more than 3,000,000 Poles, but she showed herself completely unwilling to tackle a Polish minority problem and disposed of it largely through the population exchange agreements which the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania concluded with Poland. Though not completely liquidated the Polish minority in the Western Russian borderlands ceased to be a serious political problem.

II. SOVIET MOLDAVIA

MOLDAVIA AS A.S.S.R.

On October 12th, 1924, the All-Ukrainian Executive Committee decided to set up an Autonomous Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic on the left bank of the river Dniester which was then the border between the Soviet Union and Rumania. The new A.S.S.R., the only one which ever formed a part of the Soviet Ukraine, included a number of Moldavian villages, but the great majority of the population was made up of Ukrainians (48·5 per cent), Russians (8·5 per cent) and Jews (8·5 per cent). The Moldavians themselves accounted for as little as 30 per cent of all inhabitants.

The new republic was so artificial in character that there were no postal, railway and other communications between its northern and southern half, and the newly-appointed government of the Moldavian A.S.S.R., the 'Revkom' (Revolutionary Committee) had to wait two months before it was able to start its job. The foundation of a Soviet Moldavia did not correspond to any internal needs of the Soviet Union, but was dictated by considerations of Soviet foreign policy. By setting up

a Moldavian Republic the Soviet Government tried to avenge in a subtle way the annexation of Bessarabia by the Rumanian State. In creating the tiny Moldavian Republic the Soviet Government pursued the immediate objective of influencing internal developments in Bessarabia and bringing the latter at a given moment into the Soviet orbit. Soviet Moldavia's long-term mission consisted in furthering the liquidation of an independent Rumania and in driving a communist wedge into the Balkans.

The greatest problem for the rulers of Soviet Moldavia was to find Moldavian or at least Moldavian-speaking communists. In 1925 the 500,000 inhabitants of Moldavia included but 600 communists of whom only a few were Moldavians. In the first village council elections, after the proclamation of the Moldavian autonomy, only 9 per cent of the elected candidates were members of the Communist Party. Many of the elected Moldavian village council chairmen were deeply religious peasants devoid of any sympathy for the communist ideology. During a few years the Soviet régime could rightly claim that it had given land to the peasants by distributing the large estates. The collectivization of agriculture, however, made this claim null and void, and the Sovietization of Moldavia's peasantry became then an even harder task for the local communists.

In consolidating the Soviet régime in Moldavia in the years following collectivization, the local communists treated the population more harshly than did their comrades in many other parts of the U.S.S.R. For a long time the terror exercised by the communist rulers of Tiraspol, Moldavia's capital in the inter-war period, went on unchecked. Finally, however, the rulers of Moldavia went too far even for Soviet conditions by carrying on with purges in their territory after Stalin had ordered that they should end. So it happened that the N.K.V.D. chiefs of Moldavia were punished for offences which for a long time had been considered as virtues elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. The case of the Moldavian People's Commissar for the Interior, Shiroky, became famous throughout the Soviet Union and even abroad, because he had done the right thing at the wrong moment. In co-operation with five local Soviet police chiefs he had invented a counter-revolutionary Fascist Youth Organization in Moldavia. By using criminal methods, so an official statement of January 1939 asserted, Shiroky and his accomplices extracted confessions from ten Moldavian school teachers to the effect that they had belonged to the imaginary organization.

MOLDAVIA AS A SOVIET REPUBLIC

A new period in the history of Soviet Moldavia started in the summer of 1940 when the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia. On August 2nd,

1940, five weeks after the occupation of Bessarabia by the Red Army, the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Republic was transformed into a Soviet Republic. This republic was created by the amalgamation of North and Central Bessarabia with less than half of the original Autonomous Soviet Moldavia. The greater part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic – over 1,910 out of 3,200 square miles – was on that occasion re-united with the Ukraine. In carrying out this operation the Soviet Government implicitly admitted the propaganda character of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic as it had existed between the world wars.

After the Rumanian re-occupation of Bessarabia during the war, Soviet control over the territory was finally established in 1944. The communist régime had then to start right from the beginning. Again there were hardly any communists in Soviet Moldavia, particularly in the rural areas. The total number of village communists at the beginning of 1945 was but 130 for the whole of Moldavia and thirty-eight for the formerly Rumanian Western Moldavia. The Communist Party therefore, tried to strengthen its position in Moldavia by switching party members from the towns to the villages, and from Eastern to Western Moldavia. In this way 1,000 communists were dispatched to the Moldavian rural districts on special assignment in 1948 alone. In 1949, 80 per cent of the organized communists of Moldavia were still concentrated in towns, which make up only 10 per cent of the entire population of the republic.²⁸

Although seven Soviet Republics have fewer inhabitants than the Moldavian S.S.R. the latter is the least viable of all the so-called 'member states' of the Soviet Union. Soviet Moldavia makes no sense either geographically or ethnically or historically. The economic importance of Soviet Moldavia is similarly negligible. There are no minerals in the Moldavian S.S.R., industrial activity is slight and the only economic assets the country may have for the Soviet Union as a whole are its good potentialities for wine and tobacco cultivation.

From a geopolitical point of view Soviet Moldavia has outlived its mission. The Moldavian A.S.S.R. and later the Moldavian S.S.R. had been created on the assumption of the existence of a hostile Rumania and an anti-Soviet Balkan peninsula. The more communist and the more sovietized Rumania and the Balkans in general became, the less use was there in having a special Moldavian S.S.R. The difference between Moldavians and Rumanians, and between Moldavia and Rumania, is largely, but not altogether, a fiction which Moscow may not want to uphold indefinitely. This distinction makes even less sense, as the Rumanian province situated next to the borders of Soviet Moldavia is also called Moldavia.

The Soviet régime worked out for the Moldavian Soviet Republic a special conception of history – chiefly, of course, a history of Russian-

Moldavian military comradeship-in-arms, political alliances and cultural interdependence throughout the centuries. The main stress is laid on the contacts established between Moldavian rulers and Russian Czars, notably since the fifteenth century, but the friendly character of Moldavian-Ukrainian relations is also underlined. The heroes of Moldavian history as adjusted to the needs of Soviet propaganda are the gallant medieval ruler, Stephen the Great (1457-1504), who defended the Christian Balkans against the onslaught of the Turks, and Dimiter Cantemir, who concluded an alliance with Peter the Great in 1711 and went to St. Petersburg as a refugee when his policy of co-operation with Russia against Turkey miscarried. Both Stephen the Great and Cantemir are not simply figures of the history of the territory forming the Moldavian S.S.R.; they belong to the history of Moldavia as a whole (most of which lies within the boundaries of Rumania proper) and, when all is said and done, to Rumanian history. Nothing can better demonstrate the ideological weakness inherent in the Moldavian S.S.R. than the fact that its history can be nothing but a somewhat contorted Rumanian history.

The only conceivable *raison d'être* of a Soviet Moldavia side by side with even a communist Rumania is the strong racial intermixture existing in the Moldavian Soviet Republic and the considerable number of Ukrainians and Russians living there. The Ukrainians, together with the Moldavians, belong to the original population of the country and Ukrainian peasants are scattered over almost the entire republic. Russians live mostly in the towns. The capital of Moldavia, Kishinev, had a predominantly Russian-Jewish character before the Second World War. Finally, the Moldavian S.S.R. together with the adjoining Izmail Province of the Ukraine, the former Southern Bessarabia, have a curious minority problem of their own, the problem of the Gagauz.

The Gagauz, of whom there are 100,000 in the Soviet Union, speak a language which is basically a Turkic one, but they are Christians originally hailing from Bulgaria. Together with thousands of Bulgars proper they fled from Turkish persecution to Bessarabia after 1812. The Gagauz who remained in Bulgaria largely lost their national characteristics, but those in Bessarabia preserved them although they do not possess a literary language. The All-Union Academy of Sciences and the Moldavian Soviet Government have studied the problem of the creation of such a language but in the meantime Gagauz children go to Russian schools.²⁹

The most prominent Soviet citizens originating from Soviet Moldavia are not Moldavians but either Slavs or Jews. Among them are Marshal Timoshenko; L. S. Berg, the famous Russian geographer, a former president of the All-Union Geographical Society; the prominent scientist, Professor N. D. Zelinsky; and the great Russian architect, A. V. Shchusev, builder of the Lenin Mausoleum.³⁰

III. BYELORUSSIA

The development of Soviet Byelorussia is essentially a copy of the history of the Soviet Ukraine. In many respects it is a very poor copy. Byelorussia is considerably smaller than the Ukraine, it has no outstanding economic wealth such as the Ukraine has and the national consciousness of the Byelorussian people has crystallized far less than that of the Ukrainians. The Byelorussians, it is true, can boast of an illustrious past and can claim for themselves the Lithuanian State of the Middle Ages, whose most important documents were couched in the Byelorussian language. However, the Byelorussians did not produce a Hetman Mazeppa, a vigorous rebel whose memory could inspire the present generation. The modesty of the Byelorussian national movement is almost touching. Nothing could characterize its spirit better than the title of the first Byelorussian publishing company founded in 1906 – 'In our windows also shall the sun shine'.

Byelorussian nationalism in Czarist times was so weak that no Byelorussian succeeded in getting elected to the Duma. The landowners voted for Polish candidates, and the peasants, in their ignorance, for extreme Russian nationalists. The October Revolution found the Byelorussians still too inarticulate as a nation to be able to cope with the great tests of the revolutionary years. Without much external pressure Byelorussia, or rather, what might have become Byelorussia, fell to pieces. The few Byelorussian intellectuals had no clearly defined political aim and turned from one extreme to another, wavering between a Polish, Lithuanian and Russian orientation and thus aggravating the chaos in which the Byelorussian people found themselves. By the end of 1920 the Byelorussians were under five different Byelorussian governments and National Committees, and in addition, had a Minister for Byelorussian Affairs in the Lithuanian Government.

At last the Peace of Riga concluded between Poland and Soviet Russia in 1921 determined the division of Byelorussia: Western Byelorussia with about 2,000,000 Byelorussians went to Poland, while Central and Eastern Byelorussia became part of the Soviet Union.*

SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN BYELORUSSIA

At first the Soviet régime found it rather difficult to decide which territories to allocate to the Byelorussian S.S.R. When the B.S.S.R. was formally constituted on January 16th, 1921, the Russian communists

* The estimate of 2,000,000 is halfway between Polish and Russian statistics. According to the official Polish census there were but 1,123,000 Byelorussians in 'Western Byelorussia'. Molotov mentioned the figure of 3,000,000 when proclaiming the incorporation of Western Byelorussia into the U.S.S.R. on October 31st, 1939.

had such a poor view of the strength of the Byelorussian national consciousness that they confined the Republic to a small border strip of 20,000 square miles and 1,500,000 inhabitants. Important Byelorussian districts with the towns of Vitebsk, Gomel and Mogilev remained within the R.S.F.S.R.

It took the Soviet central Government three years to transform the 'token republic' of Byelorussia into one which comprised the bulk of the Byelorussians living in a coherent territory in the western part of European Russia. On March 3rd, 1924, the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. issued a decree on the 'unification of all territories of the U.S.S.R. having a majority of Byelorussian population'. As a result of this decree the B.S.S.R. was able to enlarge its territory to 42,000 square miles and its population to 4,200,000.

Even after the 'unification decree' certain Byelorussian areas of the Soviet Union remained outside the B.S.S.R. and on December 6th, 1926, a new decree was published to rectify this situation by adding to Byelorussia some further territories including the town of Gomel. Through this second operation Byelorussia became a country of 48,000 square miles with nearly 5,000,000 inhabitants.

The 1926 census showed that great confusion persisted in Byelorussia as to who was a Byelorussian and who was not. Thus out of 4,017,000 ethnical Byelorussians only 3,350,000 declared their language to be Byelorussian. On the other hand the census recorded only 383,000 Great Russians in Byelorussia, although 1,165,000 people considered Great Russian as their language.

The basic difficulty which the Soviet régime encountered among the Byelorussians was, however, not the language question, but the fact that the Byelorussian people had hardly any 'revolutionary vanguard' in the form of an industrial proletariat worth mentioning. The five predominantly Byelorussian Governments ('Gubernyas') of the Czarist Empire had in 1913 but 69,000 industrial workers of whom by no means all belonged to the Byelorussian people.

Although Soviet statistics claimed that Byelorussian industry increased twenty-one-fold between 1913 and 1937, industrialization and urbanization made less progress in Byelorussia than in most other parts of European Russia. The major Byelorussian towns did not share in the general speedy growth of Soviet cities, nor did any new 'mushroom towns' emerge. Of the 174 towns of the Soviet Union which in 1939 had over 50,000 inhabitants only five were in Byelorussia and the largest Byelorussian town, Minsk, occupied the thirty-second place among the cities of the U.S.S.R. Byelorussia's towns were in the inter-war period only partially Byelorussian from the ethnical point of view, since they all had very large Jewish populations and included also a considerable number of Great Russians. In 1926 Minsk had 43·6 per cent Jewish

inhabitants against 40·8 per cent Byelorussians and 7·3 per cent Great Russians. In Vitebsk, the second largest town, there were 45 per cent Jews, 30 per cent Byelorussians and 20 per cent Great Russians. Gomel, the third largest, had 40 per cent Jews, 29 per cent Great Russians and 22 per cent Byelorussians, and Mogilev 52·5 per cent Byelorussians and 39 per cent Jews.

The insignificance of Byelorussian industry and the absence of any Byelorussian town life worth mentioning explains to a great extent the difficulties which the Soviet régime experienced both on the political and on the cultural front in the Byelorussian S.S.R.

For a long time the communist leadership was unable to convince the more outstanding representatives of the Byelorussian people that class struggle had to be conducted in Byelorussia just as anywhere else in the Soviet Union. The leading Byelorussian intellectuals, who had close ties with the destitute peasant masses of their people, proclaimed the so-called *Bezburzhaznost* (the non-existence of a bourgeoisie) of the Byelorussian nation. At the same time the Byelorussian nationalists or *Natsdemy* (National Democrats), as they were officially nicknamed, were profoundly pro-Western and anti-Russian in their outlook. They did not even like to be described as 'Byelorussians' or 'White Russians' since these terms simply degraded them, in their view, into a species of 'Russians'. They advocated in the twenties that the Byelorussians should be called *Krivichi*, thus identifying themselves with a Slav people inhabiting the territory of Byelorussia 1,000 years ago. The central Government opposed this suggestion. The Byelorussians had to keep the name which already externally associated them with the Great Russians. Nevertheless, the Byelorussian intelligentsia persisted in cultivating an ideology which maintained that no close relationship existed between the Byelorussians and Great Russians and that the former did not belong to the Eastern Slavs owing to their different origin, history and the character of their culture.³¹ This Western orientation of the Byelorussian intelligentsia also had repercussions in the field of linguistics and led to the attempt to create a Byelorussian scientific terminology different from the Russian.

During the twenties, the communist régime did comparatively little against the nationalist tendencies in Byelorussia. In the absence of any communists capable of making a contribution to Byelorussian cultural life, the régime was forced during a certain time to leave the artistic and scientific activities of the nation in the hands of 'bourgeois nationalists'. Only towards the end of the twenties did the régime start purging the various cultural institutions of the country, and it was only in 1933 that the persecution of Byelorussian nationalism assumed major proportions. The year 1933 saw the discovery of the 'Byelorussian National Centre' which was charged with aiming at the establishment of a 'Byelorussian

Democratic Republic'. The 'Centre' was reported to receive its instructions from Vilna and to recruit its membership from among 'remnants of Kulaks, White Guards and counter-revolutionary nationalists'.

According to the then First Party Secretary of Byelorussia, Gikalo, the party was forced to fight not only against an outside organization but also against nationalist agents in its own ranks. These nationalist agents, said Gikalo, had penetrated into the party in the early thirties and had apparently succeeded in occupying a large number of positions in the local government machinery. As in the Ukraine, the offensive against the nationalists inside the Communist Party was launched on the express orders of the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party. The All-Union Central Committee intervened in Minsk not only to secure the purity of communist principles in Byelorussia but also to protect in that republic the interests of Russian culture and the Russian language.

Moscow's intervention was precipitated by what became known as the 'Stsepuro Affaire'. A teacher with the name of Stsepuro had written a letter in Russian to a Byelorussian village council. Stsepuro's action led to a nationalistic outcry in which the local communist organizations and Soviet officials sided against the teacher, who in their view, ought to have written in Byelorussian. The matter was taken up by the Moscow newspaper *Pravda* and finally prompted the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party to draw attention to the 'distortion of Soviet nationalities policy' in Byelorussia. The statement of the Central Committee said that any ban against the Russian language and any persecution of persons using Russian were offences 'profitable only to the class enemy'. The Central Committee of the Byelorussian communists drew the necessary conclusions from the rebuke of the Moscow leaders and at a plenary meeting in December, 1933, proclaimed Byelorussian nationalism as the 'main danger'.³²

Moscow had thus won the first round in the struggle against the local nationalist forces in Byelorussia. The second part of the fight reached its climax in the summer of 1937 when all prominent Byelorussian communists were charged with conducting a nationalist policy. They included Alexander Grigoryevich Chervyakov, President of the Byelorussian Soviet Republic who committed suicide, the Prime Minister, Nikolai Matveyevich Goloded and the First Party Secretary and arch-purger of 1933-34, Gikalo. Both Goloded and Gikalo were executed. The main charge directed against them was that 'they had tried to tear away the Byelorussian people from the socialist culture of the Great Russian people'. The men around Chervyakov, asserted an official publication, 'were determined to oust the Russian language from the schools, to do away with Russian revolutionary plays, with Russian belletristic literature and works of music. They thus made it difficult for

the Byelorussian people to acquire both the inexhaustible cultural treasures of the Russian people and the great cultural values created by the Socialist Revolution'.

At the same time Stalin's opponents among the Byelorussian communists were accused of having been too liberal to the Polish minority in Byelorussia, a strange accusation from a party which professes to adhere to an internationalist ideology. The 'polonizing activities' of the Byelorussian 'Trotskyites, Bukharinites and national-fascists' consisted in having allowed a number of localities in Byelorussia to conduct their business in the Polish language and in having sanctioned the existence of a number of Polish schools.³³

The purge of the Byelorussian communists terminated the policy of tolerance which the Byelorussian Government had shown towards its national minorities. This tolerance had been symbolically expressed in the coat of arms of the Byelorussian S.S.R., which contained the inscription 'Workers of the World Unite' in four languages: Byelorussian, Great Russian, Yiddish and Polish. The coat of arms in use since 1937 shows the same inscription in Byelorussian and Great Russian only. Together with the Polish inscription in Byelorussia's coat of arms the 'Polish National District' of the Byelorussian S.S.R. likewise disappeared. This district had served purposes similar to those of the 'Polish National District' of the Ukraine. It was called after Feliks Dzerzhinsky.

KOLAS AND KUPALA - BYELORUSSIAN LEADERS

The history of the fight between the Kremlin and Byelorussian nationalism includes the interesting case of the two prominent poets and writers, Yanko Kupala (1882-1942) and Yakub Kolas, whom the Soviet régime drew over to the side of the 'proletarian revolution'. Both belonged to the petty bourgeois Byelorussian nationalist movement grouped around the weekly *Nasha Niva* (Our Cornfield) which long before the October Revolution was the first publication to advocate autonomy for the Byelorussian people.

Kupala was the son of an impoverished nobleman unable to pay for a higher education for his son. Kolas was of peasant origin. Kupala and Kolas had in common their violent hatred of the Polish landowners who owned over 6,000,000 acres of Byelorussian soil in 1914. As a symbolic challenge to the Poles they both threw off their Polish-sounding family names of Lutsevich and Mitskevich respectively and became known under their literary pseudonyms.

Kupala and Kolas found it difficult to overcome their 'bourgeois prejudices'. In their innermost feelings they remained nationalists however hard they tried to be 'good Soviet citizens'. In one of his poems

Kupala avowed his incapacity to become a real Bolshevik poet, thinking in terms of the whole Soviet Union and of all mankind:

'My Fatherland – it is the whole world,
I have torn myself away from my native soil!
Yet still I am not free from it – in sleep
I dream of Byelorussia!'

The role which Kolas and Kupala played in Soviet Byelorussia is unparalleled throughout the U.S.S.R. No Byelorussian Bolshevik ever assumed the role of a national leader of the Byelorussians – the leadership was in the hands of Kolas and Kupala. Instead of 'removing' the two poets, the Soviet régime tried to direct their poetic creation into the 'right channels' and to use them for communist propaganda. Kolas and Kupala were often criticized, at times they seem to have been in disgrace but they never disappeared, as did many excellent writers and poets of almost all the major peoples of the Soviet Union.

The purge of Kolas and Kupala would have been tantamount to the bankruptcy of the Soviet cultural policy in the B.S.S.R., since the two were not only outstanding literary figures but actually cultural 'awakeners' of their people. Byelorussia could do without its 'national democrat' historians and folklorists, it could do without its leading communist politicians. Kolas and Kupala, however, were indispensable. Their case showed that there are limits even to purges in the Soviet Union. The purge in Byelorussia could not be carried so far as to endanger the cultural foundations of the third largest people of the Soviet Union. This is why Kolas and Kupala were spared despite all their 'sins' and 'deviations'.

The Soviet régime needed Kolas and Kupala not only as pillars of Byelorussian culture in the U.S.S.R. but also as the political heralds of Byelorussian irredentism which might evoke a response among the oppressed Byelorussian population of Poland. The two poets did indeed fulfil this task not as Bolsheviks but as nationalists and denounced most violently the partition of Byelorussia. Most typical in this respect was a poem by Kolas in which he cried out: 'Our homeland has been broken up by foreign robbers . . . Away with their frontiers! Down with their barriers! To us belong the fields and woods! Let us rise together with one mind and one will, happiness and freedom will not come to us of themselves! Long enough have we been hunted and driven from our homeland!'

'GREATER BYELORUSSIA'

In September 1939 came the triumph for people like Kolas and Kupala, who by the force of circumstances had abandoned national democracy and embraced some sort of Byelorussian national communism–Byelo-

ruссия became reunited at the price of Western Byelorussia accepting the Soviet totalitarian régime. The B.S.S.R. increased its territory from 48,000 to 80,000 square miles and almost doubled the number of its inhabitants. The merger of Western and Eastern Byelorussia created a State of over 10,000,000 inhabitants uniting almost the entire Byelorussian people. The annexation of Western Byelorussia enabled the Soviet Union to push nearer to Central Europe, but from a merely economic point of view the territory was a liability. Western Byelorussia was easily the most backward part of the Polish State as it existed in the inter-war period. The territory is devoid of any large industry, its agricultural soil is poor and there are but few rail and road communications. Marshes cover a considerable part of Western Byelorussia. In the annexed former Polish province of Polesia which is 14,000 square miles in area, the famous Marshes of Pinsk or Pripiet Marshes form 56 per cent of the total territory.³⁴

There are but few small towns in Western Byelorussia; only two localities have about 50,000 inhabitants each, Grodno and Brest Litovsk. Originally 'Western Byelorussia' as it had emerged from the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal for the partition of Poland, had one town of 100,000 inhabitants, Bialystok, a centre of the Polish textile industry and the only place in the whole of 'Western Byelorussia' possessing a fairly large industrial class. For this reason, Bialystok was chosen as a kind of emergency capital of Western Byelorussia during the weeks between its occupation by the Red Army and its full incorporation into the B.S.S.R. The 'Peoples Assembly' of Western Byelorussia which on October 28th, 1939, formulated its 'request for admission into the U.S.S.R.' also met in Bialystok.

The new 'centre of Western Byelorussia' had the drawback that it had no Byelorussian population; it had only Polish and Jewish inhabitants and the outskirts of the town were Polish. In view of the national composition of Bialystok and its surroundings the Soviet Government was unable to maintain its claim to the Bialystok area after the end of the war, particularly since it was located to the east of the Curzon line which Russia adopted in principle as the Polish-Russian frontier. The area of Bialystok covering roughly 5,800 square miles was thus re-allocated to Poland. This transfer was advantageous for the Soviet Union since the B.S.S.R. rid itself thereby of a Polish population of 1,000,000 and thus considerably reduced the seriousness of the minority problem within its boundaries.

After the annexation of Western Byelorussia the minority issue threatened to cause considerable worry to the Minsk Government, since half of the annexed population were either Poles or Jews. In the post-war B.S.S.R. this problem no longer arose not only because of the substantial frontier rectification in Poland's favour in the Bialystok area,

but also, as in the case of the Ukraine, because of the transfer of Poles and Hitler's extermination of the Jews.

Another important task resulting from the annexation of Western Byelorussia still remains to be carried out by the Government of the B.S.S.R. A large proportion of the Western Byelorussians have little or no Byelorussian national consciousness, and they speak some sort of local Slav dialect which they themselves do not identify as Byelorussian. This applies in particular to the population of Polesia where Polish statistics counted over 700,000 such 'local Slavs'. 'Greater Byelorussia' is now about to round off the formation of a Byelorussian nation by amalgamating the various brands of Byelorussians, not only formally in a purely administrative sense, but also politically and spiritually.

This process, intended to effect the transformation of the Western Byelorussians into a full 'sovietized' people, has encountered considerable opposition, particularly among the Roman Catholics who had formed 20 per cent of the entire Byelorussian minority of the former North-Eastern Poland. The Roman Catholic Byelorussians had always most violently opposed the thesis of the 'brotherhood' between Byelorussians and Great Russians and their political organization under the Polish régime, the Christian Democratic Union, significantly called itself 'Byeloruthenian' instead of 'Byelorussian'.

Byelorussian opposition to the Soviet régime is dictated not only by economic and religious motives but also by national considerations. Although it has united Western and Eastern Byelorussia, the Soviet Government has offended Byelorussian nationalism by leaving the city of Vilna outside the Byelorussian 'State'. The Western Byelorussians looked upon Vilna as their national cultural centre and there may have been indeed a good case for including it in Byelorussia, but it was politically more expedient to make it the capital of Soviet Lithuania.

The difficulties which the Soviet régime had to face in post-war Byelorussia were not confined to the new western territories. The whole of Byelorussia had been occupied by the Germans for two to three years, and it was only natural that Soviet propaganda had to start in many respects right from the beginning when the Red Army re-entered Byelorussian territory. A statement by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party heralding the new propaganda campaign admitted indirectly that German Nazi propaganda had been successful among Byelorussians. The Communist Party organizations of Byelorussia were instructed in this statement to overcome 'the anti-collectivist and anti-state tendencies' with which the German occupants had indoctrinated the Byelorussian people.³⁵

Many expressions of Byelorussian nationalism, however, existed quite independently of the moral consequences of German occupation. Judging by official Soviet admissions, Byelorussian nationalism, particularly

in literature and the writing of history, has, despite its youth, a very tenacious life, and its strong emphasis on Byelorussia's ties with the West is one of its principal elements.

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VI

THE JEWS - A PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Czarist Russia had the largest Jewish population of the world. In 1909, out of a total of 11,500,000 Jews, nearly half, or 5,215,000, lived in the Russian Empire. The second largest 'Jewish State' was Austria-Hungary with over 2,000,000 Jews, followed by the United States with 1,770,000 Jewish citizens.

The large-scale Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to the United States and the new frontiers drawn in Eastern Europe after the First World War radically changed the geographical distribution of world Jewry. By 1927 the number of Jews in the United States had grown to 4,228,000; Poland, which inherited a part of the western provinces of the Czarist Empire with their strong Jewish population, had over 3,000,000 Jews and the Jews of Soviet Russia numbered 2,600,000 only.

Russia's territorial annexations of 1939/40 made her once more the world's largest 'Jewish State'. Over 2,000,000 Jews were living in the territories which Russia occupied after the beginning of the Second World War - Eastern Poland, Bessarabia and the Baltic states. As the number of Jews within Russia's pre-1939 frontiers had increased to 3,000,000 the Soviet Union in 1940 then had over 5,000,000 Jews altogether, which exceeded the total of the Jewish population of the United States by some tens of thousands.

The comparative importance of the Russian Jews was again completely altered during the Second World War, when 3,000,000 Jews perished on the territory of the U.S.S.R. Russia, it is true, is still the home of the second largest Jewish community, but this represents considerably less than one-fifth of world Jewry.

As a national community the Soviet Jews never developed into a serious political factor. This is due to the fact that the Jews are dispersed, that they form minorities everywhere, even if these are sometimes fairly important minorities as in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia and in Moscow. Nor was there at any time a national Jewish culture in the U.S.S.R. which might have corresponded to the large number of 5,000,000 or even of 3,000,000 Soviet Jews. On the contrary, the Yiddish language, which must necessarily form the basis of a Jewish

culture in the U.S.S.R., has been steadily declining and more and more Soviet Jews are gravitating towards Russian and Ukrainian culture.

JEWS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

While the Soviet Jews were never able to acquire any importance as a national community, they succeeded in playing an outstanding part as individuals inside the state and party apparatus. This must be attributed in the first place to the share which the Jews had in the fight against Czarism. The Jews formed almost a quarter of the membership of the 'All-Union Society of (former) Political Prisoners and Exiles'. Figures which the Society published on January 1st, 1927, showed indeed that Jews accounted for 23 per cent of its members, ranking in strength next to the Russians, who with 51 per cent had a narrow majority. Other nationalities were less strongly represented. They included Ukrainians (8 per cent), Latvians (6 per cent), Poles (5 per cent). The three Caucasian nationalities had only 4 per cent, and all other nationalities combined, 3 per cent. Many of the Jewish resistance fighters against Czarism, it is true, fought in the ranks of non-Bolshevik organizations such as the Mensheviks, Anarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Jewish left-wing groups. There was, however, a large number of Jewish Bolsheviks as well, since the Society of Old Bolsheviks had 10 per cent of Jewish members.

The strength of the Jews inside the Communist Party was always greater than that of the much more numerous Asiatic nationalities and it always used to be out of proportion to the number of Jews in the total population of the U.S.S.R. However, this comparison is unfair since the Communist Party membership is essentially confined to urban areas and the Jews being predominantly an urban element quite naturally came into greater prominence in the Bolshevik movement than other national minorities made up primarily of rural populations. In the twenties, when the Jewish influence in the party had reached its climax, 8 per cent of the total town population of the U.S.S.R. were Jews, but in the party there were only 5.2 per cent Jews in 1922 and only 4.3 per cent in 1927. Between 1922 and 1927 the number of Jews in the party increased from 20,000 to 50,000, but as there was a general growth of party membership in that period the Jewish proportion had decreased relatively. No further figures of the strength of the Jews within the party were published after 1927, but it can be taken for granted that the same tendency continued: the absolute number of communists of Jewish origin grew, but their relative importance declined.

The influence of the Jews inside the party was more important in quality than in quantity. A considerable percentage of the Jewish communists - in 1927 roughly one-seventh - were concentrated in the

capital, Moscow, where they were able to occupy key positions not only in the local party organization - the Moscow Committee of the C.P. - and the municipality - the 'Mossovet' - but also in the central state apparatus. In the early days of the Soviet régime the leading communist Jews included such personalities as Sverdlov, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Radek.

This prominence of Jews among the Bolshevik old guard proved fateful to Soviet Jewry during Stalin's big purge in the thirties. Jews formed a more than average proportion of the victims of the drive against the Trotskyite and right-wing oppositions, and in some of the big trials the majority of the defendants were of Jewish origin.

POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION OF SOVIET JEWRY

Most of the Jews active in the Communist Party had cut themselves off from the Jewish masses and had become part of the Russian working-class movement and implicitly in many cases part of the Russian nation.

However prominent some individual Jewish Bolsheviks may have become, the great majority of the politically conscious Russian Jews stood in the anti-Bolshevik camp and at the same time in the Jewish national camp. Western Russia was the cradle of the Zionist working-class movement. Almost all the Jewish labour leaders who have taken a leading part in the inauguration of the State of Israel were born in the territory of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand Russia was also the home of the socialist anti-Zionist Jewish mass movement known as the 'Bund', or by its full name, the 'General Jewish Labour League of Lithuania, Poland and Russia'.

In its persecution of Zionism and particularly of 'Bundism' the Bolshevik leadership proved to be more ruthless than in the suppression of national deviations among many other peoples of the U.S.S.R. There was hardly any political group, unless perhaps the Georgian Mensheviks, which Stalin hated so much as the Jewish 'Bund'. His first long ideological article on 'Marxism and the National Question' written in 1913, was largely a polemic against Bundist Jewish nationalism. Stalin felt so strongly about the 'Bund' that he never stopped persecuting its followers. Even in the winter of 1941 when Russia was engaged in a life and death struggle against a foreign invasion, Stalin found time to continue his special little war against the Jewish socialists. He then ordered the execution of two outstanding 'Bund' leaders, Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter.

In the early years of its existence the Soviet régime had created special organizations for the annihilation of Zionist and non-Zionist anti-communist tendencies among the Russian Jews. A so-called Jewish Commission, the 'Yevkom', which was attached to Stalin's Commissariat of

Nationalities, terrorized Jewish communities throughout the country and replaced their freely elected leaders by communist Jews. 'Yevkom' was abolished in 1923 but a Jewish section within the Communist Party, the 'Yevsektzia' carried on anti-religious propaganda amongst Soviet Jewry and repressive measures against Jewish 'deviationists' until 1930. From that year on, the state security organs and the League of Militant Godless continued the fight against Jewish nationalism and religion respectively. Ever since its foundation in 1925 the League had engaged in systematic campaigns against the Jewish religion. It agitated against the observance of the Passover and published a special organ in Yiddish called *Der Apikoires* or 'The Heretic' devoted to derision of Jewish religious customs, religious history and rabbis. In the predominantly Jewish townships of the Ukraine the League pressed for the closing of synagogues and for mass resignations from the Jewish religious communities.

Jewish anti-religious propagandists in their zeal had the most absurd ideas. A prominent Jewish communist linguist earnestly suggested that the word 'God' should be eliminated from the Yiddish vocabulary. There were long arguments for and against. Finally it was decided to retain the word for the quaint reason that it was necessary for the conduct of anti-religious propaganda.¹ While the Soviet authorities tried to influence the vocabulary of Yiddish, they put a total ban on Hebrew. The ban, which was part of the Soviet fight against Zionism and the Jewish religion, had symbolic rather than practical importance, since Yiddish and not Hebrew was the language of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe.

SOVIET JEWRY IN THE WAR AND POST-WAR PERIOD

Soviet Jewry had a particularly difficult time between 1939 and 1941, the period of Soviet-Nazi co-operation. The Soviet Government ordered the Yiddish press to omit even the slightest allusion to the Nazi persecution and generally ignored the feelings of Russia's Jewish population as much as possible. The régime was particularly anxious that the Jews of the new Soviet territories annexed on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal should remain in the background. The substantial Jewish minorities of the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were thus almost completely 'overlooked' when Eastern Poland was incorporated in the U.S.S.R. For example, they were refused the share in the administration of the new Soviet provinces which might have been their due in accordance with their numerical strength.²

The German invasion of Russia created a completely new situation for Soviet Jewry. The Soviet Government suddenly showed an interest in fostering among them nationalist feelings of the most romantic and

even most aggressive type. Yiddish literature, which with great efforts and after many purges had been brought on the road of strict internationalism, had to change its character completely and its representatives became the spokesmen of Jewish national pride instead of working-class solidarity. A Jewish author hastily wrote a play commemorating Bar Kochba, 'The champion of the Jewish people in the revolutionary war against the Roman Empire'. The play was performed in 1942 by the Yiddish State Theatres of Byelorussia and the Ukraine which had been evacuated to Siberia and Kazakhstan, respectively. The communist Yiddish poet, Itzik Feffer, wrote a poem 'I am a Jew' in which he expressed the new ideological creed of Soviet Jewry in most passionate terms. He evoked the memory of both Bar Kochba and the Macabees as examples for Soviet Jewry. He voiced Jewish pride in Heinrich Heine, Spinoza, Karl Marx and Yehudah Halevi. He also named two Jewish Bolsheviks, Sverdlov, who was the first president of Soviet Russia and 'Kaganovich, Stalin's friend', whilst making, of course, no mention of those other prominent Jewish communists who had been liquidated in Stalin's purges.

The Soviet Government made these concessions to Jewish nationalism in an attempt to influence world Jewry. In the months and years of the Second World War, in which Russia was struggling for its existence, the Kremlin wanted to be in a position to appeal not only to a Jewish communist vanguard in the capitalistic world but also to conservative and religious-minded Jews.

Thus, tolerance towards Jewish religion became an element in Russian political warfare in the same way as the new Soviet approach towards the Orthodox Church. Manifestations of the 'New Jewish Policy' of the Soviet Government included a goodwill mission by the two Jewish cultural leaders, Professor Solomon Mikhoels, the great actor, and Itzik Feffer, to the United States and Britain and the foundation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow which was supposed to lead the struggle of world Jewry against Hitler. It was characteristic that the Mikhoels-Feffer mission not only got in touch with left-wing Jews, but was allowed to contact both rabbis and leaders of the Jewish Agency, including Chaim Weitzmann, who used to be its president.

The officially-sponsored Jewish nationalism was stopped immediately after the end of the war and so were the contacts which had been established between Soviet and world Jewry. The war had, however, altered the outlook of the surviving Russian Jews and had created the conditions for a genuine national revival of Soviet Jewry - a revival which all official endeavours were unable to suppress completely. The Nazi acts of cruelty towards the Jews of Western Russia had affected the minds of even completely assimilated Ukrainian and Russian Jews and of Jewish Soviet citizens who had been brought up in the Com-

munist Youth League and had many years of Communist Party membership to their credit. On the other hand, Nazi anti-semitic propaganda had had a profound effect on the peoples of the occupied Soviet territories and made them more Jew-conscious, which again led indirectly to the strengthening of some sort of national solidarity among the Soviet Jews. Many Soviet Jews may even have arrived at the conclusion that the Jews of the capitalist world were nearer to them than their Ukrainian and Russian fellow-citizens.

Jewish national feeling in Soviet Russia was further stirred by the foundation of a Jewish State in Palestine. For reasons of power politics the Soviet Union suddenly reversed a thirty-year-old hostility to world Zionism and supported the establishment of the State of Israel in the United Nations General Assembly. At the same time the Soviet Government was determined to prevent the new Russian 'charity' towards Zionism from starting at home. The Soviet authorities feared that the foundation of Israel would inspire nationalist feelings among the Jews of Russia. Therefore, a particularly energetic check was put on 'Jewish' bourgeois nationalism' within the U.S.S.R. from the second half of 1947 onwards.

The fight against Jewish bourgeois nationalism was conducted with exceptional violence in the Ukraine. The first admission about the emergence of Zionist tendencies in the post-war period was made in September 1947 during the plenary session of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine where 'the existence of nationalist Zionist views in the work of a number of Jewish writers' was unmasked.³ This 'unmasking' did not stop Jewish nationalist tendencies from making themselves felt and early in 1949 it was announced that the Yiddish almanac *Der Shtern* had been banned for ideological mistakes. These included amongst others the belief of some authors of the almanac that Jews inside and outside the Soviet Union formed a single national body.

Yiddish authors were not alone in finding themselves in trouble; two well-known Ukrainian poets of Jewish origin, Savva Golovanivsky and Leonid Pervomaisky were involved. Both were publicly rebuked for having shown Jewish bias, Pervomaisky in particular for having mentioned Mount Sinai and Moses in one of his poems.⁴

In Moscow too an extensive campaign was conducted against Jewish nationalism, although it received less official publicity than the Anti-Zionist measures applied in the Ukraine. Practically all important Jewish cultural institutions in the Soviet capital were closed down in 1949, including the publishing house *Der Emes*, the newspaper *Aynikeit* and the Jewish theatre. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was disbanded.

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF SOVIET JEWRY

While traditional national and religious ideas still survive among Soviet Jews, the Soviet régime has succeeded in changing their economic structure most radically. The inclusion of the Jews in socialist reconstruction work meant not only the encouragement of class struggle within the Jewish people, but the destruction of the economic foundations on which Russian Jewry was built. The work of the Soviet régime, however, was not a purely negative one since the Jews of Russia were also given new functions in the economic life of their country.

It is true to say that the Soviet régime has changed the Jews even more thoroughly than any other people of the U.S.S.R. In the case of the other peoples the Soviet régime struck at the ruling strata, but the social status of the bulk of these peoples, made up of peasants or cattle-breeders, remained unchanged. With the Jews it was different. As they had been excluded under the Czarist régime from the ordinary economic and social life of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Russian peoples, 38·65 per cent of all Russian Jews were forced to be traders and middlemen, 35·43 per cent were artisans, 5·49 per cent had 'unproductive and undetermined professions' and only 3·55 per cent were engaged in agriculture.

The Soviet régime completely destroyed Russian Jewry as it had existed before 1917 and created a new Soviet Jewry, which in 1939 included 30 per cent manual workers, 41 per cent employees and members of liberal professions, 20 per cent artisans, 6 per cent farmers and 3 per cent people of miscellaneous professions.⁵ Of the Jewish manual workers of the Soviet Union 28 per cent worked in metallurgy and machine-building industries, whilst only 17·5 per cent were employed in the food industry and 17·2 per cent in the garment industry which are usually looked upon as the more typical 'Jewish industries'.

The new social structure of Soviet Jewry, though an improvement on the conditions in the pre-revolutionary period, is far from reflecting a solution of the Jewish problem. The fact that over two-fifths of all Soviet Jews are either state officials and employees or belong to so-called liberal professions (which in Soviet Russia is a synonym of officialdom), still reflects an unsound situation encouraging anti-semitism.

Those Jews of the Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia and Bessarabia who survived the war are still subject to the same process of social transformation which their co-religionists in the territories originally belonging to the U.S.S.R. have undergone already. This transformation was not easily achieved, since Jewish traders still flourished in the Soviet Union in the middle of the twenties, during the period of the N.E.P. when capitalism was tolerated within certain limits.

At that time over 18 per cent of all private traders of Soviet Russia were Jews.

For the retention of a moderate portion of private property and private economic activity the Jews had to pay by the loss of political rights. The number of disfranchised persons, of 'Lishentsy', as the Soviet jargon called them, was higher among the Jews than among any other people of the Soviet Union. Thus in eighty-five small Jewish townships of the Ukraine there were 42 per cent 'Lishentsy' in 1927-8. In some places more than half the population were disfranchised, like Teofipol with 54.4 per cent 'Lishentsy'. The importance of these figures can only be properly assessed if one bears in mind that the percentage of 'Lishentsy' in the whole of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was not more than 4.5 per cent.⁶

THE EASTWARD MIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS

Disfranchisement ceased only after the liquidation of the non-proletarian classes including the Jewish traders. This social transformation went together with a migration of the Jews from the Ukrainian and Byelorussian townships to the big industrial cities.

The Jews not only moved into larger cities of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, but also went eastward and settled down in larger numbers among the Great Russian people. This was a natural outcome of Jewish emancipation. The Jewish youth in particular wanted to escape from the ghetto of the 'Pale of Jewish Settlement', the twenty-five governments of Western Russia to which the law had confined the bulk of Russian Jewry under the Czarist régime.

The Jewish migration also corresponded to the interests of the Soviet State. About 800,000 Ukrainian and Byelorussian Jews lived near the Polish and the Rumanian frontier. They formed a huge agglomeration of hungry and destitute people who directly or indirectly were bound to harm in many ways the economic and political interests of the U.S.S.R. in the border regions. In the case of a war between Russia and Poland or between Russia and Rumania - an eventuality which was always taken into account in the twenties and early thirties - these border Jews might have supported the enemy. Many of the Jews in question were smugglers and sabotaged the foreign trade monopoly. The dissatisfaction among the Jewish border population of the Soviet Union also served as a means of anti-Soviet propaganda in Poland and Rumania among their border population which was likewise largely made up of Jews.⁷

Thus both for their own sake and for reasons of State the Jews left their Ukrainian and Byelorussian ghettos. As a result of this migration the number of Jews in the Ukraine diminished between the 1926 and

1939 censuses from 1,574,000 to 1,532,000 and in Byelorussia from 407,000 to 375,000. During the same period the Jews increased in the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. from 566,000 to 969,000, of whom 400,000 alone lived in Moscow. The migration of the Jews from the Ukraine and Byelorussia was, as a rule, accompanied by a cultural transformation of the migrants and their children. In the Ukraine and in Byelorussia the Jews had plenty of opportunity for education in the Yiddish language. More than half of all Jewish children in these two Republics attended Jewish schools, but there were practically no Jewish schools in the territory of the R.S.F.S.R.⁸

The number of Jews in Transcaucasia and in the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics also increased considerably between the two world wars, and a large-scale Jewish migration to Asiatic Russia took place in 1941–2 on account of the mass evacuation of Jews from Western Russia to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Not all evacuated Jews seem to have returned after the war to their homes in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic Republics.

While the Soviet régime welcomed the increase of Jews in the industrial centres of the U.S.S.R., it attached even greater importance to their recruitment into the new agricultural colonies which were set aside for the Jewish population.

JEWS IN AGRICULTURAL COLONIES

Jewish agricultural colonies had already existed under the Czarist régime in the areas of Kherson, Dniepropetrovsk (Yekaterinoslav) and Kiev. The number of Jewish persons living in these colonies in the Czarist period was at no time higher than 90,000 and considerably below that maximum figure on the eve of the First World War.

Soon after the October Revolution the Soviet Government set itself the task of expanding greatly the experiment with Jewish agricultural colonies and founded two special organizations for the encouragement of a Soviet Jewish peasantry. These organizations were the 'Komzet' — abbreviation for 'Committee for the agricultural settlement of Jewish toilers' and 'Ozet', which stands for 'Society for the agricultural settlement of Jewish toilers'. Komzet, founded in 1924, was an official body which worked under the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and was responsible to the latter for the administrative side of the Jewish agricultural settlement. The Ozet, which had existed since 1925, was a mass organization mobilizing public support for various Jewish agricultural settlement schemes. Ozet was not an organization of Soviet Jewry alone; at one time 60 per cent of its members were non-Jews. Ozet cells which were established in many big Russian factories and in the Red Army fought the surviving anti-semitic tendencies in the

U.S.S.R. and collected money for Jewish settlement purposes. Ozet furthermore kept in touch with left-wing Jewish organizations abroad which also provided funds for the Jewish agricultural settlements-to-be.

Through the combined efforts of Komzet and Ozet three Jewish National Districts of an agricultural character were set up in the Ukraine - Kalinindorf, Stalindorf and Novozlatopol. Of these Kalinindorf with forty-five collective farms in 1937 was the most important as it contained the highest proportion of Jews. In the Crimea the Jews had two more National Districts, Fraydorf and Larindorf, the last one named after the pioneer of Jewish agricultural settlement, Yury Larin. Soviet propaganda made especially great play of the Fraydorf District, which was about 190,000 acres in extent, included thirty-three collective farms with 1,692 families and had thirty-eight schools and seven reading-rooms.

The total number of Jewish collective farms in the U.S.S.R. in the middle thirties amounted to 500 and there were 225,000 Jewish persons engaged in agriculture of whom 90 per cent lived in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Crimea. This figure diminished, however, in the years just before the Second World War. In view of the great efforts involved the Jewish agricultural settlements in the Western part of the Soviet Union can hardly be considered a major success either materially or even morally. The fact that Jews became agriculturists did not diminish anti-semitic feelings but, on the contrary, stimulated them. Many Russians attacked the very formation of Komzet and put the 'poisonous question' why the Government had to create a committee for the settlement of Jews if there were no such committees for other nationalities.^{9*} The Crimean settlement project in particular provoked a great deal of jealousy among Russian and Ukrainian peasants. The communist peasant newspaper, *Bednota*, received many letters from land-hungry peasants who said the following: 'When we apply for our resettlement into the Crimea we get a refusal and are told that we should go to Siberia. Why do Jews deserve such attention since they are allowed to go to the Crimea?'¹⁰ Official propaganda quietened down these protests by making the point that Jewish landowners like Baron Ginzburg had owned under the Czarist régime more land in the Crimea than the Soviet régime was allocating to Jewish farmers.

* These critics were mistaken. The Soviet Government had organized in August 1926 a similar committee for the Russian gypsies - the 'Committee for the Settlement of Gypsies on the Land'. This Settlement Committee was connected with another organization, the 'All-Russian Union of Gypsies', founded in 1925 and disbanded in 1928 by the People's Commissar of the Interior. 'Reactionary' elements had apparently gained the upper hand in the leadership of the 'Union'. The settlement of the gypsies on the land was not entirely unsuccessful. One thousand gypsy families were induced to join collective farms, at least temporarily. In 1935 there were forty gypsy collective farms in various parts of the U.S.S.R. (18 in Uzbekistan, 4 in the Ukraine, 5 in West Russia, 4 in the North Caucasus, etc.).

In the thirties the Soviet authorities even considered the formation of a Gypsy National District which was to include over half of the 60,000 Soviet gypsies. The project did not come off since no province in the country was willing to provide land for the experiment.

The anti-semitic opposition which Jewish colonization schemes in the fertile regions of South Russia had encountered induced the chiefs of the Komzet to turn their eyes towards Asia. So the Komzet sent a commission to the vast spaces of the Soviet East which finally recommended that an area on the Russian-Chinese border should be set aside for Jewish agricultural settlement purposes. The area concerned later became known under the name of Birobidzhan.

THE CHOICE OF BIROBIDZHAN AS PROSPECTIVE
'SOVIET JEWISH STATE'

Birobidzhan – the original spelling was Biro-Bidzhan – derives its name from the two tributaries of the Amur river – Bira and Bidzhan. The whole territory is 14,800 square miles in extent, being thus considerably larger than the whole of Palestine.

Three principal reasons guided the experiment which led to the establishment of a Jewish territorial unit in the Soviet Far East:

1. To bring about a solution of Russia's Jewish problem by giving the Jews a real homeland and thus creating a Jewish nation. According to the official Stalinist definition there can be no nation without a territory of its own. Thus if the Jews were given a district in Russia where they could establish a compact settlement and a cultural centre, so the Bolsheviks argued, they would automatically become a nation.
2. To arouse sympathy among the Jewish people throughout the world for the experiment of a 'Soviet Jewish State' and for the Soviet Union in general or at least to neutralize anti-Soviet Jewish elements abroad.
3. To increase the defence potential of the Soviet State by recruiting settlers for an exposed Far Eastern border sector and to provide more manpower for the Soviet Far East in general. It was assumed that Jewish settlers would be as reliable as Russian ones at an important strategical point where the decisive struggle for the domination of the Far East might flare up one day.

The security aspect of the Birobidzhan experiment can hardly be overstressed. The Soviet Government felt uneasy at the existence of a practically empty frontier zone bordering on a populous Manchuria. Already the Czarist régime had recognized the necessity of colonizing the area between the rivers Bira and Bidzhan. From 1908 onwards Ukrainians were sent to the territory, but during the First World War Ukrainian colonization practically collapsed since the male colonists were drafted into the army and their womenfolk returned to the Ukraine.

The Soviet régime restarted the colonization of Birobidzhan in 1926–7 when about 3,000 new settlers, again mostly Ukrainians and Byelorussians, went to that territory. This accession of population was, how-

ever, utterly insufficient, for at the beginning of 1928 Birobidzhan had a population of 34,000 only, including 80 per cent Russians, 6·8 per cent Ukrainians, 1·6 per cent Byelorussians, 10 per cent Koreans, 1·6 per cent Chinese and 1 per cent Nanai and Evenki.

There were less than three people per square mile in Birobidzhan and it was, therefore, highly desirable from the point of view of the Soviet State that somebody should fill the empty space of that fertile corner of the Russian Far East, where climate was healthy, arable soil excellent and the land rich in timber, coal and minerals.

KALININ DECLARATION VERSUS BALFOUR DECLARATION

The Jewish Autonomous Province of Birobidzhan could not simply be created by a stroke of the pen as other Autonomous Provinces and Republics had been. The Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the U.S.S.R. had to proceed by stages. The settlement of Jews in Birobidzhan had to be encouraged before the formation of a Jewish territorial unit became possible. The first step taken by the TsIK was the decree of March 28th, 1928, 'reserving' Birobidzhan for Jewish colonization.

The second move was made on September 30th, 1931, when the Soviet Government pledged its word that a special Jewish administrative territorial unit would be formed in Birobidzhan if settlements of Jewish toilers developed successfully in that area. Only on May 7th, 1934, was the Jewish Autonomous Province actually created. Soviet propaganda described the decree bringing the Jewish Province into being as the 'Kalinin Declaration' to demonstrate that Birobidzhan was to be a challenge to 'Bourgeois Zionism' and to the Balfour Declaration on which the Jewish National Home in Palestine was based.

The name of Kalinin, 'the President of the U.S.S.R.', was by no means wrongly associated with the Birobidzhan scheme. Kalinin was, indeed, the only important Soviet leader who took a really active and constructive interest in Birobidzhan and in the Jewish question in Russia in general.

Whilst Stalin, the great specialist on nationality problems, seemed to ignore the Birobidzhan project completely, Kalinin would always speak with great warmth of what he looked upon as the nucleus of a Soviet Jewish State. Kalinin, a peasant's son, advocated more than anybody else in Russia the return of the Jews to the land. He thought that the Jews could never develop into a fully-fledged nation so long as they lived in towns only, least of all the Moscow Jews living in an international city where national peculiarities were bound to be effaced. Kalinin was by no means sentimental about the Jewish question. In his persistent efforts to create the Jewish territorial unit within the U.S.S.R.

he was guided by a sober appreciation of the importance of the Jewish factor within the capitalistic world. For him the Jews constituted 'one of the most lively and politically most influential nations', and it was, therefore, important for the cause of the revolution that the Jewish middle classes throughout the capitalistic countries should be inspired by a friendly feeling toward the Soviet Union.¹¹ Kalinin's hopes were perhaps not altogether vain, for the Jews abroad, particularly those in the United States, contributed financially towards the Birobidzhan experiment.

The Soviet Government was clearly determined to make the most of Birobidzhan in its propaganda both inside and outside Russia. Within the Soviet Union Ozet organized mass meetings in the early thirties voicing the slogan 'The whole Soviet Union is building the Jewish Autonomous Province'. For both foreign and home consumption Soviet propaganda stated that the foundation of the Jewish Autonomous Province heralded the dawn of a 'splendid future' of the Jewish people.¹²

A statement by the TsIK published on August 29th, 1936, under the visible influence of Birobidzhan's great protector, Mikhail Kalinin, even said that for the first time in history the Jewish people saw their burning desire fulfilled, namely, 'to create for themselves a homeland, to have a national State of their own'. After recalling that the deeds by which Jewish collective farmers received land in perpetuity were written in the Yiddish language the statement added 'The Jewish Autonomous Province will become the centre of national Jewish culture for the entire Jewish working class of the Soviet Union'. According to the official plan the greatest and most popular Jewish artists, writers and scientists of the Soviet Union were to leave Moscow, Leningrad and other big Russian cities and go to Birobidzhan 'for permanent work in the Autonomous Province'. Jewish historians and linguistic scholars in particular were urged to settle down in Birobidzhan 'to build up scientific Jewish institutions, for research into Jewish history, language and literature and into the Jewish Autonomous Province itself'.¹³ In short, Birobidzhan City, Birofeld and Waldheim, the major localities of the Autonomous Jewish Province, were to become the centres of Jewish life of the Soviet Union instead of Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev and Kharkov.

A considerable section of Soviet Jewry and even a number of prominent communist Jews were from the outset hostile to the Birobidzhan experiment. The critics of the Birobidzhan settlement project considered it as an unnecessary concession to anti-semitism in European Russia and as contrary to the interests of the Jewish people of the Soviet Union. They pointed out that the money allocated to Birobidzhan could be spent more fruitfully on the strengthening of the Jewish agricultural colonies in the Ukraine and the Crimea. They further stated that

Birobidzhan might be a suitable country for pioneer settlers with agricultural traditions, but not for a people like the Jews which had only just started to engage in farming.

The discussion about the merits and disadvantages of Birobidzhan was conducted in the late twenties with a great deal of frankness which ten years later would have been unthinkable. Thus Yuri Larin, the chief protagonist of the Crimea scheme, stated bluntly that the 'unsound noise around Birobidzhan was in reverse proportion to the real importance which that area has for the Jewish proletariat'.¹⁴ The reality in Birobidzhan showed that sceptics like Larin were right and not the enthusiasts of the project.

JEWISH COLONIZATION IN BIROBIDZHAN

Until Birobidzhan became an Autonomous Province, Jewish settlement in the territory had been negligible. In 1928, 850 Jewish settlers came, in 1929 - 1,420, in 1930 - 1,186, in 1931 - 3,230. Not all were real pioneer settlers; a number went to villages which had been founded by Ukrainian colonists but had since been abandoned.

In 1932 Jewish immigration into Birobidzhan for the first time assumed a mass character. Eight thousand two hundred Jewish colonists arrived in the territory, but the inability of the authorities to cope with them led to a crisis in the Birobidzhan experiment. The mass immigration into Birobidzhan turned into a mass flight of Jews from that territory. Over 50 per cent of the Jews who came to Birobidzhan between 1928 and 1932 left the prospective Jewish Province again and went to various Far Eastern towns, if they did not return to Europe. When the number of Birobidzhan colonists dropped, the Soviet Government sacked the leaders of Komzet and replaced them by new people who were supposed to bring about a speedier and more efficient Jewish settlement. The Government of Byelorussia also came to the rescue of the Birobidzhan experiment and took over the 'patronage' or 'shefstvo' over socialist reconstruction in the Jewish territory.

In 1933, the year when Hitler came to power in Germany, only 3,130 Jewish settlers went to Birobidzhan. This brought the total number of Jews in the Province to 7,500 although over 18,000 had immigrated between 1928 and 1933. The total population of Birobidzhan was then 51,000 of whom the great majority were Russians.¹⁵ In the years 1934-36, special efforts were made to increase the number of Jews in Birobidzhan, but the control figures of the settlement plan were never reached. In 1934, instead of the scheduled 9,000 immigrants, only 5,267 arrived and in 1935 only 8,347 instead of the 10,500 estimated in the plan. The Province was still 'too ill-prepared' for the absorption of new immigrants.¹⁶

In 1936 the population of Birobidzhan was 64,000 strong of whom 19,000 were Jews. The population of Birobidzhan City - before 1928 a little Russian settlement, Tikhonkaya or 'quiet place' - had increased between 1934 and 1936 from 7,400 to 18,000 which suggests that only a few of the Jewish newcomers went into agriculture as they were supposed to do, but most preferred to become workers and employees in their new homeland.

This induced Kalinin to make a rather critical comment on the 'leaders' of the Autonomous Province whom he blamed for not appreciating the importance of agriculture and for paying insufficient attention to settling Jewish colonists on the land. Kalinin made this statement in August 1936. In the next month a meeting of the active membership of the Communist Party of Birobidzhan discovered a 'serious defect in the work of the local party organization' and unmasked both the President of the Provincial Executive Committee, Liberberg, and one of the top-ranking Communist Party officials, Volobrinsky, as 'hidden Trotskyite nationalists'.¹⁷ These two were not the only ones to serve as scapegoats for the failure of the Jewish colonization in the Far East. After Liberberg two more 'Presidents' of Birobidzhan - Kattel and Geller - were sacked and four party secretaries of the Autonomous Province were liquidated as 'Trotskyites' or even as 'Japanese spies'. The two organizations in charge of Jewish settlement too, were, in the official view, full of 'enemies of the people' and after a new purge of the leadership both were dissolved in 1938.

Prospective Jewish immigrants were discouraged from going to Birobidzhan not only by the severe purge conducted in that Province, but also by the tense situation in the Far East which had transformed the 'quiet haven' into a dangerous outpost. Although Birobidzhan had become more and more unpopular with the Jews the Soviet Government still refused to abandon the project of a National Jewish State within the U.S.S.R. Kalinin continued to promise the Jews that the Province would be transformed into an 'Autonomous Republic' as soon as its Jewish population should reach the 100,000 mark. According to the official plans, Birobidzhan was to have not less than 150,000 Jewish settlers at the end of the third Five Year Plan (1942) including 40 to 50 per cent collective farmers. Notwithstanding all plans and promises Jewish colonization in the Far East petered out in 1939 and was stopped altogether during the war except for 3,000 Jewish war orphans who found a new home in Birobidzhan. After the war, Soviet Jews showed for a short period greater willingness to support the Jewish autonomous territory. The new approach towards the Birobidzhan settlement scheme was prompted by the revival of Jewish national feeling and the increase of anti-semitism in the Western parts of the U.S.S.R. The number of applications for travel facilities to Birobidzhan

among Ukrainian Jews became far larger than the capacity of the Province for the absorption of new settlers. In 1947, 1,500 families went to Birobidzhan from the Ukraine and the Crimea and 1,200 families in the first three months of 1948, but since then the Soviet Government has ceased to publicize Jewish migration to the Far East.

In 1942 Birobidzhan had but 100,000 inhabitants of whom less than half were Jews, but in 1948 the Province was said to have a population of 185,000. The number of Jewish colonists had undoubtedly considerably increased, but Birobidzhan had not become a land of Jewish agriculturists. Birobidzhan's urbanization proceeded at a quick pace and more than a quarter of its population lives in the capital alone.

BIROBIDZHAN - SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Birobidzhan failed to fulfil two of its main objectives; it did not solve the Jewish problem in Russia nor did the experiment contribute to the increase of Soviet prestige among world Jewry. With regard to this second point it ought to be mentioned that Birobidzhan was intended to become a kind of Soviet Palestine attracting not only Soviet Jews but Jews from all over the world. The presence of Jewish workers in Birobidzhan from the United States, Argentina, Belgium, France, Germany, in larger numbers from Poland and Lithuania and even from Palestine was, indeed, reported on various occasions in the Soviet press.¹⁸

Foreign Jewish immigration into Russia was not to be left to chance, but was to be fostered systematically. On April 4th, 1932, TsIK ordered Komzet to take special measures for the recruitment of foreign Jewish workers with qualifications for colonization work in Birobidzhan. According to the original plan about one-quarter of the Birobidzhan settlers were to be foreign Jewish workers. The settlement plan for 1936 even provided that 40 per cent of all colonists were to come from 'capitalist countries'. The real number of foreign colonists remained always greatly behind the targets. Ultimately their admission into the U.S.S.R. was considered as politically too risky and was abandoned altogether.

Birobidzhan did fulfil, however, at least to a certain degree, the third purpose which was pursued by its creation. Small though the Jewish settlement in Birobidzhan was in relation to the whole Jewish population of the Soviet Union, it nevertheless constituted a contribution toward solving the manpower problem in the Soviet Far East. A school for railway engineers in Birobidzhan City prepared highly skilled personnel for Russia's Siberian railway system. Spinning and weaving mills, footwear, clothing and food factories, a big furniture factory and even metallurgical plants came into being in the Province, supplying their goods to the major towns of the Soviet Far East.¹⁹ However, this side

of the Birobidzhan experiment is primarily an advantage to the Russian State and not a major contribution to the solution of the Jewish problem.

For the Jews of the Soviet Union it is a great pity that the Birobidzhan colonization experiment was not more successful since the lives of many Jews of the Ukraine and Byelorussia might have been spared had there been a greater immigration into Birobidzhan and had the responsible representatives of Soviet Jewry supported the idea of a Jewish autonomous territory. The reluctance of the Soviet Jews to move from Europe to the Chinese borders, and their unpreparedness for agricultural work may have been contributory reasons for the failure of a great experiment. The main reason for the failure was, however, the lack of encouragement given by the communist leaders of Jewish origin to Birobidzhan. This applies equally to Stalin's prominent Jewish opponents in the communist hierarchy and to nearly all of his Jewish collaborators like L. M. Kaganovich whose name was given to the municipal theatre of Birobidzhan. Not one of the big communist leaders of Jewish origin ever thought or felt as a Jew. All stood for complete assimilation of the Jews and the idea of a separate Jewish territorial unit within Russia was, therefore, completely alien to them. Their ideal was the amalgamation of the Jews with the workers of all other nationalities of the U.S.S.R. into one Soviet nation linked together by Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Russian language. They claimed to work and to fight for all the peoples of the Soviet Union and, therefore, could not and did not want to pay special attention to the Jewish problem. Moreover, communist leaders of Jewish origin have become rare in the Soviet Union. Those belonging to the older generation are gradually dropping out and no prominent communist leaders of Jewish descent have emerged from the new Soviet generation.

Also the appeal to leading Jewish writers, artists or scientists to go to Birobidzhan contained an unrealistic proposition. Soviet Jews of some standing in the cultural and artistic world like the famous violinist, Oistrakh, the scholars Grinberg and A. Frumkin, the poets Marshak and Pasternak, the publicist Ilya Erenburg, the Russian poetess Vera Imber, and many others are unthinkable in other than Russian surroundings. This inevitable absence from Birobidzhan of the most prominent Jewish cultural workers of the Soviet Union will condemn the Autonomous Province for all time to a kind of cultural back-water existence.

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VII

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Caucasus means more to the Russians than either Russian Central Asia or the Russian Far East. The bonds between Russia and the Caucasus are strong and real and no official propaganda efforts are needed to prove their existence. The idea of the 'Russian Caucasus' will be alive among the Russian people as long as they continue to honour and read their great poets, because the Caucasus has become part and parcel of Russian national tradition through the works of Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy.

Lermontov's works in particular show that the Russians have interpreted the word 'Caucasus' not as a purely geographical notion, but as a whole period of Russian history and a political programme strongly flavoured with romanticism. While deploring the end of the primitive freedom of the Caucasus peoples Lermontov, like Pushkin, considered the final triumph of Russian civilization over the Caucasus tribes to be an unavoidable historical necessity. Thus the two greatest Russian poets gave to the Caucasian peoples identical advice, namely to reconcile themselves to the victory of the Russians.

Pushkin has expressed this conviction in the phrase: 'Humble thyself, Caucasus, for Yermolov* is coming'. Lermontov, on the other hand, predicted to the Circassians that one day they would proudly say 'We may truly be slaves, but at least we are slaves of the ruler of the Universe!' Since Lermontov's time Russia's power has grown considerably and the service of a great master has indeed become the dubious consolation not only of the Caucasian peoples but of many others besides, throughout the Soviet Union.

The peoples of the Caucasus did not act in accordance with Pushkin's and Lermontov's admonitions; they stubbornly fought Russia and struggled desperately for their freedom, because they did not realize the tremendous odds they were facing. They were too remote from the world of political and diplomatic realities of the nineteenth century to understand either the hopelessness of their own situation or the power of the Russian Empire. They deceived themselves by the erroneous supposition

* General Yermolov (1772-1863) was the principal Russian hero of the Caucasus conquest.

that Russia would not fight for the barren Caucasus mountains if she were really as great and mighty as was sometimes asserted by some mountaineers who had seen her immensity and later returned to their own people.¹

THE FIRST EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

The mountaineers of the Western Caucasus – the Circassians or the Adyge – who had lived close to the shores of the Black Sea, occupied particularly important strategic positions. In every war which Russia waged against Turkey the fearless Circassians had constituted a grave menace in the immediate rear of the Russian Caucasus front. The alternatives, from the Russian point of view, therefore, could only be either the total surrender or the total annihilation of the Circassians. As only a minority of the Circassians were ready to accept surrender, a mass migration of the Circassians to Turkey appeared the only possible 'solution', both to the Russian conquerors and the Circassians themselves, whose indomitable spirit of freedom could not be reconciled with Russian rule.

Thus between 1861 and 1864 about 500,000 Circassians left the Caucasus; but owing to starvation, disease and the hardships of the journey in overcrowded vessels, it is said that only half of them ever reached Turkey alive. Referring to this trek of the Circassians a semi-official Russian publication admitted that 'a calamity of such proportions has rarely befallen humanity'.² This great exodus of the Circassians disposed of the problem of nationalities in large areas of the western part of the North Caucasus region and opened them up to Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian colonization.

After the departure of the Circassians a great deal still remained to be done in the North Caucasus region from a Russian national point of view. Although thousands of Chechens, Nogai Tartars and Ossetins had likewise participated in the great exodus, these and other peoples of the Central and Eastern Caucasus continued to be a source of uneasiness to the Russian State. Complete Russian victory over the rebellious mountaineers was achieved only under the Soviet régime.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS IN THE SOVIET CAUCASUS

The Russian communist leaders came to the Northern Caucasus with progressive ideas and plans for raising the material and cultural level of its peoples. The Soviet Government was originally even determined to give the small mountain peoples a chance to combine their forces and thus become a political factor of some importance. In accordance with the wishes of the more advanced mountaineers the Soviet Government decided that there should be one United Northern Caucasus

Republic aggregating approximately 1,500,000 inhabitants. This Republic – officially called ‘Autonomous Mountain Socialist Soviet Republic’ – (Gorskaya A.S.S.R.) – was formed by a decree of January 20th, 1920. Its capital was the city of Vladikavkaz. The Republic comprised no fewer than seven different Caucasian peoples: Kabardinians, Chechens, Circassians (Cherkess), Ingush, Ossetins, Balkars and Karachay.

In its original form the Mountain Republic remained in being for only about twenty months. The Russian communist rulers apparently felt that the promotion of unity among the North Caucasus peoples was not in the interest of Soviet centralism and that it was safer to have them split up again into several single units. The disintegration of the Mountain Republic started in September 1921 when the Kabardinians were given a special Autonomous Province. In January 1922 three more peoples seceded from the Republic. The Balkars were made to join the Kabardinian Autonomous Province and the Karachay and the Cherkess were given a joint Autonomous Province. In December 1922 the Chechens were induced to set up an Autonomous Province of their own, which left only the Ossetins and the Ingush, in the Mountain Republic. In July 1924 both these peoples were endowed with separate territorial units of their own. The experiment of a united North Caucasus Republic was thus finally terminated. Administrative changes in the Northern Caucasus continued even after the end of the Mountain Republic. In April 1926 the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Province was divided into two provinces; and in January 1934 the Ingush merged with the Chechens into a single Autonomous Province.

The autonomy which the Northern Caucasus peoples had enjoyed existed very largely on paper. In reality they were administered up to 1934 from Rostov, the capital of the huge North Caucasus Territory, which was almost as large as Great Britain and Eire combined. The Executive Committee of the North Caucasus Territory (Krayispolkom) was entitled to overrule any decisions taken by the various Autonomous Provinces. In 1934 the Soviet bureaucracy administering the multinational parts of the North Caucasus region moved from Rostov to Vladikavkaz. Only in December 1936 did the mountaineers gain a greater say in the management of their affairs through the transformation of three Autonomous Provinces into Republics (Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R., Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R.).

The repeated shifting of the Northern Caucasus peoples from one territorial unit to another had left untouched the real problem: how to make the mountaineers into reliable Soviet citizens and how to associate them with the socialist transformation of society. The continual changes in the administrative boundaries had hindered rather than encouraged these tasks. They had rendered particularly difficult the recruiting of administrative personnel from among the local peoples and the intro-

duction of their languages for official use. In other words, the Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus remained unsuccessful, and an endless stream of statements, ordinances and recommendations issued by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) in Moscow had been unable to remedy the situation to any major extent. On May 10th, 1931, for instance, TsIK circulated a decree to the effect that Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus should operate at a quicker pace. The decree stipulated that by the end of 1932 at least 70 per cent of officials in the Autonomous Provinces should be recruited from among the local nationalities, and that local languages should be introduced into the administration. On July 5th, 1934, TsIK issued a statement recognizing that the decree put into force over three years earlier had remained a dead letter. A further decree which Kalinin signed on January 7th, 1936, again denounced the non-implementation of the Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus and revealed that the Russian language dominated everywhere in local government bodies, from the provincial administration down to the village councils. Of 1,310 officials in the Northern Caucasus Territory only seventeen belonged to the mountain peoples. According to the new decree the local languages were supposed to come into official use in 1936 and 1937, but it is open to doubt whether that order had any greater practical results than its predecessors.

THE SECOND EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

The Russo-German War fully revealed the discrepancy existing between propaganda and reality with regard to conditions in the Northern Caucasus. One could hardly find a better example of the former than the optimistic and distorted picture which Mikhail Kalinin gave in October 1942 when the German troops were approaching the Caucasus Mountains. Kalinin then said: 'The Caucasus is the most enlightening demonstration of the reforming, beneficial effect of the Soviet system on the psychology and character of people who, not without reason, saw danger to themselves everywhere. The Caucasians have now become a social people who see in the collective system their bulwark, the foundation of material prosperity and a higher intellectual life. . . . The whole Caucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples. The whole Soviet land, from border to border, has become their beloved home. National enmity has given way to mutual understanding, estrangement to co-operation. . . . Is not everything that has taken place in the Caucasus during the twenty-five years of Soviet power a miracle? Yes, it is a miracle. It is that for which Lenin fought all his life, that for which Stalin fought and is fighting, that to which our party has always aspired.' And Kalinin went on to say that the peoples of the Northern Caucasus were

displaying worthy resistance to the enemy, derailling trains, blowing up bridges, destroying ammunition and fuel depots.³

Only a few weeks after Kalinin had made his panegyric statement little was left of the Caucasian 'miracle', and of the idyllic situation which the Soviet President had depicted. When the German armies occupied the Northern Caucasus region many mountaineers manifested their hostility towards the Soviet régime. They attempted to use the retreat of the Red Army to free themselves from what they considered the 'Russian yoke'. Over twenty years of Soviet rule had not altered their ingrained conviction that Russia's foes were their friends. These peoples apparently thought that they owed as little loyalty to Russia as the Indonesians deemed themselves to owe to the Dutch and the Vietnamese to the French when their respective countries were occupied by Japan. In the official Soviet view, of the seven peoples who in 1920 had formed the Mountain Republic four had shown themselves particularly unreliable in the crucial winter of 1942-43. They were the Chechens (407,600 according to the 1939 census), the Ingush (92,074), the Balkars (42,660) and the Karachay (75,737). After the North Caucasus region had been cleared of the invaders, the Soviet Government found itself unable to forgive these nationalities for their disloyalty or even their indifference. It also abandoned all further attempts to transform them into good citizens of the U.S.S.R. and expelled them from the 'happy family of Soviet peoples'. All of them lost the special territorial administrative units which the Stalin Constitution of 1936 had bestowed on them. Early in 1944 they were rounded up and deported to far away places in Siberia. For all practical purposes they ceased to exist. Thus were abolished the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous S.S.R. and the Autonomous Province of the Karachay. The Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R. was transformed into the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. after having been relieved of the 'burden' of the Balkar traitors.

Soviet policy in the Northern Caucasus differed to some extent from Czarist policy since it resulted in the building of schools, theatres, libraries and hospitals, but for the four deported nationalities all this had been of little use. From their point of view there is hardly any difference between the policy of General Yermolov and that of Generalissimo Stalin. Indeed, the Soviet régime deprived at least as many Caucasian mountaineers of their homes as did the Czarist régime.

CONTINUITY OF RUSSIAN CAUCASUS POLICY: THE CHECHENS

The Chechens, as the most numerous nationality left in the Northern Caucasus after the emigration of the Circassians, offer a particularly good example of the continuity of Russian policy. The Large Soviet Encyclopædia rightly summed up the historical role of the Chechens by

describing them as the 'most active and strongest opponents of the Czarist Government during the conquest of the Caucasus'. The Russians suffered extensive and costly disasters at the hands of this people, who were unequalled in forest warfare.

Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the Chechens have challenged the Russian Empire, but from 1818 onwards their resistance to Russian rule assumed major proportions. In that year General Yermolov built a fortress to subjugate more easily the land of the Chechens. He called the new fortress 'Grozny', meaning 'menacing' and 'formidable'. The name of Grozny had a deeper meaning than might appear at the first glance: it was the symbol of a political programme that Yermolov defined in the following words: 'I wish that the terror of my name should guard our frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my word should be for the natives a law more inevitable than death'. Grozny became Yermolov's headquarters, and it was from Grozny that countless Russian expeditions set out 'to punish raiders, avenge defeats, establish new posts, relieve beleaguered garrisons, or rescue retreating bands and armies'.⁴ The Russian campaign against Chechenia reached its climax in 1840, at the time of the great Chechen rising under the leadership of Imam Shamil. The breakdown of Shamil's fanatical Moslem movement led to the gradual submission of the Chechens in the years 1857-59.

The Russian authorities knew well that these new subjects of the Czar, after all the trouble they had caused, would not easily reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom; so an attempt was made to settle the 'Chechen problem' by a double transfer of population. Immediately after the conquest the inhabitants of forty-four auls (mountain villages) were transplanted from the mountains to the plains, where they could more easily be controlled. The more rebellious ones were forced to emigrate to Turkey, where they were given hospitality on the express demand of the Russian Government. In the summer of 1865, 39,000 Chechens, one-fifth of the entire Chechen population at that date, left Russia. Those who stayed behind did not remain quiescent. In 1877 there was another wave of unrest following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, and more trouble in 1886. A Russian monograph on the Chechens, published in 1894, said that they could not yet be considered 'fully pacified'; they still looked across the border to Turkey whither many more dreamed of emigrating.⁵ The emigration of the 39,000 had not eliminated the 'Chechen problem', for the birthrate of these Chechens was particularly high, far above the average in the Russian Empire.

CHECHEN-INGUSH MOSLEM OPPOSITION

The immediate consequence of the October Revolution in Chechenia was a revival of violent nationalism and religious fanaticism among the

Chechens. They at first accepted the leadership of the Sheikh Uzun Hadji who proclaimed himself Imam and Emir of the Northern Caucasus. The Emir was the ally of the communists in the struggle against the White Guards of General Denikin. Having vanquished the White armies, the Bolsheviks dropped the Imam, but they were unable to cope with Chechen nationalism. The Chechens demanded the expulsion of all Russians who in the course of the last century had settled in their 'living space'. Pending a positive answer to this request Chechen nationalist bands terrorized the Russian population of the area beyond endurance. In the early twenties the Russian settlers in Chechenia sent a complaint to Moscow on account of the endless raids and murders perpetrated by Chechen bands, and petitioned that they be disarmed. Mikhail Kalinin went personally to the Caucasus and attempted to calm down both Russians and Chechens. With carefully chosen words he tried to persuade them to live together in peace, to intermarry and to respect each other's customs.⁶

Whilst in consequence of Kalinin's personal intervention banditry stopped in Chechenia, it would seem that Moslem opposition to the Soviet régime was never quite suppressed. In 1931 the little country still had 2,675 mosques and Arab schools, as well as 1,250 mullahs, 34 sheikhs and 250 religious elders. The mullahs who were powerful opponents of the Soviet régime even managed to keep alive the illegal Shariah courts which were camouflaged as 'reconciliation commissions'.

The hostile attitude of the Chechens towards the Soviet Russian régime was often manifested in the readiness to credit the most fantastic anti-Russian rumours. Thus, in the early thirties, there existed a widespread belief that Kunta Hadji – the head of a popular Moslem sect who had died at the end of the nineteenth century – was still alive and was soon to return to Chechenia, where he would found a State based on Moslem religious law. Apparently the Chechens did not differentiate between Czarist and Bolshevik Russia in their hopes that Kunta Hadji would appear as Messiah, for it was he who had led them in the risings against Czarism in 1864 and 1877, for which he was exiled to Novgorod.

The Ingush, whose fate Soviet policy had coupled with that of the Chechens, showed themselves no less loyal to Islam. A delegate who represented Ingushetia at the 'Second All-Union Conference of Godless Pedagogists' in 1931, stated that the influence of the Moslem clergy was still so strong among the Ingush that children refused to learn from books which they believed to be anti-religious. Whenever a teacher tried to introduce anti-religious propaganda he encountered a hostile attitude among school children and there were cases in which teachers had even to leave the school for having criticized Islam. The work of the secular Soviet schools, where the children were taught in the winter, was counteracted by the Moslem schools where the young Ingush would learn

during the summer holidays all that the Soviet authorities wished them to disregard. A number of Ingush party and Communist Youth League members, instead of working against the influence of religion, used themselves to go to the mosques to pray.⁷

The difficulties existing between the Soviet authorities and the Chechens and Ingush were not exclusively due to the Bolshevik failure to understand the importance of the religious factor in the life of the mountaineers. There were also extraordinary difficulties of a technical nature, due to the fact that the directives of the central administration were issued in the Russian language and therefore did not reach the Chechen-Ingush masses. Being unable fully to understand the orders received, the local Soviet organs either could not carry them out, or falsified the decisions of the party and of the administration.⁸

GROZNY - THE OIL CITY

It was the tremendous dead weight of the predominantly Russian capital of Chechenia that prevented the implementation of any genuine Chechen autonomy and finally spelled the doom of the Chechen people. The actual liquidation of the Chechens would probably not have occurred had not the largest town in their homeland become an oil city, and indeed, one of the most important oil centres of the U.S.S.R.

This oil city had developed out of the little fortress of Grozny. Although Grozny oilfields had been discovered as early as 1833, they were hardly exploited at all in the nineteenth century. In 1912, however, they already supplied 11·5 per cent of the entire Russian oil. Between 1913 and 1917 this figure had risen to 16·7 per cent, and in the following four years to nearly 25 per cent. By 1937 the proportion of Grozny oil to total Russian oil production had fallen to 9·25 per cent, but in terms of absolute figures this output represented an increase of 234 per cent, compared to that before the First World War. The development of Grozny as an oil centre made for an increase of the population on an 'American scale'. In 1890 the place had no more than 6,000 inhabitants, against 34,067 in 1913, 97,095 in 1926 and 172,468 in 1939. It need hardly be added that the Chechens and Ingush, peoples consisting of shepherds and peasants, could not contribute anything worth mentioning to the rise of the town which was styled, almost ironically, 'Capital of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.'. Among the oilworkers of Grozny there were probably at no time more than one-tenth of 'natives', and until 1936 there were but 9·7 per cent.

Unlike so many cities in the Soviet Union, Grozny never changed its name under the Soviet régime, despite the imperialistic history connected with it. As a matter of fact, it was the Soviet oil city of Grozny which spelled the doom of the Chechens and not the little fortress which

Yermolov had founded to spread terror among the mountaineers. The struggle which Czarist Russian officers had begun was terminated by Soviet Russian police officials, who finally ensured Russian domination over the northern slopes of the Northern Caucasus by expelling the Chechens bag and baggage. It is questionable whether the crimes officially attributed to the Chechens – particularly the help which they had given to the Germans – would have been a sufficiently weighty reason for exterminating them as an organized community, had not the Grozny oil been involved. To protect the Grozny oil-wells against all future risks the Soviet authorities removed the Chechens from Grozny's hinterland and transformed the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. into the Grozny Province. Grozny is another instance of the danger which the existence of oil-wells can bring to a small people. Whether in Latin-America, the Middle East or in the Soviet Union, national self-determination, independence, autonomy and national rights count little as soon as oil interests are at stake.

Almost up to the very moment of their suppression as an ethnographic unit, Russian propaganda made considerable use of the Chechens in its attempt to impress the public abroad with the Soviet nationalities policy. Even a year after the outbreak of the Second World War the Chechens were still regarded as a 'good people'. In August 1942 they were said to have played a prominent part in a 'big anti-fascist meeting' in the town of Ordzhonikidze where 3,000 mountaineers pledged their 'boundless devotion to our beloved motherland – the Soviet Union – and the great Russian people'. Delegates of the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars – all peoples whom the Soviet Government later deprived of their national existence – addressed the meeting and spoke about their strong friendship towards the Russians.⁹ Data made available on October 5th, 1942, showed that forty-four Chechens had been awarded decorations for valour in the field, not a bad record considering that far larger national units like the Turkmenians, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz and Estonians had not won many more by that date.

Paradoxically, the Chechens and Ingush continued to serve the purpose of Soviet propaganda even after their liquidation as political entities. Their removal from their homeland enabled the Soviet régime to rewrite the entire history of the Northern Caucasus. This rewriting consisted in blaming the Chechens and Ingush for all acts of anti-Soviet resistance perpetrated in the years following the October Revolution in the Caucasus region, and in whitewashing all other nationalities. This new interpretation of Caucasus history was even elaborated in a statement of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. It dealt with the opera *The Great Friendship* the libretto of which had not taken into account the official reorientation with regard to the history of the Caucasus. The Central Committee statement of February 10th,

1948, said: 'The plot of the opera is historically false and artificial. It pretends to depict the struggle for the establishment of Soviet power and of friendship between the peoples in the Northern Caucasus in the years 1918-20. The opera conveys the erroneous impression that such Caucasian peoples as the Georgians and Ossetins had been hostile during this epoch towards the Russian people. This is historically false since the obstacle to the establishment of friendship between the peoples in the Northern Caucasus was during that period the Ingush and Chechens.'^{10*}

This pronouncement was a most authoritative exposition of the new Soviet theory about 'good' and 'bad' peoples.

THE ABOLITION OF THE KARACHAY PROVINCE

Another Caucasian people who, together with the Chechens and Ingush, came to lose their territorial administrative unit were the Karachay, a people of the Western Caucasus who had suffered greatly in the nineteenth century under the pressure of Russian Cossack colonization. The Karachay had been driven out into the mountains by the advancing wave of the Cossacks who took possession of the Caucasus foothills. Confined to the rocky mountain area the Karachay lived in conditions of great misery and earned a scanty livelihood through nomadic cattle-breeding.

Before the war the Soviet Government considered that the resettlement of the Karachay into the plain was one of the great achievements of Bolshevik Caucasus policy. It was just that resettlement which in 1942 offered to the Karachay the opportunity of getting into touch with the German armies and rendering service to them.

From the point of view of its ethnical composition the abolition of the Autonomous Province of the Karachay was hardly justifiable, since Slav colonization in the province was insignificant. In 1926 the Russians represented only 1.7 per cent and the Ukrainians 4.4 per cent of the population, while the Karachay themselves formed over three-quarters of the inhabitants in the province. As neither Russian nor Slav national interests were affected the Soviet Government decided to accompany the abolition of the Karachay Province by a friendly gesture towards the Georgians. Only the northern part of the Karachay Province was added to the Russian province of Stavropol, while the southern part with the 'capital' Kikhori,[†] was included in Georgia. The annexation of this

* Before the Chechens and Ingush fell into disgrace the official Soviet history of the October Revolution and the Civil War attributed to these two peoples the most daring exploits in support of the Bolsheviks. This is what an official Soviet publication for foreign consumption said about the Ingush in 1937: 'In the Revolution this people covered itself with undying glory. During the Civil War, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, pursued by the enemy, was driven to seek refuge with the Ingush. The Ingush faithfully protected him'.¹¹

† Kikhori was originally called 'Mikoyan Shakh'. The town was built in the late twenties to give the Karachay people an administrative centre.

territory comprising 1,200 square miles was a national triumph for Georgia, for it enabled her, for the first time, to spread out to the north of the Caucasus.

A 'GOOD' PEOPLE - THE OSSETINS

After the expulsion of the Chechens from their homeland the Ossetins became the largest mountain people of the Northern Caucasus. In 1939 there were altogether 354,000 Ossetins in the U.S.S.R. of whom slightly less than two-thirds lived in the Autonomous Republic of Northern Ossetia, with which we are here primarily concerned, and about one-third in the Southern Ossetin Autonomous Province of Georgia. The two Ossetin territories adjoin each other and it would have been logical to amalgamate them into a single Autonomous Republic. Representatives of the two Ossetias went to Moscow in October 1925 to discuss the unification of their people with the Soviet central Government and personally with Stalin whose own mother is of Ossetin origin. This discussion which is briefly referred to in the seventh volume of Stalin's complete works, was inconclusive. The unification of the Ossetins would have been possible only at the expense of Georgia and the Kremlin was apparently not prepared to harm the interests of one of the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. for the sake of a minor nationality.

Czarist and Bolshevik authorities agree in their appraisal of the comparatively peaceful and placid Ossetins, no less than in their judgment on the turbulent Chechens. Of course, both régimes had encountered difficulties among the Ossetins, too, but never on the same scale as in the case of other Caucasus mountain peoples.

Czarist Russia started the conquest of the Ossetins in the period of Catherine II and skilfully exploited the class differences among them as well as their hostility toward their western neighbours - the Kabardinians. Many Ossetins considered the establishment of Russian rule as a safeguard against the danger of attacks by more warlike mountain peoples. Ossetin folk-songs of the early epoch of Russian conquest reflect a pro-Russian spirit and state unequivocally that living under Russian rule was identical to living in peace.

The Ossetins appreciated that Russian occupation and protection enabled them to settle in the plain from which they had been driven by the Kabardinians. Part of that re-settlement had already started in the second half of the eighteenth century. The major part of the re-settlement action was, however, carried out much later, between the twenties and the forties of the nineteenth century.

The Ossetins were of use to Russia not only as settlers, but also as soldiers. As early as the last years of the eighteenth century a number of Ossetin officers distinguished themselves in Prince Potemkin's army in

actions against the Turks. An Ossetin Major-General, K. Zankisov, fought in Poland against the insurgents of 1863-4 and he was by no means the only Ossetin Major-General of that epoch. Furthermore, an 'Ossetin Division' became famous in the course of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-8, when General Skobelev described its 'chivalrous gallantry' as being 'above any praise'.¹²

Russian cultural work among the Ossetins started much earlier than among other mountain peoples. The first book to appear in the Ossetin language was printed in Moscow in 1798; its object was to serve as a kind of introduction to the study of the Bible. A long period of fruitful association with the Russians and the general peaceful approach of the Ossetins towards Russian military and political rule made them more open to the acceptance of Russian preponderance. The Ossetins were, as a matter of fact, the only people of the Northern Caucasus to produce a great writer in the person of Kosta Khetagurov (1859-1906) who was half Russianized himself and wrote in both the Ossetin and Russian languages. The Soviet régime greatly popularized Khetagurov as a symbol of Russian-Ossetin synthesis, which he undoubtedly was. He had a complete Russian education, had studied at St. Petersburg and was strongly influenced by such progressive Russian writers as Herzen and Chernishevsky, which makes him particularly acceptable from the Soviet point of view.

Until the Ossetins gave proof of their loyalty to Russia during the war the Soviet régime had had to overcome Ossetin resistance to both the establishment of collective farms and the suppression of tribal customs. During the period of the collectivization Ossetin peasants waged a sort of guerilla warfare against 'socialist property' and while outwardly accepting collectivization, tried to transform the Kolkhoz into an instrument of their respective clans. Ossetin chairmen of collective farms and officials of local Soviets seem to have acted on the principle 'I decide who is a kulak and an enemy of the State and who is not'. Thus, at least during its initial stage, collectivization in Ossetia became a downright farce. Persons belonging to a rival clan were rendered innocuous by being denounced as kulaks; real kulaks, on the other hand, were promoted to the rank of respectable Soviet citizens if they happened to belong to the clan dominating the local village council or the collective farm concerned.¹³

All such 'incidents' were forgotten when the Ossetins redeemed their reputation by their brilliant war record. In the fighting which resulted in the dislodgement of the Germans from the approaches to the Caucasus, Ossetin partisans operating from behind the enemy lines greatly assisted the Red Army.¹⁴ As a mark of appreciation for their loyalty, the Soviet Government allowed the Ossetins to increase substantially the territory of their national republic. A decree of April 8th, 1944, stipulated

that three districts were to be added to the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R. in their entirety as well as parts of three other districts. The major portion of this new Ossetin territory was sliced off the Stavropol Territory, but a section of it came from Ingushetia, which had occupied the western border area of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. In this way the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R. grew from 2,390 square miles before the war to 3,250 square miles. This territorial change altered the ethnographic character of the Republic, for together with its new territories Ossetia received a fairly large number of Russians who mostly lived in the two new 'Ossetin' towns, Mozdok and Malgobek. Russian communists thus obtained a greater say in the running of the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R. at the expense of their Ossetin comrades. In the small Northern Ossetin Republic of the inter-war period (an Autonomous Province until 1936) the Ossetins had formed 84 per cent of the entire population against 13.4 per cent Russians and Ukrainians. In 'Greater Ossetia' however, the percentage of the Ossetins may have dropped to about 60 per cent while the Slav share may have increased accordingly.

In addition to the territorial expansion of Ossetia the Soviet Government made still another 'concession' to the Ossetins. The capital of the republic, Vladikavkaz, was allowed to assume the Ossetin name of Dzaudzhikau – a worthless gesture since Russian predominance in the town was not affected by the change of its name. Dzaudzhikau remained that which was implied in its former name of Vladikavkaz, meaning 'Ruler of the Caucasus'. It continues to be one of the centres from which Russian administration exercises its control over the mountaineers.

RE-EDUCATION OF THE KABARDINIANS

The Chechens and the Ossetins represent the two extremes in the attitude of the local Caucasus peoples towards the Russians – the most irreconcilable resistance in the case of the Chechens, and the most far-reaching appeasement in the case of the Ossetins. The Kabardinians, forming part of the once powerful Circassian group which had been broken up by Russian colonization and conquest, stand between these extremes. In the Second World War their attitude was not beyond reproach. The Kabardinians had their deserters and traitors, but the Soviet Government did not consider they were bad enough to justify the abolition of their Autonomous Republic.

During the important administrative reorganization which took place in the Caucasus towards the end of the Second World War, the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. was diminished by only 300 square miles, which were incorporated into Georgia. This, however, was not meant to be a punishment for the Kabardinians, but was directed against the Balkars who had inhabited the area in question. The small administrative reform

achieved a dual purpose. In addition to punishing the Balkars it served as a warning for the Kabardinians, who from then on hastened to express their loyalty towards Soviet Russia in a very demonstrative, even effusive, way.

After the war the Soviet authorities found it advisable to provide for the Kabardinians, as a means of strengthening their allegiance to the Soviet State, a clear conception of history which would unequivocally show that the Russians had always been the protectors of the Kabardinian people. The task of formulating the details of this conception was assigned to the 'Kabardinian Research Institute', whose headquarters are in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The new conception implied the 'official recognition' of Temryuk Idarovich as the national hero of Kabarda. Kabardinian children are expected to look up to Temryuk with the same awe as Russian boys and girls to Peter the Great or Suvorov. According to the new official thesis Temryuk, a Kabardinian prince who lived around 1550, 'endeavoured to build up a strong centralized State able to resist Turkish and Crimean Tartar oppressors'. Temryuk had realized that the Kabardinians were incapable of withstanding their enemies if they were to rely on their own forces only; establishment of close contacts with Muscovy was therefore the only wise Kabardinian policy.¹⁵

It is the same story which is told with some variation to all the peoples of the Soviet Union in all their many languages. There is always a grain of truth in the story, but never the entire truth, since history is not so simple and so clear-cut that it would fit the purposes of a one-sided propaganda. It is a historical fact that Temryuk asked Ivan the Terrible for protection and even gave him his daughter for wife. Originally, in the days of greater internationalism, Soviet historians failed to stress this fact, and laid more emphasis on the slave trade in which the Kabardinian feudal lords had engaged with the Crimean Tartar Khanate. However, since events had proved the necessity of increasing the attachment and loyalty of the Kabardinians to the Russians and the Soviet State, Temryuk had to be brought to the forefront of Kabardinian history.

Kabardinian post-war literature also pursued the aim of re-educating the Kabardinian people. The central theme of the first Kabardinian literary almanac consisted in showing that it was 'the friendship with the Russian people that led the Kabardinians towards a better life.'¹⁶

While a great deal was done for 're-education' in the sense required by the Russians, education as such had been neglected during the first post-war years, at least as far as the Kabardinian language was concerned. The so-called 'national' schools in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. were Kabardinian in the first four forms only; from the fifth form onwards teaching was in the Russian language exclusively. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party issued in 1948 a state-

ment on 'serious shortcomings and mistakes' committed in Kabarda in the field of national policy. It stressed that conditions in Kabardinian education were in conflict with the constitution of the A.S.S.R., which stipulated the right of the Kabardinian people to schools in their own language.

Although the Kabardinians are by far more numerous and advanced than the peoples of the Soviet Far North, they suffer from the same acute shortage of national teaching-personnel which has been fatal to the national culture of many a minor Soviet nationality. Thus in 1948, the Kabardinian teachers' training college at Nalchik had but fifty-six Kabardinians out of a total of 559 students.¹⁷

It is to be expected that the survival of a truly Kabardinian culture and Kabardinian language will become even more remote with the increasing pressure of Slav colonization. Between 1926 and 1935 alone the number of Russians and Ukrainians in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. more than doubled; it increased from about 37,000 to 93,000. This increase was partly due to immigration, partly to the inclusion in Kabarda of a number of Cossack villages in 1932. After the war the numerical relation between 'natives' and colonists changed to the detriment of the former, owing to the forcible departure of the Balkars. Moreover more Russian colonists came into the country to staff new factories springing up around Nalchik.

THE CIRCASSIANS - A RESERVE OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

For the benefit of the remnants of the Circassian people the Soviet Government set up two Autonomous Provinces in the western part of the North Caucasus area; the Cherkess Province in the Caucasus foothills and the Adyge Province in the Kuban plain.

Surrounded as they are on all sides by Russian territories these two national units have little chance of long-term survival. This applies in particular to the Adyge Province, whose capital - Maikop - used to be the third largest Russian oil centre after Baku and Grozny, before the development of the 'second Baku' between the Volga and the Urals.

Originally, Maikop was not included in the Adyge Province, which had a small Adyge majority in its initial stage (55·7 per cent various branches of Adyge, 42·7 per cent Russians and Ukrainians, and the rest made up of other Europeans and Armenians). The size of the Province was increased, however, before the war and the Adyge thus found themselves in the position of a minority. In 1930 the Adyge Province won doubtful 'fame' owing to its extraordinarily high percentage of disfranchized people. This was due to the arbitrary action of the local Soviet authorities, who had indiscriminately interpreted the terms of 'kulak', 'capitalist' and 'reactionary' with the result that 12 per cent of the

entire adult population of the Province were deprived of their civic rights.

The Circassian (Cherkess) Autonomous Province is inhabited by three small Northern Caucasus peoples – the Cherkess, the Nogai Tatars and the Abazintsy, apart from Slav colonists. In 1933 the three indigenous peoples had a narrow aggregate majority over the Russians and Ukrainians.

Although the Circassians, as a people, have no political future in Soviet Russia itself, they may still be of service to the Soviet diplomacy. There are Circassians living in Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Transjordan. They are all descendants of the very Circassians whom the Czarist authorities forced to leave Russia in the sixties of the nineteenth century. In Turkey the Circassians have largely become one with the Turkish people, but in the Arab countries they still form distinct communities. In Palestine they have kept to their own customs and language, and do not inter-marry with the Arabs. The Syrian Arabs dislike the Circassians, of whom both Turks and French had made use against the indigenous population of the country. In Transjordan, too, the Circassian minority has preserved its individuality.¹⁸

The survival of Circassian national sentiments in Syria, Palestine and Transjordan may tempt the Soviet Union to create a 'Circassian problem'. Soviet propaganda may try at a given moment to arouse interest for the 'old country' among the Circassians in the Arab world. It should not be too difficult for Russia to spread among the Middle Eastern Circassians the story of the rebirth of the Circassian people in the U.S.S.R., and of the existence of 'Circassian States' therein. Having done this preparatory work Russia may either encourage Circassian re-immigration into the Caucasus or she may use the Circassian on the spot as one of several trump cards Russian imperialism holds in reserve in the Middle East.

RUSSIA'S MOST POLYGLOT COLONY: DAGHESTAN

Daghestan represents the most difficult problem which the Soviet nationalities policy has to face, not only in the Caucasus, but in the Soviet Union as a whole. The very name of the Daghestan A.S.S.R. indicates that the country occupies a special position in the U.S.S.R. It is the only Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic which does not bear the name of a people but of a territory.

Daghestan is one of the most polyglot countries of the world. Ethnologists record that its roughly 1,000,000 inhabitants are split up into thirty-two nationalities, in a territory of only 14,600 square miles.* The

* In its original form Daghestan covered 19,800 square miles. In 1938 the Soviet Government separated from Daghestan parts of its lowlands with their predominant Ukrainian-Russian population, and its territory was thus reduced to about 13,000 square miles. After the war, Daghestan 'inherited' from Chechenia 1,600 square miles.

language and nationality issue in Daghestan is a new and superficial one. The fundamental problem is that of religion; and religion unites the Daghestani mountaineers under the green banner of Mohammed.

Under the Czarist régime Russian penetration into Daghestan was incomplete. The country had been a Russian possession since the Treaty of Gulistan which Russia and Persia concluded in 1813, but there was no real pacification of Daghestan until 1859, the year which ended the 'Gazavat', the Holy War which the mountain peoples waged against Czarist Russia under their national and religious leader Shamil. Even during the pacification process these peoples were largely left to themselves. The Russians were concentrated in the small Daghestani towns of Temir-Khan-Shura, Derbent and Petrovsk, and did not interfere with the internal autonomy of the mountain villages. Only half-hearted efforts were made to impose Russian civilization upon the mountaineers. By 1914 only fifty-four Russian schools existed in the whole of Daghestan. In the same year the country had more than 800 religious schools where children learnt the Arabic language, the Koran and the Shariah. In 1917 the sketchy attempts at Russification broke down completely; the Russian schools were closed and mountain localities which had introduced Russian as the official language reverted to Arabic.

Thus Bolshevism had to start in Daghestan right from the beginning with the imposition of Russian rule and Russian civilization. The Bolshevik Party found it extremely difficult to gain a foothold in the isolated, deeply religious, mountain country. As an ideology Bolshevism has not conquered the mountaineers yet. The technical establishment of Bolshevik rule was, however, achieved in the greater part of Daghestan by the late autumn of 1920, when the Russian White Guards were routed and the Moslem nationalists withdrew to certain centres of resistance in the south of the country.

THE TWO FACES OF SOVIET POLICY IN DAGHESTAN

In November 1920 Stalin came personally to Temir-Khan-Shura, the temporary capital, and proclaimed the autonomy of Daghestan. Stalin addressed an 'extraordinary congress of the peoples of Daghestan' and solemnly promised on behalf of the Soviet Government that the Shariah would be respected.

'Daghestan', Stalin said, 'shall be free to administer itself according to its own conditions, its ways and its customs. We are informed that the Shariah has great importance for the peoples of Daghestan. We are also informed that the enemies of Soviet power are spreading rumours that the Soviet régime would ban the Shariah. I am entitled to declare here on behalf of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic that these rumours are lies. The Government of Russia

had met Samursky personally, said about the Daghestani politician that he was a clever man, a good speaker and evidently had great influence among the local people.²⁴

THE FIGHT AGAINST THE SHAMIL CULT

After the death of Samursky the religious resistance continued. The small Daghestani town of Buinaksk remained, together with Baku, Tashkent and Ufa, one of the four most important centres of Islam in the whole Soviet Union. Not only did the Bolshevik fight against religion fail in Daghestan, but Soviet power was equally unsuccessful in eradicating the historic traditions of the mountaineers centred around the great Imam Shamil.

Shamil is the unchallenged national hero of the mountain peoples of Daghestan and Chechenia, whom he led in the fight against Czarist Russia between 1834 and 1859. In Daghestan his memory is so universally respected that even the Soviet régime had to accept the Shamil cult. During over thirty years Soviet historians tried hard to interpret Shamil in accordance with communist ideology. Some went so far as to depict him almost as a forerunner of communism, and practically all agreed that he was the leader of a progressive national liberation movement. In all history textbooks as used in Soviet schools Shamil figured as a brave and capable military leader, a skilful organizer, a promoter of trade and an opponent of local feudalism.²⁵

After the Second World War the Soviet leaders became more and more convinced that the benevolent attitude towards Shamil had been a mistake, and that it was time to put an end to all concessions to Daghestani anti-Russian nationalism. In 1947 members of the Institute for History of the All-Union Academy of Sciences were summoned for a long discussion on the Shamil problem. Most of the historians participating in it could find no possibility of reversing their judgment on the progressive and democratic character of Shamil.²⁶ Although the party leadership might have been expected to disagree with the attitude of the Academy, it waited till 1950 for its formal denunciation of the Shamil cult. The campaign was then conducted by the party secretary of Azerbaidzhan, Bagirov, and by his opposite number in Daghestan, Daniyalov. In separate statements, each about 10,000 words long, the two officials declared that practically everything written during the Soviet régime concerning Shamil had been wrong from beginning to end. Bagirov's statement was published in the party organ *Bolshevik* and Daniyalov's in *Voprosy Istorii* (Problems of History), an organ of the Academy. Both sought to show that Shamil was no national hero but an agent of British and Turkish imperialism. He was no progressive personality, they said, but had opposed the only progressive solution

for the peoples of Daghestan, namely, union with Russia. Both Bagirov and Daniyalov produced a large number of historical documents referring to Shamil's alleged treacherous and reactionary role. All these documents, most of which were over 100 years old, must long since have been known to Soviet historians, but probably did not seem to them relevant. The Daghestani party secretary went as far as to say that the annexation of Daghestan by Russia was the only way out of stagnation, since it had led to the development of Daghestani economy and brought the country into connection with progressive Russian culture.²⁷ The communist offensive against the Shamil cult reduced to zero many cultural efforts which had been made in Daghestan under the Soviet régime. Many works which Daghestani and Russian authors had written on Daghestani history became obsolete.

In view of the liquidation of the Chechens, the dethronement of Shamil could not affect Chechenia, which had likewise fought against Czarism under his leadership, but it had repercussions in Azerbaidzhan. Shamil's struggle had been very popular with the Azerbaidzhani people. Many Azerbaidzhani historians and writers had paid tribute to him. The sympathy which Shamil enjoyed in Azerbaidzhan was even the primary reason for the launching of the anti-Shamil campaign. This happened in the following way. An Azerbaidzhani scholar, Geidar Guseinov, had written a learned thesis *History of nineteenth-century social and philosophical thought in Azerbaidzhan*. The thesis was generally believed to have considerable merit as a book of scholarship and was awarded the Stalin Prize in March 1950. Two months later the award of the Stalin Prize was withdrawn by special decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. The official explanation of this gesture, extraordinary even for Soviet conditions, was Guseinov's estimate of Shamil's personality. His book had, indeed, contained a few friendly words about Shamil and his movement.²⁸ Not only was Guseinov himself sharply rebuked but also the reviewers of his book, and in particular the Azerbaidzhani Academy of Sciences, which had recommended it for the Stalin Prize.

DAGHESTAN'S LANGUAGE PROBLEM

According to the Bible, mankind became divided into nationalities and started to speak different tongues because Man had challenged God and had built the Tower of Babel. The language problem of Soviet Daghestan originated in a similar way from the Bolshevik challenge to Allah and to Arabic, the sacred language of the Koran. Arabic had acquired a monopoly as a means of education in the mountain country. It was the inter-tribal language which made the mountaineers forget that they belonged to different nationalities.

The difficulty of Daghestan's language problem lies in the fact that there is no local language in the country which can in any way claim priority over others. Even the most widespread of the local languages – the Avar – is spoken by only 158,000 people, just 22 per cent of the total population. The other more important nationalities of Daghestan are Kumyks (95,000), Darghinians (107,000), Lezghians (100,000) and Lakians (40,000).

The local Communist Party leadership was at first highly sceptical about encouraging literacy in the languages of the Daghestani mountaineers. The party felt that a more highly developed language should be introduced instead, to take the place of Arabic. The question arose whether Daghestan's new lingua franca and official language was to be Russian, which the Czarist régime had tried to impose, unsuccessfully, or Turkic. The Soviet authorities considered that Turkic was for many reasons a more suitable choice. First, Turkic, unlike Russian, was not a language of 'Unbelievers', but one spoken by Moslem peoples, and had thus a better chance to oust Arabic. The selection of Turkic was furthermore a tribute to the culturally most advanced nationality of Daghestan, the Kumyks, a Turkic people, the only ethnical group of Daghestan who had produced a national literature, in Czarist times. Finally, the communist leaders indulged in considerable illusions about the role which Daghestan might be able to play in revolutionizing the East, provided that it adopted the Turkic language.

This is what the party secretary, Samursky, wrote about this aspect of the Daghestani language problem, at a time when he fully reflected the official point of view: 'If one takes the interests of the World Revolution as the departing point one must recognize that education in the Turkic language can render in Daghestan a much greater service than education in Russian. Daghestan, on the one hand, is a land of the Orient which has so far kept up contact with all (Oriental) countries in the vicinity. On the other hand, Daghestan has come within the orbit of the Proletarian Revolution. Daghestan can and must serve as a link between the U.S.S.R. and the Orient better than all other parts of the Soviet Union and it must become a channel of communist ideas in the Near East. The Near East either speaks the Turkic language or understands it. The Turkic language gives the Daghestani the possibility of contact with all nationalities in the Near East and this contact will introduce a revolutionary current into the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial countries'.²⁰

The Communist Party leadership soon found out that the hopes which it had pinned on the introduction of Turkic as Daghestan's lingua franca could not materialize. Daghestan was a bulwark of Oriental ideas in the Soviet Union and could never become a bulwark of Soviet ideas in the East with or without the Turkic language. The Daghestani Com-

munist Party was a tiny and weak body. In 1927 it had only 651 members from the local nationalities and they were unable to convert their own peoples to Bolshevism, let alone to become missionaries of communism in other Oriental countries.

In 1927-28 a special language commission of the Daghestan Committee of the Communist Party reconsidered the language problem and recommended that more attention should be devoted to the local languages. On the basis of this recommendation a language reform was decreed providing for elementary education in eight languages. A basic political terminology was worked out for all of them. The recognized languages were originally those of the Avars, Darghinians, Lezghians, Lakians, Kumyks, Tabasarans, Nogai Tartars and the Taty.* Later on recognition was withdrawn from the Nogai Tartar and Taty languages.³⁰

Even after the language reform higher education was based on Turkic and Russian. Finally, however, Russian dominated the field at the expense of both Turkic and Arabic. It was authoritatively stated as early as 1930 that Turkic had already fulfilled its mission of 'diverting the attention of the masses from the Arab language'.³²

The triumph of the Russian language in Daghestan was not only due to the need of a lingua franca in a multi-national territory; it was also a tribute to the outstanding role which the Russians played in the central administration of the Daghestan A.S.S.R. In the inter-war period the recruitment of Daghestani mountaineers into administrative jobs had hardly made any progress at all. In 1927 the percentage of the Daghestani employed at the headquarters of the Daghestan Government was 21.6 per cent; in 1929 it was 25.3 per cent and in 1936, 20 per cent only.³³ It is not altogether the fault of the régime if it failed to recruit civil servants from among the mountain people. The mountaineers were more interested in exercising self-government over their villages than in going to the towns of the plain to administer their villages from there. The two most important towns of Daghestan, Makhach Kala (previously

* The Taty speak an Iranian language. In Daghestan they are largely identical with the so-called 'Mountain Jews'. According to the 1926 census there were 11,484 of such 'Mountain Jews' in Daghestan and 10,270 in Azerbaïdzhân. The returns are hardly correct as far as Daghestan is concerned, where the census took place at a time when the 'Mountain Jews' were exposed to active persecution. In the year of the census the Jews sent a delegation to Moscow to complain about their plight. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee dispatched an 'instructor' to investigate the situation. He reported to Moscow: (1) anti-semitic excesses, even murders, were not punished by the administration; (2) the cultural and medical services of the Taty were neglected and the central Government deceived by wrong information; (3) national minority rights of the Taty were not observed in the local Soviets; (4) Taty were not accepted as workers in state enterprises; and (5) lower administrative organs were rude in their behaviour towards the Taty. The situation did not improve after the instructor had left Daghestan and the conditions in which the Taty found themselves remained for a while what a Jewish communist author described as a 'political scandal'.³¹

Petrovsk) and Buinaksk (previously Temir-Khan-Shura) are now called after Daghestani communists, but for that reason they have not become closer to the hearts of the Daghestani, nor are they likely to have changed their racial composition in which the Russian-Ukrainian elements used to prevail. The last available figure referring to 1924 showed that 55 per cent of the inhabitants of Makhach Kala are Slavs while Russians alone form three-fifths of the population of Buinaksk.

DAGHESTANI LITERATURE

The language problem which is also the problem of Daghestani's culture is still unsettled. Even if Russian civilization triumphs there will still remain the cultural heritage of the past, which is an Arabic heritage. Soviet cultural workers are fully conscious of this complication and are trying to solve it in a 'dialectical' way. They cannot ignore the literary documents which the peoples of Daghestan produced in Arabic during the past centuries, but they have tried to deny the existence of a cultural interdependence between the mountaineers and the Arabic Moslem world. The Arabic literary documents of Daghestan are now simply classified as 'Daghestani literature', and the fact that they were written in Arabic is just an unimportant coincidence. The Arabic heritage is still an important foundation stone for cultural activities in Daghestan. The national poet of Soviet Daghestan, Gamzat Tsadasa (1874–1951), a former Mullah, would probably not have embarked on a literary career had he not been under the spell of Arab poetry from his earliest youth. Even an official Soviet publication had to admit that a small library of ancient Arabic texts was one of Tsadasa's most treasured possessions.³⁴ The Soviet authorities were compelled to overlook Tsadasa's 'Arabomania' as long as he wrote poems in praise of Stalin and the Bolshevik régime.

Tsadasa was the second national poet of Daghestan. The first was Suleiman Stalsky (1869–1937). He, like Samursky, was a Lezghian, and it is not unlikely that this 'enemy of the people' was the first to discover him. Stalsky was built up into one of the most outstanding poets of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. His poems were translated into many languages of the Soviet Union. To a remarkable degree they were always well-informed as to the official propaganda needs of the moment. At one stage Stalsky's poems attacked the 'kulaks' and hailed collectivization; then they boosted the Stakhanov movement; finally, they exposed the deviationists and bourgeois nationalists – always at the right time. This was the more amazing as Stalsky lived, according to an official biography, in considerable retirement in a mountain village and was unable to get any first-hand information on political matters. Stalsky was illiterate and no 'original version' of his

works existed. His poems were taken down by people among the audience while he recited them. Maxim Gorky took Stalsky under his wing and described him a 'Homer of the twentieth century'.³⁵ This well-meaning but somewhat exaggerated tribute was often quoted in the Soviet Union, particularly by the Daghestani themselves, among whom it provoked a certain nationalist conceit. If we have produced a Homer, the young Daghestani Soviet intellectuals argued, we have made an outstanding contribution towards Soviet literature and are entitled to the respect of the Russians themselves. Finally, the Daghestani had to be told that their pride was based on a misunderstanding, since Gorky did not mean to put Homer and Stalsky on the same level, but his comparison only referred to the way in which Stalsky's works were produced.³⁶ Stalsky's works are still reprinted in Russia, although some of his poems in which he denounced the Russian conquest of the Caucasus are no longer in harmony with the new Soviet patriotic ideology.

Both Stalsky and Tsadasa are poets of the past even if the subjects of their poetry are Stalin and the Five Year Plans. The poet of the future is Effendi Kapiyev. He belongs to the young generation of Daghestan, is a product of the Soviet school, and no longer believes in the romanticism of the *aul*. His homeland is no longer Daghestan but the whole Soviet Union and his language no longer a Daghestani idiom but Russian. The effects of Soviet education on Kapiyev can be gathered from his own words in praise of the Russian language which are included in his novel *The Poet*:

'Oh thou, great Russian tongue, I kneel before thee. Adopt me and give me thy blessing . . . I belong to a very small people lost in the mountains but I find thee and I am no more an orphan. Without thee there was and is no future, with thee we are truly omnipotent'.³⁷

These words represent an extreme example of the spirit which the Soviet régime is trying to implant into all non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R.

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VIII

TRANSCAUCASIA

TRANSCAUCASIA AND RUSSIAN HISTORY

Russia swept beyond the Caucasus and established her rule in Transcaucasia decades before the peoples of the Caucasus mountains themselves were fully pacified and subjected to Russian rule.

The benefit which Russia derived from taking possession of Transcaucasia is similar to that gained by an upstart ruler through an alliance with a princess of royal blood: namely, making his own a tradition in which he had been lacking.

By becoming linked with Armenian history, for instance, Russian history established a link with antiquity, with ancient Egypt, Assyria and Persia, with Alexander the Great and, finally, with the Roman Empire. Soviet historians indeed proudly recall that it was the Armenians, 'a people of the Soviet Union', who, under the leadership of their king, Tigran the Great, had defeated the 'invincible Roman legions' of Lucullus and this fact could not be altered even if at a later stage Armenia did become a vassal kingdom whose rulers were given the title of 'friend of the Roman Empire'.¹

Both Armenians and Georgians had their written alphabets more than 1,000 years before the introduction of the Cyrillic script on which the Russian alphabet was ultimately based. The latest discoveries of Soviet scholars have even led to the assumption that the Georgian alphabet originated not later than the seventh century before Jesus Christ.

It is true that the history of the peoples of Russian Central Asia, which was annexed half a century later than Transcaucasia, also goes back to antiquity. However, by incorporating the Georgian and Armenian lands Russia was able to put to her credit not only general historic traditions, as in the case of Central Asia, but also an ancient Christian tradition. Both the Georgians and the Armenians had been converted to Christendom at the beginning of the fourth century, i.e. earlier than most of the peoples in the Occident and about 700 years before the conversion of the Russians.

In annexing Western and Central Transcaucasia the Russians had the proud satisfaction of having brought safely into the orbit of Christian civilization two peoples who for many centuries had been exposed to

permanent and violent pressure and persecution, on the part of Oriental, non-Christian powers. The Russians avenged the sufferings and hardships which both Armenians and Georgians had endured from Turkish and Persian overlords. Although the primary motives of the Russians were hardly of an exclusively humanitarian nature they could claim, with some justification, that they acted in Georgia and Armenia as a protecting rather than as a colonial power.

The case of Azerbaidzhan, which covers Eastern Transcaucasia, is altogether different; unlike the Georgian and Armenian 'protectorates' that country has more the character of a colony. Azerbaidzhan is, indeed, the only part of Transcaucasia where Russian colonization has been conducted on a large scale.

In Western Transcaucasia the influx of Russian elements has always remained insignificant even if Russian cultural influences are promoted there as strongly as anywhere else in the Soviet Union. The two principal peoples of Western Transcaucasia, the Georgians and Armenians, enjoy a special privileged position. They are expected to encourage Russian state interests in their area, as it were, by their own initiative, but without visible interference by Russian colonists who in other Soviet Republics occupy commanding posts in cultural and economic life.

Nominally, Georgia and Armenia have the same status as Kirghizistan or Uzbekistan, but their actual status is on a higher level. Georgia is the only Soviet Republic, apart from the R.S.F.S.R., forming a miniature federation which includes two Autonomous Republics and one Autonomous Province. Thus the Georgians exercise within the framework of the Soviet constitution a certain guardianship over other peoples, a role which the Russians claim for themselves practically everywhere else in the Soviet Union. Armenia again is not only the State of the Armenians within the Soviet Union but also the spiritual home of the Armenian people scattered all over the globe.

TRANSCAUCASIA AND RUSSIAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Politically and strategically the whole of Transcaucasia forms a Russian wedge driven into the Middle East which has every possible chance of expanding. Lermontov seems to have felt the tremendous implications which the submission of the Caucasus mountains to Russian rule may have for both Russia and the peoples of the East. He may have had a premonition that the conquest of the Caucasus would open a new chapter in the history of many lands situated to the South of the great mountain system. In Lermontov's prophetic poem 'Dispute', two Caucasus mountains, Kazbek and Shat, talk to each other. Shat warns Kazbek of the 'powerful East crowded with people', but he fails to

impress Kazbek who looks far to the South and South-East where he sees only dreaming, sleeping, almost lifeless peoples, countries and cities:

Wreathed in hookah-clouds, inclining
To a gay divan,
By a fountain's pearly playing
Slumbers Teheran.

Here, beneath the Holy City,
Wasted by God's hand,
Wordless, wearisome, unwaking,
Lies a barren land.

There, through regions shunned by shadow,
Flows the yellow Nile,
Lapping at the sun-scorched soaring
Of each kingly pile.

Bedouin forgets his forays
On his tented bed,
Singing, as the stars he numbers,
Deeds of men long dead.

Seeing all this, Kazbek confidently exclaims: 'No, the old ramshackle East shall not conquer me!' But then Kazbek turns to the North and there he beholds a vast army, a moving torrent rolling towards the Caucasus. Overwhelmed by this formidable spectacle Kazbek becomes silent for ever after.

Lermontov did not say in his poem what happened after that, but the conclusion is near at hand: the army – the Russian army – not satisfied with the possession of the subdued Kazbek and its 'fellow-mountains', walked down the Caucasus slopes. Once on the other side of the Caucasus range it would become possible for the army to penetrate into the 'sleeping world' of the East and reach Teheran, the Bedouins, Jerusalem and perhaps, one day, even the Nile. As other powers guarded the sleep of the Eastern peoples Russia made but limited use of the vast potentialities which the Transcaucasian bridge-head might have offered.

Looking towards the East from the oil-wells of Baku in our time, our eyes behold a somewhat different view from the one seen by Lermontov in 1841; a disciplined, strong and self-conscious Turkey; further on the new Israel, a modern Western State in the Middle East; and also the up-to-date installations of British and American oil companies. This, however, is but one side of the picture, for the most characteristic

feature of the Middle Eastern scene is still the existence of backward countries far inferior in strength to Russia; and if she wanted to exploit this discrepancy to her advantage she would have weapons of another nature at her disposal than those which conquered the Caucasus.

The economic strength of Soviet Transcaucasia, the unsettled social and nationality problems of the Middle East, the military weakness of most Middle Eastern nations – all this would favour Russia if she wanted to shift her borders towards the South, to enlarge the Transcaucasian bridgehead. In this political-strategic operation each of the three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics has certain clearly defined tasks to perform and each of them is, indeed, conserving a great deal of energy in order to be able to shoulder them.

The dynamic force inherent in any potential political-strategic action centring around Soviet Transcaucasia can only be rightly measured by taking into account the personality of the Caucasian Stalin and his particular interest in the three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics. Not only was Stalin born in Transcaucasia, not only did he start his political career there, but he has a more intimate knowledge of the problems of the three Transcaucasian nations than of any other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. From his extensive personal experience Stalin can guide the action of the Transcaucasian communists with a surer hand than that of any other sub-section of the All-Union Communist Party. In Transcaucasia more than anywhere else, Stalin knows how far to go in claims concerning neighbouring areas, which arguments to use to cover up his plans, where to stop and when to retreat. Stalin attracted Lenin's attention first as an expert on nationality problems, more precisely as an expert on nationality problems of the Caucasus; and it would seem that later on Stalin simply projected on the whole of Russia and Europe the experience gathered in Transcaucasia in the field of nationality and minority problems.

Certainly some genuine spontaneous manifestations of national aspirations in Transcaucasia would have flared up under any political régime and are not just 'Soviet made'. These aspirations would not, however, have been allowed to express themselves had they not obtained the approval of the Kremlin. As a matter of fact the Kremlin has not only given its blessing to the struggle for Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaidzhani aspirations, but it is even leading it, thus preventing local Transcaucasian nationalism from getting out of control.

The Kremlin knows that Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaidzhani national claims are dynamite which has to be handled with great care if it is to blow up the right things at the right time. The timing of the action cannot be left in the hands of the local rulers of Erevan, Tiflis and Baku, but has to be determined in the light of higher considerations which are the exclusive domain of the central Government in Moscow.

I. ARMENIANS

The Armenian problem constitutes perhaps the most powerful brand of dynamite which the Soviet Union has in store in Transcaucasia for action in the Middle East. Almost their entire history had prepared the Armenians for the role which they had already played in the Czarist Russian Empire and which they are called upon to carry on in Soviet Russia. This role of the Armenians consisted in serving Russia in many different ways, in working for her material prosperity and consolidating and extending the power of the Russian Empire along one of its most important border marches.

The Armenian poet, Ovanes Tumanyan, has said that Armenia's sorrow was a shoreless sea. Indeed, the long history of Armenian adventures and sufferings almost recalls that of the Jews. Both Armenians and Jews are peoples whose sons, by force of circumstances, have had to live scattered over many lands in alien surroundings exposed to the hatred and contempt of their environment. Just like the Jews, the Armenians have displayed great pride in their nationality and religion which has only served to increase the animosity of the outside world against them.

The decisive fact in the life of the Armenian people was the early loss of their national independence. This independence ended in Armenia proper – the Caucasian Armenia – in 1080 when the country fell under Turkish and Byzantine rule. The 'Little Armenia' which the remnants of the Caucasian Armenian population had established on the Mediterranean coast in Cilicia was subjugated by the Turks in 1376.

The downfall of the two Armenias was followed by great waves of emigration. Thousands of Armenian refugees poured into Cyprus, Rhodes, Smyrna, Constantinople, Italy and France. Being a people who belonged to the Orient as well as to the Occident, the Armenians also went to the East, in that case, however, not as refugees but as merchants, their economic interests and abilities prompting them to leave their small mountain country and seek their fortunes abroad. The Persian Shah, Abbas the Great (1587–1629), took the Armenians under his protection, allowed them to establish a prosperous merchant colony at Ispahan and also used them to develop Persian trade in India. Thus Armenian merchants settled in Madras, Bombay and Ceylon and contributed largely towards the development of Calcutta as a great trading centre. From India the Armenian colonies spread further to the Far East, particularly to Nanking and Canton.²

FIRST RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN CONTACTS

Contacts between the Armenians and Russia had started long before their national independence came to an end. Russian-Armenian relations are, indeed, almost as old as the Russian State. The first reference to the Armenians in Russian chronicles goes back to 1062, when the Grand Duke of Kiev invited Armenians to participate in a war against the Poles. Those Armenians who followed the appeal were allowed to settle permanently in Kiev and to have their own Armenian church in that city.³

From 1626 onwards Armenian traders began to play a part in Russian trade with the Orient, in particular with Persia. In the initial stage they served individually and informally as intermediaries between Russia and the East. A more organized Russian-Armenian co-operation began in 1667 when Czar Alexey Mikhailovich concluded an agreement with the Armenian Company in Ispahan. This agreement coincided with a turning-point in Russian history. It was approximately from 1667 that the Turkish problem became a predominant factor in Russian foreign policy. In that year Russia had signed with Poland a peace treaty rendering that 'hereditary enemy' innocuous and permitting the Czar to concentrate his attention on Turkey. The agreement with the Armenian Company resulting in a diversion of Persian trade, particularly of Persian silk exports, from Turkey to Russia, was thus a link in the anti-Turkish policy pursued by the Czar.⁴

Under Peter the Great, Russia inaugurated a more coherent and systematic 'Armenian policy'. An Armenian, Israel Orii, was the first ambassador to be sent by Peter to the Persian court of Ispahan (1708). In Peter's name, Orii promised the Armenians in Persia that Russia would liberate them from the 'Persian yoke'.⁵ A few years later, in 1716, Peter sent Artem Volynsky, one of his most able collaborators, as ambassador to Persia, entrusting him with the mission of extending trade with that country and also with collecting detailed information about the Armenians and other Christian subjects of the Persian Shah. The most decisive step in Peter's 'Armenian policy' was a manifesto which the Czar issued in 1723 inviting the Armenians of Turkey and Persia to come to Russia where they would enjoy special privileges.

Following Peter's manifesto, Armenians poured into Russia throughout the eighteenth century, not only as traders but as pioneer settlers opening up new territories. Thus Armenians became the economic backbone of the North Caucasus region after its conquest by the Russians. Hard-working Armenian settlers introduced the cultivation of the vine and the silkworm and provided the new Russian towns in

the North Caucasus region such as Kizlyar, Mozdok, Stavropol, Vladikavkaz and Armavir with the economically most valuable of their inhabitants.

By the annexation of the Crimea in 1783 another Armenian colony came under Russian rule. At an early stage in their diaspora, Armenians had gone to the South-Eastern Crimean coastal areas in such large numbers that some writers of the fourteenth century described the shore of the Crimea as 'Maritime Armenia'. In the town of Feodosia a substantial part of the population remained Armenian until the twentieth century. Feodosia's most famous son, the great painter of the Russian sea, I. K. Aivazovsky, was the offspring of an Armenian family.

Armenians from the Crimea, while still living under Tartar rule, emigrated in 1773 to the mouth of the Don where they founded, opposite Rostov, the town of Nakhichevan. The new place bore the same name as an ancient town in Armenia proper which, popular legends said, Noah himself built after having left the Ark.

RUSSIA - 'PROTECTOR' OF ARMENIANS

The year 1828 in which Russia and Persia signed the treaty of Turkmanchai brought the Armenian people finally into the Russian orbit. By that treaty Persia ceded to Russia the area which corresponds roughly to the present Armenian Soviet Republic. Erevan, to-day the capital of the Armenian S.S.R., as well as the authentic Nakhichevan and Echmiadzin, the residence of the Catholicos (the head of the Armenian Church), became Russian.

As a consequence of the wars with Persia and Turkey which both ended in 1828, about 100,000 Armenians left the two Moslem countries and settled in the new 'Armenian Province' ('oblast') of the Russian Empire which was formed out of the territories annexed from Persia. About 65,000 Armenians came from Eastern Turkey and 40,000 from Persian Azerbaidzhan while a few hundred families went from the Turkish-controlled Balkans to Russian Bessarabia where a new Armenian centre emerged.

After 1828 Russia fought no further wars against Persia, but the fight against Turkey continued. The Armenian problem was one of the weapons to be used in this fight, particularly during and after the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78 when Russian troops succeeded in occupying practically all parts of Eastern Anatolia inhabited by Armenians. The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 put a brake on the territorial ambitions of the Russian Empire which was allowed to annex only the Sandjak of Kars. Many thousands of Armenians remained under Turkish rule. The Treaty of Berlin included a minority protection clause, but no sanctions were provided against its violation.

Instead of bringing liberation to the Armenians of Turkey, the 1877-78 war proved to be the prelude to a new martyrdom of the Armenian people. The welcome which the Armenians of Turkey had extended to the Russian troops and the insistence with which Russia had protected Armenian national interests led directly to the mass slaughtering of Armenians at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. According to Armenian sources more than 1,000,000 Armenians either perished in the savage massacres under Sultan Abdul Hamid or else were exterminated in a more organized way under the régime of the 'Young Turks' during the First World War. Up to Hitler's mass destruction of the Jews, the extermination of the Armenians during the last years of the Ottoman Empire could be considered as the most barbarous crime against humanity committed in modern times. Adult Armenians were shot or burnt alive, children were converted to Islam by force, many of the victims died on their way to the places of banishment in Mesopotamia to which they were being driven from their homes in Turkish Armenia. The luckiest ones were those able to escape abroad at the price of losing all their property.

The unhappy Armenian people who, for reasons of religious affinity, had opted for Christian Russia as the lesser evil, should not be burdened with the reproach of having provoked the massacres, but the unscrupulous policy of the Czarist Government has a share of responsibility. Bolshevik critics in the post-revolutionary period ruthlessly exposed the 'Armenian policy' of Czarist Russia, but such criticism is now no longer popular in the Soviet Union. It is no longer fashionable to recall in Soviet publications that at the time of the worst massacres in the nineties of the last century official Russia categorically refused any intervention in favour of the Armenians. It was only on the eve of the First World War that the Czarist authorities remembered the important role the Armenians could perform for Russia as an auxiliary force in the enemy's rear. On October 10th, 1912, one of the last Russian Viceroys of the Caucasus, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, advised the Czar Nicholas II to revert to an active 'Armenian policy.' 'An open intervention for the protection of the Turkish Armenians', he wrote in a report, 'is essential, particularly in the present time . . . to prepare beforehand a sympathetic population in those localities which as things are at present may easily find themselves willingly or unwillingly within the sphere of our military operations'.⁶

THE ARMENIAN S.S.R.

Soviet Russia, even more than the Czarist régime, subordinated the Armenian problem to its general Middle East policy. The Soviet Government supported the Armenian cause whenever it suited its general

political strategy, but it never allowed the Armenian factor to interfere when 'higher considerations' were at stake.

The first statement which young Soviet Russia issued on the Armenian question was an unconditional recognition of Armenian self-determination. The document in question was the Decree on Turkish Armenia of December 1917, and referred to the Turkish territories which the Russian army had occupied in the First World War. The decree called for a 'free plebiscite' of the Armenian people, evacuation of all foreign troops from Turkish Armenia, the formation of an Armenian Peoples Militia and return of all Armenian refugees to their homeland in Eastern Anatolia. The Soviet Government even pledged itself to demand in the peace treaty with Turkey the repatriation of those Armenian refugees whom the Turkish authorities had deported during the war.

The emergence of Kemal Pasha's anti-imperialist national liberation movement changed the whole aspect of Soviet Russia's Armenian policy. The Kemalist revolution was, from the Soviet point of view, a gigantic diversion leading to the consolidation of the Soviet régime in general and to the stabilization of Bolshevik rule in the Caucasus in particular. The national minorities of Anatolia, including the Armenians, had to pay the price of Soviet-Kemalist friendship. There could be no question of Soviet Russia insisting on justice being done to the Armenians of 'Turkish Armenia'. The Soviet régime thus put the Armenian question into cold storage for many years as far as its international aspects were concerned. It had, however, its own Armenian problem to settle. This 'settlement' consisted in Bolshevism defeating the 'Dashnaks', the great Armenian national movement of Western orientation, in depriving the Armenians, essentially a people of shopkeepers and merchants, of their wealth and in granting them in exchange an autonomous administration having the semblance of a State.

The Armenian Soviet Republic became the smallest of the 'States' of Transcaucasia, much too small for the liking of Armenian nationalists who complained that the Armenian Soviet Republic covered but a tiny corner of 11,600 square miles out of the total of 75,000 square miles of Transcaucasia. They claimed that the 'real' Armenia within the U.S.S.R. was over 25,000 square miles in extent. Indeed, more than 600,000 Armenians continued to live in Azerbaidzhan and Georgia.

From a geographical point of view little Soviet Armenia had a rather artificial construction and had not the advantage of being a river State like Georgia of which a large part is situated in the Rion valley, or like Azerbaidzhan which roughly covers the basin of the Kura river. The frontiers of Armenia were drawn in such a way as to satisfy the arch-enemy of the Armenians - Turkey. The Soviet-Turkish treaties concluded in 1921 at Moscow and Kars pledged Soviet Russia to exclude an area of 2,100 square miles from Armenia and to put it under the

'protectorate' of the Azerbaidzhan Soviet Republic. This area which the Soviet Government had originally promised to the Armenians became known under the name of A.S.S.R. of Nakhichevan. It has a predominantly Turkic population, but is completely surrounded by Armenian territory. It would have been a more equitable solution if Nakhichevan had been granted the status of an Autonomous Province or an Autonomous Republic within the framework of Armenia. On Turkey's insistence, however, the territory had to become part of Azerbaidzhan.⁷

While Nakhichevan was handed over to Azerbaidzhan, an Armenian area of about the same size was not permitted to join Soviet Armenia for the reason that it belonged to Azerbaidzhan economically. This area – the mountain region of Karabakh – has the status of an Autonomous Province and is thus placed in an inferior position to that of Nakhichevan. The Autonomous Province covers 1,700 square miles and has 150,000 inhabitants of whom 90 per cent are Armenians. It is separated from Armenia proper by a small slice of sparsely populated Azerbaidzhanian mountain territory.

The Soviet central Government seemed to consider that the Christian Armenians to whom fate had never been kind in the past and who had been preserved from further extermination by the Russians, should be content with whatever the Russians chose to offer them, while a Moslem people, like the Azerbaidzhani Turks, had to be won over by concessions.

However small in size, the Armenian S.S.R. was an extremely important creation of Soviet nationalities policy. Even at the height of Soviet-Turkish friendship the mere existence of a Soviet Armenia was a threat which Soviet Russia kept in reserve if ever the Turkish Republic should take an anti-Soviet course. No Russian or Armenian communist mentioned the problem of Turkish Armenia during the inter-war period, but it was not forgotten and the coat of arms of the Armenian S.S.R. was a constant reminder that the last word of the Armenian question had not been spoken. In addition to hammer, sickle and Soviet star, this coat of arms shows the Ararat Mountain which lies inside Turkish territory.

ARMENIAN DIASPORA AND SOVIET REPATRIATION POLICY

In 1939 the total Armenian population of the Soviet Union amounted to 2,151,000 of which only 1,281,000 lived in Soviet Armenia. Only 65,000 Armenians are left in Turkey, according to official Turkish statistics, most of them living in Istanbul. There is, however, a third group of Armenians in whom Soviet propaganda had always been particularly interested – that Armenian diaspora scattered all over the

world. On the eve of the Second World War these Armenians were distributed as follows:

United States and Canada	200,000
Syria and Lebanon	175,000
Iran	100,000
France	75,000
Rumania	40,000
Bulgaria	30,000
Greece	30,000
Egypt	30,000
Argentina	20,000
Iraq	15,000
Brazil and Uruguay	10,000
Cyprus	4,000
India and Java	3,000
China	2,000
Ethiopia	1,000
Other countries	15,000 ⁸

In the inter-war period the Soviet Government showed little interest in the question of repatriating to Armenia even the communist elements of the Armenian emigration. It was preferable from the Soviet point of view to leave them on the spot. They were able to play a useful role, particularly in the Middle Eastern countries where there was little native proletariat and where the Communist parties were weak. A systematic repatriation on a large scale was only initiated when Russia started its cold war against Turkey in 1945 by raising simultaneously the problem of the Dardanelles and the question of 'Turkish Armenia'.

The legal basis for the repatriation policy were two decrees: one of November 1945, which provided for state subsidies and exemption from customs duties for all Armenians who wished to return to their homeland; the second, of July 1946, under the terms of which any Armenian repatriate became automatically a Soviet citizen on crossing the Soviet border. Families of repatriates were entitled to a long-term loan of 25,000 roubles if settling in villages and of 30,000 roubles if taking up residence in towns. Many Armenian refugees living abroad in precarious circumstances could rightly be expected to grasp the opportunity offered by the Soviet Governments of Moscow and Erevan and to return to Armenia. During the first year of the implementation of the repatriation scheme, in 1946, 50,000 Armenians went to the Armenian S.S.R. In 1947, however, the enthusiasm for repatriation had somehow cooled off. Instead of 60,000 Armenians as foreseen by the plan, only 35,000 came to the U.S.S.R.⁹ In and after 1948 the repatriation action petered out, presumably because of the unfavourable reports which the first repatriates had sent abroad to their kinsmen on their experiences in the Soviet Union.

The contingent of the first repatriation year included 20,000 Armenians from North-Western Persia. Many of them cannot be regarded as voluntary repatriates; they had compromised themselves for the Soviet cause when Russian troops were in occupation of Persian Azerbaidzhan and probably preferred to leave with the Red Army rather than to expose themselves to Persian reprisals. Indeed, quite a number of Armenians in Persian Azerbaidzhan who failed to join the repatriation action in time, seem to have been rounded up by the Persian authorities and transferred to Southern Persia.¹⁰

The organizers of the Soviet repatriation drive were particularly eager to get the largest possible number of children repatriates who, from a political point of view, would constitute a lesser problem for the Soviet authorities than adult immigrants. This attempt seems to have been crowned with success, since among the 85,000 Armenians repatriated in 1946 and 1947, there were over 16,700 children of school age alone. In the beginning the repatriated children were not permitted to mix with children born in the Armenian S.S.R. The segregation was partly due to language difficulties, for many repatriated children spoke little or no Armenian, and partly to political reasons. The repatriated children were kept together in eleven new specially established schools and in sixty-four new classes which had been added to schools already in existence.¹¹

To make even a partial success out of the repatriation scheme the Soviet Government badly needed the support of the Armenian Gregorian Church. The Government realized that a single appeal in favour of repatriation made by the Patriarch of Echmiadzin might be more effective than the most extensive official repatriation propaganda. The Patriarch, George VI, who is not less dependent on Soviet goodwill than the Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, could not help becoming the principal repatriation agent of the Soviet régime. Shortly before the repatriation action started, he invited Armenians all over the world to return to Soviet Armenia. He issued a further more pressing appeal as soon as the first hitches in the repatriation action became apparent. He not only appealed to, but actually threatened those who opposed the return to the old homeland. 'Whoever overtly or covertly opposes repatriation' the Patriarch said, 'willingly or unwillingly places himself outside the framework of the national and spiritual unity of the Armenian nation. With pain in our hearts we must mention those people, though few in number, in Armenian colonies abroad who have forgotten the bitter lessons of history, who are engaging in intrigues against the Soviet Government and are prepared to collaborate even with its enemies'.^{12*}

* Apart from assisting the official repatriation campaign the Patriarch also supported the policy of the Kremlin by issuing a sharp condemnation of the Vatican whose general line of conduct he described as being 'incompatible with the high aims of Christianity'.¹²

Even without the Armenian repatriates from the Middle East and the Balkans there were enough Armenians in the Soviet Union to staff industrial undertakings and scientific institutions in an area considerably larger than the present Armenian Soviet Republic. By inviting an ever increasing number of Armenians into the small Armenian mountain country, the Soviet Government was apparently pursuing the aim of building up a reserve force which one day might take charge of the neighbouring Turkish territories if they should be included in a Greater Armenia.

On the small territory of the Armenian S.S.R., the Soviet power was responsible for outstanding achievements, including the building of an Armenian capital, an impressive cultural, economic and political centre – Erevan – which no longer had need to look enviously towards Tiflis and Baku. Erevan had 200,000 inhabitants in 1939, but was supposed to house 450,000 people after the termination of the repatriation action. The second largest Armenian town, Leninakan, which is situated only a few miles from the Turkish border, is said to have grown at an ‘American pace’.¹⁴ Leninakan, founded as late as 1837 as the fortress of Alexandropol, is now the most important centre of textile industry in the whole of Transcaucasia.

The policy of industrializing Soviet Armenia to the utmost capacity and bringing as many Armenians as possible into the country was calculated to make more obvious the discrepancy between the Armenian Soviet Republic on the one hand and the sparsely populated and destitute eastern provinces of Turkey on the other. The density of population in Soviet Armenia between 1926 and 1939 rose from 29 to 43·6 people per square kilometre, and to about 47 in 1947, while the density of population in the seven provinces of ‘Turkish Armenia’ was 10·5 per square kilometre in 1933.

Soviet policy in Armenia endeavoured to bring about not only a concentration of manpower and of industrial potential on the Turkish border, but also a concentration of hatred. No efforts were needed on the part of the Soviet Government to achieve that objective. The memory of the massacres in Turkey is alive in Soviet Armenia. Many citizens of Soviet Armenia are themselves refugees from Turkey, many lost their parents and relatives in the massacres and every one of them has been told from his earliest youth about the sufferings of his people.

A small symbolical gesture shows better than anything else how much the past is overshadowing the present in Soviet Armenia. Near the Turkish border a new Armenian village called Zeitun was founded. There is hardly an Armenian in whom the very word ‘Zeitun’ does not call up the most painful associations. Zeitun was an Armenian mountain town in the Western Taurus, in Southern Anatolia, whose entire population the Ottoman authorities deported. Franz Werfel in his novel *The*

Forty Days of Musa Dagh gave an eloquent description of Zeitun's importance from the Armenian national point of view when he said: 'Zeitun had been a perpetual thorn in Turkish flesh. For the earth has both its holy places, its sites of pilgrimage, which frame the human mind to devotion, and its natural fortresses, redolent of hate and defiance, whose spirit is such as to arouse to seething point the blood of an opposing racial fanaticism. In Zeitun such hate had its definite reasons. . . .'¹⁵

And this Zeitun has re-emerged in the Soviet Union both as a warning to Turkey and as an encouragement to the Armenians, hundreds of thousands of whom eagerly await the moment when they may be called to cross the Soviet border into Turkish Armenia and to reoccupy the Kars Province, which was a Russian possession between 1878 and 1921.*

THE ROLE OF THE ARMENIANS IN THE SOVIET UNION

It would be wrong to consider the Soviet Armenians only as a pawn in a diplomatic, political and military game against Turkey. The Armenians fulfil important tasks inside the Soviet Union, too, and have gained the reputation of being uncommonly useful and versatile Soviet citizens.

The aptitude of the Armenians for foreign languages, for instance, has made a number of them eligible for diplomatic posts. One can find Armenians holding high office in various Soviet embassies and legations, and even among the delegates of the U.S.S.R. to the various United Nations bodies. The Soviet Government has also appreciated the commercial talent of the Armenians and has applied it in the service of the Soviet State, particularly by making an Armenian communist, Anastas Mikoyan, its foreign trade chief. It has also occurred to the Soviet authorities that, contrary to the views which prevailed in Czarist Russia, a people who traded all over the world ought to be able to supply good sailors as well. On this assumption the Red Fleet recruited large numbers of Armenians. The Armenian sailors succeeded in occupying the highest ranks in the Soviet naval hierarchy and distinguished themselves in all the seas in which Soviet vessels fought in the Second World

* The first period of Russian rule over Kars was a failure both from a Russian national and from an economic point of view. The conqueror of Kars during the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-8, Grand Duke Michael, suggested a large-scale Russian peasant colonization of that strategically vital area. This never materialized and the Kars Province, once a granary of Anatolia, declined economically. At the time of its annexation by the Russians the great majority of the population of the Kars Province were Moslems. Although 80,000 Moslems emigrated to Turkey proper during the first three years of Russian rule the province continued to have a Moslem majority throughout the nineties of the last century while the Armenians counted for less than a quarter of all inhabitants. Armenian, Greek and Russian colonists combined were unable to fill adequately the gaps resulting from the departure of the Moslems. Many fields remained untilled and many villages were completely deserted. The new settlers could not maintain the yield of the soil on the previous level and this led to a shortage of cereals in the province.¹⁶

War. Soviet propaganda has even endeavoured to create a naval 'mystique' among the Armenians by reminding them that their ancient State had possessed a sea-coast.¹⁷

As far as the Russian army is concerned, at any rate, the Armenians had a glorious tradition of long standing. At least five Armenian generals fought in the Napoleonic Wars, the most prominent of whom, Prince V. G. Madatov, won fame in 1813 during the recapture of Vilna from the French armies. In all the military campaigns against the Turks and the Persians, the Armenians supplied not only 'fifth-columnists' who secretly assisted Russia from beyond the border, but also gallant soldiers for the front line. As early as 1838 a Russian publication paid the following striking tribute to the military qualities of the Armenians: 'As faithful sons of a common mother and a common fatherland the Armenians have always shared the efforts and the glory of the victories of the Russian Army'.¹⁸ It was thus no surprise that the Armenian people provided sixty generals for the Soviet army in the Russian-German War of 1941-45.¹⁹ They included the only non-Slav general who became one of the top commanders of the Red Army, Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan.

Armenians also occupy an outstanding place in the Russian world of learning. Russia was in particular indebted to the Persian Armenian I. L. Lazarev, who in 1816 founded the famous Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in St. Petersburg, where hundreds of Russian experts on Asiatic affairs were educated. To-day scores of Armenian scholars are working in Soviet scientific institutes, among them the brothers A. I. Alikhanov and A. I. Alikhanyan, are researching into cosmic rays.

THE SURVIVAL OF ARMENIAN NATIONALISM

There is hardly another small people in the Soviet Union which has given to the old and the new Russia as much as have the Armenians. The Soviet régime, not content with using for its own ends the hands and brains of the Armenian people, seeks to capture their very soul, the soul of a people with a history stretching back over 4,000 years. The Kremlin is willing to concede to the Armenians the right to extol their historic past – but only to a certain extent. The Armenians are told that it is unnecessary and out of place to indulge in the glorification of any such distant historic epoch as the 'golden age' of Armenia, when the climax of Armenian national history can be found so near at hand, namely, in the foundation of the Armenian Soviet Republic.

This explains why, after the Second World War, certain Armenian scientific and literary works were put 'on the index' as expressions of 'bourgeois nationalism'. Not only have individual Armenian writers 'sinned', but the entire Union of Soviet Writers of Armenia, the depart-

ments of history, philosophy and literature of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, have been found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and deviations and criticized accordingly by the Armenian Communist Party leadership.²⁰

Thus there is ample evidence that the Armenians have been unable to accept the double-faced role which the Soviet Government has tried to assign to them. The Soviet régime, indeed, expected that the Armenians would be Armenian nationalists in their relations with the Turks and Persians, but, at the same time, good communists and Soviet patriots inside the Soviet boundaries. Whilst fulfilling the first part of the ideological assignment, the Armenians have remained largely nationalists inside the Soviet Union as well.

The Armenians feel the isolation which the communist régime imposed on the peoples of the U.S.S.R. much more than most other nationalities in view of their great traditions, the large number of their intellectuals and the extensive contacts which they used to keep up with the world at large. The repatriates who came to Soviet Armenia after the Second World War, were bound to find it particularly difficult to accept the totalitarian order ruling in the homeland of their race. Many of them had come from democratic or at least comparatively democratic surroundings. These repatriates have learned by their own experience that Russia offers to the Armenians security in a purely physical sense, but not the possibility of a genuine spiritual and national survival.

II. GEORGIANS

Not only are the Georgians neighbours of the Armenians but their history and area of settlement are so much intertwined with those of the Armenians that it is often impossible to say where Georgian history begins and Armenian history ends. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this that the historic destiny of the two peoples was in any way identical. The Georgians, though they had suffered a great deal, did not bear the cross of a 'chosen people' – they led nominally an independent religious existence but had no special dogmas of their own such as brought about the isolation of the Armenian Church from the rest of the Christian world.

'GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN BROTHERHOOD'

Georgia was less exposed to foreign invaders than Armenia partly because the Armenians frequently played the part of the shield which protected the Georgians. Although Georgians and Armenians often became simultaneously victims of aggression, there were other cases when Armenians were subjugated, but Georgians spared. The precarious role of a small Christian people which, for geographical reasons, was at

the mercy of Moslem powers soon suggested to the Georgians the path of seeking an alliance with Russia. The desire for such an alliance was expressed for the first time as early as 1587 when a Georgian prince, Alexander of Kakhetia, asked the son of Ivan the Terrible, Fyodor, to accept the overlordship of the whole of Georgia. Subsequently, attempts of Georgian princes to get the Russian Czars interested in their country never ceased. Deputations of the Georgian principalities were repeatedly going to Moscow to ask for Russian assistance against Persia. However divided on other issues the Georgian principalities – Kakhetia, Kartli, Mingrelia, etc. – always showed a considerable degree of unity in their positive attitude towards Russia.

Peter the Great was the first Russian ruler to conclude a formal alliance with a Georgian king, namely with Wachtang VI, ruler of Kakhetia, Eastern Georgia, for his time a very progressive personality, author of law books and founder of the first printing works in Tiflis. The Peter-Wachtang alliance is part of the history of the first Russo-Persian War of 1722–25, an undeclared war in which Peter occupied Persian provinces without ever breaking off diplomatic relations with Persia. After some initial successes the Persian expedition had to be discontinued, partly because Georgian assistance proved to be less effective than Peter had hoped for. Wachtang, and many other Georgians, who had compromised themselves for Russia's cause were offered sanctuary in Moscow. These Georgian exiles and their descendents, as individuals, played a distinguished part in Russian history by embracing military and diplomatic careers. At the same time they continued to contribute to the development of Georgian national culture and published books in their mother-tongue.

The actual establishment of Russian overlordship over Georgia was also due to the initiative of the Georgians themselves. Georgia became a Russian protectorate in 1783 by a treaty concluded between Catherine II and the King of Kakhetia, Irakli II. The Georgian King who let the Russians enter his realm and sign the death-warrant of the independent Georgian State, was by no means a weak or degenerate ruler who betrayed his country for personal advantages. He was one of the ablest kings Georgia had ever had. In signing the treaty he was guided by a deep understanding of Georgian history and acted under no external compulsion whatsoever. Since he was not only a gifted statesman, but also a brilliant military commander, he succeeded in making the end of Georgian independence not a source of humiliation and grief for the generations to come, but a matter of heroism and glory which inspired a great many of the writers and poets which Georgia had brought forth in the course of the nineteenth century. The treaty with Irakli paved the way for the manifesto of September 12th, 1801, about the incorporation of Eastern Georgia into the Russian Empire which Czar Alexander I

signed only after some hesitation. This manifesto marked the actual beginning of a determined Russian Transcaucasian policy.

A large number of Russian revolutionaries came to Georgia immediately after its annexation and spread their influence among the Georgian intelligentsia. Quite a number of these aristocratic Russian revolutionaries, who later participated in the December rising of 1825, served on the staff headquarters of the Caucasian Army Corps under General Yermolov, the uncrowned king of Georgia between 1816 and 1827. Recent Soviet historical writers have emphasized Yermolov's progressive trend of thought and have given him credit for many positive things achieved in Georgia under his proconsulate. Thus the first Georgian newspaper was published in Tiflis under Yermolov in 1819, which was the more remarkable since there existed then but three provincial newspapers in the whole of the Russian Empire, namely in Kharkov, Kazan and Astrakhan.²¹

All these historical facts constitute the basis of that concept of Georgian-Russian brotherhood which contributed to the formation of the political personality of Stalin perhaps as much as Marxist-Leninist theory. The encouragement which Stalin, the Georgian, gave to Russian nationalism, the demonstrative tribute which he paid to the Great Russian nation can only be understood if the Russian-Georgian associations in the past are taken into account. From the point of view of Stalin and of the Soviet régime, the historic Russian-Georgian brotherhood offers an excellent argument for the thesis that the Georgians ought willingly to accept dependence on Moscow.

That, however, is not the conclusion which Georgian nationalists might wish to draw from Georgian history. Without denying that Christian Russia played the role of Georgia's protector against such mighty oriental powers as Persia and the Ottoman Empire, they might consider that this protection has come to an end. Indeed, no powerful Shah or Sultan is likely to threaten the Georgian State in future, or try to Islamize it. Nor can gratitude for the beneficial effects of Russian culture on Georgia during the nineteenth century in any way interfere with Georgia's political orientation in the twentieth century. Georgian nationalists can only too easily make the point that classical Georgian literature borrowed a great deal from Persian literature, without the Georgians having ever felt any debt of gratitude towards Persia for that reason.

For the Georgian nationalists who tried to build up an independent Georgian State after the Russian October Revolution, neither Istanbul nor Teheran was the real danger, but communist Moscow.

MENSHEVISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM

Georgia was for Stalin not only the homeland where his first political notions were formed, but also the scene of those of his political triumphs which had been the most difficult to achieve. The saying that a prophet has no honour in his own country applies fully to Stalin.

Stalin's attitude towards Tiflis is in many ways comparable to Hitler's attitude towards Vienna. Hitler disliked Vienna because he considered that city was not sufficiently German and too polyglot. Stalin hated Tiflis because of its petty bourgeois atmosphere and the absence of sharp class conflicts. Vienna offered no scope to Hitler and forced him to seek his luck in Germany. For Stalin, Tiflis was tantamount to failure. In Tiflis Stalin found a strongly developed Georgian nationalism preventing the unfolding of an internationalist revolutionary working-class movement such as Bolshevism wanted to be at the beginning of the century. Having recognized that Tiflis and the whole of Georgia were a rather hopeless ground for his activities Stalin left the field to the Georgian Mensheviks, a popular socialist party with deep roots in the national traditions. He went to Baku, which became the capital of the Transcaucasian revolutionary movement.

The day of revenge came. Just as Hitler entered Vienna as conqueror on March 12th, 1938, Stalin entered Tiflis in the middle of July 1921 not as a Georgian, but as the representative of the Moscow central power. For three years little Georgia had succeeded in keeping outside Soviet control. From the Russian October Revolution onwards until the proclamation of the Georgian Soviet Republic on February 25th, 1921, Georgia was not just a little recalcitrant Caucasus Republic, a 'Menshevik Vendée' braving Bolshevik Moscow, but the symbol of the struggle between World Bolshevism and international Social Democracy. Social Democrats of Western Europe looked with hope and almost with pride towards Georgia. The leaders of the Second International went to Tiflis and returned to their respective countries greatly impressed by the achievements of the Georgian Menshevik Government. The chief theoretician of Social Democracy, Karl Kautsky, wrote an enthusiastic book, *Georgia – a Social Democratic Peasant Republic*, and the Belgian socialist leader Emile Vandervelde contributed a preface to a book on democratic Georgia by the Menshevik, Vladimir Voytinsky. Social democrats throughout the world seemed to indulge in a secret wish that small Menshevik Georgia would make a better case for socialism than large Bolshevik Russia. Social democrats also expected Georgia to demonstrate that the relationship between peasants and workers could be solved more satisfactorily by democratic means than by establishing the Bolshevik hegemony of the city proletariat over the rural

population. In short, Tiflis was designated to avenge the defeat which democratic socialism had suffered in Petrograd and Moscow.

The liquidation by military action of Menshevik Georgia under these circumstances became a vital necessity from the point of view of the Bolshevik leaders. By establishing Soviet power in Georgia they attained several aims simultaneously. In Russia proper Bolshevik prestige was greatly enhanced by the fact that a province of the Czarist Empire had been recovered. The British Empire was embarrassed by Russia's enlargement of her access to the Middle East. More important than all this was the blow inflicted by the young Soviet State on 'World Menshevism', which led to a strengthening of the Russian grip on certain sections of the working-class of Western Europe.

STALIN'S FIGHT AGAINST 'NATIONAL' BOLSHEVISM

The proclamation of the Georgian Soviet Republic was a victory for Bolshevism, but, as yet, not for Stalin personally, since the original leaders of the Georgian Communist Party were hostile to Stalin and to his views on Georgia's future within the framework of the Soviet Union. Those Georgian Bolsheviks who took over the Tiflis Government after the collapse of Menshevik rule considered Stalin as a kind of renegade, because he had completely stripped himself of any Georgian national feeling and was determined to uphold against the Georgians the interests of the central power, which were ultimately Russian interests. Knowing his Georgian compatriots, Stalin feared that even the Georgian communists would strive for a measure of independence detrimental to Soviet centralism. He felt that the Georgian people with its strong historical state traditions and occupying the largest single territory of Soviet Transcaucasia needed to be more thoroughly watched than the Armenians or the Azerbaidzhani Turks.

It was always Stalin who insisted on curtailing the powers of the Georgian Bolsheviks while Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders of the early period were prepared to grant them far-reaching freedom within the Soviet framework. It was also Stalin's idea to press the Georgians into a Transcaucasian Soviet Federation in order to keep them better under control. Such a Transcaucasian Federation might have been a commendable solution for a *rapprochement* between Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaidzhani Turks; it might have even become a means for creating a united front of the three peoples against Moscow centralism. Stalin's intervention, however, brought a different sort of federation into being. For Stalin, federation was no end in itself, but just a temporary instrument of Soviet policy to be cast aside after its aim had been achieved. At a time when Soviet centralism was not strong enough to rule Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaidzhanis from

Moscow, the Transcaucasian Federation was an intermediate agency by which the national sovereignty of the three republics could be limited. The cabinet of the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R. included ministers for agriculture, home affairs, home trade, finance, and local industry as well as the Chairman of the Transcaucasian State Planning Commission, who was usually a Russian. The existence of the Transcaucasian Federation enabled the Russian communists generally to play the role of arbiters.

The Georgian communists felt the weight of the Transcaucasian Federation more than anybody else, for the headquarters of the federal government were in Tiflis. The recognized leaders of the Georgian communists, like Budu Mdivani and Philip Makharadze, energetically opposed Stalin's federation manœuvre and wanted Georgia to become a direct member state of the U.S.S.R., which in their view should be but a loose federation. The ideal solution which they aimed at was, however, to have no Soviet Union at all, but to be linked with the Russian communists only through the Communist International.

In the early twenties the Georgian communists showed many signs of an independent policy, confirming Stalin's anxiety as to the future relationship between Georgia and the Soviet State as a whole. If Georgia could not be independent from Moscow, they wanted her to keep at least as many prerogatives of an independent State as possible. Thus they resisted Russian control over the Georgian railways and ignored the foreign trade monopoly of the Moscow Government by concluding contracts with foreign companies directly. In doing so they were in accord with the recommendation which Lenin had given to the Transcaucasian communists shortly after the formation of Soviet Georgia. This is what Lenin had advised: 'Make the utmost intense and speedy economic use of the capitalist West by means of a policy of concessions and by commercial intercourse. . . .'²² Soviet Georgia also wanted to maintain an independent attitude in relation to the other Transcaucasian Soviet Republics and their subjects. Thus certain categories of Armenians and Azerbaidzhanis were ordered to leave the Georgian Soviet Republic so that the country might assume a more homogeneous national character. Georgian women marrying citizens of other Soviet republics lost their Georgian nationality. The central Government in Moscow declared all these discriminatory practices null and void.

Despite all appearances the Georgian communists were by no means chauvinists. They knew only too well that their régime was unpopular and that they had to maintain themselves in power by making concessions in every possible direction, including concessions to nationalist feelings. When taking over the Georgian Government in February 1921 the Bolsheviks claimed a membership of 20,000, of whom about one-half were expelled from the party almost immediately after the

establishment of Soviet rule. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, had 60,000 members on the very eve of the collapse of Georgian national independence. After Georgia's annexation by Soviet Russia the Mensheviks and other opposition forces continued to exercise considerable influence on the Georgian peasantry, whose material conditions remained unsatisfactory, and on Georgian intellectuals, who temporarily were replaced in the administration of the country by Russian communists. By 1924 half the civil servants in Georgia were of non-Georgian origin and in Tiflis, the capital, as many as 63 per cent.²³

In view of the comparatively liberal rule of the local communists, underground activities on a mass scale were then still possible in Georgia. All non-Bolshevik groups of Georgia formed a secret coalition under Menshevik leadership and also established contact with resistance forces in the Northern Caucasus and in Azerbaidzhan. On August 27th, 1924, the long prepared rising broke out. It was probably the biggest anti-Soviet insurrection initiated by any non-Russian nationality after the end of the Civil War. The centres of the rising were the rural areas in Western Georgia and the Chiaturi manganese mines, the most vital economic asset of the country. The rising was liquidated by the Red Army within a few days. A British trade union delegation which toured the Caucasus soon afterwards and which otherwise almost entirely endorsed the official Soviet attitude remarked: 'The insurrection probably had the sympathy of a majority of Georgians and would have had their support had it succeeded. But it never had any chance of success.'²⁴

About 3,000 people perished in the rising. The régime showed a comparatively mild attitude towards the organizers of the insurrection; none of them was executed after a trial which took place in the summer of 1925. Later on Soviet courts were less indulgent and passed death sentences not only on genuine rebels but also on participants in imaginary plots against the régime. The rising was nevertheless a turning point. It led to the speedy liquidation of all opposition groups and the complete consolidation of the communist one-party system in Georgia. Inside the Communist Party itself conditions remained unsatisfactory. Official Soviet sources pointed out later that members of a gang of 'enemies of the people' had penetrated into high party and state posts, particularly during 1929 to 1931.²⁵

Stalin's principal antagonists in Georgia were, however, not the new converts to Bolshevism, but the old Bolsheviks around Makharadze, the President of Georgia, and Mdivani, the Vice-Premier. For a long time mutual dislike and hostility were covered up by hypocritical statements which reached a culminating point in the celebrations held in Tiflis in February 1936 on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Georgian Soviet Republic. The Georgian leaders to whom Stalin extended his congratulations were then already marked as purge victims.

The speeches which they delivered in return in praise of Stalin could not save them. There was only one element of dignity in Soviet Georgia's noisy birthday celebrations, namely when the patriarch of Georgian communism, Makharadze, recalled the following passage from Lenin's letter to the Caucasian and Transcaucasian communists: 'The Transcaucasian communists . . . shall understand the necessity of not copying our (i.e. Russian) tactics, but of thoughtfully varying them in accordance with the difference in the concrete conditions'.

In view of his advanced age Makharadze was later spared from trial and execution. The other Georgian leaders were less fortunate. They were executed after two separate trials for 'terrorism and high treason' in the summer of 1937. The first group included Budu Mdivani and the Georgian planning chief, Toroshelidze. The second group was headed by the Georgian Prime Minister, Mgaloblishvili.

THREE GEORGIAN COMMUNISTS: ORDZHONIKIDZE, YENUKIDZE, BERIYA

By a strange coincidence a prominent Georgian member of the central Government, the Peoples Commissar for Heavy Industry, Grigory Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze (1886-1937), a member of the Politbureau, died suddenly in his Moscow flat shortly after the arrest of the Mdivani-Toroshelidze group which included relatives and personal friends of his. His death occurred a few hours after a meeting of the Politbureau which is believed to have discussed the Georgian situation. Ordzhonikidze had enjoyed a considerable popularity even among many non-communists. No wonder that his death provoked a large number of contradictory rumours. Although the official announcement spoke of Ordzhonikidze's natural death, people in Moscow were suspicious and believed that he had committed suicide. The régime tried to remove suspicion by a pompous state funeral and by keeping the name of the dead man in high honour. Ordzhonikidze used to be one of Stalin's few personal friends; he was known to have persistently endorsed the tough line which the secretary-general had pursued towards his Georgian compatriots. This does not exclude the possibility of suicide. The friendship between Ordzhonikidze and Stalin may have ended suddenly on account of the refusal of the former to accept the wholesale physical extermination of the Georgian communist leadership.

Only two years before Ordzhonikidze's death Stalin had broken with another close Georgian friend of his, Abel Yenukidze, who had become a danger to his policy. He had occupied the extremely influential post of the secretary-general of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK), which was, until the introduction of the new Stalin constitution, the highest Soviet institution, the body which made the laws of the U.S.S.R.

All decrees and laws which the Central Executive Committee passed had to bear Yenukidze's signature as well as that of Kalinin. Early in 1935 the Transcaucasian Federation approached TsIK with the request that Yenukidze should be relieved of his post so that he could become Prime Minister of the Transcaucasian federal Government. Soon afterwards, Yenukidze was indeed relieved of his post, but not to take up the high office reserved for him. He was dismissed as a punishment for alleged lack of vigilance, for having allowed untrustworthy elements to infiltrate into important positions of the TsIK apparatus. Two and a half years later Yenukidze was executed as a traitor, together with other high-ranking Soviet officials, including the Armenian-born diplomat Karakhan (1889-1937), former Soviet ambassador to Turkey and China. The Yenukidze riddle is easily solved. When Yenukidze was sacked Stalin had already decided to scrap the Transcaucasian Federation, which was no longer necessary for the checking of local nationalism in view of the consolidation of the central state machinery. Stalin had no need for a strong personality like Yenukidze at the head of the Transcaucasian Government, who might have instilled new life into a dying body. The Federation was formally disbanded in 1936 with the introduction of the new Stalin constitution.

In the place of Ordzhonikidze and Yenukidze, another prominent Georgian penetrated into the supreme Soviet leadership and into the closest circle of Stalin's favourites. His name was Lavrenty Beriya. His principal merit was that he had carried out purges all over Transcaucasia. These had been of such importance for the strengthening of the Soviet régime as a whole that they led to his appointment to the post of all-Union Soviet police chief in December 1938.

GEORGIA'S ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL MISSION

In the inter-war period the Soviet central authorities considered Georgia primarily from the point of view of its economic usefulness. We have already referred to the manganese mines of Chiaturi. They are not the largest manganese ore deposits in the U.S.S.R., which are those of Nikopol in the Ukraine, but the Chiaturi ores contain a higher percentage of manganese and are famous for their high quality. In the early years of the Soviet régime the Chiaturi manganese played an important part in Russian foreign trade, and as late as 1931 Chiaturi covered 42 per cent of the world demand for that valuable mineral. In later years Chiaturi manganese was less used for export in view of the discovery of new manganese ore deposits in the 'capitalistic world', but Soviet industry itself relied greatly on Chiaturi's output.

Apart from boosting manganese production, the Soviet régime encouraged the increase of Georgia's oil and coal output and founded over

800 industrial enterprises in the country, most of which had a local importance only. Great attention was paid to the cultivation of tea and citrus fruits. The tea plantations, almost non-existent before the First World War, covered 128,440 acres in 1947. Tea production increased from 264,556 pounds in 1913 to 118,814,635 pounds in 1940, and the entire Soviet Union is now drinking 'Georgian tea'. Georgia has become completely dependent on the Russian market for this new produce of her soil; an independent Georgian State would hardly be able to find alternative buyers for the quantity of tea which is being grown on Georgian territory on the basis of all-Union economic planning.

The same would most probably apply to Georgia's citrus fruits, for which Georgia has also a monopoly in the U.S.S.R. The Georgian citrus fruit plantations grew from 295 acres in 1913 to 24,700 acres in 1938, but an ambitious plan fixing the area of these plantations at 98,000 acres in 1944 has remained largely on paper. Such a sensational increase had been decreed by the Council of Peoples Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on April 25th, 1940, but even without the interruption of the war the fulfilment of these targets might have proved unattainable. After the war, the question of the Georgian citrus fruit plantations was reconsidered by the central Government. A new decree was enacted on February 15th, 1946, which fixed the revised target for 1950 at 72,600 acres only.

It was the Georgian Government which was entrusted with the unpopular task of prohibiting the Georgian collective farmers from planting the areas reserved for the new citrus plantations with anything but lemons, oranges and tangerines. The overall responsibility for the implementation of the decree on the development of Georgian citrus plantations was, however, divided between the all-Union Ministry for Technical Cultures and the Georgian Government.

The extension of tea and citrus fruit plantations in Georgia prevented any increase in the local wheat and maize production which would have corresponded to the 32 per cent augmentation of Georgia's population between 1926 and 1939. Even before the First World War Georgia was forced to import cereals in years of an average harvest. The agricultural policy which the Soviet régime had pursued in Georgia made things much worse. In 1950 Georgia had to import 75 per cent of its bread supply from other Soviet Republics. This state of affairs was bound to cause considerable dissatisfaction in the country and the Communist Party found itself compelled to change its agrarian policy. It introduced a special seven-year plan for Georgian agriculture with the aim of making the republic self-sufficient in cereals by 1957.

The economic assignments given to Georgia were not of such magnitude as to require any substantial manpower imports. On the contrary, the Georgians belong to those few peoples in the Soviet Union who should be able to cope with the tasks allotted to them by economic

planning without much assistance from labour drawn from the outside. Nevertheless racial intermixture in general and the immigration of Russians in particular increased even in Georgia under the Soviet régime. In 1926 there had been but 3·4 per cent Russians in the country against 8·9 per cent in 1939. On the other hand the percentage of Georgians dropped between the 1926 and 1939 census from 71·5 per cent to 61·4 per cent.

Russian cultural influence in Georgia is, however, much stronger than the percentage of Russians in Georgia's population indicates. In 1947 there were 300 Russian secondary schools in Georgia out of 800 altogether. Kupradze, the Minister of Education of the Georgian S.S.R., himself admitted that more than half of the pupils in Russian schools were non-Russians.²⁶

It must be noted in this connection that the standard of education in Georgia is higher than in any other Soviet Republic, including the R.S.F.S.R. Thus in 1939 Georgia had, for every 1,000 inhabitants, 113·4 persons with secondary education and 12·2 persons with higher education. In the Russian Federation, on the eve of the Second World War only 76·8 per 1,000 had secondary education and only 6·5 per 1,000 had higher education. Georgia has also introduced eleven-year secondary education instead of the ten-year school existing everywhere else in the Soviet Union. This comparatively high educational level, combined with a good knowledge of Russian, has enabled the Georgians to play a not unimportant part in the Soviet civil service and in the bureaucratic machinery of the party.

GREATER GEORGIA

During the war the Georgians made a greater contribution to the defence of the U.S.S.R. than most non-Russian peoples. They played an outstanding part in preventing the Germans from penetrating into Transcaucasia. Fighting mostly in separate Georgian regiments and under Georgian officers they held up the German advance at the state borders of Georgia. It was thus a legitimate symbolical recognition of the Georgian war effort that a Georgian sergeant was allowed to hoist the flag of victory over the Berlin Reichstag together with a Russian Red Army man.²⁷

The Soviet Government had every interest in advertising the war effort of the Georgians, for Moscow wanted to tell the world that here was a small people who had fought Hitler most heroically. This people must be rewarded at the expense of a neighbour state which had been neutral throughout the war. In other words, Georgia was to be switched into the diplomatic offensive which the Soviet Government launched against Turkey immediately after the end of the Second World War.

The Soviet Government remembered very conveniently that there were old Georgian national claims against Turkey which Bolshevism had persistently ignored during 27 years, but which could easily be revived to embarrass the Turks. Two Georgian professors, S. N. Dzhanashia and N. Berdzenishvili, started the job by publishing a long learned article in the Tiflis newspaper *Kommunisti* on December 14th, 1945. In this article, entitled 'Our Lawful Demands to Turkey', the two Georgian historians claimed for Georgia all territories which Georgia had lost from the Middle Ages onwards. They included, in particular, a coastline 170 miles long on the Turkish shores of the Black Sea.

The Georgian professors said 'We appeal to world public opinion concerning our ancient lands wrested from us by Turkey. This is not a matter of an insignificant territorial infringement, but of the seizure from us of the cradle of our individuality as a nation; of a crime which cut in two the living national body. . . . The Georgian people must get back their lands which they never gave up and cannot give up'.²⁸

The world outside Georgia would never have learned of this re-birth of an outspoken Georgian national imperialism, had not the Moscow newspaper *Pravda* reprinted the entire article in Russian translation a few days later.

What the historians had started was carried on by poets and playwrights. Thus Grigol Abashidze, co-author of the Georgian national anthem, wrote a collection of poems, *On the Southern Border*, in which he passionately advocated the reunion of the Georgian territories of Turkey with the Georgian motherland. North-Eastern Anatolia appears in Abashidze's poetry as the Georgian Province of 'Tao'. In one of his poems Abashidze promised that 'Tao' including the two ancient cultural centres of the Georgian people, Khandzta and Tbeti, would become Georgian again:

Tao, O Tao, our country thou,
Cradle thou of Georgian glory!

Ploughland of my forebears' furrows,
Brooded o'er by ancient towers,
How wast thou beset by sorrows
'Ere decay befell thy flowers!

Tao, O Tao, I hear thee, Tao,
Hear thy weary sighing dying.

Khandzta weeps and Tbeti murmurs;
Brothers' hearts there turn towards us.
One day Tao will join our numbers
'Neath the flag that proudly guards us.

For this and similar lyrical expressions of irredentism Abashidze was awarded a Stalin Prize for 1950. The same honour was bestowed on the Georgian playwright, Ilo Mosashvili, for the play *Sunken Stones*, which deals with the national aspirations of the Georgian inhabitants of an imaginary Turkish town not far from the borders of the U.S.S.R. The title of the play refers to the ruins of an ancient Georgian church, a national shrine of the local Georgians, which the Turkish authorities dismantle by night, throwing the debris into the sea. The play was shown in all the leading theatres of Georgia.

In the past the Soviet Government cared as little for Georgian as for Armenian national aspirations. In 1921 it had ceded to Turkey some of the territories which the Georgians have demanded since 1945. During the inter-war period any mention of the Georgian claims against Turkey would have been tantamount to high treason, since it would have disturbed Soviet-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, the Soviet régime showed an ambiguous attitude towards Turkey even in the period of the Bolshevik-Kemalist honeymoon. Almost from its inception the Georgian Soviet Republic included a small special territorial unit which, in itself, constituted a challenge to the Turks. This territorial unit is called Adzharistan or Adzhar A.S.S.R. It is situated in Georgia's south-western corner and covers but a tiny territory of 970 square miles. Adzharistan, which consists of the port of Batum and its surroundings, was incorporated into Russia in 1878 after Turkey had held it since 1625. From a Georgian national point of view this conquest was of great significance, since it was the first of those vast formerly Georgian Black Sea territories which Russia succeeded in wresting from the Turks.

Though the population of these ancient Georgian territories, which reached as far as Trebizond, was forced to accept the Moslem religion, many continued to speak a Georgian dialect. Georgian nationalists, who called the lost Georgian lands 'Moslem Georgia', or 'Turkish Georgia', and their inhabitants 'Moslem Georgians', or Lazi, claimed that Russia, in her treaty with Irakli II, had pledged herself to strive for the reunion of Georgia with the lands which had belonged to her of old. The treaty did indeed contain a clause which might have been interpreted in such a way. Imperial Russia was in no way inclined to satisfy Georgian national demands. She was interested in Batum because it was an excellent sea-port and, later on, the terminus of the oil-pipeline running from Baku to the Black Sea, and not because Georgian nationalists cherished the idea of Batum's annexation.

The idea of annexing more Turkish Black Sea coastal territories by using Batum as a springboard for further conquests was not alien to Czarist policy. But this was *par excellence* a Russian imperialistic idea which totally disregarded any specific Georgian national interests. The development of Batum from a wretched little place with 1,500 inhabitants

and one stone building – the house of the Russian consul – in the year of annexation, to a port of international importance ten or fifteen years later certainly helped to raise Russia's prestige in north-eastern Turkey.

The Russian scholar, N. Y. Marr, who in 1910 travelled in Lazistan, 'Turkish Georgia', noted that Russia enjoyed a fairly good reputation among the Lazi; at the same time he was unable to trace any pan-Georgian feelings among the latter. He found that the Lazi were actually dying out.²⁹ Notwithstanding the evidence supplied by Marr, Georgian nationalists continued to talk of 'Turkish Georgia', which included, they said, as many as 600,000 Georgians. During the First World War these nationalists formulated, indeed, territorial demands for large stretches of land along the Black Sea coast, including areas to the east of Trebizond.³⁰

No Soviet source has so far reiterated the fantastic claim about the 600,000 'Turkish Georgians', but Soviet text books maintain that there were 'not less than 200,000' of them forming up to 40 per cent of the population in certain areas of North-Eastern Anatolia.³¹

ABKHAZIA

In the early years of the Georgian Soviet Republic Stalin tried to enlist the small national minorities of Georgia in the fight against the communist leadership in Tiflis. Stalin then complained of the 'harmful and dangerous chauvinism' of the Georgian communists who thought 'there was no need to reckon with less cultured and less developed nationalities'.³² The minorities whom Stalin had in mind were the Georgian Moslems (also called Adzharians), the Ossetins and in particular the Abkhazians.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Abkhazians found themselves in a difficult situation. They had been exposed to colonization from two sides and had become part of both the Great Russian and the Georgian living space. In these circumstances thousands of Abkhazians thought it preferable to leave their homeland for Turkey rather than to wage a hopeless struggle against the dual Russian-Georgian pressure. Although the Georgian nationalists and 'National Bolsheviks' disliked the idea of an Abkhazian autonomy, an 'Abkhazian A.S.S.R.' was nevertheless established within the Georgian S.S.R. on the insistence of the Moscow Government. In 1926 Autonomous Abkhazia covered 3,240 square miles and had a population of 174,000 of whom the Abkhazians accounted for less than one-third.

The Abkhazians, though useful as long as they could be played up against the Georgians, lost favour with the central Government as soon as their national interests clashed with those of the Soviet Union as a whole. This happened when, under the Second Five-Year Plan, Ab-

khazia was ordered to increase considerably its tobacco production. Since the population of Abkhazia as it was at that time, and the small Abkhazian people in particular, could not possibly have coped with the targets assigned to them by the Five-Year Plan, more Russians, Georgians, Armenians and Greeks had to be brought into the republic.

It mattered little to the Abkhazians whether the new influx of foreign elements into their country was effected in the name of socialist planning and 'specialization', or in that of nationalist expansion. Fearing for the future of their people, Abkhazian communists demanded that the Abkhazians who had emigrated to Turkey under the Czarist régime should be brought back and take the place of the non-Abkhazian colonists. It is no wonder then that, in consequence, Soviet publications started complaining about Abkhazian resistance.³³

In the end the Abkhazians fell completely into disgrace with the Kremlin. Paradoxically enough, the leaders of the people whom Stalin had shielded against encroachments by Georgian nationalists became involved in an alleged plot aiming at assassinating their 'protector'. The Abkhazian Bolshevik leader, Nestor Lakoba, was fortunate enough to die a natural death in 1936, for in the following year he might have been the central figure in a plot trial held in the Abkhazian capital, Sukhum. Most of the forty-seven defendants charged with having attempted to murder Stalin were Lakoba's friends, relatives and collaborators. Ten of them were executed.

The 'liquidation' of 'the Abkhazian nationalists in Bolshevik disguise' cleared the way for further Georgian colonization in Abkhazia. After the Second World War a special Resettlement Board of the Tiflis Government gave grants to Georgian collective farmers settling down along the Black Sea shore in the Abkhazian coastal districts of Gagry, Gudauti and Ochenchiri.³⁴

III. AZERBAIDZHAN

BAKU – THE OIL CITY

Whilst Georgia fell into the hands of the Russians like a ripe fruit, the establishment of Russian rule over Azerbaidzhan was a very protracted affair. The conquest of Azerbaidzhan was in fact one of the most difficult and costly enterprises in the entire subjugation of Transcaucasia. The first Russian conqueror of Azerbaidzhan's future capital, Baku, was the leader of lawless Cossack bands from the Don, Ataman Stenka Razin, one of the greatest rebels against the authority of the Czar. The second conqueror of Baku was Russia's greatest Czar, Peter I.

The fact that Peter's general, Matyushkin, brought Baku, in 1723, for twelve years under Russian rule, is, perhaps, less important than the

principle which the Czar laid down in his instructions to the general. Peter described Baku as 'the key to our whole business' (*klyuch vsemu nashemu delu*), which meant the key to the success of the Russian cause on the shores of the Caspian Sea and, perhaps, in the whole of Transcaucasia. If the totality of Peter's plans and deeds is to be considered as his political will, his appreciation of Baku was undoubtedly one of the most prophetic parts of it.

The eventual fulfilment of Peter's order – the final conquest of Baku – took place in 1806. Russia paid for it with the death of her first great administrator and military commander in Transcaucasia, Prince Pavel Dimitrievich Tsitsianov, who was treacherously murdered during the negotiations for the surrender of Baku.

While the existence of oil deposits in the Baku region has been common knowledge for centuries, it is only since the seventies of the nineteenth century that they have contributed to the development of the city. As late as 1883, not only St. Petersburg but even southern Russia used the more expensive American oil, because the oil production of Baku was still in its beginnings and transport facilities for Caucasian oil inadequate. At the turn of the century Russia was the second oil producer in the world after the United States, and for a short time even exceeded the American oil output.

The upsurge of Baku as oil centre was only to a minor degree due to the Russian national genius. It was the foreigners who had the lion's share in the technical development of the oil production and in financing both production and transport of Baku oil. Particularly high credit goes to the Swedish brothers Robert and Ludwig Nobel, who started the first Baku oil refinery in 1875 and were responsible for many technical improvements introduced during the following decades into the Baku oil industry. Nobels had the largest refineries and the largest oilfields of Baku and built up the most important oil concern. The Rothschilds, in exchange for mortgages on Russian-owned Baku oilfields, financed the Transcaucasian railway line running from Baku to Batum on the Black Sea, which enabled Russia to export the Baku oil to Europe. The reverse of the medal was the gradual elimination of small oil firms in the hands of Russian and Persian owners. Thus conditions in Baku became in reality symbolic of Czarist Russia's semi-colonial dependence on foreign capital. By ousting all the Swedish, British, French and German 'capitalists' from Baku the Soviet régime brought the city and its riches into the possession of the Russian State.

THE BOLSHEVIK BAKU

The great historic role of the Russian Bolsheviks, with regard to Baku, did not consist in the extension of its oil production and the building of

an engineering industry, but in giving Baku two new political functions, both of which have helped to augment enormously its offensive strength as a frontier outpost.

At first the Russian Bolsheviks transformed Baku into one of the chief headquarters of the revolutionary movement in Russia, and later they made it the capital of the Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic. As the 'Capital of the Bolshevik Movement of Transcaucasia', which it became at the beginning of the century, Baku constituted an alien, international enclave in the land of the Azerbaidzhani Turks. Thus Lavrenty Beriia, in his official history of the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia, fails to mention a single prominent Azerbaidzhani Turk among the leaders of the Baku Bolshevik Party before 1917. The virtual absence of the Azerbaidzhani from the Bolshevik movement is corroborated by the fact that the eight Bolshevik newspapers published in Baku between 1904 and 1907 included four papers in the Russian language, three Armenian papers and only one Armenian-Turkic paper, *Koch-devet*.³⁵ Before the October Revolution, the Bolshevik party organization in Baku was mainly composed of Russians, Armenians and Georgians. There was but a small extremist Azerbaidzhani Turkish group, 'Gummet' (Energy), connected with the Bolsheviks and working among both the local Moslem population and the immigrants from Persian Azerbaidzhan.

After the October Revolution Baku went, during a certain period, its own way. For several months it had a Soviet Government of its own, while the Azerbaidzhani nationalist party 'Mussavat' ('Equality'), which had its headquarters in Gandzha, was in control of the rest of the country. The short-lived Baku Soviet Government of 1918, the so-called 'Baku Commune', is usually described as one of the most glorious episodes of the entire Russian civil war. The indigenous people of Azerbaidzhan, however, took almost no part in the 'Commune'.

The Chairman of the Baku Soviet was Stepan Shaumyan (1878-1918), an Armenian, a genuine professional Bolshevik revolutionary of the old type. He had participated in the illegal revolutionary movement both inside Russia and abroad and was a highly educated personality. His chief lieutenant was the Georgian Alyosha Dzhaparidze (1878-1918), People's Commissar of the Interior. The People's Commissar for the Army and Navy, Grigory Kurganov (1886-1918), was a Russian and so was the Chairman of the Baku Economic Council, Ivan Fioletov (1884-1918). The only Azerbaidzhani Turk occupying an important post in the revolutionary Baku was Meshadi-Bek Azizbekov (1876-1918), a graduate of St. Petersburg University, who was Assistant People's Commissar of the Interior.

After the fall of the 'Baku Commune', in September 1918, Shaumyan, together with twenty-five other communists, almost all of them Russians

and Armenians, were executed without trial by the 'counter-revolution'. The 'twenty-six Commissars', who belong to the most cherished martyrs of communist Russia, had been intercepted while trying to escape to Astrakhan, via the Caspian Sea, and shot by the right-wing 'Socialist Revolutionaries' who were then in control of Transcaucasia (Turkmenistan).

The Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic came into being only at the end of April 1920, when the Bolsheviks had finally wrested the capital and the whole country from the Mussavat Party. The Soviet régime carried on with the work of the Nobels and Rothschilds and developed the oil industry of Baku. In 1932 the production of crude oil reached 12,613,000 tons (against 10,028,000 tons in 1904 and 7,669,000 tons in 1913) and in 1937, 23,227,000 tons. The population of the oil city also continued to increase. It went up from 453,000 in 1926 to 809,000 in 1939. This was a remarkable achievement though a less striking one than the growth of Baku under the Czarist régime when the number of its inhabitants had risen from 15,000 in 1873 to 92,000 in 1893 and to 333,000 in 1913.

MULTI-NATIONAL BAKU

Under Soviet rule Baku also preserved its international character, which had increased to the same extent as the number of its inhabitants and the output of its oil wells. In 1875 over 90 per cent of the population of the city were still Azerbaidzhani Turks. The two minority groups, Russians and Armenians, formed but 5 per cent each. The number of Russians was then 782. By 1905 the Russian element had multiplied ninety-five times. In that year the Russians of Baku numbered over 74,000 against 72,000 Azerbaidzhani Turks or 'Azeri' and so-called 'Persian Tartars', as the immigrants from Persian Azerbaidzhan used to be called under the Czarist régime. The third largest ethnical group were the Armenians with 34,000. In addition, thirty-nine other nationalities had their representatives in the oil city.

In 1923 Baku's racial composition was as follows: Azerbaidzhani Turks 31·3 per cent, 'Persians' (mostly Turkic speaking people from Persian Azerbaidzhan) 14·7 per cent, Russians 28·3 per cent, Armenians 15·2 per cent, Jews 5·7 per cent, other nationalities (including Georgians, Lezghians, Germans, Greeks, Assyrians, etc.) 4·8 per cent. Azerbaidzhani Turks, together with the Persian 'Azeri', thus accounted for just half the population of the city.

In the industrial and oil-producing area of Baku city there was, however, a clear predominance of the Russian element over the autochthonous Turkic one. As late as 1934 only one out of five oil workers was an Azerbaidzhani Turk.³⁶ The composition of the Baku town council elected in 1950, reflected roughly the same racial intermixture as the

population statistics for 1905 and 1923. Over 54 per cent of all elected town councillors were Azerbaidzhani Turks, 30·5 per cent were Russians, 6·5 per cent Armenians, and the rest comprised a large number of other nationalities.³⁷

The composition of the Baku school population shows that the Russians are likely to remain a strong factor even in the next generation. In 1949 there were 46,200 Azerbaidzhani, 47,800 Russian and 19,000 Armenian school children in the oil city. Although the number of Russian and Azerbaidzhani children is almost equal there are considerably more Russian than Azerbaidzhani schools in Baku. In 1949 Russian was the language employed in teaching in seventy-eight schools and Turkic in fifty-eight schools. In forty-one schools teaching was given in both languages. There were only four Armenian schools, an indication that most of the local Armenians receive none but Russian education.³⁸

BAKU AND AZERBAIDZHAN

Baku, which became the fifth largest city of the U.S.S.R., reached its fullest growth roughly by the outbreak of the Second World War. After the war Baku was still Russia's largest single oil-producing centre, but its output had dropped to about one-half of the total Soviet oil production. Although Baku's stormy progress has thus reached a standstill, Russian colonization of Azerbaidzhan will nevertheless continue, because industry is shifting from Baku to other places, particularly to Kirovabad, the ancient Gandzha, and to new towns which were created under the Five Year Plans. These include Dashkesan, a mining town producing iron ore, Minchegaur, which supplies electric power to Baku, and Sumgant, which is to provide equipment for the oil industry of Baku. The first miners of Dashkesan came from the Ukraine; the builders of Sumgant hailed from Kharkov, Moscow, Leningrad and Chelyabinsk.³⁹

Thanks to Soviet economic policy, Azerbaidzhan has ceased to be a backward, feudal-patriarchal country, but the gap between Baku and its hinterland still exists, even if it has narrowed. There is still a cleavage between the international city, on the one hand, and the Moslem country on the other. Even in the future, the Azerbaidzhani Turks are unlikely to accept Baku, which is much too big a capital for a republic with 3,200,000 inhabitants.

Although the integration of Baku into Azerbaidzhan is largely fictitious, Soviet propaganda as directed to the Middle East is bound to treat the two as an entity if it is to be successful. This propaganda is inspired by the belief that Baku and Azerbaidzhan are called to play a vanguard role in the Orient. Probably nobody has defined that role as authoritatively as Azerbaidzhan's most glorified Bolshevik poet, Samed

Vurgun, in the play *Khangar*. The play deals with Stalin's stay in Baku in 1907. Vurgun put into Stalin's mouth the following words, which the future leader of the Soviet State, then still bearing the pseudonym of 'Koba', addresses to a young Azerbaidzhani party member in his Baku home:

From here the light will burst in living torrents
On Araby, Afghanistan, Iran,
And dawn will bathe the Orient of tomorrow
From this thy land, the happiest of lands!⁴⁰

There is no doubt that Vurgun faithfully interpreted Stalin's own ideas on the importance of Azerbaidzhan.

THE NATIONALIST OPPOSITION

An independent Azerbaidzhani State would have been conceivable, both from the geographical and from the cultural point of view. In Czarist Russia the Azerbaidzhani Turks had competed with the Kazan Tartars for leadership of the Russian Moslems, but in their readiness to become Europeanized they rank above all other Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire. On the question of the latinization of the alphabet, for instance, the Azerbaidzhani marched ahead of most of their co-religionists on the Volga and in Central Asia and never opposed or sabotaged the 'alphabetic revolution' in the same way as other Turkic peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Thus, while the Azerbaidzhani Turks may have been no less ripe for statehood than the Anatolian Turks, the colossus of Baku and the evil influence of the oil factor frustrated their national aspirations. Not only Azerbaidzhani nationalists but also the Azerbaidzhani Turkish communists tried to revolt against the inescapable fate of their country, which was to become a prey of foreign, mainly Russian, industrial colonization.

M. D. Bagirov, during ten years the leading G.P.U. official in Azerbaidzhan and First Secretary of the local Communist Party since 1937, admitted the strength of nationalism within the Azerbaidzhani communist camp when he wrote: 'From the very first days of the existence of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, national deviationists tried to counteract by every means the formation of a firmly united monolithic Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks of Baku, faithful to the banner of Lenin and Stalin, conducted an energetic struggle against the treacherous activity of the national deviationists who later on were unmasked as spies of a foreign intelligence service'.

The struggle against the national deviation among the Azerbaidzhani communists during the first years of the existence of Soviet Azerbaidzhan was conducted by the Russian, S. M. Kirov, who, as party secre-

tary, guided the destinies of the country between 1921 and 1925. Almost immediately after his arrival in Baku, Kirov liquidated the first Azerbaidzhani 'deviation', the national-communist 'Narimanovism'. This was an historic act in so far as it constituted the first purge of 'national communists' in the whole of Transcaucasia. In 1924 Kirov suppressed the second inner-party revolt, the 'Khanbudagovism'. Under the leadership of Khanbudagov, Azerbaidzhani communists had demanded the end of Russian colonization and the replacement of non-Turks by Turkic workers.

Although Kirov left Azerbaidzhan in 1925, he returned again in 1930 when a new crisis broke out in the Azerbaidzhani Communist Party. His role as commissar extraordinary was later taken over by another of Stalin's favourites, the Georgian L. P. Beriia, who, according to Bagirov, took a 'conspicuous part in the merciless unmasking and extermination of the Trotskyite-Bukharinist and bourgeois-nationalist nests in the country'.⁴¹

Whilst the Azerbaidzhani 'deviationists' defended the interests of their people, the Russian communists of Baku and the Soviet bureaucracy headed by Kirov and Beriia were fighting in the first place for oil and, secondly, for cotton. Azerbaidzhan, apart from being the principal oil source of the Soviet Union is also the 'second cotton basis of the U.S.S.R.'. Between 1913 and 1938 the sowing area for cotton increased by 90 per cent, while there was a shrinkage of the wheat sowing area by 12 per cent, and of the rice sowing area by 48 per cent.⁴²

The enforcement of cotton-growing in Azerbaidzhan at any cost added greatly to the difficulties which the Soviet power encountered in that country. Cotton-growing to the detriment of the cultivation of cereals was unpopular with all parts of the agricultural population, kulaks, middle peasants and the village poor. Even Communist Party organizations in villages and the rural party district committees frequently sabotaged the instructions which the Baku authorities issued on the implementation of the cotton plan.⁴³ Collectivization alone could not solve the cotton problem and break the 'anti-cotton front'. The Soviet Government had to impose the implementation of the cotton plan on the collective farmers by the same measures of coercion which had been used against individual farmers.

RUSSIAN-AZERBAIDZHANI CULTURAL SYNTHESIS

Despite the fact that oil and cotton were the primary concern of Soviet policy in Azerbaidzhan, the Soviet régime by no means overlooked the cultural side of the Azerbaidzhani problem. Soviet cultural policy in Azerbaidzhan consisted in strengthening the cultural independence of the Azerbaidzhani from their Moslem neighbours, Anatolian Turks and

Persians. Both had shown a considerable interest in Russian Azerbaidzhan during the Civil War of 1917-21, when the Russian Empire was in a process of disintegration. Persia had flatly claimed Russian Azerbaidzhan on historical and geographical grounds in a memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The pan-Turkists of Turkey, too, had looked towards Baku as the item of their annexation programme which seemed to be the easiest to materialize. Soviet policy quite naturally aimed at making the Azerbaidzhani Turks immune against all future pan-Turkic, pan-Iranian and pan-Moslem temptations by creating a new artificial ideology aimed at isolating them from their oriental surroundings in which they had lived for many centuries.

The Azerbaidzhani Academy of Sciences made it its task to study Russian-Azerbaidzhani relations in the past and to show that the union between Azerbaidzhan and Russia was based, not only on the superiority of Russian weapons which conquered Baku, Shemakha and Gandzha, but also on the attraction which Russian culture had exercised on the Azerbaidzhani.

The essence of Soviet cultural propaganda in the Azerbaidzhani language is contained in the following statement which Bagirov made in 1945: 'For its great achievements in the field of science and culture, literature and art the Azerbaidzhani people is indebted to the beneficial influence of the great Russian scholars, teachers, poets, writers, artists, etc. We have learned from the Russian people the best traditions of revolutionary struggle. With the help of the Russian people we established the Soviet régime'.

In the light of Soviet ideology, as formulated for Azerbaidzhani consumption, the spiritual leaders of Azerbaidzhan, such as the poets Khagani Shirvani and Nizami Gandzhevi, have had a lively interest in Russia ever since the twelfth century. The beginnings of a political pro-Russian orientation in Azerbaidzhan are traced as far back as the time of Ivan the Terrible; and in the nineteenth century all notable Azerbaidzhani personalities, according to the official thesis, had been conspicuous in advocating almost fanatically Russian-Azerbaidzhani friendship.

There is no doubt indeed that eminent representatives of Azerbaidzhani intellectual life in the nineteenth century established personal friendship with Russian writers and poets and learned the Russian language. It was only through the medium of Russian that they had been able to acquaint themselves with Western ideas and Western science. The greatest Azerbaidzhani poet of the nineteenth century, Mirza Fathali Akhundov (1812-78) (in the Azerbaidzhani spelling Mirza Fethali Ahund-zade), who is called the 'Molière of the Orient', was so completely devoted to the Russian cause that he urged his compatriots to fight Turkey during the Crimean War.

The Czarist authorities put no obstacle in the way of gifted Azerbaidzhani Turks qualified to occupy distinguished posts in St. Petersburg or Moscow. The poet and writer, Mirza Dzhafar Topchibashev, was assistant professor of the Persian language at St. Petersburg University and the Azerbaidzhani philologist, A. Kazem-bek, even became a member of the Russian Academy in the middle of the nineteenth century.*⁴⁴

The Communist Party and the Soviet régime want more than a mere recognition of the facts testifying to Russian-Azerbaidzhani cultural interdependence in the past, which would be but reasonable. The Azerbaidzhani are also expected to admit their own inferiority by stressing that their modern poets took their inspiration from Russian literature. Views expressed to the contrary are nailed down as 'deviations', as in the case of the Azerbaidzhani writer G. Mekhti, who had stated in September 1948 that the three Azerbaidzhani writers and poets, Akhundov, Akhverdov (1870-1933) and Mamed Kuli-zade (1869-1932), could not be looked upon as pupils of Russian masters. The Union of Soviet Writers of Azerbaidzhan had to issue a statement describing the opinion expressed by Mekhti as a 'harmful distortion of historical truth'.⁴⁵

Whilst trying to link Azerbaidzhani culture as closely as possible with Russian culture, the Soviet régime is equally eager to deny the existence of close cultural ties between Azerbaidzhan and Persia. The fact that most of the great poets brought forth by Azerbaidzhan in the past wrote mainly in Persian does not discourage the Soviet theoreticians, who are working out the ideological basis of Soviet nationalities policy. They declare categorically that everything produced by poets born in Azerbaidzhan 'belongs to the Azerbaidzhani people,' notwithstanding the language in which the works of the so-called Azerbaidzhani poets were written.⁴⁶ According to this theory the Persians have no right to claim any of the outstanding poets who had written in the Persian language; if, nevertheless, they do advance such a claim they are immediately branded as guilty of 'pan-Iranianism'.

The attempt to 'annex' an important part of Persian literature and to transform it into 'Azerbaidzhani literature' can be best exemplified by the way in which the memory of the great Persian poet Nizami (1141-1203) is exploited in the Soviet Union. The Soviet régime does not pay tribute to Nizami as a great representative of world literature, but is mainly interested in him as a 'poet of the Soviet Union', which he is considered to be because he was born in Gandzha in the territory of the

* Azerbaidzhani scholars were not alone in becoming famous in Czarist Russia; no limit was imposed on the Azerbaidzhani Turks in attaining the highest posts in the army. Eight members of the Bakikhanov family alone had served as generals and colonels in the Czarist forces. Russian artillery is greatly indebted to Azerbaidzhani military scientists, particularly to General Ali Aga Shikhlinsky, who took a leading part in the defence of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) and was later appointed to a post in the Red Army.

present Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic. The Soviet régime proclaims its ownership over Nizami also by 'interpreting' his works in accordance with the general pattern of Soviet ideology. Thus the leading Soviet journal *Bolshevik* stressed that Nizami's 'great merit' consisted in having undermined Islam by 'opposing the theological teaching of the unchangeable character of the world'.⁴⁷

Stalin himself intervened in the dispute over Nizami and gave an authoritative verdict on the matter. In a talk with the Ukrainian writer, Mikola Bazhan, Stalin referred to Nizami as 'the great poet of our brotherly Azerbaidzhani people' who must not be surrendered to Iranian literature, despite having written most of his poems in Persian. Stalin even quoted to Bazhan a passage from Nizami where the poet said that he was forced to use the Persian language because he was not allowed to talk to the people in their native tongue.⁴⁸

Thus in Stalin's view Nizami is but a victim of Persian centralism, and of a denationalization policy directed against the ancestors of the Azerbaidzhani Turks. Nizami is not a Persian poet, but a historical witness of Persian oppression of 'national minorities'. It is by no means surprising that Stalin should take this line or that he should attach the greatest importance to everything that would undermine Persia's cultural and political prestige. Stalin's interest in Persia is that of a Georgian rather than that of a Russian. In spite of being, as we have seen, a bad Georgian nationalist in many other respects, he is animated as far as Persia is concerned by a traditional Georgian animosity against the 'hereditary enemy'. To gain economic and political influence in Persia is traditional Russian policy ever since Peter the Great, but the Soviet Government, thanks to Stalin's influence, has done more than follow in the footsteps of Czarist diplomacy. It has put into effect new methods to disintegrate Persia, methods which only a Caucasian neighbour of the Persians and an expert on nationality problems could design.

THE OTHER AZERBAIDZHAN

Even before the Second World War the Soviet authorities of Moscow and Baku knew that autonomist and separatist movements would emerge one day in Persia, particularly among the Turks of Persian Azerbaidzhan. It was felt however that some time might elapse before conditions would be ripe for launching a 'national liberation' campaign in Persia. The organ of the Soviet of Nationalities, *Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, stated as late as 1930 that the Azerbaidzhani Turks of Persia never ceased to consider themselves as an integral part of the Pahlevi monarchy and continued to supply both leaders and pioneers for the Persian national movement. However, the same article forecast that the growth of Turkic culture in Soviet Azerbaidzhan and the attraction

of the Baku oilfields would play their part in awakening the Turkic national consciousness of the people of Persian Azerbaidzhan.⁴⁹

The 'awakening' of the Azerbaidzhani Turks came earlier than the Soviet sociologists could have foreseen in 1930, and was a direct consequence of the Russian military occupation of Northern Persia of 1941-46. During this occupation the Persian Azerbaidzhani were brought into close contact with the people of the Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic, and it is small wonder that the idea of a union took shape in the two Azerbaidzhans, which, though widely differing economically and politically, are united by the bond of a common language. With the assistance of the 'brothers from the North' this Turkic language – ignored under Persian rule – was given the first place in education and administration all over Persian Azerbaidzhan. An Azerbaidzhani university and an Azerbaidzhani National Museum were opened, Azerbaidzhani books and newspapers were either printed on the spot or imported from Soviet Azerbaidzhan. While contact between Tabriz, the capital of Persian Azerbaidzhan, and Teheran was practically cut off, the most advanced Turkic nationalists were encouraged to look to Baku for political and cultural inspiration. Left-wing Azerbaidzhani poets praised Baku with oriental hyperbole. One of them, Tavrieli, described Baku as the 'Rose of beauty graven in stone' and another, Muhammed Biriya, poet and also secretary of the trade unions of Persian Azerbaidzhan, said he came to Baku to drink the 'life-giving water' of this city and that he wept 'happy tears' on seeing Baku.⁵⁰

In 1946, when the Soviet troops left Northern Persia, the Persian Government only too easily swept away the régime set up by pro-communist Azerbaidzhani autonomists in Tabriz. The nationalism of the Azerbaidzhani Turks of Persia was still too feeble to put up a successful resistance even to a weak Persian State. The end of the Azerbaidzhani separatist government was, however, not the end of the Azerbaidzhan problem. The Soviet régime did its best to keep the issue alive both in Soviet 'Northern Azerbaidzhan' and in Persian 'Southern Azerbaidzhan'. Soviet Azerbaidzhani poets and writers continued to deal in their works with the problem of the unredeemed brothers in the South and thus to foster an irredentist ideology among the people of the Azerbaidzhani S.S.R. On the other hand communist refugees from Southern Azerbaidzhan were given shelter in Baku and were assisted in their efforts to keep in touch with the Turkic-speaking people of Northern Persia.

IV. TRANSCAUCASIAN MINORITIES

Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaidzhani Turks are the three 'state nations' of Transcaucasia, but they do not exhaust the nationality prob-

lems facing the Soviet Government in that part of the Russian Empire. Each of the three Transcaucasian republics also includes a large number of ethnical minorities which differ widely in character and can, from the point of view of the Soviet régime, be classed into three categories:

1. Minorities organically linked with the three Transcaucasian state nations (Ossetins and Abkhazians in Georgia, Talyshi in Azerbaidzhan*). They are a purely internal problem of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics.

2. Minority groups, mainly made up of immigrants, who proved to be a handicap to the Soviet régime. These minorities included Germans in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan, Greeks who, in 1926, formed 2 per cent of the entire population of Georgia, Anatolian Turks in Armenia and small groups of Persians. The Soviet Government treated all these minorities at one time or another as potential agents of a foreign power. These communities of immigrants were much reduced by deportations and arrests during and after the Second World War.

3. Minority groups who can be used for purposes of Russian power politics. This group comprises Assyrians and Kurds.

THE ASSYRIANS

The Assyrians can be compared in many ways with the Armenians. They are a Christian people scattered among Moslem countries, a people which has been deprived for many centuries of a State of its own. The number of Assyrians who have survived oriental persecution is too small to enable them to follow the example of the Armenians and rebuild a kind of 'National Home'. As a matter of fact, by interfering in the life of this small Christian people Russia probably did more to hasten their doom than to help them towards recovering from the blows which their Moslem neighbours had inflicted on them.

During the First World War in particular the Assyrians had to pay dearly for their pro-Russian sympathies. The Russian army relied in the early part of the war on the Assyrians as allies behind the Turkish lines. The Assyrians assisted the Russians, indeed, wherever they could, but in return they did not obtain national liberation. Their fate was exile or death. In May 1915, inspired by the expectation of Russian help, the Assyrians started an insurrection but were unsuccessful. To save their lives 40,000 Assyrians then embarked on a heroic march across difficult mountain passes and finally reached the Russian side of the front. The Russian authorities cordially welcomed them and the Grand Duke Nikolay decorated the Mar Shimun, the political and religious leader

* The Talyshi are a people of Persian stock of whom 80,000 are living in the area of Lenkoran on the Soviet-Persian border. They were not granted a special administrative unit, presumably because their national consciousness is little developed. Most of them are bilingual and speak Turkic in addition to their native tongue.

of the Assyrians, who had led the great migration. These platonic expressions of sympathy were of little help to the Assyrians. Transcaucasia was soon drawn into the turmoil of revolution and civil war and there was no Russian authority in existence which could be interested in the fate of the Assyrian people.

It is not our task to follow up the further calvary of the Assyrians in Iraq, their recruitment into the famous Assyrian levies and the massacres of 1933 – we are concerned here only with the Russian aspect of the problem. Whilst the centre of gravity of the Assyrian nation was in Iraq, where the Mar Shimun had his residence, Soviet government circles claimed that the largest single group of Assyrians lived in the U.S.S.R. and thus, from the Russian point of view, the Assyrians had become one of the peoples of the Soviet Union.⁵¹

In 1935 the number of Assyrians in Russia was officially estimated at 50,000-60,000, but the 1939 census recorded not more than 20,000. They occupied eight villages in Transcaucasia and had also small colonies in Krasnodar, Rostov, Kiev, Leningrad and Moscow, where at one time over 2,000 Assyrians were counted. In all these places the Assyrians had their own national schools, and a special Assyrian section was established in the Teachers' Training College in the North Caucasus town of Armavir. Soviet Assyrians were looked after by a special Assyrian organization, 'Khoyadto', which both attended to their cultural needs and directed their mobilization for socialistic reconstruction work.

The Soviet Government found it a hard task to reconcile the Assyrian people with Bolshevik ideology, in view of their deep attachment to their ancient Nestorian Church. In April 1933, a statement of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee complained about 'undermining activities' which class-alien exploiting elements were alleged to have carried out amongst Soviet Assyrians. These 'elements' were said to have penetrated into Assyrian collective farms and co-operatives in an attempt to dominate them.

The régime also found fault with the communists and Communist Youth League members who had been recruited amongst the Assyrians in 'considerable numbers', for even Assyrian communists seemed to have kept faith with their nation and its rich traditions. In the middle of the thirties the authorities turned against a number of Assyrian communists who had proved to be 'prisoners of family ties', and who had defended 'class enemies' because of their Assyrian nationality. These 'communists' had denied the necessity of class struggle inside the Assyrian people since they could not see any class divisions within a nation which had concentrated all its energies on its survival.⁵²

Soviet philologists also tried to replace the 'archaic' Syriac alphabet of the Assyrians. At first they gave them a Russian alphabet, then, in 1930, a Latin alphabet. This had to be revised two years later because it

was 'unsuitable' and in the end the Russian alphabet was re-introduced.

Many 'Soviet Assyrians' disliked the anti-religious policy of the Bolsheviks, the continuous experiments which the Soviet authorities made with Assyrian cultural life, as well as the entire communist social system. A large number of Assyrians therefore left Russia for Iraq in the period between the wars to join the Assyrian levies under British command.

During and after the Second World War Soviet Russian power politics made use of the Assyrians of Northern Persia. Although their number was small Soviet occupation authorities mobilized them, together with local Armenians, in support of the pro-Russian autonomous régime established in Tabriz. After the withdrawal of the Red Army troops the Persian Assyrians suffered together with all other groups of the population in whom the Russians had shown particular interest.

RUSSIA AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

The small number of Assyrians in Middle Eastern countries (30,000 in Iraq, 9,000 in Syria, 25,000 in Persia) indicates that Russia could use them only for very limited purposes. The Kurds may become a more redoubtable instrument in Russian hands. They are one of the most important factors in the Middle East. How many Kurds are there altogether? This purely statistical question is in itself part of the 'Kurdish problem'. In Turkey, for instance, official data referring to 1945 say that their number in that country does not exceed 1,900,000, but sources more favourable to the Kurdish national point of view speak of 4,000,000 Turkish Kurds. It is significant that this latter figure is approvingly quoted in a Russian monograph on Turkey.⁵³ In addition, there are 800,000 Kurds in Iraq, 700,000 in Persia and 200,000 in Syria.

The four States with a Kurdish population are bound to draw closer to each other for military, geographical, political and economic reasons. The Kurdish question common to all of them to a greater or lesser degree may prove to cement their unity. Russia's interests are the exact opposite of those of the four Middle Eastern countries with Kurdish minorities. Russia is a bitter opponent of any kind of federation on her borders. What she wants is not Kurdish cement but Kurdish dynamite.

For a long time Soviet Russia had had no real Kurdish policy. The strength of Britain in the Middle East prevented both the Soviet Government and the Comintern from playing the Kurdish card. In Russian communist eyes the Kurds were but a 'counter-revolutionary force', a tool of British imperialism intended to embarrass Turkey, the Arab world and even the Soviet Union itself.

But even at the time when leading Soviet quarters still held this negative view on the Kurds, they envisaged the possibility of a change in the

evaluation of the Kurdish factor. From the cultural point of view the Kurds were still an unwritten sheet of paper. Soviet Russia, so the communist strategists may have argued, thus stood the chance of exercising a paramount influence on the development and the character of a future Kurdish culture, if she only tried.

The raw material for such a Soviet experiment was the small Kurdish minority in Transcaucasia. The exact number of the Kurds in Soviet Russia is as difficult to ascertain as their number in any other country. Officially Russia had only 54,700 Kurds in 1926 and 45,800 in 1939, but unofficial pre-war data recorded as many as 80,000, of whom 40,000 were in Azerbaidzhan, 23,000 in Armenia and the rest in Georgia and Turkmenistan. Only in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were the Kurds a political problem.

For a long time neither Azerbaidzhani nor Armenian communists seemed to have grasped the importance of the Kurds within the framework of a far-sighted Soviet policy in the Middle East. They either neglected the Kurdish minorities living in their respective republics or even tried to deprive them of their national character.

The Armenian communists disliked the Kurds in view of the role which the latter had played in the Armenian massacres, and thus showed not the slightest interest in their well-being and their mobilization for the Soviet State. Kurds in Armenia were not entrusted with political and social work, no skilled workers were recruited from among them and Kurdish peasants were not even organized into collective farms.⁶⁴ In 1936, the Soviet central Government strongly reprimanded the Armenian communists for letting national animosities interfere with their Kurdish policy.

All the mistakes which local Transcaucasian authorities committed in handling the Kurdish question in the inter-war period proved to be unimportant at a moment when Russia was able to use the Kurdish issue on a big scale. Her success in handling the problem was then indisputable. Colonel W. G. Elphinston, who was in charge of Kurdish affairs as a British Middle East Intelligence Officer, said that the effects of propaganda in the Kurdish language originating in the Kurdish community in the U.S.S.R. made themselves felt as far away as Syria, and communist pamphlets in Kurdish penetrated as far as Cairo.⁶⁵

The Kurdish group outside the U.S.S.R. most directly affected by Russian policy and propaganda were the Persian Kurds whose country was occupied by the Red Army between 1941 and 1946. The Soviet occupation authorities did not spread communist ideas among the Kurds; they did not propagate collectivization and nationalization. All they aimed at was to make the Kurds respectful to Soviet Russia, the Russian Army and Stalin. The Kurdish Republic set up with Russian help in 1946 under Quazi Mohammed as Prime Minister was a national

Kurdish State and not communist. It existed for only nine months, despite the Treaty of Alliance for twenty years which it had concluded with another Soviet-sponsored government, the autonomous administration of Persian Azerbaidzhan.

Even such short-lived experiments as the Kurdish Republic of 1946 can become an important factor in the national tradition of a people, who, like the Kurds, are living under foreign rule. Experiments of that kind are apt to create a myth which ultimately may have a greater impact on the national development of the people than the original event itself. From year to year the Kurdish Republic of Quazi Mohammed may appear to the Kurds more splendid and more powerful, particularly if Soviet propaganda does its share by reminding the Kurds of the downfall of 'their' republic and recalling the part which Russia played in its foundation. Soviet propaganda is indeed taking every opportunity of referring back to the glorious times when two pictures decorated the walls of the houses of many a Kurdish sheikh – that of Quazi Mohammed, the Kurdish leader, hanged by the Persians in March 1947, and that of Generalissimo Stalin.⁵⁶

Despite the collapse of 'Free Kurdistan' Soviet Russia has nevertheless made great progress in mastering the Kurdish problem. Kurdish chieftains became acquainted with Soviet institutions and Soviet ideology while the Russian occupation of Persia's Kurdish territories lasted. Many Persian Kurds joined their countrymen already living in Soviet Transcaucasia and Kurdish culture 'national in form and socialist in content' developed: 200 Kurdish pamphlets and books had been published in the Soviet Union by 1949.⁵⁷ Nor was there any shortage of qualified Kurdish personnel in the Soviet Union after the war. On the contrary, Soviet propaganda was able to boast of Kurdish 'state dignitaries and outstanding workers in culture and science', who had sprung up among the Russian Kurds. A Kurdish Soviet poet, Amin Avdal, is the 'author of wonderful verses on the Soviet homeland'. Another Kurdish poet, Jasmeh Jalil, translated Russian classics into his native tongue. A Kurdish philologist, Nure Pulatova, a graduate of Leningrad University, became the only Kurdish woman scholar in the world.⁵⁸ And lastly, between 1946 and 1950 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. included a Kurdish deputy, Samand Alievich Siabandov.

However important the recent Soviet experiments with the Russian Kurds may be, the latter represent not even 5 per cent of the entire Kurdish people. Soviet Russia must bring either the Turkish or the Persian Kurds within her orbit if she wants to make a success of her 'Kurdish policy'. It remains to be seen whether the political dynamic of the U.S.S.R. and the ideological power of Bolshevism will be sufficient to accomplish this aim.

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IX

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The possession of wide stretches of Central Asia is one of the essential factors which have made Russia a world power. The area east of the Caspian Sea and south of the lakes Aral and Balkash has, from the point of view of Russian power politics, far greater weight than the whole gigantic body of Siberia. This area is indeed the watchtower from which Russia can look into India, Western China and Afghanistan. With Central Asia as far as the Pamir in her hands, Russia has become an Asiatic power without losing her separate status as a European power, while the possession of the much larger but more isolated Siberia had made Russia only a Euro-Asiatic power.

Ethnically Central Asia is not the natural continuation of European Russia like Western Siberia. Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited by Asiatic peoples with an old history and an old civilization, is a colony of the Russian Empire where Russian colonization has been and still is active and successful.

THE CONQUEST

The Russian advance into Central Asia was carried out mainly in the nineteenth century, mostly during its latter half, although the foundations for the final conquest were laid and consolidated from the eighteenth century onwards.

Russia established her rule over Central Asia by a gigantic two-pronged strategic movement starting from Omsk in a southerly direction and from Orenburg in a south-easterly direction.

The main work had been performed from Orenburg, later named after Chkalov, the first Soviet pilot to fly from Russia to America across the North Pole. The foundation of Orenburg, which is no more than a provincial town on the border of Europe and Asia, was one of the most outstanding events in Russian history, ranking in importance not far behind the conquest of Kazan. Unlike the establishment of many other outposts of the Russian Empire, the beginnings of Orenburg did not result from Cossack exploits, but from careful geographical and political

planning. Some of the finest Russian brains of the epoch, such as I. K. Kirillov, the author of the first geographical atlas of the Russian Empire, and the prominent historian V. N. Tatishchev, were associated with the Orenburg project. It is characteristic of the methods of Russian colonization that Orenburg was actually founded three times. In 1737 the original Orenburg fortress was erected at the confluence of the rivers Or and Ural; in 1740 it was transplanted about 112 miles down the river, and in 1742 it was shifted to a place about 165 miles from Orenburg II. The very name of Orenburg was no longer justified since the fortress was, in its final location, far away from the Or river.

For a hundred years the Russians stopped at Orenburg. They used it as a cornerstone for the building of the Orenburg Line, a chain of small fortresses along the Ural river, but for a long time they did not move further. A similar chain of fortresses called the Irtysh Line was built at the north-eastern fringe of Central Asia, south of Omsk. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russians started to move again. They advanced from Orenburg to the Lake Aral and reached the mouth of the Syr Darya river in 1847. Starting from the Irtysh Line they pushed forward to the Lake Balkash and beyond. In 1853, troops of the military governor of Orenburg gained command of the middle course of the Syr Darya by capturing Ak Mechet, which then became the Fort Perovsk, while in the next year troops advancing from the Irtysh Line erected the fortress of Verny – 'The Faithful'.

The most triumphant day of the whole Central Asiatic campaign was June 15th, 1865, when General M. G. Chernayev, with only 1,500 men and twelve cannons, captured Tashkent against enemy forces 30,000 men strong and having fifty guns at their disposal. Only two persons were killed in the final 'assault' on the city, which became the administrative centre of Russian Central Asia.

Three years later another Russian force took, likewise almost without casualties, the town of Samarkand, once one of the most splendid cities of the world, for the possession of which Asiatic rulers had sacrificed tens of thousands of people. A great act of historic *revanche* was associated with this victory. In Samarkand was the grave of Timur the Lame, before whom Russia had trembled and whose men had set Moscow on fire.

From the point of view of Soviet Russian state ideology it is of no small importance that the most vital parts of Central Asia and, in particular, some large and famous towns joined Russia's fold, not as a result of bloody battles, but by virtue of the respect inspired by Russian might and superiority, and as the outcome of skilled manœuvring and diplomatic action. When the Soviet régime reconquered Central Asia for Russia from local nationalists during the Civil War, it was at a much higher cost in human life.

THE 'NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL DELIMITATION'

Soviet Central Asia went through many an experiment before taking its present shape. In the early years of Bolshevik rule Soviet Central Asia was still described as 'Turkestan', as it was under the Czarist Government. An Autonomous Turkestani S.S.R. was founded on May 1st, 1918. In addition there existed the 'Soviet People's Republics' (as distinct from 'Soviet Socialist Republics') of Bokhara and Khorezm, previously known as the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva. These two 'People's Republics' were formally outside the Soviet Union and were linked with the Russian Socialist Soviet Federation by treaties of alliance.

Turkestan, Bokhara and Khorezm had a multi-national character. The population of Turkestan consisted of 41·4 per cent Uzbeks, 10·8 per cent Kirghiz, 10·3 per cent Kazakhs, 7·7 per cent Tadzhiks, 4·7 per cent Turkmenians. Khorezm had 61 per cent Uzbeks and 28·8 per cent Turkmenians. 98·6 per cent of all Kirghiz and 66·5 per cent of all Uzbeks lived in Turkestan, but the Tadzhiks were almost equally divided between Bokhara and Turkestan, while the Turkmenians were split between three territorial units: 43·2 per cent lived in Turkestan, 27 per cent in Bokhara and 29·8 per cent in Khorezm.

The Soviet régime considered that its task in Central Asia consisted in establishing national states for Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmenians and Kirghiz. This was achieved by the formal annexation by Soviet Russia and partition of Bokhara and Khorezm and by the disbandment of the Turkestani A.S.S.R. This whole process was officially described as the 'national-territorial delimitation' of Soviet Central Asia. It was decided upon in principle in September 1924, and carried out by the spring of 1925. As an outcome of the 'delimitation' 94·2 per cent of all Turkmenians were allocated to a Turkmenian Soviet Republic, 82·6 per cent of all Uzbeks of the U.S.S.R. to Uzbekistan, 86·7 per cent of all Kirghiz to Kirghizistan and 75·2 per cent of all Tadzhiks to Tadzhikistan.¹ (These percentages do not, however, take into account those Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, etc., who are living outside the Soviet Union.) Not all of the newly formed national territories were immediately given the rank of fully fledged Soviet Republics. Tadzhikistan, for instance, was an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan until 1929, when it was raised in status. Kirghizistan, originally an Autonomous Soviet Republic within the R.S.F.S.R., became a Soviet Republic as late as 1936. In the same year, Kazakhstan became the fifth Soviet Republic of Central Asia.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ROLE OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

For the Soviet Union, Central Asia became more important than it had ever been for Czarist Russia. In addition to being a strategic watch-tower, Central Asia became a Soviet show-window for the peoples of the East. This double role of Central Asia was always present in the minds of Lenin and Stalin.

Lenin said in 1919: 'The establishment of relations of the right kind with the peoples of Turkestan has now, without any exaggeration, a gigantic world-historic importance for the R.S.F.S.R.'² In 1923, Stalin elaborated on this idea when he declared: 'Turkestan is the most important Soviet Republic from the point of view of revolutionizing the East. . . . The task is to transform Turkestan into a model republic, into an advanced post for revolutionizing the East. With this aim in view it is necessary to concentrate on Turkestan in the sense of raising the cultural level of the masses, of putting the state machinery into the hands of the local peoples, etc. We have to fulfil this task whatever the price may be without sparing efforts and without shrinking from sacrifices. . . .'³

Stalin always remained faithful to the 'show-window' idea as far as Central Asia was concerned. When, in connection with the new Soviet constitution, Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan were transformed into Union Republics, Stalin and his experts on nationalities policy immediately assessed the importance which this gesture might have on Russia's Asiatic neighbours. Thus Semyon M. Dimanshtein, Stalin's former collaborator at the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, wrote 'One cannot overlook the fact that Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan are situated on the borders of the Soviet land. They are objects of tremendous interest for their foreign neighbours - China, Persia and for the comparatively near Afghanistan; every forward step carried out by the Soviet Republics meets with a loving echo in the hearts of those peoples suffering under the yoke of imperialistic States and enduring all the horrors of the colonial rule of imperialist robbers. . . . They see from the example of the national republics located near to them and belonging to the U.S.S.R. how national and social liberation can be achieved. Their hopes receive a new inspiration with every success of the formerly oppressed peoples of the U.S.S.R. We can be bold enough to declare that the transformation of Kirghizistan and Kazakhstan will have a great echo beyond our frontiers'.

In this statement which was made in July 1936 in the journal *Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, Dimanshtein mentioned China, Persia and Afghanistan as countries which Soviet Russia wanted to impress by her policy on nationalities in Central Asia; he might have added

India to that list. Russian objectives in each of those countries are of a very different nature. The idea of annexing the whole or part of Afghanistan is from a Russian point of view not unreal. Nor can it be ruled out by a far-sighted Soviet policy. The idea of transforming Persia into an 'Iranian People's Republic' seemed to have been harboured and repeatedly encouraged by the Soviet rulers. In India, Russian aims were bound to be more modest. None the less, the Bolshevik leaders have always indulged in the hope that important sections of Indian public opinion can be influenced by clever propaganda on the achievements in Soviet Central Asia, and more particularly so if this propaganda were not conducted via Moscow but by reliable allegedly independent 'national governments' of Soviet Central Asia.

In regard to China, despite its long common frontier with Soviet Central Asia, the latter represents no more than a secondary base for a Russian political and propaganda offensive. The part assigned to Soviet Central Asia in a campaign against a hostile China was of a purely local character. It consisted of loosening the ties between the sparsely populated Chinese Turkestan and China proper.

Soviet Central Asia can fulfil its many-sided tasks within the framework of Russian power politics by its division into five Soviet Republics, each of which has a special part to play in Russia's relations with the outside world. The Soviet Government was fully aware of the fact that each of the five principal peoples of Soviet Central Asia had racial brothers living on the other side of the Russian border. There are Turkmenians both in Persia and Afghanistan; Tadzhiks both in Afghanistan and India; Uzbeks in Afghanistan; Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Western China. It was, therefore, logical to assume that the very existence of national Turkmenian, Tadzhik, Kirghiz and Uzbek Republics would exercise a certain attraction on their kinsmen beyond the Soviet borders. It was even logical to believe that this attraction might ultimately lead to an enlargement of the 'national republics' of the U.S.S.R., and in the final analysis to an enlargement of the Russian Empire.

THE FIGHT AGAINST CENTRAL ASIATIC UNITY

By dividing Soviet Central Asia into five national republics the Government of the Soviet Union not only served the aims of its foreign policy but also safeguarded the stability of Russian rule in Soviet Central Asia itself. With the exception of the Tadzhiks and some minor ethnical groups, the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia are all Turkic peoples intimately inter-related. The formation of a Central Asiatic federation would, therefore, be quite logical and would probably correspond to the desires of the peoples concerned. Such a federation is, however, bound

to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite, such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.⁵

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.⁴

endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.⁶

Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia this is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system.

The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority

* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942-3.† As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.‡ In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.¶

of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek, Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.¹⁰

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan, which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

chromium deposits and possesses 57·4 per cent of all copper, 56·3 per cent of all lead, 49·8 per cent of all zinc, in the U.S.S.R., in addition to its wealth in coal, oil and silver. Moreover, 15 per cent of the entire stocks of cattle and 20 per cent of the sheep of the U.S.S.R. are found in the territory of Kazakhstan. Both the size of the Republic and its extraordinary economic importance make Kazakhstan a most suitable model for the study of Soviet nationalities policy in Central Asia.

Soviet policy in Kazakhstan is based on ensuring the political and ideological reliability of this rich country with its vast potentialities. This aim is to be achieved by destroying any organized Kazakh national movement, by wiping out all anti-Russian tendencies among the Kazakh communists and non-party people and by spiritually transforming the Kazakhs into Russians.

After the October Revolution the Soviet régime in Kazakhstan was faced with a powerful Kazakh nationalist movement, the 'Alash Orda', which, like other Oriental nationalist parties of its kind, was at first courted by the communists and later dropped and most bitterly attacked. Kazakh communists were a rare species at that time. Most Communist Party organizations in Kazakhstan had but 1 to 5 per cent of Kazakh members, while the entire party machinery was in Russian hands. The Russian colonists who, particularly since the end of the nineteenth century, had penetrated into the Kazakh steppe, were the only solid pillar on which communist propaganda could rely in Kazakhstan.

On the whole the Russian colonization of Kazakhstan was accomplished in twenty years – from 1893 to 1912. During that period the total male population which poured into that country, and particularly into its northern and central districts, numbered 750,600. Russian colonization advanced even in far-off South-eastern Kazakhstan, including the town of Verny, which in 1910 had 26,000 Russians among its 37,000 inhabitants. In varying strength the Russians spread over practically the whole of Kazakhstan, introduced agriculture into that country of cattle breeding nomads and occupied wide stretches of the most fertile and valuable parts of the Kazakh steppe.

In the years following the October Revolution Kazakh nationalists threatened to annihilate Russian colonization by sending the colonists back to Russia proper and making Kazakhstan a Kazakh country. Had they succeeded, a large part of Central Asia would have become a prey to anarchy and famine, but they failed thanks to the Russian communists who defended in Kazakhstan the interests of both the Russian people and the Russian State.

The Soviet Government ruled Kazakhstan at first from Orenburg, which was merely at the periphery and practically outside the country. In 1925 the capital of the then 'Kazakh Autonomous S.S.R.' was moved right into the Kazakh steppe, to Kzyl Orda (formerly 'Ak Mechet'

meaning 'White Mosque'), so that the régime could increase its hold on the Kazakh people. Orenburg was separated from Kazakhstan and added to Russia proper. This measure, amply warranted by the Russian character of Orenburg, was a very important operation. It separated the Volga Moslems from the Moslems of Central Asia and thus thwarted nationalist dreams about a great united State of Russia's Turkic peoples.

The name of the new administrative centre, 'Kzyl Orda', which stands for 'Red Capital', was soon devoid of meaning since in 1927 it was decided to move the capital to Eastern Kazakhstan, to Alma Ata, formerly Verny.

SOVIETIZATION OF THE KAZAKH VILLAGE

The chief problem facing the communist rulers of Kazakhstan was the Sovietization of the Kazakh aul (village), and this process was not made much easier by the shifting of the capital from Orenburg to Kzyl Orda and from Kzyl Orda to Alma Ata. In 1926 there was but one communist in every 1,000 of the Kazakh 'aul' population, and most of these 'aul communists' were technically and politically illiterate.¹¹ In that year only 5 per cent of the responsible posts in Kazakhstan's village councils were in the hands of communists. Many councils were controlled by the 'bais' who were more than a mere Central Asiatic counterpart of the Russian 'kulak'; they were chiefs of clans and leaders of an anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian Kazakh nationalism. In order to curb the power of the 'bais', the communists established a special class movement of the village poor known in Central Asia as 'Koshchi'. At first this measure also failed. The 'bais' infiltrated into the 'Koshchi' organization under the guise of village poor. In 1928, 2,000 'bais' were expelled from the organization and 700 'bais' exiled to 'distant areas' after confiscation of their cattle.

The Soviet authorities were unable to devote their undivided attention to the class struggle in Kazakhstan. They were forced to check at the same time the strong nationalist tendencies among the first Kazakh communists. It seems that the majority of the party leadership was, in 1927, in the hands of the nationalists whose chief aim was to carry out land reform at the expense of the Russian and Ukrainian colonists. A Communist Party conference summoned under the auspices of the nationalist Kazakh elements decided that in Kazakhstan Kazakhs must have priority in questions of land distribution. Russian and Ukrainian peasants were to receive their share only after the needs of the Kazakhs had been satisfied. The Government of Kazakhstan implemented this decision without waste of time. Russians and Ukrainians were speedily removed from their fertile fields and transferred to unproductive stony ground.

In this situation the central authorities of the Soviet State put their whole weight on the side of the Slav peasants and declared null and void all anti-European discriminatory measures. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan, from which nationalist elements were removed, had to hold another conference revising the decision of the previous one and proclaiming the absolute equality of all nationalities in respect of land distribution. The Kazakh nationalist wing inside the Communist Party never recovered from that blow. For about five years an old Russian Bolshevik, Filip Isayevich Goloshchokin, became the ruler of the country in his capacity as party secretary. Under his proconsulate not only was the existing Slav colonization protected, but the country was opened to new colonists, particularly in connection with the construction of the Turkestan-Siberia (Turksib) railway line cutting across Eastern Kazakhstan. The Turksib was opened in 1930 at a ceremony which was meant to be a big communist pan-Asiatic manifestation. The speakers on that occasion were significantly enough the veteran Japanese communist leader, Sen Katayama (1859-1933), and representatives of Soviet Bashkiria and Soviet Kazakhstan. While the building of the Turksib greatly improved the communication system in Soviet Central Asia, it did not acquire the importance which the Bolshevik leadership had initially attributed to it. The original assumption that several million Europeans would be able to settle down within a few years on both sides of the railway line proved to be erroneous.

The Turksib was by no means Goloshchokin's only miscalculation. In line with instructions received from the central Government he tried to settle the Kazakh nomad population and to create collective farms in large numbers for the very people who had just abandoned their nomadic way of life. In a single year Goloshchokin and his underlings tried to transform 400,000 nomads into a settled population attached to collective farms. This attempt failed for a variety of reasons. The Kazakh Vice-Premier, U. D. Kulumbetov, openly admitted in 1932 that the settlement of the nomads had been carried out by high-handed administrative measures without having, by means of propaganda, prepared the minds of the people concerned and without having ensured in advance the economic conditions necessary for such an important operation'.^{12*}

Kazakh nationalists opposed the settlement of the nomads and collectivization because they considered both as tantamount to Russification and to the confiscation of cattle belonging to Kazakhs. Indeed, the collectivization of agriculture and cattle breeding increased the influence of Russian and Ukrainian settlers in Kazakhstan because of the 'assistance' which Slav collective farmers had to give to their

* Kulumbetov was executed as a 'bourgeois nationalist' in March 1935 together with eighteen other leading Kazakhs.

Kazakh colleagues. Russian and Ukrainian collective farms established a 'sheftstvo' or 'patronage' over Kazakh collective farms.

In the early part of 1932 the situation in Kazakhstan got completely out of hand. Seventy per cent of all newly founded collective farms collapsed, the so-called 'liquidated nomads' resumed their nomadic way of life, slaughtered a large part of their cattle and fled across the Soviet-Chinese border into Sinkiang. In some districts of Kazakhstan livestock was reduced by 50 per cent.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party intervened and recalled Goloshchokin. On September 17th, 1932, it issued a statement denouncing the 'serious political mistakes' which he had committed.¹³ The Central Committee sent two men to Kazakhstan to clear up the entangled situation. They were L. M. Kaganovich, who headed a special mission in charge of the stabilization of Kazakh agriculture and cattle breeding, and an Armenian, C. I. Mirzoyan, who replaced Goloshchokin as party secretary. One of his main tasks was to attract more Kazakhs into the administration, which his predecessor had badly neglected. The beginning of his activity was not very promising in this direction. Mirzoyan arrived in Kazakhstan with a staff of forty Russians and Armenians whom he placed in responsible positions.

In the economic sphere the situation improved after the termination of 'left-wing megalomania' in autumn 1932. The decree of September 17th stipulated that nomadic cattle breeders after having joined collective farms could own privately as many as eight to ten cows, one hundred sheep and goats, eight to ten horses and three to five camels.* Even collective farmers conducting a sedentary life could own two to three cows, ten to twenty sheep and ten to twenty pigs. These concessions led to a consolidation of Kazakh cattle breeding, but on the political front conditions continued to be difficult even under Mirzoyan. The years between 1932 and 1936 were a period of tension in Kazakhstan due to the activities of 'Trotskyist and Bukharinist elements and of Kazakh nationalist deviationists intent on selling socialist Kazakhstan to the imperialists of Fascist Germany and Japan'.¹⁴ These elements – so official Soviet sources alleged – tried to disrupt the industrialization of the country, to undermine collective farms and to arouse discontent among workers and collective farmers against the Soviet power. The 'enemies of the people' were even accused of killing shock-brigade workers, of provoking railway accidents and of organizing attempts on the life of communist leaders. Party secretary Mirzoyan was held responsible for all these happenings and removed from his post in 1938.

* The Model Statute of the Agricultural Artel of 1935 increased the maximum figures for the nomadic cattle breeders to eight for camels and to 150 for sheep and goats.

INDUSTRIAL COLONIZATION

Economic, political and ethnical conditions in Kazakhstan were greatly affected by the industrialization of the country. Soviet power established the third largest coal-producing centre of the U.S.S.R. in the Karaganda area of Central Kazakhstan; it encouraged oil production at Emba and copper mining at Balkash and Karsakpay. Large numbers of Russian and Ukrainian skilled workers, engineers and technicians were imported to staff the new enterprises. The immigrants, many of whom came from the principal Bolshevik bulwarks, Moscow, Leningrad, the Donets Basin and Baku, included a very high percentage of Communist Party members. Thus the new industrial colonists provided not only manpower but also consolidated communism in Kazakhstan by increasing numerically the politically reliable elements in the country.

With the help of the immigrants the urban population of Kazakhstan rose from 9 per cent in 1926 to 17 per cent in 1936, and to 27·7 per cent in 1939. In 1949 there were as many as thirty-six towns and 100 workers' settlements in the country most of which had come into being under the Soviet régime.¹⁵ Before the Second World War, Alma Ata, the Kazakh capital, had 230,000 inhabitants and Karaganda 165,000 inhabitants. A new town, Temir Tau, which came into existence after the war, will eventually accommodate 100,000 people.

The increasing concentration of the population of the republic in towns enabled the régime to exercise control over the country more efficiently. From the point of view of Kazakh national interests urbanization turned out to be harmful because the natural increase of the Kazakhs lagged behind the growth of the towns in their territory. The new towns were thus bound to become predominantly Russian, and Russians took a prominent part in their administration. Thus in 1933, when Karaganda was still in process of growing, the city council of 150 members and 56 alternate members was made up of 115 Kazakhs, 81 Russians, 4 Tartars and 6 'others'.

More and more former Kazakh cattle breeders are being transformed into unskilled workers and town dwellers. In 1940 about half of the total number of workers employed in Kazakhstan were Kazakhs against one-third in 1930. However, this increase was not sufficient to give the Kazakhs an economically decisive position in their homeland. There are too few of them in the skilled and intellectual professions. Thus out of 100,000 tractor and harvest combine drivers in Kazakhstan, only 26,000 were Kazakhs at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, and in 1938 there were only 203 Kazakh students at Alma Ata University out of a total of 865. This was a remarkable achievement perhaps, if compared with conditions under the Czarist régime, but not enough to

guarantee to the Kazakhs a political future in a country where the cult of the specialist prevails.¹⁶

Czarist colonization policy had established an important Slav minority in Kazakhstan. Soviet colonization policy went further; it completely reversed the balance of nationalities and transformed the Kazakh people into a virtual minority in their own country. In 1926 there were 57 per cent Kazakhs in Kazakhstan against 19·8 per cent Russians, and 13·2 per cent Ukrainians, while the remaining 10 per cent were split up among various Asiatic peoples. By 1939 the Kazakhs formed less than 50 per cent of the population in 'their' republic. According to the census of January 17th, 1939, the whole population of Kazakhstan then numbered 6,146,000, while the total number of Kazakhs in the entire Soviet Union was 3,098,000, of whom at least 10 per cent were living outside Kazakhstan in various Central Asiatic Republics and in Russian industrial centres.

Official Soviet statistics likewise reveal that under the Soviet régime the Kazakhs have declined numerically. Between 1926 and 1939, the number of Kazakhs in the Soviet Union dropped by 869,000. Taking into account the average rate of increase of the population of the U.S.S.R. there ought to have been an increase of 631,000 Kazakhs. Thus the actual population deficit of the Kazakhs in the period roughly covered by the first two Five-Year Plans amounted to at least 1,500,000. No satisfactory explanation has been given so far for this development, but migration movements into Sinkiang have been mentioned as one of the reasons for the 'disappearance' of so many Kazakhs.¹⁷

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE KAZAKH SOUL

During the first thirty years of Soviet power the external pacification of the rather recalcitrant Kazakh people made great headway; the struggle for the soul of the Kazakhs is still, however, as fierce as ever. One of the essential objectives of that struggle is to bring about the complete harmony between the Kazakh and the Russian conception of history. It is, of course, taken for granted that whenever history as seen from the Kazakh point of view clashes with the official Soviet Russian version, the former must give way to the latter.

The Soviet Russian conception of Kazakhstan's history may be reduced to four cut and dried formulae to which Kazakh intellectuals, and more particularly writers and historians, were bidden to subscribe. These were as follows:—

1. The Union of Kazakhstan with Russia was an aim which had been pursued by the most prominent and far-sighted rulers of the Kazakh people since the end of the sixteenth century.
2. The Union of Kazakhstan with Russia had prevented the enslavement

of the Kazakhs by the 'barbarian States of the Orient' and brought them into close contact with a country 'incomparably more civilized' than all their Asiatic neighbours.

3. The annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia had ended the partition of that country between China, Russia and Kokand, and had opened the way to more progressive forms of economy.

4. All through their history the Kazakhs had never possessed a genuine well-organized State, only loosely connected semi-state organizations. The Soviet régime had enabled the Kazakhs to have a real State of their own – the Kazakh S.S.R.

Even Kazakh communist intellectuals whose devotion to the Soviet régime is beyond doubt were unable to agree with the aforesaid principles, particularly the last. These intellectuals expressed their viewpoint in a voluminous *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.*, which was published in 1943 and to which sixteen historians and seven writers had contributed. It is true that not all of this team of twenty-three were Kazakhs since they had been assisted by Russian scholars; nevertheless the compilation of the *History* constituted primarily an effort on the part of the native Kazakh intelligentsia.

While the authors' views on Kazakhstan's history under Soviet rule were fully in keeping with the official party line, they were accused of having committed 'grave errors' when dealing with the more remote past of the Kazakh people. The principal 'errors' consisted in considering Czarist Russia as the chief and most dangerous enemy of the Kazakh people; in expressing regret at the liquidation of the primitive 'shuzy' – or hordes – as the Kazakh 'States' which had come into existence since the sixteenth century were called, and in idealizing Kazakh national leaders who had refused to accept Russian rule. Because of these and similar 'errors' the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.* was withdrawn from circulation, despite the fact that it had been originally heralded as an important step forward in the development of the Asiatic peoples of the Soviet Union, inasmuch as it represented the first comprehensive history of a Central Asiatic Soviet Republic.

While the Second World War was still in progress, the Communist Party leadership instructed the authors of the *History* to undertake a thorough revision of the book in a spirit of Kazakh-Russian brotherhood.¹⁸ It took them over seven years to complete this task. A 'Second, Revised and Supplemented Edition' of the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.* was published in two volumes in 1949 and 1950. From the official point of view the new edition marked a great improvement, but it still contained 'serious errors' in the description of events connected with the incorporation of Kazakhstan into the Russian State. Early in 1951 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan decided that the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.* would have to be revised once more.

Soviet propagandists have carefully selected all the historical facts tending to prove that Kazakhstan is a dependency of Great Russia not only politically but also culturally. Thus they have laid great stress on a short visit which Pushkin paid to some Kazakh auls near Orenburg, an event important enough to give Pushkin's name to the library of Alma Ata, the largest in Kazakhstan.

F. M. Dostojevsky too became part of Kazakh cultural history and cultural life, having lived as an exile in Kazakhstan for nine years. He is said to have considerably influenced the development of Kazakh culture, mainly because of his friendship with the first Kazakh intellectual to have a European education – Chokhan Valikhanov (1835–65). This first Kazakh to exchange the life of the steppe for one at St. Petersburg University, was treated with great friendliness by the most distinguished Russians of his time, such as the geographer, Semyonov-Tyanshansky, and the poet, Maikov, who never considered him as an 'exotic' oddity but treated him as an equal.

Soviet publications strongly underline that all the other outstanding Kazakh intellectuals in Czarist times have been no less closely connected with Russian culture. Thus the greatest Kazakh poet, Abai Kunanbayev (1845–1905), translated Krylov, Pushkin and Lermontov into Kazakh and made Pushkin as popular among his people as the favourite native poets. The first Kazakh pedagogue, Ibrai Altynsarin (1841–89), was an ardent missionary of Russian civilization and founder of mixed Kazakh-Russian schools. He was the first to transcribe Kazakh in the Russian alphabet, fifty years ahead of the introduction of that 'reform' by the Soviet régime. The relationships which had existed between Kazakhs like Valikhanov, Kunanbayev and Altynsarin and the Russians are held up as an example to the present generation of Kazakhs, but this argument is neither convincing nor logical. The fact that enlightened Russians of the nineteenth century helped in the development of the Kazakh people and that Pushkin inspired the first Kazakh poets is by no means a reason for the Kazakhs of our time to look to a communist Moscow for guidance. Those Kazakh intellectuals who master the positive elements of Russian culture, such as the humanism of Pushkin, must on the contrary inevitably turn their backs on the distorted form of Russian civilization propagated by the Soviet régime.

II. KIRGHIZISTAN

RUSSIAN COLONIZATION

In Kirghizistan as in Kazakhstan Russian mass colonization was the factor which determined the development of the country in the twentieth century. Russian colonization in Kirghizistan started in 1866,

but became really important only after 1907. Up to that year only twenty Russian settlements existed in Northern Kirghizistan, but between 1907 and 1914, sixty-one settlements were founded. In South-west Kirghizistan, the Kirghiz part of the Ferghana plain, where Russian colonization was practically non-existent until 1906, fifty Russian settlements were established between that year and 1915.¹⁹

Russian colonization proved to be a serious menace to the rather small Kirghiz people. Between 1902 and 1913 the Kirghiz population of the Russian Empire had decreased by 8 or 9 per cent. The position had been aggravated further by a national disaster, namely, the unsuccessful uprising of 1916 when the Kirghiz, the Kazakhs and other Central Asiatic peoples revolted against the introduction of conscription. The Kirghiz rising had an all-national character, with members of the feudal upper-class, the 'Manaps' and 'Bais', not only participating in it, but even assuming the leadership of the movement. It is estimated that during the rising 150,000 Kirghiz were killed either by Czarist punitive expeditions or by Russian colonists. In addition a great number of Kirghiz died of starvation in China where they had sought refuge. All in all about 30 per cent of the Kirghiz people perished for various reasons between 1915 and 1920. Losses were greatest in the northern part of the present Kirghiz Soviet Republic which had been almost completely cleared of its Kirghiz population.

Soviet propaganda claims that the Soviet régime 'saved' the Kirghiz from extinction. In reality, the régime did not stop the suffocation of the Kirghiz by the Slavs, but on the contrary gave it a new impetus. In 1926 the Kirghiz accounted for about two-thirds of the population of their republic. On the eve of the Second World War their number had dropped to about 50 per cent. In the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, elected on February 16th, 1947, the Kirghiz received 56.6 per cent of the seats, which was slightly more than they were entitled to on the basis of their numerical strength. The Russians got 25.1 per cent and the Ukrainians 8.7 per cent of the seats. These figures must be compared to the returns of the 1926 census when Russians and Ukrainians accounted respectively for 11.7 per cent and 6.45 per cent of the entire population.

Russian influence dominates every aspect of life in the Kirghiz S.S.R. At the end of 1949 the Kirghiz occupied only 17.8 per cent of all the leading industrial posts of the country. In the same year the percentage of the Kirghiz in the planning, financial and trade organs of Kirghizistan was 27 per cent.* Nearly all the remaining jobs were in the hands of Europeans and notably of Russians. The capital of the republic – Frunze – is an essentially Russian town bearing the name of a Russian communist leader, Mikhail Frunze, descendant of a family of colonists

* *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, October 10th, 1949.

who had settled in the country. Przhevalsk, another of the very few towns in the land of the Kirghiz, was named after a famous Russian explorer of Central Asia, N. M. Przhevalsky (1839–88), its native name of Karakol having been abandoned.

Soviet policy aiming at settling the nomads proved to be even more disastrous in Kirghizistan than in Kazakhstan. The decline of livestock in Kirghizistan was catastrophic. The number of sheep and goats dropped in 1937 to 1,886,000 from 3,665,000 in 1914 and 5,906,000 in 1928–29. The number of cattle between 1914 and 1937 underwent the following changes: 1914, 477,299; 1928, 1,084,000; 1937, 486,000.

The Communist Party shifted the whole responsibility for this economic plight on to Kirghiz nationalists. The opposition to collectivization and the settlement of the nomads in Kirghizistan was officially referred to as 'Sydykovshchina' (or Sydykovism) so called after Abdukerim Sydykov, a prominent member of the Kirghiz State Planning Commission. He was accused of being the leader of a counter-revolutionary feudal 'bai' organization engaged in sabotage, disruption of the collective farms and even armed struggle against the Soviet régime.²⁰ Another prominent Kirghiz to be expelled from the party was Prime Minister Yusup Abdurakhmanov. He was unmasked as a traitor because he had allegedly demanded that no Kirghiz bread should be exported to Uzbekistan. The most outstanding Kirghiz communist to be purged was Taras Ryskulovich Ryskulov, who was the only Kirghiz to acquire all-Union importance in the first thirty years of Soviet power. Ryskulov was, in 1922, Stalin's deputy in his capacity of Peoples' Commissar of Nationalities; he was later Vice-Premier of the R.S.F.S.R. and occupied various other prominent positions in Moscow, until he disappeared in the great clean-up of 1937.

'RUSSIAN MARCH TO VICTORY'

On the Kirghiz 'cultural front' the Soviet régime for a long period used to encourage anti-Chinese traditions which are rather deep-rooted among the Kirghiz. The history of the struggle between the Kirghiz and China is summarized in the epic work *Manas*, the 'Iliad of the steppe', as the Kazakh scholar Valikhanov describes it. *Manas* is an encyclopaedic compilation of all the Kirghiz legends and folk tales grouped around one single person, Manas, hero of countless battles against the Kirghiz' enemies, particularly against the Chinese who are depicted throughout the epic as 'terrible and dangerous opponents'.²¹ In the U.S.S.R. *Manas* is considered the longest epic work in world literature; several months would be required to recite it from beginning to end. Before the October Revolution only extracts from *Manas* had been written down and the recording in written form of the complete

epic poem was due to the initiative of the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party.*

The most important Kirghiz literary work written under the Soviet régime, *The Bloodstained Years*, by Aaly Tokombayev, also has to a certain extent an anti-Chinese tinge. Tokombayev is the greatest contemporary Kirghiz poet and writer, and his book, revered as a Gospel by the young Kirghiz generation, depicts the misfortunes which befell the Kirghiz people after the 1916 rising and especially the sufferings to which they were exposed in Western China where they had sought refuge. The book ends with the description of the Kirghiz returning to a new and free Russia after having been robbed of all their possessions by the Chinese authorities. The conclusions to be drawn from Tokombayev's work are that there can be no future for the Kirghiz and no solution of their problems outside Russia and without the Russian people. This is clearly stated in the advice which Adymkul – the hero – gives to his friend, Dzhunuzh:

'The Czar has been dethroned, and now, Dzhunuzh,

Follow the Russian banner and Russian march to Victory!'²³

The 'Russian march to Victory' in Kirghizistan brought in its wake, among other things, a considerable measure of cultural progress embracing native dramatic art, literature, literary translations into Kirghiz poetry, etc. At the same time, however, the Soviet régime severely regimented Kirghiz cultural life and prevented it from assuming a genuinely Kirghiz national character.

The great literary purge which started in the autumn of 1946 in most parts of the Soviet Union was carried out in Kirghizistan by a predominantly Russian party bureaucracy headed by the First Secretary, the Russian Nikolay Semyonovich Bogolyubov. It was he who rebuked Kirghiz poets, writers and playwrights for having favoured in their works Kirghiz historical subjects to the detriment of those 'reflecting the life of the Soviet people'. The party leadership took particularly to task the Kirghiz theatre, for having produced historical plays and for having portrayed 'backward people, not characteristic of the Soviet epoch'.²⁴

Soon after the purge of Kirghiz literature, the head of the Propaganda Department of the Kirghiz Communist Party, Soronbayev, was replaced by a new man. The new propaganda secretary, Orozaliev, discovered

* After the establishment of a communist régime in China official Soviet enthusiasm for *Manas* faded away. Its folk character and its historicity were then questioned.²⁵ The 'revaluation' of *Manas* is, however, not only motivated by opportunist considerations but it is also connected with a general change in the party attitude towards the great literary epics produced by the peoples of the Soviet Orient. Thus from April 1951 onwards the Communist Party and its subsidiary organizations denounced the Azerbaidzhani national epic *Dede Korkud* as 'anti-popular' and 'reactionary' although previously it had been praised in the most enthusiastic terms. Just as *Manas* had been compared with the *Iliad*, *Dede Korkud* was ranked on the same level as the most ancient Russian epic *Lay of Igor's Regiment*.

more 'ideological mistakes' in the summer of 1947, this time in the field of history. He accused the Language, Literature and History Institute of the Kirghiz Branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences of ignoring the class-struggle aspect of Kirghiz history, thus failing to show in its true light the role played by the *bais*, *manaps* and *khans*.

Almost identical criticisms were applied on various occasions to the works of the historians of many a Soviet nationality. However, the Kirghiz case differs from other similar cases in so far as those guilty of 'nationalist deviation' were not only Kirghiz nationalists but included two Russian scholars of Jewish origin, Professor A. Bernshtam and S. Abramson. In his book, *Outline of Kirghiz Culture*, Abramson had expressed the heretical point of view that the Kirghiz popular masses submitted reluctantly to Russian rule, whereas the upper class, the *manaps*, accepted it willingly. Bernshtam's offence was even graver: he had the temerity to compare one of the historic local rulers of the Kirghiz – Ormon Khan – with the Russian Czar, Ivan the Terrible, whose personality and reign occupy a place of honour in the Stalinist conception of Russian history.²⁵

III. UZBEKISTAN

While Kazakhstan is territorially the largest of the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics, Uzbekistan has the biggest population. The ethnic group from which Uzbekistan derives its name, the *Uzbeks*, are 5,000,000 strong and are the largest non-Slav people of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan forms the very heart of Central Asia and is the only Central Asiatic Republic to have common borders with each of the four other republics. Both their numerical strength and their geographical position make it easy for the *Uzbeks* to play a leading part among the Central Asiatic peoples. Moreover, of all nationalities in Soviet Central Asia the *Uzbeks* have the strongest and most continuous state tradition. They had been the politically decisive force in such States as the Khanate of Kokand which had come to an end in 1875 and the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva which existed until after the downfall of the Czarist Russian Empire.

After the collapse of Czarism the *Uzbeks* tried to recover what they had lost during half a century of Russian rule, and fought for some kind of statehood not only in Bokhara but throughout the territory of Turkestan, the *Uzbek* 'living space'. These aspirations towards national independence found an outlet in the formation of a short-lived Autonomous Turkestan Government in Kokand which collapsed in February 1918, and later on in the *Basmachi* movement which comprised not only *Uzbeks* but all anti-Soviet elements of Turkestan. The word '*Basmachi*' means 'bandit' or 'robber' in the *Uzbek* tongue, but for anti-Soviet

Uzbek nationalists it had become identical with 'patriot' and even 'holy warrior'.²⁶ The hold of the nationalist-religious factor on the population even after the termination of organized bandit fighting in Uzbekistan can best be gauged by the attitude of Uzbek Moslems towards women whom the Soviet authorities, by force or persuasion, had induced to abandon the veil. In 1927-28 hundreds of these unfortunate women were killed by their own relatives for having violated one of the essential commandments of Islam.²⁷

The vigorous nationalist resistance movement which existed in Uzbekistan in the years following the October Revolution caused the Moscow Government to fear that the Uzbek Soviet Republic might become the point of departure for a re-unification of all Turkestani Moslems. A strong Uzbekistan might even have become a potential ally of an anti-Soviet power and a threat to Russia. To prevent the Uzbeks from embarking on an independent policy and developing into an important factor in the destinies of Central Asia, the Soviet Government created for them the most inorganic and one might almost say the most 'crippled' of all the Central Asiatic Soviet 'States', very long and narrow in shape and with abnormally long frontiers. In the final form which it assumed after some experiments and adjustments, the republic is almost 900 miles long and 200 miles wide at its widest point. Its area is 157,000 square miles, but two-fifths of it belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakia, a thinly populated territory bordering Lake Aral.*

SAMARKAND AND TASHKENT

From the point of view of political strategy the selection of the Uzbek capital was as important as the drawing of the republic's boundaries. At first the choice of the Soviet leaders fell on Samarkand, birthplace in 1904 of the Moslem reform movement, 'Dzhadidism', and an important centre of progressive Turkestani nationalism ever since. The Communist Party attempted to conquer Samarkand from within by making it the seat of Uzbekistan's Soviet Government.

Samarkand proved a bitter disappointment to the Bolshevik leadership. It seems that some Uzbek communist intellectuals, instead of applying themselves to the transformation of Samarkand into a bulwark of the Soviet régime, were seduced by the spirit of that old oriental city where every stone breathes Moslem tradition. After the unsuccessful experiment with Samarkand the communist Government of Uzbekistan decided to move to Tashkent in 1930.

* Karakalpakia was, until 1930, part of Kazakhstan. For the next six years it came under the direct control of the Russian Soviet Federation. In 1936 it was included in Uzbekistan. The Karakalpakians, a Turkic people, formed in 1926 but 38·1 per cent of the 300,000 inhabitants of the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. The republic further included Uzbeks (27·7 per cent), Kazakhs (28·1 per cent), Turkmenians (3·2 per cent) and Russians (1·8 per cent).

As we have already seen, the transfer of a capital always had and still has a deep political significance in Russia. This was the case with the transfer of the Russian capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg under Peter the Great and its retransfer to Moscow under the Soviet régime. The shifting of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev and of the Lithuanian capital from Kaunas to Vilna were likewise expressions of far-reaching changes in the countries concerned.

Each city has a specific individuality of its own which is the sum total of its history, the peculiarities of its geographic location, its economic functions and the character of its inhabitants. If a town becomes a capital this individuality reflects on the essence of the State concerned. The change-over from Samarkand to Tashkent meant in practice that the essentially national Uzbek atmosphere which prevailed in the former town was to be superseded by that of a half-European international city – Tashkent. It was much easier to keep Uzbek nationalism in check from Tashkent with its strong Russian population than from Samarkand where the number of Russians was negligible.

Quite rapidly Tashkent became the seventh largest city in the U.S.S.R.; the number of its inhabitants grew from 323,000 in 1926 to 585,000 in 1939. This increase was to the advantage not of the Uzbeks, but of the Russian and international character of the city. Thus the town council of Tashkent which was elected in 1950 included but 51·3 per cent Uzbeks against 37·2 per cent Russians and 11·5 per cent representatives of other nationalities.*

SOVIET COTTON POLICY

Soviet policy in Uzbekistan aimed not only at eliminating antagonistic political forces, but also at giving the country a definite function in Soviet economy, linking it firmly to the Russian State, and depriving it of the possibility of becoming a comparatively self-contained unit. The task assigned to Uzbekistan within the Soviet economy consisted of producing a maximum of cotton, quite regardless of the economic interests of the local population.

It would be inaccurate to describe the development of cotton-growing in Uzbekistan as an aim characteristic of the Soviet régime. Any Russian government striving to dominate Central Asia would have conducted there an active 'cotton policy'. Under Czarist rule the cotton-growing area in the territory covered by the present Uzbekistan had increased from 533,000 to 1,045,000 acres between 1902 and 1913 alone. Had the Czarist régime remained in existence it might easily have reached the target figures of Stalin's five-year plans, namely, 2,267,000 acres of cotton-growing areas in 1938 and 2,470,000 acres in 1950.

* *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), January 12th, 1951.

Simultaneously with the systematic and sustained campaign for the increase of Uzbekistan's cotton production needed for supplying Soviet textile industry with adequate quantities of raw material, the Soviet régime diminished the cereal-growing area of the Republic from 3,758,000 acres in 1913 to 3,595,000 acres in 1938. This development made Uzbekistan more dependent on food supplies from European Russia, the more so since the population of the Republic had risen between 1926 and 1939 by 1,850,000 or by 37 per cent.

When 2,000,000 refugees were given shelter in Uzbekistan during the Second World War, the food situation became critical and the Soviet State had to undo the arm of the official cotton policy by hastily extending grain production. 170,000 acres of Uzbek soil were even planted with sugar-beet to make up for the temporary loss of the Ukrainian sugar-beet growing districts. The cotton policy was not, however, revised in the interest of the Uzbeks, but only as a temporary wartime emergency measure.

Uzbek opposition to Soviet cotton policy had an all-national character. The peasants adhered to the slogan 'You cannot eat cotton', and it made little difference to their attitude whether they were individual or collective farmers.²⁸ Uzbek agronomists, cotton experts, and officials of various planning and scientific institutes in Uzbekistan showed great reluctance in encouraging the growing of cotton to the detriment of cereals, and many Russian agricultural experts seemed to have joined them in their negative attitude.

To break the 'anti-cotton movement' the central state authorities carried out a sweeping purge of cotton plan wreckers in the scientific research institutes, the cotton experimental stations and the office of the 'Uzgosplan', the Uzbek state-planning board. The immediate cause of this purge was the poor cotton harvest of 1930 when the crop was 7 per cent below that of 1915. The struggle against Soviet cotton policy extended even to the highest Uzbek party circles. There is little doubt to-day that both the Prime Minister of Soviet Uzbekistan, Faisulla Khodzhaev, and the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Akmal Ikramov, who were both in office in the late twenties and early thirties, profoundly disagreed with the central authorities over the cotton question. Khodzhaev, when defendant in the Bukharin trial of March 1938, admitted to having drawn up, with the assistance of his Government, a counter-plan to the First Five-Year Plan for Uzbekistan. 'We laid the economic plans in such a way as to have less cotton' said Khodzhaev before his judges, 'because that industrial crop more than any other was binding Uzbekistan to the Soviet Union; secondly, we planned to develop agriculture in Uzbekistan so as to extend grain farming . . . in order to be independent of Russian grain; lastly, we had planned to develop industry, road building, etc., in such a way as to be more economically

independent at the end of the First Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union, than ever before.²⁹

Both Khodzhayev and Ikramov were national Bolsheviks, leaders of rival Uzbek nationalist groups within the Communist Party, who hoped to get a greater degree of independence for their Uzbek homeland. They were executed on March 13th, 1938, together with Bukharin and Rykov. Khodzhayev was the most prominent political personality Uzbekistan produced in the period between the two wars. At the age of twenty-four he had already been 'Chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs' of the People's Republic of Bokhara. Since 1925 he had been Prime Minister of Uzbekistan. At one time he had even occupied the post of President of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. As Khodzhayev and his friends had been at the head of Soviet Uzbekistan for twelve years Their 'liquidation' amounted to the disruption of Uzbek self-government.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND RUSSIFICATION

A partial compensation for the harm inflicted on Uzbek national economy by the cotton policy was provided by the development of industry in Uzbekistan, particularly by the emergence of several new industrial towns near Tashkent. Angren is a new coal-mining centre, Leninsk produces oil, Chirchik has chemical and metallurgical industry, and Yangi-Yul (meaning 'New Road') has textile plants. These modern 'socialist' towns are growing quickly in contrast to Uzbekistan's typical oriental cities, Andizhan, Namangan, Bokhara, etc., which made hardly any progress under the Soviet régime. Industrial development was particularly marked between 1931 and 1945, when the number of industrial and office workers in Uzbekistan increased from 386,000 to 700,000. These figures include a very large number of Russians.

How far did Russian industrial colonization influence the overall ethnographic picture of Uzbekistan? In 1933 76 per cent of the population of Uzbekistan were Uzbeks and 5·6 per cent Russians; in other words, every eighteenth inhabitant was a Russian. Since up-to-date population statistics are lacking the only approximate indication of the present proportional strength of the nationalities of Uzbekistan is the composition of the Uzbek parliament elected on February 16th, 1947. It included 249 Uzbeks, eighty-three Russians, thirty-two Turkmenians and thirty-six Tadzhiks, Karakalpakians, Kazakhs and other nationalities.³⁰ Thus the Russians accounted for 20·75 per cent and the Uzbeks for 62·25 per cent. These percentages do not necessarily mean that every fifth citizen of Uzbekistan is now Russian, but this inference can by no means be excluded. The only other explanation of these figures would be that the Russians have more than their adequate share among the members of the Uzbek parliament.

While a great number of Russians are organizing Uzbekistan's industry, tens of thousands of Uzbeks are leaving their country to work in key industrial centres in other parts of the Union, where the Soviet authorities are faced with an acute manpower problem. A case in point is the Urals where Uzbeks are employed in large numbers in foundries and workshops. Uzbek migration into the Urals became such an important feature in the life of the Uzbek people that it found its expression in a literary work. The Uzbek writer, Sadyk Kalyandar, wrote a novel, *We in the Urals*, in which he described the life and work of the Uzbek workers, who far from their homeland are acquiring professional skill as blacksmiths, founders and turners.³¹ The most remarkable thing about this novel is that it is the first novel of an Uzbek writer to be written in the Russian language – a landmark in Uzbek history, in Soviet nationalities policy and in the triumph of Russian civilization. It is by no means a rare feature in the U.S.S.R. that writers belonging to the minor nationalities should prefer to write in the Russian language rather than their own; but that a son of the largest people of Soviet Central Asia should follow this example is an interesting new departure indicative of the growth of Russian cultural influence achieved by the Soviet régime.

UZBEK CULTURE UNDER TUTELAGE

On the cultural plane the Soviet régime in Uzbekistan applied the method of 'give and take'. On the one hand the Uzbeks were given such material advantages as school buildings, publishing houses, cultural institutions, clubs, etc.; in exchange the Uzbeks had to part with their traditional spiritual values, for the retention of which the Uzbek intellectual élite fought a losing battle. The liquidation of the original nucleus of Uzbek cultural leaders was as complete as the elimination of Uzbek political leaders who led the nation until 1937. Most of the prominent Uzbek poets and writers acclaimed in the first fifteen years of the Soviet régime must not be even mentioned to-day. This applies both to Uzbek communist poets, who had later become 'national deviationists', and to writers of the 'Chagatai Group' – a literary movement aiming at the revival of the ancient Uzbek literary language, the 'Chagatai' – who considered the October Revolution as a purely Russian political event and as such having nothing in common with the Uzbek nation. Among the 'liquidated' representatives of Uzbek literature was a young and remarkably gifted poet, Mekhmed Maksud Batu, at one time Minister of Education of Uzbekistan, who was arrested in 1928 as a leading figure in the secret organization 'Milli Istiklal' (National Independence).

Probably the most treasured exhibit of Soviet cultural policy in Uzbekistan is the 'Central Asiatic State University' at Tashkent, usually

referred to under its initials 'S.A.G.U.' Lenin personally had sanctioned the foundation of this university, which was designed to become the largest centre for the training of cadres in Central Asia and not a specifically Uzbek cultural institution. S.A.G.U. worked under the supervision of the central authorities of the Soviet State, till April 1938. Only at that date, i.e. eighteen years after S.A.G.U.'s foundation, was the Uzbek Government put in charge of it. The transference of the university to the care of the Uzbek Government took place shortly after the execution of Khodzhayev and was, therefore, considered as a gesture demonstrating Stalin's confidence in the new Uzbek communist leadership which had replaced the 'national deviationists'. After the Second World War, the Central Asiatic State University was again put under the direct supervision of the central Government, following the creation of the All-Union Ministry for Higher Education.

At all stages of its development S.A.G.U. continued to be a primarily Russian institution. As late as 1940, 88 per cent of the lecturers were Russians, while the remaining 12 per cent belonged to the local Central Asiatic nationalities. The number of students from among the local population had, however, increased from 6.4 per cent in 1927, to 32.5 per cent in 1940.³²

In order to compensate the Uzbeks for the Russian and international character of S.A.G.U., a special 'Uzbek State University' was set up in Samarkand in 1927. There, too, the state nation of Uzbekistan played none too impressive a part. Of 1,100 students who passed through the university in the first twenty years of its existence, only 'over one half' belonged to Asiatic nationalities, the remainder being Europeans.³³

MIR ALISHIR NAVOI – SOVIET NATIONAL HERO

The Soviet Government with admirable ingenuity has exploited for its own purposes the memory of the greatest Uzbek poet, Mir Alishir Navoi. Even during the war years huge sums were lavishly spent on the construction and decoration of the 'Palace of Arts of the Soviet East' – the Alishir Navoi Theatre. Its exquisite architecture, wealth of marble facings, mural paintings, chiselled panels and cut-glass chandeliers were meant to satisfy the romantic imagination of oriental intellectuals.

Navoi, the founder of Uzbek literary language, who lived in the fifteenth century, was elevated to the rank of an all-Union national hero, whose effigy even appeared on a Soviet postage stamp. But for the homage bestowed on Navoi by the régime he had to give the Soviet State something in return. His task was similar to that of all Uzbek and Russian poets and writers of the present generation, namely, to contribute to the success of the five-year plans and inspire the people to greater output and industrial achievements. Navoi's name and work were linked,

for instance, with the Farkhad Hydro-Electric Station ('Farkhades'), one of the largest in the whole Soviet Union. The station, which 70,000 Uzbeks started building in 1943, supplies electric power to new Uzbek industrial enterprises and waters part of the 'hunger steppe' by raising the level of the Syr-Darya River. The dam bears the name of the hero of Navoi's master work, *Farkhad and Shirin*, who is, at the same time, the hero of Uzbek popular legends. In the official Soviet interpretation as given by the Russian writer Nikolay Tikhonov, Navoi's *Farkhad* is the 'symbol of great labour transforming, in the name of love, the earth to the benefit of the people'. Farkhad conquers mountains and forces rivers to give water to the deserts. Princess Shirin is the very heart and soul of the world, who yearns for Farkhad, the source of light and warmth.³⁴ The country of the Uzbeks has prided itself on possessing a mountain named after Farkhad and a river named after Shirin. The Soviet Government had every interest to pose as the executor of Navoi's legacy and to present Uzbekistan's largest hydro-electric station as the fulfilment of an old dream of the Central Asiatic peoples. The régime wisely withstood therefore the temptation of giving to the new dam the name of Stalin or Lenin.

The Navoi cult also has a certain export value. Navoi, who wrote both in 'Chagatai' and in Persian, is held in high esteem not only in Soviet Central Asia but also in Afghanistan where he lived and worked in the town of Herat. By using a vast propaganda machine for the glory of Navoi on a scale which little Afghanistan could never afford to imitate, the Soviet régime is able to demonstrate the cultural superiority of Soviet Central Asia over Afghanistan. This cultural supremacy of the Soviet Central Asiatic Republics was ostentatiously displayed in May 1948, when the Soviet Government organized a big Navoi Festival in Tashkent in the presence of Afghan and Persian delegations. The celebrations which marked the 500th anniversary of Navoi's birth were to have been held in 1941 but had to be postponed on account of the war.

The Navoi cult also offers a most welcome opportunity for showing the permanent and beneficial character of the historical links which existed and still exist between the peoples of the present Soviet Central Asia and Western Afghanistan. To the population of the latter territory it also brings home the idea that if one day the town of Herat were to be annexed by Soviet Russia, this would not mean the incorporation of an alien body into the Soviet Union, but a kind of re-union with an area with which Western Afghanistan has been intimately linked in the past.

All problems from which Uzbekistan had suffered between the two wars re-emerged in the war, and particularly in the post-war period, with

unabated intensity. The cotton policy of the Soviet Government had still to be enforced by Draconic means. A new decree was passed in 1943 punishing 'loss of cotton' with up to ten years' imprisonment and deportation.

With regard to the situation on the ideological front the party secretary, Yusupov, at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in March 1949, admitted the survival of pan-Turkic tendencies. He said nationalist mistakes were still committed by a section of the Uzbek intelligentsia and even by members of the Communist Party. 'Among the historians and experts on literature', Yusupov added, 'there are still people who completely deny the historical past of the Uzbek nation and the originality of its culture. They assert that the ancient culture (of Uzbekistan) had been brought from outside. Uzbek culture does not exist for these people . . . but only a common Turkic culture. These rootless cosmopolitans do not understand, or rather they do not want to understand, that they essentially embrace the ideology of pan-Turkism, profoundly hostile to Marxism-Leninism'.³⁵ It can be seen that the people of Uzbekistan still consider the partition of Central Asia into various self-contained Soviet Republics as an artificial act of Bolshevik-Russian 'divide and rule' policy.

IV. TADZHIKISTAN

Tadzhikistan is a typical example of the discrepancy between the colossal ambitions of Soviet nationalities policy and its limited concrete possibilities.

Geopolitically Tadzhikistan is the most important of the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. The Kremlin brought a Tadzhik Soviet Republic into being with the clear intention of creating a source of embarrassment for Afghanistan, Persia and India. The history of Tadzhikistan must thus primarily be considered as a sub-section in the history of Soviet diplomacy.

The existence of a special Tadzhik autonomous unit, it is true, can be motivated by the fact that the Tadzhiks as a people have an individuality of their own. They distinguish themselves from the other major nationalities of Soviet Central Asia by being of Iranian and not of Turkic origin. It was in the interest of the Soviet State to over-emphasize this difference, for had the Tadzhiks freely decided their fate they would hardly have destroyed the united Moslem front in Turkestan to satisfy their special national interests.

An Autonomous Tadzhik Soviet Republic was formed on March 15th, 1925, covering the eastern part of the territory which used to belong to the Emirate and later to the People's Republic of Bokhara. On the

occasion of the establishment of the Tadzhik A.S.S.R. Stalin sent an interesting message to the Tadzhik communists outlining the great importance which Tadzhikistan was to have within the framework of Soviet policy. The message said: 'Greetings to Tadzhikistan, the new Soviet Republic of the toilers at the gates of Hindustan. I ardently wish to the whole working people of Tadzhikistan success in the transformation of their republic into a republic which will be exemplary for the countries of the East. The Tadzhiks have a rich history, their great organizing and political abilities in the past are for no one a secret. Party workers of Tadzhikistan! Raise the culture of your country, develop its economy, assist the working people in town and country, rally around yourselves the best sons of your homeland and show to the whole East that you are worthy children of your ancestors, firmly holding in your hands the banner of liberation'.³⁶

The operative words in this message are 'show to the whole East' – '*pokazhite vsemu vostoku*'. This phrase should always be borne in mind when examining the part which Tadzhikistan has been playing in Soviet policy. The message clearly indicated that Stalin wanted the Tadzhik communists to manœuvre on a national rather than on a class basis. The Tadzhik communists were to make use of their national traditions and in propagating the Soviet cause they were to stress both past glory and present achievements.

TADZHIKISTAN VERSUS AFGHANISTAN

On December 5th, 1929, the Autonomous Soviet Republic of Tadzhikistan was transformed into the seventh Union Republic. From the point of view of its internal development Tadzhikistan was hardly fit for the new status, but external events had forced the hand of the Soviet Government. King Amanullah of Afghanistan had just been desposed by an internal revolution. This was a severe blow for the Soviet Government, which rightly counted on Amanullah as a friend and ally of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government felt that the disappearance of Amanullah from the political scene had changed the balance of power in Central Asia and that it was time for a Russian counter-move. The formation of a fully-fledged Tadzhik Soviet Republic was Russia's answer to Amanullah's dethronement, calculated to annoy both the new Afghan rulers and Britain, the power which was believed to be behind Amanullah's foes. The new Soviet Republic covered an area of 55,000 square miles, nearly half of which, 25,800 square miles, is occupied by the Pamir—'the roof of the world'. The high mountain area of Tadzhikistan which has but 30,000 inhabitants became the 'Autonomous Province of Gorno-Badakhshan'.*

* The bulk of that province, the Eastern Pamir (15,500 square miles), was incorporated

However small in size, Soviet Tadzhikistan could become dangerous to Afghanistan on account of the complicated ethnical problems of that country. A large part of the inhabitants of Northern Afghanistan consists, to use the official term, of 'Peoples of the Soviet Union', namely Tadzhiks, Uzbeks and Turkmenians. Soviet estimates as to the strength of these 'national minorities' vary in proportion to the amount of pressure which the Soviet Government may wish at any given moment to bring to bear on the Afghan State. In 1925 the Large Soviet Encyclopædia did not see fit to give any figures at all. In 1947 the same Encyclopædia stated that the Tadzhiks of Afghanistan numbered 2,000,000 and the Uzbeks 500,000. A new edition of the Encyclopædia published in 1950 increased the number of the Afghan Uzbeks to one million and also recorded the existence of 380,000 Afghan Turkmenians. The Soviet writer, Sofronov, who in the same year made a hasty trip by car across Northern Afghanistan, reported that there were as many as three million Tadzhiks in that country and over one and a half million Uzbeks.³⁷

Soviet ethnographers have paid particular attention to the Tadzhiks of Afghanistan. They have even compiled exact figures showing their percentual strength in the various Afghan Provinces. Thus the Tadzhiks account for 24 per cent of the total population of the Herat Province, for 28·8 per cent in the Kabul Province, for nearly 46 per cent in the Kadaghan-Badakhshan Province, the immediate neighbour of Eastern Tadzhikistan, and for 23·7 per cent in the Mazar i Sharif Province which adjoins Western Tadzhikistan. In the Maimana Province, Turkmenians, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks have a combined majority.³⁸ These Soviet ethnographic statistics regarding Afghanistan are the more remarkable as the exact number of its inhabitants has never been satisfactorily established. There are but conflicting estimates putting this figure between 7,000,000 and 12,000,000.

There can be no doubt that the Soviet Government aims at the creation of a Tadzhik irredenta movement. In its attempt to build up this movement Soviet propaganda operated not only with figures but also with historical facts. Soviet propaganda has always endeavoured to keep alive the idea that the Tadzhik people had been divided by an artificial process. The first step in the partition of the homeland of the Tadzhiks occurred in the middle of the eighteenth century when Afghan tribes under Akhmed Khan detached from the weak Khanate of Bokhara the Tadzhik territories south and south-west of the Amu

into Tadzhikistan for the sole purpose of increasing the size of that Soviet Republic. From an ethnical point of view, however, it would have been more logical to integrate the Eastern Pamir into Kirghizistan, since its few hundred inhabitants are Kirghiz nomads. The rest of the Autonomous Province – the Western Pamir – is inhabited by three Persian tribes closely related to the people of the Badakhshan Province in Afghanistan, to which the Western Pamir belonged until 1895.

Darya river (Oxus). The territories which the Tadzhiks lost in the eighteenth century comprised Balkh, the most ancient centre of Tadzhik-Iranian culture. In 1895 the Tadzhiks were partitioned a second time. In that year Russia and Britain fixed the northern frontiers of Afghanistan and ceded to that country the Tadzhik-populated territories on the left bank of the Pandzha river.³⁹

The Soviet Union is using the Tadzhik minority issue against Afghanistan not exclusively as an offensive weapon but also for self-protection. Tadzhik nationalism was supposed to counteract the anti-Russian tendencies of Afghanistan which had made themselves felt in many ways. Various Afghan rulers had toyed for a considerable period with the idea of an anti-Russian Central Asiatic Confederation comprising Bokhara, Persia and Afghanistan. After the October Revolution, Afghan nationalists became ardent supporters of the federalist idea, and in connection with it advocated certain border changes at the expense of the young Soviet State.⁴⁰

The last Emir of Bokhara, Alim Khan, found in Afghanistan support for his attempts to stir up unrest in Soviet Central Asia, particularly in the Tadzhik mountain regions. For several years, it is true, there had been a strong home-grown Basmachi movement which challenged Soviet rule in the remote parts of Tadzhikistan, but by 1926 the armed struggle against the Soviet régime had come to an end and without support from Afghanistan it would hardly have been revived. Anti-Soviet guerilla activities in Tadzhikistan flared up again after Amanullah's dethronement when Alim Khan's people were allowed to use Afghan territory as an operational base. The last invasion into Tadzhikistan occurred in 1931. Its leader was Ibrahim Beg, who called himself 'Commander of the Islamic Army'.

TADZHIKISTAN AND PERSIA

The Afghan aspect is but one side of the Tadzhikistan problem and by no means the most important. Although Tadzhikistan has no common frontier with Persia it has become an instrument *par excellence* for the anti-Persian policy of the Soviet Government, perhaps even to a greater extent than Azerbaidzhan.

The dominant Soviet conception regarding Tadzhikistan is that it is not just an Iranian country but the heart and the head of the Iranian world. Tadzhikistan has, therefore, in the Soviet view, a clear claim to leadership over the Persian State in particular. This claim is based on an interpretation of Tadzhik history whose author is the First Party Secretary of Tadzhikistan, Bobozhdan G. Gafurov, a young historian. Gafurov's method is a simple one. He identifies the entire Iranian tradition of Central Asia with the modern Tadzhik people, the Tadzhik Soviet

Republic and the Soviet Union. Gafurov together with another Tadzhik historian wrote a book, *The Tadzhik People in their Struggle for Freedom and Independence of their Homeland*, which is an astounding document of self-centred nationalism. Gafurov credited the Tadzhiks with having produced, twenty-two centuries ago, 'the first partisan hero in the history of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.', Spitamen, who had organized a popular Tadzhik resistance movement against Alexander of Macedonia when the latter had penetrated into the land which to-day is Tadzhikistan.⁴¹ The historian party secretary also hailed the Tadzhiks as 'the first people of the Soviet Union' to meet the great Mongol onslaught of the thirteenth century which later swept through the whole of Russia. Above all, Gafurov told the young Tadzhiks to admire the great 'Tadzhik' rulers of the past such as Ismail Samani, 'the builder of a strong and centralized State' with its capital at Bokhara.

In the field of culture almost everything Iranian that is not already claimed by the Azerbaidzhani is considered part of Tadzhik culture. Originally, Soviet propaganda coined the term 'Tadzhik-Iranian culture and literature' when referring to the works of certain Persian classics. This term must now no longer be used in the Soviet Union since it has assumed a 'pan-Iranian' and 'cosmopolitan' flavour. Firdausi and other Iranian poets are now described as representatives of Tadzhik culture without any further qualification. Since the great Firdausi is a Tadzhik poet it is only legitimate to use his writings for the education of the Tadzhiks in a spirit of loyalty towards the socialist fatherland. During the Second World War, for instance, a passage taken from Firdausi's greatest work *Shahnama*, was included in a 'Letter from the Tadzhik People to the Tadzhik fighters on the front', and the image of Rustem, the hero of *Shahnama* and legendary defender of Iran against Turan, was repeatedly evoked by Soviet propaganda to inspire the Tadzhiks in the fight against the Germans.

Of course, there are certain Persian poets whom the Soviet régime cannot, for geographical reasons, claim for Tadzhikistan, for instance, Hafiz and Saadi, who were born in Shiraz; but they are considered as part of the Tadzhik national patrimony for ideological considerations. Both Hafiz and Saadi, said a Tadzhik Soviet poet, Mirzo Tursun-zade, had opposed reactionary Islam and the reactionary Persian State has, therefore, no right to their heritage. The Iranian classics, even if they are not considered as Tadzhik classics, will thus be held as a trust by the Tadzhiks. This task of the Tadzhiks is, however, only a temporary one since, according to Tursun-zade, 'the day will come when the time of reaction will end in Iran and the Tadzhik people will hand back to the Persians their poets in all their original greatness and splendour'. The secretary general of the Union of Soviet Writers, Alexander Fadeyev, carried this idea even further when he said that the Tadzhiks will

ultimately educate the Persians in Persian culture.⁴² In the Soviet view the 'education' of the Persians must not be confined to matters of culture. Tadzhikistan must also give a political lead to the Persian people. The idea of Persia's political re-education was systematically propagated by Abulkasim Lakhuti, a Persian communist revolutionary who became 'National Poet of Tadzhikistan'. Lakhuti fled to Russia in 1922 after having organized an unsuccessful uprising in Tabriz. The poetry which he wrote in the Soviet Union was one continuous instigation to revolt addressed to the peoples of the Orient, the Persians in particular. Lakhuti's appeals reached a climax in the poem written during a visit to the famous Ukrainian hydro-electric station. the 'Dnieproges':

And I see: the soil of Shiraz is
Soaked in oppressors' blood,
While a brother of the Dnieproges
Stems the Karun* river's flood.
The Ukraine has won her freedom:
Leninism backed her stand.
Iran one day will also be
A free, a Soviet land.

TADZHIKISTAN AND INDIA

Lakhuti's poetry leads on to the third aspect of the Tadzhikistan problem: India. Lakhuti, Tursun-zade and several other Tadzhik poets have largely specialized in 'Indian affairs'. This is hardly surprising since Stalin had described Tadzhikistan as the 'Soviet Republic at the gates of Hindustan' and thus given a hint that the Soviet Union must use the Tadzhiks in its attempts to influence the Indian situation.

It seems that the Soviet Government has for a long time shared the belief of the Czarist régime that India was the point where Russia could deal a deadly blow at British power and British prestige. In practice, Soviet Russia could do very little, if anything, to shake British rule in India and the expectations in this direction which were connected with the foundation of the Tadzhik Soviet Republic were more than unjustified. Britain's withdrawal from India finally frustrated the anti-British plans which the Soviet Government had cherished with regard to Tadzhikistan.

After India and Pakistan had acquired dominion status the 'anti-imperialist' propaganda campaign conducted from Tadzhikistan was changed into one directed against 'feudal' and 'bourgeois' India itself. The most important literary propagandist of the new trend is

* The Karun river in South-west Persia runs through the concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

M. Tursun-zade who, in 1948, was awarded a Stalin prize for a collection of Soviet propaganda poems on India. In one of the prize poems, *The Hanging Garden of Bombay*, Tursun-zade invites mankind and, it would seem, particularly the Indians, to join the Tadzhiks in 'the sunny garden of communism'.

Tadzhikistan's mission with regard to India was an absurdity not only because a country of 1,500,000 inhabitants cannot easily influence the development of the huge Indian sub-continent, but also because internal conditions in Tadzhikistan were by no means attractive from the democratic nationalist Indian point of view.

Statistically, it is true, Tadzhikistan could present a splendid record. It could easily be proved that Tadzhikistan had made tremendous cultural and economic progress when compared with the situation prevailing under the rule of the Emir of Bokhara. When Soviet propagandists speak of Tadzhikistan they mention in particular the town of Stalinabad, the capital of the republic, as a specially striking example of the advance which the Tadzhiks experienced under Bolshevism. Between 1927 and 1939 Stalinabad increased the number of its inhabitants from 5,607 to 82,500, and grew from a dirty wretched township into a fairly modern city with handsome white buildings, with theatres, a university and even an 'Academy of Sciences'. This was a great achievement, but could it impress India? Could it impress India that Soviet power had built in the land of the Tadzhiks not an Asiatic town but an international, if not altogether predominantly Russian, city? With its large number of Russian officials, its Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish specialists and experts of all kinds, and its Russian party secretary, Stalinabad has become a particularly poor example of Asiatic home rule under the Soviet régime.

TADZHİK NATIONAL OPPOSITION

A fair assessment of Tadzhikistan's potentialities as a propaganda weapon is possible only by taking into account the strength of the Tadzhik national opposition and the manifold difficulties which the Soviet régime had to face in the 'Seventh Soviet Republic'. The social and political struggle which was going on in Tadzhikistan in the inter-war years represented a serious obstacle to the realization of the ambitious plans which the Soviet Government conceived for that country.

The end of 1933, the fourth year of the republic's existence, saw the first big crisis of 'Tadzhik Independence'. Both the President of Tadzhikistan, Nasratullah Maksum, and the Tadzhik Prime Minister, Abdurakhim Khodzhibayev, were then removed from office by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. Simultaneously

the entire leadership of the Tadzhikistan Communist Party was replaced because of 'lack of vigilance'. Maksum and Khodzhibayev were charged with having followed a national-Tadzhik instead of a communist policy. Actually, Maksum had consistently advocated the expulsion of all Russians from Tadzhikistan while Khodzhibayev had cherished the project of a 'Greater Tadzhikistan' to be achieved not at the expense of Afghanistan – a plan which might have been viewed with favour by Soviet authorities – but at the cost of the Uzbek Provinces of Surkhan-Darya, Bokhara, Samarkand and Fergana. In addition both were found guilty of denying the existence of class differences within Tadzhikistan and thus of readiness to co-operate with kulaks, bais and former officials of the Emir of Bokhara. This unorthodox attitude of the two Tadzhik communist leaders became particularly objectionable during the Ibrahim Beg incursion of 1931, when they tried to set up a kind of coalition of national unity and put anti-communists, members of respected and influential Tadzhik families, at the head of fighting detachments.

Above all, however, the two leaders became the scapegoats for the unsatisfactory progress of the collectivization and agricultural settlement policy. They had failed to fulfil the state plan providing for the agricultural settlement of 45,000 Tadzhik families. The Tadzhik Government had satisfied the land hunger of only 15,000 smallholders; many of the remaining 30,000, disappointed by unfulfilled Soviet promises of land, emigrated to Afghanistan. This action involved a considerable loss of prestige for the Soviet power.⁴³

The difficulties of the central Government in Tadzhikistan did not end with the crisis of 1931–33 which led to the 'unmasking' of a Tadzhik nationalist group operating under the guise of communism. In 1937 a second team of Tadzhik leaders were discovered to be traitors; this time they were no longer branded as 'national deviationists' but, according to the fashion of the day, as 'Trotskyites' and 'Bukharinists'. The new opposition was also headed by a Prime Minister – Abdullah Rakhimbayev – and a President – Shotemor. This new set of 'enemies of the people' also included the People's Commissar for Local Industry, Kurbanov, the People's Commissar for Education, Khasanov, and his deputies, three secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and others.⁴⁴

The purges brought about the virtual collapse of Tadzhik self-government from which the country has not yet recovered. Home rule has remained a fiction in Tadzhikistan even more than in the other Central Asiatic Republics. There are few Tadzhik communists in whom the Bolshevik party leadership has genuine confidence, and the régime prefers, therefore, to put Russians in charge of party and state offices, not only in Stalinabad but also in the provinces of the little republic,

as well as in the Autonomous Province of Gorno-Badakhshan. Wherever a Tadjik occupies a leading post there is a Russian nearby to check his actions. These Russians are usually disguised as 'assistant' or 'deputy' or 'secretary'. Supervision by Russian communists in the post-war period was the more vital from the viewpoint of the régime since anti-Soviet feelings manifested themselves in the country in various ways, by the revival of the 'religious prejudices' among the common people, by the existence of pan-Iranian tendencies among a section of the intellectuals and by peasant resistance against the Soviet cotton policy.

V. TURKMENISTAN

Turkmenistan, which is almost as big as France, is the youngest of all Russian Central Asiatic colonies. The greater part of Turkmenistan's territory was conquered during the Turkmenian war of 1879-80, while South-east Turkmenistan, with the town of Merv, was occupied as late as 1884, almost twenty years after the capture of Tashkent.

TURKMENISTAN'S CRUCIAL PROBLEM - IRRIGATION

Both Russian authorities and Russian experts realized at once that the military conquest of the country was nothing compared with the second part of the task facing Russian imperial policy in Turkmenistan: the conquest of the desert. Nine-tenths of the territory which to-day forms the Turkmenian S.S.R. is covered by the Kara Kum desert. It is clear that Turkmenistan can become a real economic asset for Russia only after the realization of a bold irrigation scheme which will transform the desert sand into fertile soil. The possibility of building a canal across Turkmenia was, therefore, studied almost as soon as Russian rule was extended over the country. The first canal scheme, the 'Project Glukhovsky', was published as early as 1893. It suggested the establishment of a waterway connecting the lower course of the Amu Darya river with the Caspian Sea.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the question of the Transcaspian Canal, as it was then called, attracted an increasing interest in both official and scientific circles. New detailed projects were submitted to the Government, one by the economist, Sazonov, another by Colonel Yermolayev, a third by Morgunenkov. Great attention was paid in particular to the Sazonov project which forty prominent personalities, geographers, botanists, members of the State Council and high officials, studied at a special conference in 1906. Soon after the October Revolution Professor Rizenkampff came out with another project which he published under the auspices of the 'Supreme Economic

Council'.⁴⁵ Until 1947 no practical steps had been taken to launch a serious offensive against the Turkmenian desert or to make use of the research work which Russian scientists had been pursuing for half a century. In 1947 the Soviet Government decided to build the 'Great Kara Kum Canal', to run from the middle course of the Amu Darya to the rivers Murgab and Tedzhen. The canal was to be 410 miles long and was intended to irrigate large tracts of Southern Turkmenistan. In 1950, however, the Soviet Government decided to transfer the priority in their schemes for the irrigation of Turkmenistan, from the south to the north of the country. Apparently without abandoning the project of the 'Great Kara Kum Canal', the Government announced a further plan for the construction of a 'Main Turkmenian Canal', of a length of 600 miles, in Northern Turkmenistan. This canal is to link the lower course of the Amu Darya with Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea.

All canal projects worked out under the Czarist régime had made the point that the opening up of the country to Russian colonists was one of the main aims of the irrigation plan. The many Soviet statements issued about the 'Main Turkmenian Canal' make no direct reference to the manpower problem as it will present itself in Turkmenistan after the completion of the big scheme. It is obvious, however, that the manpower requirements of the country will be considerable, for the new irrigated Turkmenistan will be able to enlarge not only its tillage area, but also its industry, thanks to the new hydro-electric stations which will be built at the same time as the canal.

Who will work on the new farms, who will man the new factories, the new Machine Tractor Stations? To judge by the figures, it is not the Turkmenians who will reap the benefits of the great canal which carries their name so much as the European immigrants. According to the Soviet census of 1939, there were but 811,000 Turkmenians in the Soviet Union of whom about 770,000 were living in Turkmenistan. They were not in a position, even before 1939, to satisfy the manpower requirement of Turkmenistan's oil and cotton industries, and Russians were thrown in to fill the gaps. A large number of European, i.e. Russian and Ukrainian workers were concentrated also in the port of Krasnovodsk, 'the maritime gateway of Soviet Central Asia'.⁴⁶

As late as 1926 Russians formed 5.8 per cent of Turkmenistan's population, whilst the various Turkmenian tribes totalled 77.9 per cent, Uzbeks accounted for 9.8 per cent and the balance was divided up between Tartars, Kazakhs, Persians, Armenians and others. By 1939 the proportion of the Turkmenians in the population of the Turkmenian S.S.R. had dropped to 70 per cent but in the political life of the country the role of the Turkmenian people was smaller than this percentage might indicate. Thus, in the parliament of the republic, the Supreme Soviet, the Turkmenians accounted in 1938 for only 55 per cent of the

members. Thirty per cent of the others were Russians, 9 per cent were Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews and 6 per cent belonged to various Asiatic minorities.⁴⁷ The composition of the Supreme Soviet elected in 1947 was more favourable to the Turkmenians. Its members comprised only 22·2 per cent of Russians, 12 per cent of Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other minorities, while 65·8 per cent of all the deputies were Turkmenians.⁴⁸

The predominantly urban character of the Russian-Ukrainian immigration into Turkmenistan has led to a sharp increase in the percentage of the town population, from 13·7 per cent to 33·2 per cent between 1926 and 1939. Following the construction of the 'Main Turkmenian Canal', European immigration is likely to be less one-sided in character, since farmers will be needed in large numbers for the cotton-growing collective farms which will be established on the newly irrigated land.

GREATER TURKMENISTAN

Not only will irrigation alter the economic life of Turkmenistan and change its ethnographic composition, but it will also affect the relations of Russia with Turkmenistan's neighbours – Afghanistan and Persia.

The attraction exercised by Turkmenistan on Western Afghanistan and North-western Persia is bound to grow in proportion to the increased Russian financial and manpower investments in the irrigated Turkmenian areas. At the same time the Soviet Government will be increasingly tempted to bring stronger political and economic pressure to bear on the territories bordering Turkmenistan in the south.

The progress of the Turkmenian irrigation project might create between Russia and Afghanistan a relationship similar to that existing between Egypt and the Sudan. Russia might be compelled to covet full control over the Amu Darya, for not only does the river's upper course flow through Afghanistan, but its middle course, along a stretch of several hundred miles, forms the frontier between Russia and Afghanistan.

Once provided with an adequate irrigation system Turkmenistan may, in addition to contributing to the break-up of Afghanistan, exert as great an attraction on Persia as Soviet Azerbaidzhan. Just as Soviet propaganda originating from the Azerbaidzhan Republic and the economic development of the latter fostered autonomist and separatist trends in North-western Persia, so a prosperous Turkmenistan would indubitably lead to the development of centrifugal tendencies in the Persian provinces of Khorazan and Asterabad. It is quite likely that following a new influx of Russian colonists into Turkmenistan, Turkmenians, who may easily become a minority in their own country, will

have but little say in the running of the republic's economy. Nevertheless, in the interest of the Soviet Empire they might be permitted to play a part in the complex Middle Eastern and Central Asiatic struggle for power, in which the deep-rooted anti-Persian and anti-Afghan national traditions of the Turkmenians would be used to the full. The Turkmenians of Turkmenistan might be offered the opportunity of appealing to their 'brothers' beyond the border, particularly to those living in the Khorazan Province, whose national consciousness, while still under-developed at the present stage, would increase with the economic and cultural progress of the Soviet Turkmenian 'motherland'.

A campaign for the 'Union of all Turkmenians in one National State' would find its ideological foundations already laid. Soviet research into Turkmenian literature discovered that the border area of Persian Khorazan played an important role in Turkmenian literary history. Thus the greatest poet of the Turkmenians, Makhtumkuli (1733-82), the 'Turkmenian Pushkin' as he is called in the Soviet Union, was buried in Persian territory on the bank of the river Gurgan. The valley of the Gurgan, it is said, presents a 'particularly great interest' for students of Turkmenian literature. The remains of Makhtumkuli's father, the poet Azadi, rest in a grave 'thirteen kilometres inside Iranian territory'. The nephew of Makhtumkuli, Zelili, another outstanding representative of 'classical Turkmenian literature' spent the last years of his life in the Gurgan valley.⁴⁹ On the strength of the above-mentioned facts North-eastern Persia could easily be proclaimed one day 'the cradle of Turkmenian culture' and styled 'Southern Turkmenistan' along with the term 'Southern Azerbaidzhan' which has already found its way into the Soviet vocabulary.

POLITICAL AND LINGUISTIC OPPOSITION

The Soviet régime proved, however, unable always to direct Turkmenian nationalism and national literature into those channels where they were best suited to assist Russian state interests.

Soviet sources have openly admitted that a strong nationalist Turkmenian organization was in existence at least between 1922 and 1931. This organization was said to be particularly active after 1927, when it prepared an armed rising against the Soviet power. The organization had its ramifications in the Turkmenian Government, and two of its members, the Minister of Education, Boriev, and the Supply Minister, Ak Murad Orazov, were charged with aiming at the establishment of an independent Turkmenian State under British protection.⁵⁰

A very tense situation also existed in Turkmenistan in the middle of the thirties when, according to official Soviet sources, a widespread opposition movement developed which was both nationalistic and reli-

gious in character. The Turkmenian organization, 'Turkmen Azatlygi' ('Turkmenian Freedom'), it seems, carried out 'terrorist and diversionist acts'. The official version said that the Turkmenian nationalists and saboteurs of collectivization in Turkmenistan were protected by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmenian S.S.R., Nederby Aitakov, one of the thirty sponsors of the Stalin Constitution of 1936.⁵¹ He was executed soon after having added his signature to the constitution project.

To build up a pro-Soviet Turkmenian literature was a particularly difficult task which faced the Bolshevik Party. The most prominent Turkmenian writers, including Berdy Kerbabayev, the Chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers of Turkmenistan, had joined in the early thirties the ranks of the anti-Soviet Turkmenian nationalists who were fighting for an independent Turkmenian State. Kerbabayev was able to escape the fate which 'traitors' like him had to expect under normal circumstances. The Soviet leadership decided to pardon him and his friends and offer them the opportunity of 'repenting'. This was done not out of humanitarian considerations but in recognition of the fact that there were no alternative poets available who could have replaced Kerbabayev and other nationalist representatives of Turkmenian literature. Kerbabayev fulfilled the expectations which the régime had put in him. He publicly expressed 'shame and bitterness' at his anti-Soviet conduct. This is what Kerbabayev confessed during a congress of Turkmenian writers held in 1934 on his behalf and on behalf of other nationalist-minded writers: 'We too have succumbed to the influence of those counter-revolutionary nationalist elements who exploited our national feelings and recruited us for their work'.⁵² Ever since his public repentance Kerbabayev has been a reliable supporter of Soviet rule in Turkmenistan, although as late as 1946 he used to be reprimanded for lack of vigilance and complacency.⁵³

The political complications which the Soviet régime encountered in Turkmenistan were reinforced by difficulties on the 'linguistic front'. As the Turkmenians are geographically nearer to the Anatolian Turks than any other people of Central Asia, pan-Turkic ideas were bound to become popular with their intellectual élite. A number of Turkmenian intellectuals were even convinced that a Turkmenian literary language was altogether superfluous and that Anatolian Turkish should be introduced in Turkmenistan.

All attempts to replace Turkmenian by Turkish having been stigmatized as 'counter-revolutionary' the Turkmenian intellectuals were forced to concentrate on the creation of a Turkmenian literary language but these efforts too were criticized. Thus for a long time complete 'linguistic anarchy' prevailed in Turkmenistan. A Russian scholar, Professor A. Potseluyevsky, asserted that this anarchy was systematically

fostered by reactionary 'wreckers' who strove to undermine the 'linguistic front'.

Up to 1935, two kinds of Turkmenian language had been branded as 'anti-Marxist' and 'anti-Leninist'. The first of these 'counter-revolutionary' literary languages, which was abandoned in 1933, had been compiled by a certain Geldiev in an alleged attempt 'to revive the language of the feudal period'. Geldiev's wrecking activities, it was officially held, were quite obvious because the use of the language he had created would have necessitated the rebuilding of all typewriters and printing machines. The second anti-Marxist language, conceived by Karakhanov, was influenced by Anatolian Turkish and its orthography was that used in pre-Kemalist Turkey.⁵⁴

POST-WAR OPPOSITION

In the years 1946–48 a new crisis took shape in Turkmenistan owing to the strong nationalistic mood of the new Turkmenian intelligentsia, the very intelligentsia who had grown up under the Soviet régime. The state publishing firm, 'Turkmengosizdat', had apparently fallen into the hands of nationalistic elements, for on the one hand it brought out nationalistic 'falsifications of history' which could be interpreted as pro-Persian, and on the other it neglected the translations into Turkmenian of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, the Turkmengosizdat, in the first three post-war years, published but eight books belonging to 'Marxist-Leninist literature', although in 1940 alone seventy-eight such works had been printed in the Turkmenian language.⁵⁵

Another source of uneasiness for the Turkmenian Communist Party was the leading literary journal of the Republic, *Soviet Edebiati*, whose editor was dismissed in 1946 and whose editorial board, on which were serving all important Turkmenian Soviet writers, was sternly rebuked for not having carried out its obligations to the State.⁵⁶

A statement by Batyrov, secretary of Turkmenistan's Communist Party, in the summer of 1948, showed that not only this or that cultural institution of the republic had drifted from the set course, but the country as a whole had not digested Bolshevism properly. This admission was implicitly made when Batyrov attacked the party organization under his jurisdiction for not fighting strongly enough against 'the remnants of capitalism in the minds of the people'. The word 'capitalism' should, however, not be taken too literally, since such a thing as 'Turkmenian capitalism' has never existed. In this case 'capitalism' is a synonym for nationalism, religion, etc., in short, any expression of opposition to Bolshevism. According to Batyrov, the Communist Party of the republic equally failed in its task of enabling a greater number of Turkmenians to enter responsible jobs in industry, transport and administration by means of proper Leninist-Marxist education.⁵⁷

VI. THE MINORITIES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The problem of national minorities is of great importance for the Central Asiatic Republics. Each of the five Central Asiatic 'state nations' has minorities in the other four republics. Some of them are numerically fairly large, such as the Uzbeks in Kirghizistan and Tadzhikistan, or the Turkmenians in Uzbekistan.

In addition there are minorities who have their national territories outside Soviet Central Asia, but inside the U.S.S.R., such as Tartars, Mordvinians, Armenians, etc. Finally, there are ethnical groups who have no national republic either in Central Asia or anywhere else in the Soviet Union. These peoples, the bulk of whom live outside the U.S.S.R., are of considerable interest since they occupy a definite, even if subordinate, place in Russia's policy towards her Central-Asiatic neighbours. Into this category fall the Uigurs and Dungans, who live in Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan. Another nationality which may eventually become a tool of Soviet foreign policy are the Baluchis of Turkmenistan. There are also Arabs in Uzbekistan, who theoretically could be a formidable weapon in the hands of Soviet diplomacy, but who for practical reasons could not play this part.*

UIGURS AND DUNGANS

The Uigurs, a Turkic people racially related to the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks, and the Dungans, of mixed Arab and Persian origin, who had kept the Moslem faith but adopted the Chinese tongue, are both peoples of Western China. In the sixties of the nineteenth century the two peoples endeavoured to shake off Chinese rule and set up independent Khanates of their own. When these attempts failed, many Dungans and Uigurs fled into Russian territory. A particularly heavy exodus of the Uigurs took place when, in 1881, Russia restored to China the Kuldzha border district which she had occupied during the Western Chinese troubles of 1871.

The Uigurs and Dungans were readily granted Russian citizenship and

* All these minorities already lived in Central Asia under the Czarist régime. The Soviet Government added to them some other ethnical groups who had not been previously associated with Central Asia. Their members came to the Central Asiatic Republics as inmates of forced labour camps, as evacuees during the war, and also as more or less voluntary settlers. A particularly interesting community formed by the latter is a Korean minority which has been living in the Kzyl Orda Province of Kazakhstan since 1928. The Koreans of Kazakhstan are very successful rice-growers and their collective farms, bearing such names as 'Bolshevik', 'Third International' and 'Gigant', have acquired a certain fame. Other Korean groups have settled more recently and perhaps less voluntarily in the Khorezm Province and in the Tashkent Province of Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan Koreans are mostly cotton planters. Politically the Central Asiatic Koreans are without influence, except for one Korean deputy in the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan.

land for settlement purposes as well as exemptions from taxes for a period of ten years. The new subjects of the Russian Empire proved to be an asset, both economically and culturally, in South-East Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan. After 1881, in the Semirechie district on the skirts of China, the Uigurs founded sixty settlements. Most of the settlements survived the revolution and Soviet statistics mention the existence of forty-five Uigur villages in the same area. They are forming a 'Uigur National District' which is part of the Alma Ata Province of Kazakhstan. The Uigurs also have over sixty National Collective Farms in Uzbekistan.

The total number of Uigurs in the Soviet Union, together with ethnical groups who are practically identical with them, can be placed with some certainty in the neighbourhood of 100,000. In regard to the Dungans, Soviet statistics mention a total figure of 14,600 for the whole Soviet Union, but that figure would seem to be an understatement. The Dungans have been allotted a special 'National District' in Kazakhstan and have fifteen National Collective Farms in Kirghizistan.⁵⁹

Considering their small numerical strength the two national minorities enjoy the use of a comparatively large number of cultural institutions. As many as five newspapers, two theatres (one each in Alma Ata and Andizhan) and two teachers' training colleges are at the disposal of the Uigurs, while the Dungans have two newspapers and a teachers' training college in addition to a Dungan department in the teachers' training college of Frunze. An Uigur-Dungan department has also been attached to the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan.

Such liberality by the Soviet authorities may be explained by the political-military role of considerable importance which, in addition to the economic and cultural one, the Uigurs and Dungans had all along been called to play. Having settled down in the Russo-Chinese frontier area the Uigurs and Dungans took upon themselves the tasks usually reserved for Russian and Ukrainian settlers. In the cultural and economic fields the Uigurs and Dungans exercised a stabilizing and beneficial influence on their nomad surroundings. In the domain of politics, thanks to their anti-Chinese outlook, they provided Russian frontier districts with a human wall as reliable as if composed of Russian colonists themselves.

From the point of view of Soviet diplomatic strategy the Uigurs, who are the largest people in multi-national Sinkiang, are by far the more important of the two. The 2,900,000 Uigurs of Sinkiang are, however, split up into a large number of communities so isolated from each other that it has been difficult to deal with them as a real national unit. Soviet nationalities policy, taking the Soviet Uigurs as a basis, may assist them to develop a clearer national consciousness.

During the decade of active Soviet interference (1933-43) in the

internal affairs of Sinkiang, certain progress was made in that direction mainly by means of forming national Uigur clubs, introducing Soviet textbooks in the new local schools and educating a certain number of young Sinkiang Uigurs in Tashkent and Alma Ata. The non-existence of an actual Uigur national movement in Sinkiang deprived Soviet policy of a reliable basis and made it depend almost exclusively on the assistance of the pro-Soviet Chinese governor – Shan Shi-tsai.

As in numerous other territories, so too in Sinkiang, Soviet anti-religious policy conflicted with Soviet policy on nationalities. The closing of mosques and the persecution of mullahs which was carried out during the period of the *de facto* Soviet protectorate antagonized the Sinkiang Moslems whose goodwill Russia might otherwise have won.⁶⁰

After the authority of the Chinese central Government had been re-established in the province in 1943–44, it was not the Uigur population but the 319,000 Kazakhs of Sinkiang who played the Russian game. In 1946, with the more or less open support of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs succeeded in obtaining a wide measure of local autonomy in three of the ten districts of Sinkiang, thus virtually dividing the province into two. Any further important Soviet action with the design of eliminating Chinese rule in Sinkiang altogether, would undoubtedly hinge on those ‘brothers’ of the peoples of the Soviet Union who inhabit the province; these include, in addition to the Uigurs and the Kazakhs, 65,000 Kirghiz, 9,000 Tadzhiks and 92,000 Dungsans. Since the establishment of Chinese communist rule in Sinkiang the Soviet cultural tutelage over that province has not come to an end but has become more effective. It is conducted more openly than ever before through a special Soviet cultural mission and through the Sinkiang branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. These two bodies have imported into Sinkiang large numbers of books, magazines and posters, particularly in the Uigur and Kazakh languages.

BALUCHIS

The existence of a few thousand Baluchis in Soviet Central Asia may be of some value from the point of view of Soviet policy towards Persia and Pakistan.

There are 200,000 Baluchis in Persian Baluchistan and 500,000 in the Indian province of the same name. However small the number of the Baluchis in the Soviet Union may be they represent an asset for Soviet policy in so far as they can be called upon to form part of a communist vanguard both in Persia and Pakistan if and when required. In Turkmenistan the Baluchis have nine National Village Soviets and twenty-three schools, where the Baluchi language is taught in the first

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'.

AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.⁶¹ Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools.

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works.

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem

Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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X

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AS A WORLD PROBLEM

An investigation of the Soviet record territory by territory and nationality by nationality does not bear out the claim of the Kremlin that the U.S.S.R. has solved the problem of nationalities. Soviet nationalities policy, instead of destroying Russian imperialism, has in reality tried to preserve and to consolidate it. This has led to a crisis in the relations between the central authorities of the Soviet Russian State and the dependent peoples fighting for national liberation. The Second World War laid bare the extent of the crisis in a number of areas (North Caucasus, Crimea, Ukraine, etc.). Since the war the Soviet régime has tried to solve it by tightening up security measures and by increasing the might of the centre at the expense of the non-Russian peoples.

The blame for the failures of Soviet nationalities policy cannot be put on the Soviet Government and the Communist Party alone. A number of factors obstruct a genuine solution of the problem on lines suggested in the Bolshevik programme. They have nothing to do with the shortcomings of the Soviet régime, but are inherent in conditions within the Russian Empire, independent of any political régime. These factors are:

1. The numerical disproportion between the Russian people and the non-Russians, particularly the non-Slavs of the Soviet Union, which naturally ensures Russian domination.
2. The geographical distribution of Russians and Ukrainians almost throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R.
3. The numerical weakness of many Soviet nationalities which prevents their independent cultural and political development.

Other more weighty reasons for the failure of Soviet nationalities policy are connected with the political philosophy and strategy of what is called 'Stalinism' with its totalitarian atmosphere of compulsion rendering impossible the cultural and political unfolding of all the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. From the point of view of the communist ideology itself the Soviet nationalities policy was a failure because it did not and could not succeed in establishing a federation of equals in the territory of the U.S.S.R., thus setting an example to the world. The Soviet nationalities policy did not fail in an absolute sense, however,

since it greatly increased the efficiency of the Russian 'melting-pot', under the neutral term of 'Union of Socialist Soviet Republics'.

The U.S.S.R. as a melting-pot of races is in many ways similar to that other big melting-pot, the United States of America. The melting-pot process, while disposing in the long run of the problems of nationalities in a given territory, provides no model for a global solution. Neither the American nor the Russian pattern can be schematically applied to Africa, Eastern Europe or South-East Asia.

There are, of course, notable differences between the American and Russian melting-pots. The Europeans who are being Americanized as citizens of the United States enter the melting-pot of their own free will; from the outset they want to become English-speaking Americans and they want their children to absorb English-American culture. The Soviet melting-pot is of a strongly compulsory character and produces some modified specimens of Russians linked together by the doctrine of Leninism-Stalinism. On the other hand, the colour problem which prevents the full integration of an American nation is absent in the Soviet Union. Because there are no Negroes in the territory of the U.S.S.R. it is impossible to assess with certainty whether colour prejudice is non-existent or whether it is non-existent in the higher sense of complete racial equality. It is a fair assumption, however, that were a large coloured population included in the framework of the Soviet Union it would not suffer from any special racial discrimination but only from the same repressive measures which the Soviet Government imposes on all peoples, their national cultures and traditions, within the boundaries of the Russian Empire. The Soviet Government would undoubtedly try to break the Negroes spiritually just as it has tried to break other nationalities and races. As long as the communist dictatorship lasts, racial equality in Russia will mean nothing but equality of subjection.

As far as absence of colour prejudice in Russia is a fact, it goes to the credit of the Russian people and not of the Soviet régime. The Russian attitude to racial problems is by no means unique but is characteristic of all peoples who, in the course of their history, have been exposed to a process of drastic racial intermixture. In view of this intermixture which educates towards racial tolerance and broadmindedness, the Russians, irrespective of the régime under which they live, would never insist on a policy of segregation, even to one slightly approaching that prevailing in the Southern States of the U.S.A., or in the Union of South Africa.

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

The value of Soviet nationalities policy for the outside world has been greatly reduced, not only by its failure at home, but also by its inability

to bring about a just solution of the national and minority problems of Eastern Europe. In its early years Soviet Russia had a blueprint for solving the Eastern European nationality problems: the programme adopted by the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International in 1924. This programme, if put into effect, might not have altered anything in the present communist totalitarian structure of Eastern Europe, but within the general framework of a communist order it might have brought about a more just solution than the Pax Sovietica which emerged from the Second World War. For instance, the programme of the Comintern provided for the independence of the Slovaks and for a special régime of autonomy for nationally mixed territories such as Transylvania. For Hungary, the Communist International had demanded a frontier revision by which Hungarian-speaking areas of Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia were to be added to the Hungarian State. When Russia had a chance to carry out the principles embodied in that programme she ignored them completely and worsened rather than improved the conditions created by the 'imperialist peace treaties' of 1919-20. In solving the nationality and minority problems of Eastern Europe, Russia was not concerned with the establishment of some sort of abstract 'proletarian' justice as was the Comintern in 1924, but only with her own national interests. Russia divided the peoples of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe into those which for the time being were able, in one way or another, to serve her imperialist aims, and those which were less useful. The former, in most but not all cases, Slav peoples, were privileged at the expense of the latter. Thus Russia favoured Czechs and Rumanians against Hungarians, backed Bulgarian claims against Greece and supported the most far-reaching Yugoslav ambitions against Italy and Austria.

Fundamentally these temporarily favoured nations were not much better off than those nations whose interests had been consciously ignored. Since all Moscow-sponsored settlements of minority and border problems were based on expediency and changing Soviet moods, not on firm principles, the favoured nations had always to fear that Russia might drop them at any time and reverse her attitude towards claims on a disputed territory.

Russia's primary concern was to increase her own national territory at the expense of her satellites and to push their western frontiers as far to the West as possible. As regards the internal frontiers between her satellites, Russia assumed an unimaginative attitude and left them practically untouched. The Soviet Government did not even see to it that there was real fair play towards the minorities within the satellite States. Of all the small Eastern European countries only one, Yugoslavia, with its home-grown communist régime, tried to solve the nationalities problem on the basis of federalist principles. The Slovaks, instead of inde-

pendence, did not even get a proper provincial government, but only a 'Board of Commissioners'. All other minorities of Eastern Europe had to content themselves with the creation of totalitarian communist organizations which pretended to defend their interests. These new organizations, such as the Democratic Federation of the South Slavs in Hungary, the Hungarian People's Union in Rumania, the Turkish People's Council Union in Bulgaria, etc., etc., were modelled on the pattern of similar totalitarian organizations which had existed in the Soviet Union, in the inter-war period, for small scattered minorities like Latvians, Assyrians and Gipsies. These Eastern European minority organizations are equally indistinguishable in character from the minority organizations which the Nazis built up from 1933 onwards for the German minorities in Eastern Europe. The members of these minority organizations have not the slightest influence on their policy, nor a say in the selection of the responsible officials, who are appointed by the central Government. No cultural or social activity outside the totalitarian bodies is possible; they hold a monopoly in the same way as does the Communist Party in relation to the people of the majority nationality. It is not even sufficient that the minority organizations are communist; they have to adhere to the officially approved communism of Moscow. The Tito-Cominform conflict showed that active persecution of national minorities in Eastern Europe is only suspended as long as complete ideological and political uniformity prevails. The slightest breach of discipline within the ranks of international communism results in a revival of nationalist antagonism and oppression of national minorities. Nothing is altered in the violent character of this oppression by the fact that it is nominally carried out for the sake of the purity of a political creed and not admittedly on behalf of a national ideology. The Tito-Cominform dispute led to purges of the associations of Slav minorities in both Hungary and Rumania, to the resumption of the Serbian-Bulgarian rivalries around Macedonia and to acute hostilities between Albanians and Yugoslavs.

The example of Eastern Europe is important because it indicates the kind of 'solution' which Russia may envisage for the many nationality problems in Asiatic countries which are either near her frontiers, like Persia, Afghanistan and Kashmir, or are the scene of particularly intense communist efforts, like Malaya or Burma. The peoples of these countries cannot expect from the Soviet Union any genuine consideration of their national claims. The Soviet Government and the international communist movement, for their own purposes, will encourage and exploit these claims only as long as they can be fitted into the general pattern of Soviet and communist policy.

Soviet diplomacy has given abundant evidence, particularly by its conduct in the United Nations organs, that it ignores principles, both those related to nationalities policy and all others, and that it is guided exclusively by opportunistic considerations. In the case of the Sudan, for instance, Russia supported Sudanese-Egyptian unity instead of Sudanese independence, as would have been in line with the basic principles to which Russia pays lip-service in her own territory.¹ In the case of Libya, Eritrea and Somalia, Russia, during a certain period, supported Italian overlordship, not because the Soviet experts considered this solution a just one and in agreement with the wishes of the local peoples, but because Italy is the weakest 'imperialist power'. In the case of Palestine Russia sided with the Jewish minority against the Arab majority, not out of sympathy with the aims of Zionism, but to embarrass 'imperialism'. In India, Russia's agents, the local communists, pursued a policy opposite to that adopted towards Palestine. So long as India was without independence they opposed Pakistan's urge towards nationhood because they feared that the emergence of a large Islamic State might harm the cause of an Indian communist revolution and the interests of Soviet Russia.²

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AND BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

In their tendency to over-simplify and to press all political facts into a narrow ideological pattern, the Russian communist leaders conceive all developments in colonial territories in terms only of class struggle or 'imperialist manœuvres'. This makes the undogmatic, empirical British colonial policy particularly incomprehensible to them. Soviet experts on nationalities problems are interested in British colonial policy, not in order to understand its functioning, but to engage in arbitrary, naïve comparisons between conditions in backward colonies of tropical Africa, for instance, and conditions in Central Asian and Transcaucasian lands famous for their ancient civilizations. Unscrupulous Soviet propagandists and their sympathizers in other countries compare the number of hospital beds in cities like Tashkent and Samarkand with the sanitary installations in the forest regions of the Gold Coast, and measure the standard of education in Baku with conditions in the interior of New Guinea.³

A comparison between British and Soviet colonial policy can be of considerable interest provided that it does not confine itself to statistics and points of detail, but is concerned with the basic methods applied in dealings with dependent peoples, in the British and Russian Empires. Such a comparison, made after the Second World War, is more favourable to Britain than it might have been in the thirties, owing to the transformation of the Empire in the post-war period and the greatly

accelerated tempo in the implementation of constitutional reforms. Even the boldest changes carried out in this new era of British colonial rule seem often to become outdated in a matter of months after their coming into force, not because of more far-reaching demands made by colonial peoples but as a result of the deliberate policy of the colonial Power to improve conditions in dependent territories.

1. **DEMOCRACY AND TOTALITARIANISM.** The first and basic difference between Soviet nationalities policy and British colonial policy springs from the difference between a totalitarian one-party State and a democratic régime. The British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. H. Poynton, described the British colonial system as a 'practical illustration of democracy under tuition'.⁴ The political system as established in the non-Russian Soviet Republics can be described as totalitarianism under tuition. In the British Colonial Empire to-day there is almost unlimited possibility for the development of national movements. The outlawing of a political movement may occur as the result of armed struggle or threat of armed struggle, but very rarely because of the nature of its cultural and political activities. In the Soviet Union the only opportunity for political expression by non-Russian peoples is offered by the All-Union Communist Party and the All-Union Communist Youth League, while all cultural activity has to be carried on through such totalitarian organizations as the 'Union of Soviet Writers'. Not even the foundation of an orthodox Communist Party, on a national basis, is possible as was shown by the ban on an attempted Moslem Communist Party in the early years of the Soviet régime.

2. **RIGIDITY AND ELASTICITY.** Apart from the great differences in the substance of the two policies there are also profound differences in the forms. The Russian system makes little allowance for the various stages in the development of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. All are pressed into the framework of four constitutional patterns: one of these four simply has to fit. The chief criterion for the selection of the constitutional pattern for a given nationality is not its political and cultural maturity but its numerical size and its geographical position. Peoples of such unequal developments as Armenians and Turkmenians, Estonians and Kirghiz, Volga Tartars and Yakuts, are put constitutionally on the same level. In practice, it is true, there are considerable differences, since the central authorities intervene more directly in the affairs of the less developed nationalities than in those of the more advanced.

The British system, 'with its haphazard complexity and lack of co-ordination on any structural basis' (Amery) does more justice to the great variety in the degree of development among peoples of such vast empires as the British or Russian. The wide range of British constitutional patterns includes at one end cases in which the nationality or group of nationalities is advanced enough to be given complete independence,

e.g. Burma or India, and at the other end such territories as Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, where the indigenous peoples have acquired no more than a token representation on the Legislative Council. Between these two extremes there is a wide range of intermediary stages. This system is so flexible that there are hardly two colonies in the British Empire with a fully identical administrative and constitutional set-up. It means little to say that a Dominion like Ceylon or a self-governing colony like Malta have incomparably greater political powers than any constituent republic of the Soviet Union. The so-called sovereign rights of the Soviet Republics lag far behind even those which the Queen and Legislative Council of Tonga, a British island Protectorate in the Pacific, are exercising. African chiefs, like the Emir of Kano, the Oni of Ife, or the Kabaka of Buganda, with their traditional African councils, are, in their spheres, less dependent on the British administration than the governments of the non-Russian Soviet Republics are on the Kremlin.

3. DISINTEGRATION AND FEDERALISM. The territories of the British Colonial Empire are either geographical entities like the British island-possession throughout the world, or were created as a result of British conquest, like Nigeria, the Gold Coast, British Honduras, etc., and have subsequently developed into economic and even political units. The national-territorial sub-divisions of the U.S.S.R. are in most cases of an artificial nature. Soviet nationalities policy has been dominated by the idea of creating a maximum number of small self-contained units regardless of economic, geographical and historical factors, and with the only purpose of giving formal satisfaction to a 'national autonomy' idea without granting real home rule. With two or three exceptions, the national-territorial units of the Soviet State were each formed for the benefit of one specific nationality. Although in practice most of these units are bi-national if not multi-national, Soviet nationalities policy always distinguishes between the nationality after which a given autonomous territory is named and the national minorities.

British colonial policy, on the other hand, opposes the idea of national isolation and tries to find a satisfactory federalist solution for the problem of 'plural' societies. British colonial policy, as it emerges from the Second World War, dislikes the idea of splitting up the plural societies by 'partition'. Britain accepted the partition of India only reluctantly and never accepted it in Palestine as long as that country was a British responsibility. British policy is to induce peoples to stay together within a given natural, historic or even geographic or only economic unit; to find a common political platform and to arrive at a common patriotic conception. This may often be difficult, sometimes even an illusion, but it is the only truly humanitarian approach to the problem, for it expresses belief in human progress, in sound reasoning,

and it presupposes the triumph of common sense over passion and fanaticism.

Soviet nationalities policy, if consistently applied to the British Empire, would mean the disintegration of most of the African colonies into a number of national republics and autonomous provinces. The Soviet 'solution' for Nigeria, for instance, would have consisted in creating national States for the Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo, Fulani, etc., and other states of a lower order for the smaller Nigerian nationalities. These 'States' would have no links with each other, but would be directly subordinate to a central imperial government. Every important step in the economic life of these 'national States' would be decided by this far-away central administration. This is exactly the pattern which Russia followed in Central Asia.

Britain went the opposite way. Instead of splitting up Nigeria, whose main peoples differ from each other as much as Germans, English, Russians and Turks, the British Government did its utmost to make it a united country. The 1946 Constitution created a Legislative Council with an African majority which, for the first time, legislated for the whole of Nigeria, whose population is far bigger than that of all five Central Asiatic Republics put together.

4. NATIONAL CUSTOMS: BRITISH RESPECT AND SOVIET INTERFERENCE. The Soviet Russian colonizer considers that he is entitled to abolish all institutions of a given nationality; to impose every possible reform if this is in line with the communist programme. Thus Russian Bolsheviks never hesitated to introduce the principles of class struggle into the most backward atmosphere. They discovered an equivalent to the Russian 'kulaks' everywhere, from the oasis of the Kara Kum desert in Turkmenistan to the Lapp settlements of the Arctic coast. The most violent measures of coercion against the guardians and symbols of primitive national traditions, the chiefs and tribal elders, were always justified in the eyes of Soviet colonizers.

The British colonial administrator, whether he be a conservative or a socialist, feels he has no right to interfere with the customs of the peoples under his administration beyond what is necessary to maintain order. British colonial policy does not attempt to sweep away tribal customs and institutions simply because they are 'reactionary'. Customs are not abolished unless they are of a criminal nature. The British idea is that backward peoples, as they grow into a higher degree of civilization, will themselves throw off the ballast of their more primitive past. Gradual transformation of the institution of Chiefs and Elders and its adaptation to modern conditions is the aim, not abolition.

It may be held against British colonial policy that it interferes too little, where Soviet nationalities policy interferes too much. This applies in particular to British Protectorates which enjoy full internal autonomy,

and which may engage in extreme forms of religious intolerance without the local British officials preventing them.

5. THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM. Both Soviet nationalities policy and British colonial policy aim at the creation of a lingua franca in their respective domains. The Soviet Government conducts cultural propaganda for the Russian language, particularly amongst the less developed nationalities, while the cultural efforts promoted in British territories lead almost automatically to a further extension of the influence of English.

However, there is a considerable difference. The English language is a genuinely international one and not the language of one country and one nation. The peoples in British colonies who acquire a knowledge of English have a key to European and not specifically English civilization. It does not necessarily follow that a people increases its political dependence on the British Empire simply because it adopts the English language as its principal cultural medium and link with the outside world. The Russian language, on the other hand, cannot claim to be international. Every cultural success it achieves among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union benefits, in the long run, only the Russians, and it increases the power of Russia as the only state where Russian is the language spoken. The Soviet Empire has always discouraged attempts to introduce an alternative lingua franca (Arabic, Azerbaidzhani Turkic, Chagatai) instead of Russian. The British authorities have not tried to place English in the same monopolistic position. Indeed, British colonial authorities have been instrumental in giving an honourable status to Hausa and to Swahili as inter-tribal languages, the first in Northern Nigeria, the second in East Africa.

Elementary education in both Empires is given in local languages. With regard to secondary education the British and Soviet educational policies adhere to different patterns. In view of the low degree of the development of the African languages secondary education is given in English in all schools of British Africa. English is the language of teaching even in schools run entirely or predominantly by Africans. In the Soviet Union many native schools switch over to teaching in Russian from the fifth form upwards and in many others from the eighth form. Thus in the Russian Soviet Federation forty-six languages are used in primary schools but only twenty-two languages in the last three forms of secondary schools (the so-called 'ten-year-schools').⁵

6. DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION. British and Soviet educational policies in the colonies differ not only in regard to the language question. The Soviet Government, with the help of a totalitarian state apparatus, has been able to make literacy much more general than British colonial administration could do with its much slower-working democratic mass-education projects. The Soviet Government has also given greater

impetus to university education in the colonies than the British. Four of the five Central Asian Republics have not only got universities but even 'Academies of Sciences'. In the U.S.S.R. the terms 'university' and 'academy' are used in a rather loose way. A Soviet 'university' may be what the British would call a 'University College' or even a 'College' (the Fourah Bay College in Freetown, for instance).

'Academies' and 'universities' in the non-Russian republics and particularly in the Asiatic republics of the Soviet Union are not supposed to serve the national interests of the peoples for whom they are allegedly founded. Unlike the University Colleges of Ibadan and Achimota which have only African students the universities of Stalinabad, Ashkhabad, Baku, Samarkand, Alma Ata and Tashkent are half European institutions. As to the so-called 'Academies of Sciences' they have two assignments. First, they are to help in the implementation of economic schemes which are carried out in the territory of a given Republic in the all-Union interest, and secondly they must watch over the ideological orthodoxy of the local intelligentsia, their writings on history, their poetry, music and theatrical art. The existence of the 'academies' makes it easy for the régime to put into effect new directives governing the intellectual and artistic life of a non-Russian nationality and to purge 'nationalist' artists, writers and historians. If 'academies' with similar functions existed in the British colonies the local intellectuals would rightly consider them as redoubtable imperialistic instruments directed towards spiritual oppression.

7. THE COLONIZATION PROBLEM. The most important common problem which both the Russian and the British Empires have to face is that of European colonization in non-European territories. Lenin explained imperialism as the 'export of capital'.⁶ Manpower investments, however, are a much safer basis for imperialist activities than capital investments. It has happened that colonists have been expelled from former colonial countries, but as a rule European manpower in the colonies is less endangered by political changes than European capital, mines and factories are. Russian imperial policy was almost everywhere built on the solid basis of colonization by Russian workers and peasants. Thus one essential basis of Russian imperialism remained untouched by the October Revolution.

The manpower export which is the rule as far as the Russian colonies are concerned is an exception in the British colonies. The territories which were originally colonized by the British, like the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are no longer part of the British Colonial Empire. No British mass colonization has ever been carried out in Burma, India, British West Africa and the West Indies. Something like a mass immigration of Europeans took place only in East Africa, in the two Rhodesias, in Kenya and Tanganyika. In these

territories the European colonization has created a worse problem than Russian colonization in Central Asia. This is due to the fact that the cultural, racial and economic cleavage between the indigenous population of East Africa and the European colonists is much greater than the cleavage between Russian and Ukrainian colonists, on the one hand, and the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Uigurs on the other.

8. 'KORENISATSIYA' AND AFRICANIZATION. Many things which are accomplished in the Soviet Union as part of a great revolutionary achievement and widely publicized inside the country and outside, are also done in the British Empire, but as part of the day's work and unnoticed. Thus the Soviet 'korenisatsiya' (the gradual replacement of Russian party and state officials in the national territories by 'natives') has an exact equivalent in the 'Africanization' gradually carried out in the African British colonies, also called 'Nigerianization' in Nigeria. 'Korenisatsiya' and Africanization do not mean quite the same thing. Soviet nationalities policy is satisfied if a 'native' can be appointed to a job with a high-sounding title, such as 'Chairman of the Council of Ministers', or 'Chairman of the Supreme Soviet' of this or that republic. It does not worry the Soviet leadership if the person in question is a mere figurehead surrounded and guided by Russians. The British, prefer to give an African the subordinate job of 'assistant' or 'deputy' so that he can acquire the necessary skill and knowledge for a higher job, pending further promotion. But once chosen for a top position he will be fully responsible for his office and not a puppet in the hands of English mentors.

Full Africanization will ultimately be possible at least in some African colonies, while the large number of Russian colonists in the Soviet dependent territories will prevent any genuine 'korenisatsiya' from being implemented.

9. STRATEGIC COLONIES. Some of the general rules guiding British colonial policy do not fully apply to what one may describe as 'strategic colonies'. One can hardly deny that British policy towards Cyprus, Gibraltar or Malta has been less liberal than the British attitude towards the West Indian or West African colonies. However much one may criticize Britain's handling of the Cyprus question, on the other hand, it is a fact that Britain has not prejudiced the future of that island by altering the composition of its population. This is precisely what the Soviet Union has done with its strategic colonies. It has deported the Japanese from Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; it has expelled all Germans from the Koenigsberg Province.

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The peaceful transformation of the British Colonial Empire, if carried on boldly and determinedly, will more and more become the democratic

Western alternative to Soviet nationalities policy. In re-shaping relations between the former master-race and former dependent peoples, British colonial policy is perhaps taking the longest way, but other nations have made similar efforts in the same direction. The French Colonial Empire has become the French Union. Although the French Union, compared with the British Empire, is a centralistic body, its principles are democratic. Tolerance and respect for human dignity are its basis and it represents a much higher form of political organization than the Soviet Empire. Nationalist organizations in the French Union have been subject to a number of vexations and in the case of Madagascar even to bloody suppression. Nevertheless, national liberation movements which would never be allowed in Soviet Russia, are now conducting a legal or at least semi-legal existence in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The United States have given a new deal to their dependent territories; independence to the Philippines, far-reaching autonomy to the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Hawaii Islands, while Alaska is heading for statehood. Denmark has shown for years a humanitarian non-imperialist attitude towards the people of its only remaining colony, Greenland. The Dutch had to liquidate their Empire under the pressure of events. Only the Belgians, Portuguese and Spaniards have refused to change the status of their colonial territories.

Whatever progress may have been made, the non-communist world is still very imperfect and a great deal of courage will be needed to correct mistakes and redress the wrongs of the past in the field of colonial policy. However, if the Western world lives up to its own ideals it can establish an order in Africa, in the West Indies and in South-East Asia, which not only will not be overwhelmed by communist Russian expansion and infiltration, but which will put to shame the Soviet nationalities policy. Of course, colonial reforms must primarily be concerned with the welfare of the colonial peoples, but they can simultaneously be part of a great plan to take the initiative of action and propaganda out of Russian hands. The Western nations can and must prevent Russia from posing as that force in the world whose task it is to solve the problems which the rest of mankind has left unsolved, including the nationalities problem and the problem of dependent peoples. Western justice in the field of colonial policy will ultimately acquire an explosive character in relation to those parts of the world suffering under political oppression and totalitarian rule. The conviction that Western civilization implies for everybody a greater degree of liberty than Soviet power and Bolshevism, will become general not only among the peoples outside the Russian grip but will spread to the nationalities within the Soviet sphere of influence and even within the Soviet Union itself.

The complete news blockade by which the Kremlin has surrounded

the peoples of Russia and the peoples living under indirect Soviet rule will not be sufficient, in the long run, to conceal the truth about what is good and progressive in the West and about such epoch-making changes as the granting of freedom to India. In the long run it will be impossible to hide from the peoples of Soviet Russia and her satellite countries, that 'something has changed' in the 'imperialist world'. The first doubts as to whether Bolshevism has discovered the universal medicine against the evils of our time and whether Russia holds a monopoly of progress, have already emerged among the satellites and have even crept into Russia itself.

To speak of changes for the better, outside the Soviet sphere of influence, is in itself a heresy for every Russian communist and few can be expected to admit their existence. The aged Hungarian-born Soviet economist, Professor E. S. Varga, is the only Soviet personality, so far, to come out with a timidly formulated statement challenging the official thesis that only communist countries are on the way to progress while the rest of the world is declining. He said: 'The fact that a process of political liberation is going on in the colonies, the fact that India has an ambassador in our country and we have one in India, is after all something new. One cannot simply say that this does not mean anything'.⁷ In making this statement, for which he incurred the displeasure of the Kremlin, Varga showed that the facts which are giving the lie to Soviet theory and propaganda are becoming so strong that even Soviet communists can no longer ignore them.

The Kremlin is haunted by the fear that the Lenin prophecy will come true, according to which Russia will cease to be the model and will again become the backward country.⁸ Russia is backward already in many ways – its lack of freedom is in itself extreme backwardness – but the backwardness is still hidden under the veneer of technical progress and propaganda slogans about the fraternity and equality of the peoples. It is up to the free nations to make the Russians more conscious of their backwardness by showing them through deeds that there are better, juster ways of solving many problems than those adopted in Soviet territories. The British Commonwealth, as the largest federal organization in the world, has a special mission in this respect; it can serve as a living example that Russia too can become a Commonwealth, that something like the 'United States of Russia' is not a Utopia but a practical, political possibility.

THE FUTURE OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA

To speak of such a possibility, however, means to envisage a change of régime in Russia. This change alone could guarantee to the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. something which one could rightly describe as a 'future'.

If the Soviet régime continues in its present form there is no future for the peoples of Russia in the sense of a genuine political and cultural development. The first thirty years of the Bolshevik régime have shown clearly what the nationalities of the Soviet Empire have to expect from its continued existence: in the economic field further industrialization and urbanization connected with Russification; in the political and cultural field complete elimination of any genuine national initiative of the peoples concerned, through the communist inquisition and continuous purges.

In discussing a non-Bolshevik future for Eurasia one can never divorce the problem of the non-Russian nationalities from that of the Russian people. The Russians, a people of 100,000,000, will always have an important part to play in the destinies of Europe and Asia. A politically balanced world order cannot refuse to allocate to them a place which corresponds to their numerical importance, their abilities, their cultural and economic efforts and the vastness of the space they occupy. To incite the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union against the Russian people and to aim at the disintegration of the Russian Empire would be a short-sighted policy. Disintegration propaganda addressed to the non-Russian nationalities is perhaps the easiest way to embarrass the Bolshevik régime, but it will never lead to its downfall for such propaganda would irritate the Great Russians and make them sceptical regarding the intentions of the Western world. If Bolshevism is to be overcome at its very birthplaces, Leningrad and Moscow, the Russian people must not be under the impression that they will have to pay for liberation from communism with the dismemberment of their State through the loss of all territories which at various times have been attracted by centrifugal forces. In other words, the Western nations should not become the splitters of Russia by attaching more importance to the local nationalities than to the Russian people. Those peoples of the U.S.S.R. who for geographical, historical, cultural and economic reasons will not fit into a new Russian Federal State will leave Russia anyway, in the process of tremendous political upheavals which are likely to accompany a change of régime. Responsibility for this action, however, should rest with these peoples alone. The Western nations should take no initiative in it and should not push the non-Russians towards political separation. This non-interference should not be dictated simply by opportunistic, tactical considerations. The emergence of a multitude of small national States in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in the territory of what to-day is the U.S.S.R. would increase the anarchy in the world and would not even benefit the nationalities concerned. The creation of small and medium-sized national States, encircling as it were the Great Russian people and cutting them off from the rest of the world would guarantee the interests

of the peoples of Russia as little as the collapse of Austria-Hungary safeguarded the interests of the peoples of the Danubian monarchy. What both the interests of the peoples of Russia and the maintenance of world peace really require is the transformation of the mock federation, which is the U.S.S.R., into a genuine federal union. This does not mean that a new Russia will necessarily remain in possession of all territories over which the Soviet Government to-day extends its domination, nor does it mean that the internal divisions of the U.S.S.R. into Republics and Autonomous Republics, etc., will remain as they are now. Numerous adjustments will undoubtedly be necessary. Thus there is no justification for the maintenance of such creations of Soviet propaganda as the Karelo-Finnish Republic, or the Moldavian Republic; nor would it be proper for a democratic Russian Federation to keep 'strategic colonies' like the Kurile Islands or the Petsamo region, the islands of the Gulf of Finland and other territories which the Soviet Government has wrested from the Finns.

It would be in Russia's own interest to give the members of the federation the maximum of freedom so as to increase the attraction of joining it. Such a genuine federation might comprise, as a minimum rather than as a maximum, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia and Georgia together with Russia proper including all nationalities living within the habitat of the Great Russian people. We have shown how Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians are intertwined with each other and no further lengthy explanation is, therefore, necessary here to prove that a federal union of the three Slav peoples is reasonable and feasible if there is full respect for each other's peculiarities. The inclusion of Armenians and Georgians in the federation could be warranted by the positive character, in the past, of relations between the two Christian Caucasian peoples and the Russians. Moreover, the fact that a large number of Armenians live intermingled with Russians in the Northern Caucasus region and elsewhere in the Russian Empire, would have to be considered in any future settlement, as well as the interdependence of Russian-Georgian economic relations.

The Baltic nations, on the other hand, cannot be expected to join a federal union with the Russians. A new democratic Russia will only gradually gain the confidence of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians and these three small peoples might prefer to enter a regional federation centred in the Baltic Sea.

The problem of Russia's Moslem border republics will be the most difficult to solve, but political reason demands that they should not be separated altogether from the Russian body. The case for the present Soviet Central Asia remaining within the framework of a Russian federation is at least as strong as the French case for the retention of Algeria within the French Union.

Any political planning dealing with the future of Russia's Moslem Republics must take into account the substantial changes brought about in these countries since the Russian conquest, both in the economic and ethnographic fields. The Russian mass colonization, in particular, is a factor which must be considered. Not one of the six Moslem Republics of the U.S.S.R. can really be regarded as a 'Moslem State' in the same sense as Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran. They are even far less Moslem in character than Morocco and Tunisia where European colonization has left a fairly strong imprint.

There is a tremendous scope for changes in the conditions of the Moslem and other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union without disintegrating the Russian Empire. The establishment of freedom of religion alone would have far-reaching consequences. It would not only bring about the freedom of religious cults, as such, but in the case of the Russian Moslems it would mean freedom to keep up contacts with the Moslems of the world. It would also imply freedom to publish books in Arabic and permission to teach and learn Arabic in government schools. Thus the Moslems in Russia, while citizens of a Russian federation, would have every possible chance to be simultaneously members of the great world community of Islam.

A future Russia would also have to accept the principle that whatever obligations a political and economic federation might impose on its members, every nationality must be the supreme master of its language and literature. All pressure from the central Government regarding the vocabulary and grammar of the local languages and the contents of their literature must obviously be discontinued if the peoples are to develop freely. If the local nationalities want to 'purify' their language from Russian expressions they have been forced to absorb in large numbers under the Soviet régime, they should likewise be free to do so. If two or more peoples belonging to the same language group should express the desire for a single literary language no obstacle should be put in their way to achieve this aim. The Turkic peoples of Russia, in particular, should be given the choice to decide whether they want to retain the languages created in the Bolshevik period or whether they want to pursue those tendencies towards linguistic and cultural unification which Bolshevism repressed. Any cultural unification would also have political consequences which would be reflected in the regional subdivisions of a future Russian federation. While the Soviet régime has tried to keep non-Russian peoples apart as much as possible, a new Russia would have to recognize all trends not only towards cultural but also towards political union, in so far as these union ideas are geographically and ethnically sound.

A democratic Russian federation will be able to establish a new relationship between Russians and non-Russians. Cultural contacts

between Russians and the peoples historically linked with them can have no real value so long as they result from political pressure and so long as admiration of Russian culture is officially demanded in the same way as admiration of Stalin.

Under the Bolshevik régime the Russian classics have been desecrated and reach the non-Russian peoples only as a by-product of the vast flood of Soviet propaganda literature. After the stamp of official Bolshevik approval has been removed the Russian classics will acquire again their educational and enlightening role among the non-Russian peoples. Pushkin will again be read as Pushkin, Tolstoy as Tolstoy and Belinsky's critical works will be studied because of their merits and not within the framework of a propaganda campaign against 'cosmopolitanism' or for the 'Greatness of the Motherland'.

Not only to the nationalities of Russia but to the whole world will the true face of Russian culture become visible again. Russian poets and writers will again be able to enrich literature, music and art to the benefit of all mankind, instead of being doomed to servile propaganda production. The Russian people, at present represented to the world by a thin strata of diplomats and bureaucrats, will become visible through the expression of their true political ideals, not those of world revolution and world communism which are advocated on this people's behalf. The people of Russia will resume contact with the outside world by making genuine contributions at international conferences into which Soviet representatives invariably carry an element of discord. The Russian Christians will enter into a relationship with other Churches of the world, not to serve Russian state interests, but to promote Christian co-operation on a world-wide scale. A Russian labour movement will emerge, no longer issuing orders to the 'workers of the world' but keen on a free exchange of views with organized labour in the advanced industrial countries. Thus in all fields the Russians would be equal partners instead of stubborn, suspicious opponents. Not to believe in such a future for the Russian people would mean not to believe in the future of human civilization, in its strength to survive and shake off totalitarianism.

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INDEX

- Abashidze, Grigol, 234-5
 Abazintsy, 196
 Abbas the Great, Shah, 212
 Abdul Hamid, Sultan, 215
 Abdurakhmanov, Yusup, 272
 Abkhazian A.S.S.R., 236-7
 Abkhazians, 236-7, 248
 Abo, Treaty of, 89
 Abramson, S., 274
 Academies of Sciences:
 All-Union, Institute of History, 92,
 200; Polar Commission, 57
 Armenia, 223
 Azerbaijdzhan, 244
 Functions, 312
 Kazakhstan, 297
 Kirghiz Branch, 274
 Tadzhikistan, 288
 Ukrainian, 129, 131, 143
 Adyge, 182, 195-6
 Adyge Autonomous Province, 195-6
 Adzhar A.S.S.R., 235
 Adzharians, 236
 Afghanistan:
 Herat, 281, 284
 Kabul, 284
 Kadaghan-Badakhshan Province, 284
 Maimana Province, 284
 Mazir i Sharif Province, 284
 Soviet policy, 258-9, 281-5, 292-3, 306
 Tadzhiks in, 259, 284
 Turkmenians in, 259, 284
 Uzbeks in, 259, 284
 Africa:
 British colonial policy compared with
 Soviet nationalities' policy, 309-14
 East, 312-13
 South - racial policy, 304
 Aibek, Tashmukhamedov, 260
 Aitakov, Nederby, 294
 Ak Mechet: see Kzyl Orda
 Akhay, Akhmet, 80
 Akhmed Khan, Emir of Afghanistan, 284
 Akhundov, Mirza Fathali, 34, 244-5
 Akhverdov, A., 245
 Aklavik, 64
 Aksakov, S. T., 5-6
 Akushinsky, Sheik Ali-Hadji, 198
 Aland archipelago, 89
 Alash Orda, 7, 263
 Albania, 306
 Albanians in Ukraine, 146-7
 Alexander I, Czar, 119, 224-5
 Alexander III, Czar, 105
 Alexander of Kakhetia, Prince, 224
 Alexander of Macedonia, 286
 Alexandrovsk, 94
 Alexey Mikhailovich, Czar, 213
 Alexeyev, Kuzma, 50
 Algeria, 314, 317
 Alikhanov, A. I., 222
 Alikhanyan, A. I., 222
 Alim Khan, Emir of Bokhara, 285
 Alksnis, Gen., 107
 Alma Ata (formerly Verny), 256, 263-4,
 267-8, 297-8, 312
 Alma Ata Province, 297
 Alphabet:
 All-Union Central Committee for the
 New, 35-6
 Arabic alphabets reformed, 36
 Assyrian, 249-50
 Azerbaijdzhani attitude, 242
 Chuvash, 48
 Georgian, 208
 Latinization, 33-7
 'Novgorodov Alphabet', 34
 Religious aspect of reforms, 34, 37
 Russian alphabet, 37-8
 Turkic Alphabet, All-Union Central
 Committee for the New, 35
 Turkological Congress in Baku, 35
 Altai region, 74
 Alter, Victor, 165
 Altynsarin, Ibrai, 270
 Amanullah, King of Afghanistan, 283
 America, United States of: see United
 States of America
 Amery, L. S., 308
 Amu Darya river, 284-5, 290-2
 Amur region, 22
 Anarchists, 164
 Anatolian Turks, 242-3, 248, 294
 Andizhan, 278, 297
 Angren, 278
 Arabic language - Daghestan, 201-2;
 Central Asia, 299
 Arabs in Central Asia, 298-9
 Arabic alphabet reformed: see Alphabet
 Aral, Lake, 255-6, 275
 Archangel, 93
 Arctic: see Far North
 Argentina, 218
 Armavir, 214, 249
 Armenia, 7, 128, 209, 211-23, 248, 251
 Armenian Church, 214, 219, 223
 Armenians, 37, 123, 208, 211-23, 227-8,
 239-41, 247-8, 251, 260, 291, 296, 308,
 317
 Ashkhabad, 299, 312
 Assyrians, 240, 248-50, 306
 Astrakhan, 82, 85, 240
 Ataturk, Kemal Pasha, 34, 216
 Attorney-General, All-Union, 20-1

- Australia, 1, 312
 Austria, 305
 Avars, 37, 202-3
 Avdal, Amin, 252
 Ayuka, Khan, 82
 Azadi, Davlet Mamed, 293
 Azerbaidzhan, Persian: see Persia;
 Azerbaidzhan
 Azerbaidzhan, Soviet, 7-8, 20, 128,
 200-1, 203, 209, 211, 216-7, 229,
 237-48, 251, 273
 Azerbaidzhani Turks, 8-9, 217, 227,
 239-42, 244-7
 Azizbekov, Meshadi-Bek, 239
- Bagirov, M. D., 11, 200-1, 242-3
 Bagramyan, Ivan Khristoforovich, 222
 Bagrationovsk (formerly Eulau), 119
 Bakhchisaray, 81
 Bakhmurov, P. M., 80
 Bakikhanov family, 245
 Baku, 200, 211, 226, 235-7, 244, 246-7,
 307, 312
 Balkars, 183, 185, 189, 193
 Balkh, 285
 Balkash, 267
 Balkash, Lake, 255-6
 Baltic Sea, 89-90, 104
 Baltic States, 104-21, 317
 Baltic-White Sea Canal (Stalin Canal),
 100-1
 Baltiisk (formerly Pillau), 119
 Baluchis, 296, 298-9
 Bandera, Stephen, 142
 Banderovtsy (Ukrainian Insurgent
 Army), 142-3
 Bashkiria, 32-3, 41-6, 265
 Bashkirs, 5-6, 32-3, 41-6, 81
 Basmachi movement, 274-5, 285
 Batu, Mekhmed Maksud, 279
 Batum, 235-6, 238
 Batyrov Sh. B., 295
 Batyrsha, Aliev, 42
 Bazhan, Mikola, 142, 246
 Belgian colonial policy, 314
 Belinsky, V. G., 319
 Berdzenishvili, N., 234
 Berg, L. S., 152
 Beriya, Laventry, 12, 231, 239, 243
 Berlin, Treaty of, 214
 Bernshtam, Prof. A., 274
 Bessarabia, 150-1, 214
 Bialystok, 159
 Biarmia, State of, 56
 Biriya, Muhammed, 247
 Birobidzhan City, 175, 177-8
 Birobidzhan Province, 173-9
 Birofeld, 175
 Bobruisk Province, 120
 Bogolyubov, Nikolay Semonovich, 273
- Bokhara, 257, 274, 278, 284-5, 288-9, 299
 Bulgarian Empire, 46-7
 Bolshevik Party: see Communist Party
 Bondarenko, I. P., 133-4
 Borislav, 137
 Borotbists, 130, 132-3
 Brazil, 218
 Brest Litovsk, 159
 Bryansk, 126
 Bryansk Province, 120
 Buddhists, 67-8, 81-6
 Budget, Soviet State, 23-5
 Buinaksk (formerly Temir-Khan-Shura),
 197-8, 200, 204
 Bukharin, Nikolay Ivanovich, 9-10, 18,
 277-8
 Bukovina, 139-40
 Bulashev, Z. G., 44
 Bulgaria, 218, 305-6
 Bulgarians, in Crimea, 77; in Ukraine,
 146-7
 'Bund' (General Jewish Labour League
 of Lithuania, Poland and Russia), 165
 Burma, 300, 306, 309, 312
 Burmistenko, M. A., 134
 Buryato-Mongolia, 22
 Byelomorsk, 100
 Byelorussia, 8-9, 21, 128, 145, 149,
 153-61
 Byelorussians, 123, 136, 153-61, 174, 292,
 317
- Canada, Soviet and Canadian Arctic
 towns compared, 64; Armenians in,
 218; British colonization, 312
 Cantemir, Dimiter, 152
 Capitals:
 Moscow, replaced by St. Petersburg
 (1703), 90; reinstated under Soviet
 régime, 91, 276
 Moving of, 23; Udmurtia, 54; Volga
 German Republic, 73; Kalmuckia,
 85; Lithuania, 117, 276; Ukraine,
 135, 276; Azerbaidzhan, 239; Kaz-
 akhstan, 263-4; Uzbekistan, 275-6
 Caspian Sea, 255, 290-1
 Catherine II, 2, 69, 76, 82, 92, 125, 140-1,
 224
 Caucasus, North, 8, 31, 182-205, 229, 317
 Census, (1926), 28, 53, 73, 99, 127, 147,
 154, 170-1, 203, 271; (1939), 14, 49,
 170-1, 185, 249, 268, 291
 Central Asia, Soviet, 8, 10-11, 14, 21,
 123, 171, 208, 255-300, 307, 316-7
 Central Asiatic Economic Council,
 liquidation, 260
 Central Resettlement Board, 14-15
 Ceylon, 212, 300, 309, 312
 Chagatai, 279
 Chainikov, K., 54

- Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., 67, 183, 185
 Chechens, 183, 185-9, 191, 193, 201
 Chelyabinsk, 46, 241
 Cheremiss: see Mari
 Cherkess (Circassian) Autonomous Province, 22, 195, 196
 Chernayev, Gen. M. G., 256
 Chernigov, 126
 Chernishevsky, N. G., 192
 Chernovitsy, 139
 Chernyakhovsk (formerly Insterburg), 45, 119
 Chernyakhovsky, Gen. Ivan, 119
 Chervyakov, Alexander Grigoryevich, 156
 Chiaturi manganese mines, 229, 231
 China:
 Armenians in, 212, 218
 Kazakhs in, 259, 298
 Kirghiz in, 259, 271
 Soviet policy, 258-9, 297-8
 Uigurs in, 297
 Chinese, 91, 174
 Chinese Turkestan, 81, 259
 Chirchik, 278
 Chkalov (formerly Orenburg), 74, 255, 263-4
 Chkalov, Valery, 255
 Chubar, Vlas Y., 134
 Chukchi, 59
 Chuvash, 37, 43, 46-8
 Chuvashia, 46-8
 Circassians, 182-3, 185, 195-6
 Civil War, 8, 31, 72, 107, 244, 256; Latvians' part in, 107; Volga Germans' part in, alleged, 72
 Coalmining:
 Donets, 41, 125
 Georgia, 231
 Kazakhstan, 263, 267
 Komi Republic, 57-8
 Kuznetsk Basin, 41
 Ukraine, 20, 41, 123, 125
 Uzbekistan, 278
 Coats of arms, Baltic States, 109;
 Byelorussia, 157; Armenia, 217
 Collectivization:
 Abkhazia, 237
 Estonia, 112
 Kazakhstan, 265-6
 Kirghizistan, 272
 Latvia, 115
 National Collective Farms, 22-6, 106, 296-7
 Resistance to, 17, 47, 55, 61, 132, 192, 272, 277-8
 Ukraine, 132
 Volga German Republic, 74
 Colonization, early Soviet policy, 3;
 change in policy from agricultural to industrial colonization, 13-14; direction to military vital areas, 15; Russians' domination, 16
 Azerbaijdzhan, 241
 British policy compared with Soviet policy, 312-3
 Catherine II, under, 69
 Czarist régime, under, 1-6
 Crimea, 77-8
 Forced labour, by, 57, 100-1
 Germans, by, 69-71
 Kaliningrad Province, 120
 Kalmucks, by, 81
 Karelia, 99-101
 Karelian Isthmus, 15, 102
 Kazakhstan, 263, 267-8
 Kirghizistan, 270-1
 Komi Republic, 57
 Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians, by, 105-6
 Murmansk Province, 15
 Orenburg, 256
 Ukraine, 125
 Colour problem, absence of, in Soviet Union, 304
 Cominform conflict with Yugoslavia, 306
 Comintern:
 Congress, First, 128; Fifth, 129, 305; Sixth, 116
 Eastern European minorities, policy on, 305
 Executive Committee, 132
 Lithuanian independence, defence of (1928), 116
 Nationalities policy, 129, 142
 Ukraine, Western, propaganda in, 136
 Communist Party, 7-12, 26, 308
 Central Asiatic Bureau, liquidation, 260
 Central Committee, 11-12, 26, 44, 47, 61, 109, 136, 156, 160, 189-90, 194-5, 288
 Chuvash membership, 47
 Congress, 12th, 10; 13th, 9; 15th, 9; 18th, 11-12
 Daghestani membership, 202-3
 Estonian membership, 107, 112
 Ethnical composition, 8-9, 12
 Jews' membership, 164-5
 Karakalpakia, 260
 Kazakhstan, 264-5
 Komi membership, 56
 Latvian membership, 107
 Lithuanian membership, 107
 Moldavian membership, 150-1
 Politbureau, 107, 144
 Russian element, 8-9
 Tadzhikistan, 260
 Tartar membership, 8-9

- Transcarpathian Ukraine membership, 139
 Turkmenistan, 260
 Ukraine, Western, 139
 Uzbekistan, 260
 Volga German membership, 72
 Communist Youth League:
 Assyrians, 249
 Congress, first post-war, 28
 Function, 308
 Ingush members, 188
 Ukraine, 135
 Constitution, (1923), 25, 128; (1936), 23
 128, 231, 294
 Cossacks, 4, 6, 124-5, 141-2, 237
 Cotton-growing, Azerbaidzhan, 243;
 Uzbekistan, 276-8, 282
 Crimea, 76-81
 Crimean Tartars, 67-8, 76-81
 Crimean War (1853-6), 77, 81, 244
 Culture, Soviet measures against
 national:
 Armenians, 222-3
 Assyrians, 249-50
 Azerbaidzhani, 243-6, 273
 Baltic peoples, 108-9, 113
 Bashkirs, 43-4
 Byelorussians, 155-8, 160-1
 Caucasus, Northern, 180-90
 Central Asia, 260-2
 Daghestani, 197-205
 Far North, 61-3
 Finns, 102-4
 Jews, 165-8
 Kabardinians, 194-5
 Kazakhs, 268-70
 Kirghiz, 272-4
 Kurds, 252
 Moldavians, 152
 Tadzhiks, 285-7
 Tartars, 38-40, 79-81
 Turkmenians, 293-5
 Ukrainians, 141-4
 Uzbeks, 279-82
 Cyprus, 218, 313
 Czechoslovakia, 129, 139, 305
 Czechs, 77, 146-7
 Daghestan A.S.S.R., 196-205
 Danilevsky, G. P., 70-1
 Daniyalov, A. D., 200-1
 Darghinians, 202-3
 Dashava, 137
 Dashkesan, 241
 Dashnaks, 7, 216
 Denikin, Gen., 187
 Denmark, colonial policy, 314
 Derbent, 197
 Derzhavin, Prof., N. S., 89
 Dimanshtein, Semyon M., 72, 258
 Dinmukhametov, Galey Afzaletdino-
 vich, 38-9
 Dniepropetrovsk, Latvians in, 106; Jews
 in, 171
 Dolgano-Nenets National Area, 60, 62
 Dolgany, 60
 Donets Basin, 14, 125, 127, 133, 135
 Dostojevsky, F. M., 270
 Dovbysh: see Marchlewsk
 Drogobych, 137
 Dudinka, 62
 Dungans, 296-8
 Dzaudzhikau, 183, 193, 214
 Dzerzhinsky, Feliks, 148, 157
 Dzerzhinsky National District, 157
 Dzhannashia, S. N., 234
 Dzhaparidze, Alyosha, 239
 Echmiadzin, 214
 Education:
 Arabs, 299
 Armenian schools, 241
 Assyrian schools, 249
 Baku schools, 241
 Baluchis, 298-9
 British colonial policy compared with
 Soviet policy, 311-12
 Central Asia, 261-2
 Far North, 62-3
 Georgia, 233
 German schools, 120
 Kalingrad Province, 120
 Karakalpasia, 261
 Kirghizistan, 261
 Polish schools, 100-11, 157
 Russian language, compulsory, 18
 Turkmenistan, 298-9
 Uigurs, 298
 Uzbekistan, 261
 Egypt, 218
 Eideman, Robert Petrovich, 107
 Eikhe, Robert Indrikovich, 107
 Elista: see Stepnoy
 Elphinston, Col. W. G., 251
 Emba, 267
 Engels (formerly Pokrovsk), 73
 Enskoye, 94
 Epics, national, Soviet interpretation of:
 see Literature: Epics
 Erenburg, Ilya, 179
 Erevan, 211, 214, 218, 220
 Eritrea, 307
 Erlich, Henryk, 165
 Estonia, 21, 104-13
 Estonians, 37, 49, 77, 104-13, 189, 308,
 317
 Ethiopia, 218
 Eulau: see Bagrationovsk
 Europe, Eastern, minorities: effect of
 Soviet policy, 304-6

INDEX

- Evenki, 60-3, 174
 Evenki, National Area of, 60, 63
 Executions: see Trials and purges
- Fadeyev, Alexander 28 286-7
 Far East, 13, 31, 126
 Far North, 22, 59-64, 91-6
 Farkhad Hydro-Electric Station, 281
 Farms, National Collective: see Collectivization: National Collective Farms
 Feffer, Itzik, 167
 Feodosia, 214
 Fergana, 289
 Fet, A. A., 55
 Finland:
 Arctic Highway, 95
 Communist exiles, Provisional Finnish Peoples' Government, 101
 Karelia, Western, 97-8
 Petsamo, inter-war development, 95
 St. Petersburg, effect of foundation of, 90
 Soviet policy:
 Karelian Isthmus, annexation of, 101-2
 Petsamo, annexation of, 94-5
 Viborg (Viipuri), annexation of, 101-2
 War, (1939), 101; (1941), 102; armistice (1944), 95
 Finnish peoples, 21, 37, 43, 48-58, 90-1, 93, 99, 102-3
 Finnmarken: see Norway: Finnmarken
 Fioletov, Ivan, 239
 Firdausi, 286
 Five-Year Plans, 14-16, 93-4, 236-7, 241, 267-8, 276-8
 Forced labour:
 Murmansk railway line, on, 91
 Komi Republic industrialization, 57
 Peter the Great, under, 90
 Stalin Canal, on, 100-1
 France, Armenians in, 218; colonial policy, 314, 317
 Francis Joseph Land, 64
 Fraydorf National District, 172
 Friedland: see Pravdinsk
 Frontiers, changes in national territories, 23, 47, 101, 183, 196, 257, 264; Norwegian-Soviet frontier established, 94
 Frumkin, A. N., 179
 Frunze, 271, 297
 Frunze, Mikhail Vasilyevich, 8, 271-2
 Fyodor, Czar, 224
- Gafurov, Bobozhdan G., 285-6
 Gagauz, 152
 Gagry, 237
 Galicia, Eastern, 137, 139-40
 Gammal Svensky, 110
- Gandzha: see Kirovabad
 Gasprinsky, Ismail Bey, 78
 Geller (Birobidzhan communist), 177
 Genocide: see Liquidation of nationalities and autonomous territories
 Georgia, 21-2, 74, 128, 190-1, 193, 209, 211, 223-37, 248
 Georgians, 37, 123, 190, 208-9, 211, 223-37, 247, 260, 317
 Germans, Azerbaidzhan, in, 248; Baku, in, 240; Baltic States, repatriation from, 110; Black Sea areas, in, 71, 75; Georgia, in, 74, 248; Kaliningrad Province, in, 120, 313; Ukraine, in, 146; Volga Germans: see Volga Germans
 Germany, anti-Soviet campaign, 74; recognition of Soviet claim to Baltic States, 110
 Gibraltar, 313
 Gikalo, N. F., 156
 Ginzburg, Baron, 175
 Gipsies, 175, 306
Glavsevmorput, 60, 64, 91
 Glazov, 54
 Gogol, N. V., 124, 134-5
 Gold Coast, 307, 309, 312
 Goloded, Nikolay Matveyich, 156
 Goloshchokin, Filip Isayevich, 265-6
 Golovanivsky, Savva, 168
 Gomel, 155
 Gomel Province, 120
 Gorky (formerly Nizhny Novgorod), 49
 Gorky, Maxim, 205
 Gorky Province, 14, 120
 Gorno-Badakshan, Autonomous Province of, 283, 290
 Gotsinky, Imam Nazhmuddin, 198
 'Great Kara Kum Canal project, 291
 Grechukha, M. S., 142
 Greece, 218, 305
 Greeks, Baku, in, 240; Georgia, in, 248; Ukraine, in, 146
 Grinberg, A. A., 179
 Grinko, Grigory Fyodorovich, 134
 Grodno, 159
 Grozny, 186, 188
 Gudauti, 237
 'Gummet', 239
 Guseinov, Geidar, 201
 Gylling, Dr., 100
- Hafiz, 286
 Heckert District, 74
 Herzen, A. A., 192
 Hitler, Adolf, 226
 Honduras, British, 309
 Hrubeshov, 142
 Hrushevsky, Prof. Mikhail, 129, 131, 143
 Hughes, John, 125

INDEX

- Hugo, Victor, 113
Hungaria, minorities' policy, 305-6
Hungarians, work on Murmansk railway, 91; in Transcarpathian Ukraine, 138
- Ibrahim Beg, 285, 289
Igarka, 63-4
Ignatov, I., 63
Ikramov, Akmal, 277-8
Ilminsky, N. N., 38
Ilovaisky, Dimitry Ivanovich, 89
Imber, Vera, 179
India and Pakistan, 212, 218, 259, 282, 287-8, 298, 300, 307, 309-10, 312, 315
 Armenians in, 212, 218
 Soviet policy, 259, 282, 287-8, 298, 307
 Tadzhiks in, 259
Indonesia, 1, 218
Industrialization of national territories, 13-17, 44-5, 57-8, 73, 231-3, 267-8, 278
 Bashkiria, 44-5
 Georgia, 231-3
 Komi Republic, 57-8
 Kazakhstan, 267-8
 Uzbekistan, 278
 Volga German Republic, 73
Ingush, 183, 185, 187-90
Interburg: See Chernyakhovsk
Inta, 58
'Intourist', 74
Irakli II, King, 224, 235
Iraq, Armenians in, 218; Assyrians in, 249-50; Kurds in, 250
Ishimbay, 45-6
Ismail Province, 137, 152
Israel, State of, 165, 178, 307
Italy, 305, 307
Ivan the Terrible, 2, 4, 39, 92, 104-5, 128, 194, 244, 274
Izhevsk, 54
- Jalil, Jasmeh, 252
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow, 167-8
Jewish Autonomous Republic, 173-9
Jews, 8-9, 78, 111, 127, 145-6, 149, 154-5, 159, 163-80, 203, 212, 240, 292
 Baku, in, 240
 Baltic States, extermination by Germans, 111
 Byelorussia, in, 154-5, 159, 166, 169-71, 175, 179
 Central Asiatic Republics, in, 171
 Communist Party membership, 8-9, 164-5
 Crimea, in, 78, 172, 175, 178
 Moldavia, in, 149, 152
 Moscow, in, 163, 165, 174
 'Mountain Jews', 203
- National Districts, 172
Stalinabad, in, 288
Ukraine, in, 145-6, 168-9, 178-9
- Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R., 183, 185
Kabardinian A.S.S.R., 185, 193-5
Kabardinians, 183, 191, 193-5
Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich, 8, 131, 167, 179, 265
Kakhetia, 224
Kalevala, Soviet interpretation of, 103
Kalevala District, 103
Kalevipoeg, Soviet interpretation of, 109
Kalinin (formerly Tver), 98
Kalinin, Mikhail:
 Birobidzhan, association with, 174-5, 177
 Caucasus, policy in, decree on Northern Caucasus (1936), 184; statement (1942), 184-5; intervention in Chechen banditry, 187
 Crimean Republic, decree establishing, 78
 Jewish question, interest in, 174-5, 177
 Proletariat leadership over peasantry, statement on, 7
Kalinin Province, 99
Kalinindorf National District, 172
Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg), 118-9
Kaliningrad Province, 119-20, 313
Kalmuckia, 67-8, 85-6
Kalmucks, 5, 67-8, 81-6
Kalyandar, Sadyk, 279
Kamenev, L. B., 165
Kandalaksha (formerly Kannanlahti), moved from Karelia to Murmansk Province, 101
Kannanlahti: see Kandalaksha
Kapiyev, Effendi, 205
Kara Kum desert, 290-1, 310
Karabakh Autonomous Province, 217
Karachay, 183, 185, 190
Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Province, 183
Karachay Autonomous Province, 185, 190-1
Karaganda, 267
Karelo-Finnish S.S. Republic, 21, 97, 102-4, 317
Karakalpakia, 260-1, 275
Karakalpaks, 275, 278
Karakhan, L. M., 231
Karakol: see Przhevalsk
Karelia, 92, 97, 99-103
Karelian Isthmus, 15, 101-2
Karelians, 21, 92, 97-9
Karelo-Finnish S.S. Republic, 21, 97, 102-4, 317

INDEX

- Karl Liebknecht District, 74
Karsakpay, 267
Kashka Darya Province, 299
Kashmir, 306
Kaspiskoye (formerly Lagan), 85-6
Katayama, Sen, 265
Katherinenstadt: see Marxstadt
Kattel, M. A., 177
Kaunas (Kovno), 117, 276
Kautsky, Karl, 226
Kazakhs, 8, 21, 257, 259-60, 261-71, 275, 278, 291, 296, 298, 313
Kazakhstan, 7, 20-1, 126, 257-8, 260, 262-70, 296-7
Kazan, 2, 255
Kazan Tartars: see Tartars
Kazem-bek, A., 245
Kenya, 312-3
Kerbabayev, Beruy, 294
Khakass Autonomous Province, 22
'Khanbudagovism', 243
Khandzta, 234
Khanti-Mansiinsk, 62
Khanty, 61
Khanty-Mansi, National Area of, 60, 63
Kharkov, 106, 129, 133, 135, 139, 241, 276
Kherson, 71, 125, 171
Khetagurov, Kosta, 192
Khibinogorsk (formerly Kirovsk), 93-4, 101
Khmelnitsky, Bogdan, 142
Khodzhayev, Faisulla, 277-8, 280
Khodzhibayev, Abdurakhim, 288-9
Kholm, 142
Khorezm (formerly Khiva), 257, 274
Khorezm Province, 296
Khvylovy, Mikola, 130-1
'Khvylovy-ism', 130, 144
Kiev, 126-7, 129, 133, 135, 139, 171, 213, 249, 276
 Armenians in, 213
 Assyrians in, 249
 Capital of Ukraine, 135, 276
 Ethnical composition, 127
 Jewish population, 171
Kiev, State of, 123
Kingisepp, Victor, 106
Kingisepp District, 106
Kirghiz, 8, 49, 189, 257, 259-60, 262, 271-4, 296, 298, 308, 313
Kirghizistan, 21, 209, 257-8, 260-1, 270-82, 296-7
Kirillov, I. K., 256
Kirov, Sergey Mironovich (Kostrikov), 8, 91, 242-3
Kirov Province, 120
Kirovabad (formerly Gandzha), 239, 241, 244-5
Kirovsk: see Khibinogorsk
Kishinev, 152
Kizlyar, 214
Klikhori, 190
Klaipeda (formerly Memel), 117-8
Klyuchevsky, Vasily Osipovich, 13
Koenigsberg: see Kaliningrad
Kokand, Autonomous government of, 274
Kokhtla-Järve, 111
Kola, 92, 94
Kola Peninsula, 92-3, 96-7
Kolarov, Vasil, 147
Kolarov District, 147
Kolarovka, 147
Kolas, Yakub, 157-8
Komi, 37, 48, 53, 55-8
Komi A.S.S.R., 55-8
Komi-Permyak National Area, 56
'Komzet' (Committee for the agricultural settlement of Jewish toilers), 171-2, 175-6
Kondopoga, 100
Koreans, in Birobidzhan, 174; in Central Asia, 296
Korneichuk, A. Y., 144
Koryaks, 59
Kosior, Stanislaw, 132-4
Kostomarov, Nikolay Ivanovich, 89
Kostroma Province, 120
Krasnodar, 249
Krasnovodsk, 291
Krasnoyarsk Territory, 22
Krumin, Y., 108
Krushchov, Nikita Sergeyevich, 134-5
Kruus, Hans, 113
Krylov, I. A., 270
Kuli-zade, Mamed, 245
Kulumbetov, U. D., 265
Kumyks, 37, 202-3
Kunanbayev, Abai, 270
Kunta, Hadji, 187
Kupala, Yanko, 157-8
Kupradze, V. D., 233
Kurbanov, 289
Kurganov, Grigory, 239
Kurdish Republic, 251-2
Kurds, 250-2
Kurile Islands, 15, 313, 317
Kursk, 126
Kursk Province, 120
Kutuzov, Field-Marshal Mikhail, 38
Kuusinen, Otto W., 101
Kuybishev, Valerian Vladimirovich, 8
Kuybishev Province, 120
Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbass), 41
Kzyl Orda (formerly Ak Mechet), 256, 263-4
Kzyl Orda Province, 296
Ladoga, Lake, 97-8, 100
Lagan: see Kaspiskoye

- Lakhuti, Abulkasim, 287
 Lakians, 202-3
 Lakoba, Nestor Apollonovich, 237
 Languages:
 Alphabetic Revolutions: see Alphabet
 Baltic States, Russian introduced, 109
 British policy compared with Soviet policy, 311
 Daghestan, 201-4
 Finnish in Karelia, 98-9
 Hebrew, ban on, 166
 Far North native languages, 63
 Northern Caucasus, decrees, 183
 Karelia, Soviet decree on equal rights for Karelian, Finnish and Russian; Finnish as official language, 98-9
 Political terminology, introduction of international terms, 18
 Russian language, imposition and obligatory teaching in schools, 18, 37; introduction into Baltic States, 109; domination in Daghestan, 203
 Turkmenistan, 294-5
 Lapps:
 Norway, in: see Norway: Lapps
 Russia, in: see Saami
 Soviet policy, 95-6
 Sweden, in: see Sweden: Lapps
 Larin, Yury, 175-6
 Larindorf National District, 172
 Latinization of Alphabet: see Alphabet
 Latvia, 21, 106-9, 111, 114-6
 Latvians, 8-9, 37, 104-11, 114-6, 306, 317
 Lazarev, I. L., 222
 Lazi, 235-6
 Lazistan, 236
 League of Militant Godless, 18, 166
 Lebanon, 218
 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov:
 Bashkirs' relations with Tartars, views on, 32
 Central Asia, policy towards, 258
 Central Asiatic State University, sanctioning of foundation of, 280
 Crimean Republic, decree establishing, 78
 Daghestani Moslem dignitaries, message of allegiance from, 198-9
 Georgia, policy on, 227
 Imperialism as 'export of capital', 312
 Kalmuck Autonomous Province, decree establishing, 85
 Kalmucks, proclamation to, 83, 86
 Karelian folklore, in, 103
 Letter to the Communists of Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan and the Mountain Republic, 10, 228, 230
 Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine, 10
 Stalin as expert on nationality problems, appreciation of, 211
 Tartars' relations with Bashkirs, views on, 32
 Turkistan, statement on, 258
 Ukrainian independence, attitude towards, 130
 Leninakan, 220
 Leningrad (formerly St. Petersburg), 14, 57-9, 62-3, 90-1, 93, 96, 102, 106, 114, 249
 Assyrians in, 249
 Latvians in, 106
 Migration to, 14
 Port, as, 114
 Leningrad Province, Karelian Isthmus incorporated, 102; Estonians and Latvians in, 106
 Leninsk, 278
 Lenkoran, 248
 Lermontov, M. Yu., 181, 209, 270
 Lezghians, 202-3, 240
 Liberberg (Birobidzhan communist), 177
 Libya, 307
 Liquidation of individuals: see Trials and purges
 Liquidation of nationalities and autonomous territories:
 Armenians in Turkey, 215
 Balkars, 185, 193-4
 Baltic minorities, 110-1
 Chechens, 189, 201
 Crimean A.S.S.R., 67-8, 76-81
 Crimean Tartars, 67-8, 76-81
 Greeks, 146
 Ingush, 185
 Jews, 146, 163
 Kalmuck A.S.S.R., 67-8, 81-6
 Karachay, 190
 Volga German A.S.S.R., 67-76
 'Lishentsy' (disfranchised persons), 170
 Literature:
 Azerbaidzhani, Soviet attitude, 273
 Bashkirs, counter-revolutionary organizations defeated, 43; plays criticized, 44
 Central Asia, 260-2
 Crimean Republic, Soviet policy, 79-80
 Daghestani, Soviet influence, 204-5
 Epics, national, Soviet interpretation of, Kalmuck *Dzhangar*, 85; Finnish *Kalevala*, 103; Estonian *Kalevipoeg*, 109; Kirghiz *Manas*, 272; Azerbaidzhani *Dede Korkud*, 273
 Georgia, 234-5
 Kabardinian, Soviet influence, 194
 Kirghiz, Soviet interpretation, 272-4
 Latinization of alphabet, effect of, 35

Literature: *continued*

- Persian, Soviet interpretation, 245-6, 286-7
- Tadzhikistan, 286-7
- Turkmenistan, Soviet interpretation, 293-5
- Ukraine, 124-5, 143-4
- Uzbeks, Soviet policy, 279
- Lithuania, 104-11, 116, 118-20, 149
- Lithuanians, 37, 104-11, 116, 118-9, 317
- Livonian War (1558-82), 104
- Loennrot, Elias, 103
- Luft (Volga German Premier), 74
- Luxemburg District, 74
- Lvov, 139, 141
- Lyubchenko, Panas Petrovich, 133
- Macedonia, 306
- Machine Tractor Stations, 24, 120, 291
- Madagascar, 314
- Madatov, Prince V. G., 222
- Maikop, 195
- Maikov, A. N., 270
- 'Main Turkmenian Canal', 291-2
- Makeyevka, 127
- Makhach Kala (formerly Petrovsk), 197, 203-4
- Makharadze, Philip, 228-30
- Makhtumkuli (Turkmenian poet), 293
- Maksum, Nasratullah, 288-9
- Malaya, 306
- Malta, 309, 313
- Malgobek, 193
- Manas*, Soviet interpretation of, 272-3
- Manchurian border regions, colonization, 15
- Mansi, 60-1, 63
- Manuilsky, Dimitry, 145
- Mar Shimun, 248-9
- Marchlewsk (formerly Dovbysh), 148
- Marchlewsky, Julian, 148
- Marchlewsky District, 148
- Mari, 37, 48, 51-3
- Mari A.S.S.R., 51-3
- Mariupol (Zhdanov), 125, 127, 146
- Marr, N. Y., 236
- Marshak, Samuel, 179
- Marxstadt (formerly Katherinenstadt), 72-3
- Matyushkin, Gen., 237
- Mazeppa, Hetman, 124, 153
- Mdivani, Budu, 228-30
- Medvezhegorsk, 100
- Mekhti, Gusein, 245
- Melitopol, 147
- Memel: see Klaipeda
- Mensheviks, 164-5, 226-7, 229
- Menshikov, Prince, 77
- Merv, 290
- Mgaloblishvili, G., 230
- Michael, Grand Duke, 221
- Middle East, Soviet policy, 196, 241, 250-1
- Migration (see also Colonization):
 - Abroad, ban on, 16
 - Asiatic territories, to, 13
 - Caucasian mountaineers' exodus, 182, 185
 - Crimean Tartars emigration to Turkey, 76-8
 - Finns from Karelian Isthmus, 102
 - German emigration, 74
 - Kalmuck emigration, 82
 - Kazakhs to Sinkiang, 268
 - Mass populations, transfers of, 67-8, 75-6
 - Military vital areas, to, 15
 - Resettlement organizations, 14-15, 99
 - Uzbeks, 279
- Mikhoels, Prof. Solomon, 167
- Mikoyan, Anastas, 8, 12
- Mikoyan Shakhhar: see Kikhori
- 'Milli Istiklal', 279
- Minchegaur, 241
- Minsk, 154, 156, 159
- Mirzoyan, C. I., 265
- Mitskevitch-Kansukas, V. S., 108
- Mogilev, 126
- Mogilev Province, 120
- Moldavia, Soviet, 21, 149-52, 317
- Molotov, V. M., as Prime Minister, 10; on incorporation of Western Byelorussia, 153
- Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 110, 149, 159, 166
- Monchegorsk, 93-4
- Mongolia, Outer, 31
- Mordvinian A.S.S.R., 48-50, 53
- Mordvinians, 37, 47-50, 296
- Morocco, 314, 318
- Mosashvili, Ilo, 235
- Moscow:
 - Assyrians in, 249
 - Capital as, replaced by St. Petersburg (1703), 90; reinstated under Soviet régime, 91, 276
 - Communist Party members, 12
 - Jews in, 163, 165, 174
 - Latvians in, 106
 - Mari belief *re* foundation, 52
 - Migration to, 13
 - Population, 12
- Moscow Province, Tartar workers, 41; Karelians in; population, 99
- Moslems, 42-3, 187-8, 197-8, 200, 202, 235-6, 243, 264, 275, 296-300, 317-8
- 'Mountain Jews': see Jews: 'Mountain Jews'
- Mountain Republic (Gorskaya), 183, 185
- Mozdok, 193, 214

INDEX

- M.T.S.: see Machine Tractor Stations
Murmansk, 31, 91-4, 96
Murmansk Province, 15, 93-4, 101
Murmansk Railway: see Railways: Kirov Railway
Mussavat Party, 7, 239-40
Nakhichevan, 214
Nakhichevan A.S.S.R., 217
Nalchik, 194-5
Namangan, 278
Nanai, 174
Nansen, Fritjof, 199-200
Narva, 112
'Narimanovism', 243
National Areas, 22-3, 25, 59-63
National Collective Farms: see Collectivization: National Collective Farms
National Districts, 22-3, 74, 96, 99, 146-8, 157, 172, 297
 Dungan, 297
 Bulgarian in Ukraine, 146-7
 German, 74
 Gipsy, planned, 172
 Greek, 146
 Jewish, 172
 Karelian in Kalinin Province, 99
 Polish, in Ukraine, 148; in Byelorussia, 157
 Saami, 96
 Ukraine, in, 146-8, 172
National Village Soviets, 22-3, 146, 298
 Albanian in Ukraine, 146
 Baluchis, 298
Navoi, Mir Alishir, 280-1
Nekrasov, N. A., 75
Nenets National Area, 59, 62
Nentsy, 59-63
Nestorian Church, 249
Netherlands, colonial policy, 314
New Guinea, 307
New Zealand, 1, 312
Nicholas I, Czar, 141
Nicholas II, Czar, 215
Nigeria, 309-13
Nikolay, Grand Duke, 248
Nikolayev, 125
Nikopol manganese mines, 231
Nizami, 244-6
Nizhny Novgorod: see Gorky
Njemen, 117
Nobel, Ludwig, 238, 240
Nobel, Robert, 238, 240
Nogai Tartars, 196, 203
Norilsk, 63-4
'Norman theory' of origin of first Russian State, 88-9
North, Institute of the Peoples of, 59, 62-3, 91, 96
Northern Pechora Railway Line: see Railways: Northern Pechora
Northern Sea Route, Chief Administration of: see *Glavsevmorput*
Noteborg, treaty of (1326), 92
Norway:
 Finnmarken, Soviet historian's denial of Norwegian rights to; early Russian settlements, 92
 Fishermen's settlements in Russia, 93
 Hammerfest, 94
 Lapps, Soviet policy, 96
 Arctic towns eclipsed by Soviet towns, 94
 Vadsoe, 92, 94
 Vardoe, 92, 94
Novaya Zemlya Island, 64
Novgorod, 98, 102
Novgorodov, N., 34
Novosibirsk, 106
Novozlatopol National District, 172
Nyasaland, 309
Nystad, treaty of (1721), 89
Ochemchiri, 237
Odessa, 125
Oil:
 Azerbaijan, 20, 238, 240-3
 Bashkiria, 45-6
 Chechenia, 188
 Georgia, 231
 Grozny oilfields, 188
 Komi Republic, 57
 Kazakhstan, 263, 267
 Ukraine, Western, 137
 Uzbekistan, 278
Oirots, 37
Oistrakh, D., 179
Oktyabrsk, 45-6
'Old Believers', 4
Old Bolsheviks, 164-5, 229
Olenogorskoye, 94
Onega, Lake, 100
Omsk, 255-6
Omsk Province, German collective farms, 76
Oranienbaum, 90
Orazov, Ak Murad, 293
Ordzhonikidze, 189
Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich (Sergo), 8, 90, 230-1
Orozaliev, K., 273-4
Orel Province, 120
Orenburg: see Chkalov
Orii, Israel, 213
Ormon Khan, 274
Orthodox Church, persecuted sects, 4; Soviet campaign against, 18, 52; Baltic States, 104; new Soviet approach, 167; Uniates forced to join, 140-1

INDEX

Ösel Island: see Saaremaa Island

Ossetin Autonomous Province,
Southern, 191

Ossetin A.S.S.R., Northern, 183, 191-3

Ossetins, 37, 183, 191-3, 236, 248

'Ozet' (Society for the agricultural settle-
ment of Jewish toilers), 171-2, 175

Pakistan: see India and Pakistan

Palestine, 165, 178, 196, 307, 309-10

Pamir, 255, 283-4

Pan-Iranianism, 244-5, 286, 290

Pan-Turkism, 78, 244, 294

Panch, P., 144

Pärnu, 112

Pasternak, Boris L., 179

Pechenga: see Petsamo

Pechora region, 57-8

Pecipus, Lake, 106, 109

Persia:

Armenians in, 212-3, 218-9

Asterabad Province, 292

Assyrians in, 250

Azerbaidzhan, 219, 246-7, 292

Baluchistan, 298

Karun river, 287

Khorazan Province, 292-3

Kurds in, 250-2

Literature, Soviet interpretation of,

245-6, 286-7

Soviet policy, 245-7, 250-2, 258-9, 282,

285-7, 292-3, 298, 306

Turkmenians in, 259

Pervomaisky, Leonid, 168

Peter the Great, 2, 4, 38, 44, 82, 89-90,

92-3, 102, 104-6, 128, 152, 186, 194,

213, 224, 237-8, 246

Peterhof, 90

Petrovsk: see Makhach Kala

Petrovsky, Grigory Ivanovich, 134

Petrozavodsk, 90, 99-100

Petsamo, 94-5, 317

Phillippines, 314

Pillau: see Baltiisk

Pilsudsky, Marshal, 116

Pioners (formerly Neukuhren), 120

Pogodin, Nikolay Petrovich, 89

Pokrovsk: see Engels

Poland:

Continental expansion in Middle

Ages, 2

Jews in, 163

Soviet policy, 104, 135-7

Vilna, claim to, 111

Poles, 8, 110-11, 146-9, 157, 159

Byelorussia, in, 147-9, 157, 159

Communist Party membership, 8

Lithuania, in, evacuation, 110; schools

and newspapers, 110-11

Schools, 110-11, 157

Ukraine, in, 146-9

Polesia, 159-60

Poltava, 126

Poltava Province, 126

Polyarnoye, 94

Portugal, colonial policy, 314

Postyshev, Pavel, 132-4

Potseluyevsky, Prof. A., 294-5

Poynton, A. H., 308

Pravda, 1942 article on Russians in the
army, 19; accusations against Tartar
ideology, 39; criticisms of Ukrainian
Communist Party, 144; action against
Byelorussian 'Stsepuro Affaire', 156;
Stalin's article on Daghestan (1920),
198

Pravdinsk (formerly Friedland), 119

Pripet Marshes, 159

Provinces Autonomous, 22-6

Prussia, East, 15, 118-20

Przhevalsk (formerly Karakol), 272

Przhevalsky, N. M., 272

Pugachov, Emelyan, 42, 50

Pulatova, Nure, 252

Purges: see Trials and purges

Pushkin, Alexander S., 90, 138, 181, 270,
319

Pushkino, 138

Quazi Mohammed (Kurdish leader),
251-2

Radek, Karl B., 165

Railways:

Kirov Railway Line (Murmansk Rail-
way), 91, 98-100

Komi Republic, 57-8

Mari sect opposition, 52

Murmansk Railway: see Kirov Rail-
way, above

Northern Pechora Railway Line, 57-8

Transcaucasian line from Baku to
Batumi, 238

Turksib, 265

Rakhimbayev, Abdullah, 289

Rakovsky, K. G., 128-9, 132

Razin, Stenka, 50, 237

Reindeer-breeding, collectivization in
Far North, 60-1

Religion:

Alphabetic reforms, aspect of, 34, 37
Anti-religious department of Society
for the Dissemination of Political
and Scientific Knowledge, 18

Baltic States, 104

Daghestani, 197-9

Ingush, 187-8

Karelians, 97-8

Jews, 165-7

League of Militant Godless, 18, 166

INDEX

Religion: *continued*

- Lithuanians, 104
- Local religions, Soviet campaign against, 17-18, 33, 37
- Mari national religion, 51-2
- Mordvinians' national religion revival attempt, 50
- Ukraine, Western, Soviet interference with Uniate Church, 141
- Resettlement organizations, 14-15, 99
- Rhodesia, Northern, 309, 312-3
- Rhodesia, Southern, 312-3
- Riga, 114
- Riga, Peace of, 153
- Rilsky, Maxim, 144
- Rizenkampff, Prof., 290
- Rogö Island (Pakrisaared), evacuation of Estonian Swedes, 110
- Roman Catholic Church, Lithuanians, 104; Western Byelorussians, 160; Western Ukraine, 140, 141
- Rostov, 146, 183, 249
- 'Rot Front' District, 74
- Rothschilds, 238, 240
- Rovno, 139
- Rudzutak, Yan Ernestovich, 107
- Rumania, 129, 137, 139, 150-1, 218, 305-6
- Runö Island (Ruhnu), evacuation of Estonian Swedes, 110
- Rykov, Alexey Ivanovich, 9-11, 18, 278
- Ryskulov, Taras Ryskulovich, 272
- Saadi (Persian poet), 286
- Saami (Lapps), 95-6
- Saami National District, 96
- Saaremaa Island, 89-90, 110, 112
- St. Petersburg: see Leningrad
- Sakhalin, 15, 313
- Salekhard, 62
- Samarkand, 256, 275-6, 280, 289, 299, 307, 312
- Samoyeds: see Nentsy
- Samursky, N., 199-200, 202, 204
- Saratov, 49, 74
- Scandinavia, history, 88-9; Soviet ideology; Czarist régime, under, 89-92; founding of St. Petersburg, 90-1; building of Murmansk Railway, 91-2; evolution of Murmansk Province, 93-5; Soviet policy towards Lapps, 95-6; significance of Karelia, 97-102; building of Stalin Canal, 100; annexation of Karelian Isthmus, 101-2
- Scandinavian origin of Russian State, 88-9
- Sciences, Academy of: see Academy of Sciences
- Scythians, 89
- Semper, Johannes, 113
- Semyonov-Tyanshanky, P. P., 270
- Senchenko, I., 144
- Serbs in Ukraine, 125
- Sevastopol sieges (1855 and 1942), 80-1
- Severnaya Zemlya, 64
- Shamil, Imam, 186, 197, 200-1
- Shen Shi-tsai, 298
- Shaskolsky, I. P., 92
- Shaumyan, Stepan, 239-40
- Shchusev, A. V., 152
- Shemakha, 244
- Shevchenko, Taras, 138
- Shikhlinsky, Gen. A. A., 245
- Shiraz, 286
- Shirokogorov, S. M., 61-2
- Shiroky (Moldavian Communist), 150
- Shirvani, Khagani, 244
- Shishkov, Vyacheslav, 118
- Shotemor (Tadzhik Communist), 289
- Shumsky, Oleksandr, 130, 131
- Shuro Islamiya movement, 7
- Siabandov, Samand Alievich, 252
- Siberia, colonization, 6, 13; lack of racial prejudice, 6
- Siberia, Central, 31
- Siberia, Eastern, 22, 31
- Siberia, Northern, National Areas, 59
- Siberia, Western, 106-7, 126, 255
- Estonian and Latvian immigration, 106
- Kuznetsk Basin: see Coalmining:
- Kuznetsk Basin
- Ukrainians in, 126
- Siberian Tartars, 6
- Simbirsk: see Ulyanovsk
- Sinkiang, 268, 297-8
- Skobelev, Gen., 192
- Skrypnik, Mikola, 128-9, 132-3
- Skvortsov, Nikolay, 11
- Slepoy, Metropolitan, 141
- Smolensk, 106
- Socialist-Revolutionaries, 164, 240
- Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, 18
- Sofronov, Anatoly, 284
- Solovyov, Sergey Mikhailovich, 89
- Somalia, 307
- Soronbayev (Kirghiz Communist), 273
- Sovietsk (formerly Tilsit), 119
- Spain, colonial policy, 314
- Spinoza, Baruch, 167
- Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich:
 - Abkhazian assassination plot, alleged, 237
 - Azerbaidzhan, views on, 242
 - Bashkir oil workers, letter to, 45
 - Central Asia, policy towards, 258
 - Daghestan policy, proclamation on autonomy (Nov. 1920), 197-8; article in *Pravda* (Oct. 1920), 198; message of allegiance from Moslem

- Stalin: *continued*
 dignatories (1923), 199
 Georgia, policy towards, 165, 225-31, 236-7
 Jews, policy towards, 165-6, 174, 179
 Kalmuck poem on 60th birthday, 83-5
 Karelian poem on, 103
 Mari letter, 52-3
 'Marxism and the National Question', 165
 Nationalities policy, early, 9-11, 32
 Nizami, views on, 246
 Ossetins, discussions with (1925), 191
 Persia, interest in, 246
 Russian people, toast to (24 May 1945), 19
 'Skrypnik affair', liquidation of, 132
 Tadzhikistan, policy towards, 283, 287
 Transcaucasia, policy in, 128-9, 211, 227-8, 231
 Turkestan, statement on (1923), 258
 Ukraine, policy in, 128-9, 134-5
 Stalin Canal: see Baltic-White Sea Canal
 Stalin Prizes, 201, 235, 288
 Stalinabad, 288-9, 312
 Stalindorf National District, 172
 Stalingrad, 74
 Stalino (formerly Yuzovka), 125, 127
 Stalino Province, 127
 Stalsky, Sulciman, 204-5
 Stavropol, 22, 190, 193, 214
 Stephen the Great, 152
 Stepanov (formerly Elista), 85-6
 Stolbovo, treaty of (1617), 97
 Sudan, 307
 'Sukhorukovism', 50
 Sukhum, 237
 Sultan-Galiyev, M., 33
 Sumgant, 241
 Surkhan-Darya Province, 289
 Suvorov, Gen., 38, 194
 Sverdlov, Ya. M., 165, 167
 Svetlogorsk (formerly Rauschen), 120
 Sweden:
 Karlia, Western, under, 97-8
 King Charles XII, 89, 124
 King Gustavus Adolphus II, 97-8
 Lapps, Soviet policy, 96
 Territories lost to Russia, 88-90
 Swedes in Estonia, evacuation of, 110
 Sydykov, Abdukerim, 272
 'Sydykovism', 272
 Syr Darya river, 256, 281
 Syria, Circassians in, 196; Armenians in, 218; Kurds in, 250
 Tabasarans, 203
 Tabriz, 247, 250, 287
 Tadzhikistan, 22, 257, 260, 282-90, 296
 Tadzhiks, 49, 189, 257, 259, 260, 278, 282-90, 298
 Tagirov, A. M., 44
 Taimyr National Area, 61
 Tallin, 112
 Talyshi, 248
 Tanganyika, 312-3
 Tannenberg, Battle of (1410), 109
 Tartar-Bashkir Republic, 32-3
 Tartar A.S.S.R., 32-40
 Tartars (Kazan or Volga), 5, 8, 32-43, 47, 91, 242, 308
 Crimean Tartars: see Crimean Tartars
 Nogai Tartars: see Nogai Tartars
 Siberian Tartars: see Siberian Tartars
 Tartu, 112
 Tashkent, 200, 261-2, 275-6, 279, 281, 290, 298-9, 307, 312
 Tashkent Province, 296
 Tatishchev, V. N., 256
 Taty, 203
 Tavrieli, T. M., 247
 Tbeti, 234
 Teheran, 247
 Temir-Khan-Shura: see Buinaksk
 Temir Tau, 267
 Temryuk Idarovich, 194
 Teptyars, 42
 Terijoki, 101
 Tevosyan, I. T., 12
 Thaelmann District, 74
 Tiflis, 211, 224-7, 229, 236-7
 Tigran the Great, 208
 Tikhonov, Nikolay, 281
 Tilsit: see Sovietsk
 Timoshenko, Marshal, 152
 Timur the Lame, 256
 Tiraspol, 150
 Tokombayev, Aaly, 273
 Tolstoy, Count Alexey, 125
 Tolstoy, Count Leon Nikolayevich, 181, 319
 Tonga, 309
 Topchibashev, Mirza Dzhafer, 245
 Toroshelidze, M., 230
 Towns, new: see Urbanization
 Trade Unions, 10th Congress (1949), 28
 Transcaucasia, 14, 31, 171, 208-52, 307
 Transjordan, 196
 Trebizond, 235
 Trials and purges:
 Abkhazia, 237
 'Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites', 11
 Azerbaijani, 243
 Bashkiria, 44
 Birobidzhan Province, 177
 Byelorussia, 156
 Crimea, 79
 Daghestan, 199

- Trials and purges: *continued*
 Georgia, 229–31
 Glavsevmorput, 64
 Jews, 165, 177
 Kazakhstan, 265
 Kirghizistan, 272–3
 Latvians, 107
 Tadzhikistan, 288–9
 Tartaria, 33
 Turkmenistan, 293–4
 Ukraine, 131, 133–4
 Uzbekistan, 278
 Volga German Republic, 74
 Trotsky, Leon, 33, 165
 Tsadasa, Gamzat, 204–5
 Tsarskoye, Selo, 90
 Tsitsianov, Prince Pavel Dimitrievich, 238
 Tukay, Gabdullah, 40
 Tukhachevsky, Marshal, 107
 Tumanyan, Ovanes, 212
 Tunisia, 314, 318
 Turkestan: see Central Asia
 Turkestan-Siberian Railway: see Railways: Turksib
 Turkey:
 Arabic script, abolition of, 34–5
 Armenian claims, 220–1
 Armenians in, 214–5, 217
 Circassians in, 196
 Communist Party, Crimean Tartar leadership, 78
 Crimean Republic as Soviet propaganda in, 78
 Crimean Tartars, immigration of, 76–8
 Georgian claims, 234–5
 Kars Province, 221
 Kurds in, 250, 252
 Soviet policy, 216–8, 220–1, 233–5
 Turkic Alphabet, All-Union Central Committee for the New, 35
 Turkic peoples, 28, 32–3, 42, 78, 217, 242, 247–8, 259, 275, 318
 Turkish Georgians: see Lazi
 Turkish language, demands for creation of, 78
 Turkmanchai, treaty of (1828), 214
 Turkmenians, 49, 91, 189, 257, 259–60, 275, 278, 284, 291–6, 308
 Turkmenistan, 290–6, 298, 310
 Turksib: see Railways: Turksib
 Tursun-zade, Mirzo, 286–8
 Tver: see Kalinin
 Tychina, Pavel, 144
 Tyutchev, F. I., 55


 Udmurt A.S.S.R., 53–5
 Udmurts, 37, 48, 53–5
 Ufa, 43, 45, 200
 Uganda, 309

 Ugro-Finnish peoples, 28, 43, 99
 Ugurs, 296–8, 313
 Ukhta-Pechora region, 57–58
 Ukraine, 11, 14, 20, 41, 123–49, 152–3, 231
 Ukrainian Insurgent Army: see Banderovtsy
 Ukrainians, 8–9, 78–9, 123, 137–8, 142, 149, 153, 174, 190, 196, 260, 264, 267–8, 271, 288, 291–2, 303, 313, 317
 Communist Party membership, 8–9
 Crimea, in, 78–9
 Polish areas, repatriation from, 142
 Ulyanov, I. N., 48
 Ulyanovsk, Chuvash claims, 47
 Umarov, Sultan, 261
 Uniata Church, history, 140; Soviet interference, 141
 United States of America, colonization by Europeans, 1; Jewish immigration, 163; Jews' contribution towards Autonomous Province of Birobidzhan, 175
 Armenians in, 218
 Alaska, 314
 Colonial policy, 314
 Hawaiian Islands, 314
 Puerto Rico, 314
 Racial policy, 304
 Virgin Islands, 314
 Universities:
 Alma Ata, 267, 312
 Ashkhabad, 312
 Baku, 312
 British and Soviet colonial universities compared, 312
 Central Asiatic State, 261, 279–80
 Samarkand, 312
 Stalinabad, 312
 Tashkent, 312
 Uzbek State, 280
 Urbanization:
 Arctic towns founded, 63–4
 Azerbaidzhan, 241
 Bashkiria, 45–6
 Foundation of new towns (1917–47), 14
 Karelia, 99–100
 Kazakhstan, 267
 Komi A.S.S.R., 58
 Mari A.S.S.R., 53
 Murmansk Province, 93–4
 Uzbekistan, 278
 Uruguay, 218
 Uzbekistan, 21–2, 209, 257, 260–1, 274–82, 296–7, 299
 Uzbeks, 8, 91, 257, 259–62, 274–82, 284, 291, 296
 Uzun, Hadji Sheikh, 187

INDEX

- Validov, Akhmed Zak-, 43
 'Validovism', 43
 Valikhanov, Chokhan, 270, 272
 Vandervelde, Emile, 226
 Vares, Johannes, 113
 Varga, Prof. E. S., 315
 Vasilkov (Ukrainian Communist), 136
 Veli-Ibragimov, 79
 'Veli-Ibragimovism', 79
 Vepsians in Karelia 99
 Verhaeren, Emile, 113
 Verny: see Alma Ata
 Viborg (Viipuri) 101-2
 Village Soviets: see National Village Soviets
 Vilna, 110-11, 116-7, 160, 222, 276
 Vinnitsa Province, 126
 Vipper, P. Y., 104
 Vitebsk, 106, 126, 155
 Vladikavkaz: see Dzauzhikau
 Voguls: see Mansi
 Volga German Republic, 67, 72-6
 Volga Germans, 69-75
 Volga Tartars: see Tartars
 Volynsky, Artem, 213
 Volobrinsky (Birobidzhan communist), 177
 Volzhsk, 53
 Vorkuta, 58
 'Vorkutugol' (coal trust), 57-8
 Vormsi Islands, 110, 112
 Voronezh, 126
 Voronezh Province, 120
 Vorontsov-Dashkov, Count, 215
 Voroshilovgrad Province, 127
 Votyaks: see Udmurts
 Voytinsky, Vladimir, 226
 Vurgun, Samed, 241-2
 Wachtang VI, King, 224
 Waldheim, 175
 Weitzmann, Chaim, 167
 Werfel, Franz, 220-1
 West Indies, 312-4
 Yakovlev, I. Y., 48
 Yakutia, 22
 Yakuts, 308
 Yamalo-Nenets National Area, 59-60, 63
 Yangi-Yul, 278
 Yanovsky, Y., 144
 Yaroslavl, 98
 Yaroslavl Province, 120
 Yekaterinoslov: see Dniepropetrovsk
 Yenukidze, Abel, 230-1
 Yermolov, Gen., 181, 185-6, 189, 225
 Yermolayev, Col., 290
 Youth League, Communist: see Communist Youth League
 Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Communists compared with 'Borotbists', 130; nationalities' policy, 305-6
 Yulayev, Salavat, 42
 Yusupov, Usman, 11, 282
 Yuzovka: see Stalino
 Zankisov, Maj.-Gen. K., 192
 Zeitun, 220-1
 Zelenogradsk (Cranz), 120
 Zelili (Turkmenian poet), 293
 Zelinsky, Prof. N. D., 152
 Zhdanov: see Mariupol
 Zhdanov, A. A., 91, 146
 Zinoviev, G. E., 165
 Zionism, Soviet policy, 165, 168, 307
 Zlatoust, 46
 Zola, Emile, 113
 Zyryans: see Komi

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